

Bhartrhari

Language, Thought and Reality



Edited by
Mithilesh Chaturvedi

Bhartṛhari:
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(Proceedings of the International Seminar
Delhi, December 12-14, 2003)

Edited by
MITHILESH CHATURVEDI

Foreword by
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Publisher's Note

The year 2003 A.D. marked a century of Indological publishing at Motilal Banarsidass. What had begun as a humble business enterprise in Lahore in the year 1903, has over the decades, blossomed into a House of international repute in the field of Indology. During these momentous years, we have undergone several vicissitudes and passed through many a testing time. Our commitment to the mission of Indology has, however, remained unshaken. If anything, it has only gathered strength and momentum.

The centenary year, celebrated at MLBD during 1903-04, was our humble tribute to the founding fathers of this House. Several programmes and functions were organised in different parts of the country. These programmes concluded with a three-day international seminar on **Bhartrhari: Language, Thought and Reality** at the India International Centre, New Delhi, on December 12-14, 2003, in which some of the most eminent scholars and specialists deliberated on the subject, taking into account, *inter alia*, the contemporary relevance of the rich legacy of this grammarian-philosopher.

As we sat to finalise the theme of the seminar, taking into account its propriety and relevance to the occasion, the question that exercised our minds was, "What does a publisher, in particular a publisher of Indological literature, do?" On this we debated through long hours extended over

several weeks. We consider it necessary to share, in brief, the process we underwent in taking the final decision.

The scholar, the specialist or the researcher delves deep into the universe of word and thought. He surveys the vast empire of the masters of the past, gleans the choicest pearls from its treasure-trove and, in the glow of his intellectual experience, weaves a garland of letters and words and, in the process, makes value additions of major significance, so that the connoisseurs of words, thought and meaning enjoy and enrich themselves. There, then, are the creative writers too who, with the warp and weft of words, weave the magic of emotions and thoughts to reach out to the generations, present and future, that stay under its spell. As years move on, scholars, specialists and experts of a different time delve into that creative universe of emotions and thoughts to experience the nature of reality as enshrined in their work.

And a publisher becomes the vehicle, the transport, the medium, on which this great empire of learning, wisdom and creativity rides to go across to the present and future generations of the learner, the wise, the creator and many a lay reader who simply seeks his delight in the realm of letters. Millennia of variegated Indian wisdom have inspired authors to increasingly enrich our inheritance and placed a pleasant responsibility on the Indological publisher to serve a spectrum of both writers and readers. In this sense, a publisher is the common link between the author and the scholar or the reader.

And for both, author and publisher, while exploration of the nature of Reality may be the *raison d'être* for this effort, it is the word that is their wherewithal in this pilgrimage. Hence, Bhartṛhari, with his grand preoccupation with the philosophy of grammar, semantics and thought, was identified as the theme of our seminar.

We are grateful to all the eminent experts and intellectuals of international eminence who participated in the seminar, at our invitation, and made valuable contribution to its proceedings.

It has taken us rather long to collect, collate, compile, edit and publish the entire material and, finally, bring it to our readers. The task was, in fact, complex and demanded perseverance and unrelenting hard work on the part of the editor who made large investment of his time and labour in order to make it possible for us to bring this volume out.

We hope this volume shall prove useful to all the serious students of the subject and motivate them to carry further the research in this sphere.

Foreword

G.C. PANDE

Motilal Banarsidass is a name to conjure with in the world of Indological publications. Their renown as publishers of original works in Sanskrit and Prakrit and standard research works in all the branches of Indological learning, hardly needs to be emphasized. Their centenary celebrations have been a unique event. One of the items in the celebrations was an International Seminar on Bhartṛhari. The Seminar was a resounding success. Scholars from different parts of the world attended it and contributed to the furtherance of research in the writings and doctrines of Bhartṛhari. Many have contributed to the study of doctrines and texts in Bhartṛhari using the standard methodology of classical philology and historical research. This methodology depending on text criticism, collation and documentation is now an accepted part of Indological research. Some papers however attempt studies from a philosophical or linguistic science point of view.

Earlier Bhartṛhari had been placed in the seventh century A.D. on the basis of some traditions related by I-tsing. Now relying on the evidence from Bhāva-viveka and Diṇnāga, Bhartṛhari is generally placed not later than the fifth century A.D. He revived the Mahābhāṣya tradition and propounded the celebrated doctrine of *śabda-brahma*. Bhartṛhari belonged to the grammatical tradition, which reflected one side of Vedic orthodoxy, but it tended to differ both from the Mīmāṃsā as well as from Vedānta. The common objective of the schools of Vedic philosophy was to search for

the original principle of creation. The Upaniṣads identified that principle with *sat*, being or sentience and called it Brahma. The diversity of the World is nothing but names and forms overlying non-dual being or sentience. The Mīmāṃsakas upheld the eternity of the Vedic Word as *varṇānupūrvī*. The grammatical tradition culminating in Bhartṛhari identifies the Brahma as *śabda* and the *śabda* as *sphoṭa*. The celebrated opening verse of the Vākyapadīya:

*anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yadakṣaram,
vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ.*

outlines the doctrine in a nutshell. Brahma is the original principle of the world. It is without beginning and end. It is essentially one and eternal but is capable of differentiation through its association with its powers. This process of appearing as different without losing its essential identity is termed *vivarta*.

Even till the age of Śaṅkara the word *vivarta* had virtually the same sense as *pariṇāma*. Pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta from Bādarāyaṇa onwards clipped upon the world as a heterogeneous 'transformation of Brahma. Brahma is one, eternal and sentient. The world is manifold, transient and insentient. And yet the world is the *pariṇāma* or *vivarta* of Brahma. This manifestly illogical doctrine leads Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara to argue that the world is an illusory appearance. The Sāṅkhya doctrine of *pariṇāma* kept sentience outside the process of temporal transformation. In Bhartṛhari however *vivarta* seems to be the same as a realistic *pariṇāma*. But there are many overtones of illusionism. Thus Brahma is differentiated by its *śaktis*, which include that of *avidyā*. Change and reality are appearances. Objects are meaning constructs comparable to dream phenomena etc.

Even though Bhartṛhari's *vivarta* is close to *pariṇāma*, in the sense that it is not an illusory transformation, nevertheless it is not real change either. The differentiation of forms or the process of activity in time is regarded by him as appearances only. These changing appearances serve empirical purposes. The inward nature of Brahma is hidden in consciousness. But it has the power of expressing itself as communication. This capacity of self-expression and communication gives it the character of word. The essence of the word also lies in expression and determination. Thus the non-dual and eternal reality of Brahma expresses itself in the diversity of the empirical world as the word and meaning. There is no doubt that creative power is definitely attributed to speech. This theory of *śabdādvaita* and also that of creation by word and thought can only be understood as self-expression. It would, thus, seem that Bhartṛhari is committed to a realistic theory of the world. However, if we reflect over the nature of the meanings intended by words or the objects projected by thought, it is difficult to see how these could be called real. The objects of

speech and thought can hardly be said to have any reality apart from their appearing to consciousness. The linguistic model of creation shows the purely phenomenal nature of the world far more clearly than the older Vedāntic analogy of the clay and the pots made out of it.

*ekameva yadāmnātām bhinnam śaktivyapāśrayāt,
apṛthakte 'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthktveneva vartate.*

In particular it is the power of time with its assumption of divisions and parts, which imposes the process of change in Brahma as the ground reality.

*adhyāhitakalām yasya kālāśaktim upāśritāḥ,
janmādayo vikārāḥ śaḍ bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ.*

As a result of differentiation the unity of Brahma appears to be split into the world of subject, objects and experiences.

*ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ceyam anekadhā,
bhokṛḥbhoktavyarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ.*

For Bhartṛhari the scope of perception and inference is limited to empirical objects. The knowledge of supra-sensuous reality can come only from the *āgama*. Even the intuitive knowledge of the seers depends on the *āgama*. The gateway to the understanding of the *āgama* is the science of grammar.

*prāptarūpavibhāgāyā yo vācaḥ paramo rasaḥ,
yat tat puṇyatamaṁ jyotiś tasya mārgo 'yamāñjasaḥ.*

Śabda as the matrix of the world is to be distinguished from speech and language as found in common experience. These belong to *dhvani* or sound and immanent regulatory order. One may say that just as the graphic form of the word stands for the phonetic form, the phonetic form stands for the ideal word as a significator, which is inseparable from thought.

vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdāḥ vikalpāḥ śabda-yonayaḥ.

Behind the spoken and conventional language there is a deeper language of thought. This in turn is the discursive form of intuitive understanding. Thus the word has three levels which may be called intuitive or *paśyantī*, mental psychological or *madhyamā* and phonetic or *vaikharī*. At the level of sound as *dhvani* language of speech becomes divided into numerous languages or speeches. Each language uses a different set of phonemes in a different order to signify the same or similar objects. But this dissimilarity of words and their constructions at the level of *dhvani* disappears largely at the psychological level so that different languages become translatable and their meanings intelligible even without their specific linguistic form. This suggests the notion of *sphoṭa* as an ideal word which has no necessary connections with the particular sounds and their order but which is revealed or manifested by those sound patterns. For the grammarians *pada-sphoṭa* was an abstraction from *vākya-sphoṭa*. Ideally there is one or comprehensive affirmation, an infinite judgment unified in a single self-expressive act of

the omniscient consciousness. This is *praṇava*, the matrix of the Veda from which begins the tradition of knowledge (*āgama*) increasingly diversified into the sciences.

Bharṭṛhari's ideas on language were found highly suggestive by Buddhist logicians who however used them for purposes of their own. For the Buddhist, the word is the inbuilt force of illusion in thought, not the revelation of reality. But they agreed that *śabda* and *vikalpa* are inseparable. *vikalpa* is not a pure signifier like some ideal word. It is a determination or differentiation, a marker in the stream of experience. Consequently meanings are not self-subsistent or independent objects. They are mental constructs. Some of these reflect innate tendencies of the mind, *anādivāsanā*. It deserves to be noted that these categories have been regarded as purely logical or transcendental in Western thought which abhors the psychologising tendency. In Bharṭṛhari however, what is revealed at the level of thought is not the original product of the psyche but a reflection with inevitable distortion of a metapsychic vision.

The Kashmir Śaivas accepted the doctrines of the multiple levels of language. Somānanda had been very critical of the doctrine of Bharṭṛhari, largely because he understood Bharṭṛhari's *śabda-brahma* as an insentient principle. This however is a misunderstanding. Later philosophers of the Pratyabhijñā school held a different view. Since *paśyantī* appears to refer to the knowledge of Sadāśiva, they posited a fourth state called *parā*. Śaṅkarācārya rejected the concept of *sphoṭa* altogether and placed *śabda* including the Vedas in the phenomenal world.

As the papers of the Seminar show, there has been considerable interest in the study of Bharṭṛhari as the philosopher of language. Some papers study specific doctrines and texts from Bharṭṛhari following, as mentioned earlier, the methods of classical philology or historical research. This methodology is well entrenched in Indological research. A few papers attempt the comparative evaluation of ideas such as *pratyavamarśa*, *dhvani* or *kāla*. Some point to the need for opening the doors of independent philosophical research or of approaching Bharṭṛhari from the insights of new direction in linguistic research. The Seminar succeeds in highlighting the importance of Bharṭṛhari as a philosopher of language as well as metaphysician and the immense areas of research which lie ahead. While there are several partial translations of *Vākyapadīya*, a complete, lucid modern translation of the *Vākyapadīya* itself remains an outstanding desideratum.

Motilal Banarsidass need to be thanked for the lead they have taken in opening up what may be called a whole new branch of research in philosophy and Indology.

Keynote Address

V.N. JHA

Respected Singhviji, Shrimati Kaplilaji, participant scholars, friends, ladies and gentlemen, let me first of all congratulate Mr. Narendra Prakash Jain and his entire family for their spectacular and dedicated service of one hundred years in the field of publication of books related with Sanskrit and Indian culture. There is every reason to be happy on this occasion and to arrange a befitting academic celebration by organizing this International Seminar on *Bhartṛhari: Language, Thought and Reality*. I thank Prakashji for associating me with this academic get-together. I welcome you all on behalf of the organisers and on my own behalf.

Friends, I am here to say a few words on the theme of the Seminar. In my understanding, right from the Ṛgvedic period I find that there are two major questions or enquiries in Indian culture: (1) How do human beings speak? and (2) How do human beings understand? I locate the answer to the first question in Ṛgveda (1.164.45):

चत्वारि वाक्परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिणः।
गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेङ्गयन्ति तुरीयं वाचो मनुष्याः वदन्ति॥

and the answer to the second question can be located in Ṛgveda (10.71.4) which runs as follows:

उत त्वः पश्यन् न ददर्श वाचं उत त्वः शृण्वन्न शृणोत्येनाम्।
उतो त्वस्मै तन्वं विसम्रे जायेव पत्य उशती मुवासाः॥

Although we find mention of only three terms *paśyanti*, *madhyamā* and *vaikhari* in the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, the Bhartṛhari tradition of *śabdādvaita* philosophy includes *parā* in the *śaivāgama* tradition of Kashmir. Ṛgveda (1.164.45) stands as the source of this philosophy of language where it is stated that there are four stages of *śabda* and there is a gradual manifestation of it, three parts of which are hidden or unmanifest and it is only the fourth stage which is manifest and which takes the form of human speech or utterance.

परा वाङ् मूलचक्रस्था पश्यन्ती नाभिसंस्थिता।
हृदिस्था मध्यमा ज्ञेया वैखरी कण्ठदेशगा॥

I consider this to be the result of the first enquiry "How do human beings speak?"

Similarly, Ṛgveda (10.71.4) is the result of the second enquiry namely, "how do human beings understand an utterance?" Unless the *vāgdevatā* voluntarily appears before a reader or a hearer, it is impossible to understand the sentence. Unless she unfolds herself, the process of understanding continues to be troublesome and tortuous. Thus, the tradition of *śābdabodhaprakriyā* has also to go back to the Ṛgvedic period, at least in the seed form.

The inquiry did not stop at these two aspects but was addressed to many other aspects of linguistic communication, namely: Who is the speaker? Who is the listener? What does the speaker talk about? How does he comprehend what he talks about? What is the medium of communication? What is the nature of language? What is the relationship between language and what language talks about? What is grammar? What role does it play in establishing the relationship between linguistic form and linguistic content? What is the minimum unit of linguistic communication? What is the status or ontology of sentence? How does it capture human thought? Is it a fact that a sentence presents a picture of reality? Or is it a fact that a sentence presents isolated elements of reality in a sequence, out of which a picture of reality is constructed?

The Indian tradition must have addressed these and many other questions for satisfactory answers. And at the top of it what could be the source of all these, i.e., language, thought and what language conveys, i.e., the whole universe? The Vākyapadīya, the text of Bhartṛhari, envisages all these questions and has tried to address them in a highly philosophical way, which has made it a unique text on Indian philosophy of language.

In Indian tradition one always adopts a holistic approach. All acts of normal human beings must have some purpose, because only abnormal human beings are observed acting without a purpose.

प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते।

Ślokavārtika of Kumārila

Thus, acts like employing inference to prove the existence of God as done by Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* or stating ground to establish existence of soul as distinct from body, mind and intellect as done by him in his *Ātmatattvaviveka* or Bauddhadhikkāra will be termed as purposeful acts and the acts like *kākadantaparīkṣā* or *jalatāḍana* are called purposeless acts. When asked, why Udayana should take so much trouble of establishing the existence of God, he says his act is not purposeless. He says the act of inferring God is the act of worshipping God.

न्यायचर्येयमीशस्य मननव्यपदेशभाक्।

उपासनैव क्रियते श्रवणानन्तरागता॥

Nyāyakusumāñjali, 1.3

That purpose should be a life-enriching purpose, the ultimate purpose of life. That is why, no purpose lower than the attainment of immortality, *mokṣa* or *apavarga* or *niḥśreyasa*, is worth the name, the ultimate purpose of life. This is the reason, Maitreyī had to ask Yājñavalkya: *yenāhaṁ nāmṛtā syāṁ kiṁ tenāhaṁ kuryām*. 'What am I to do with that which does not make me immortal'? This was not a question of Maitreyī alone, rather it is a question of all human beings, the Indian tradition believes.

Śaṅkarācārya in his *stotra* called *Parāpūjā* often ridicules the acts of worship such as going around the *vigraha* called *pradakṣiṇā* (e.g., when God is everywhere and no space is left without Him, how is it possible to do *pradakṣiṇā* around Him?). When the performer of an act is transformed to such a state wherein all his acts are considered to be the acts of worship of that Almighty, he is said to be liberated.

Why should only the acts performed in the temple be called worship of God? Let all our acts be considered as acts of worship of God! That makes life worth living:

यद्यत् कर्म करोमि तत्तदखिलं शम्भो तवाराधनम्।

Parāpūjā

Bhartṛhari, a devout believer and follower of such a Vedic tradition has to follow the received format of the traditional discourse in which one has to mention not only the purpose of an act, but also the ultimate purpose of that act in terms of enrichment of life, i.e., the ultimate purpose of life. If one looks at the subjects dealt with, in a broad way, in the *Vākyapadīya*,

one can observe that it is the philosophical purpose, namely, the *apavarga*, the *sāyujya* with Brahman, which has formed the binding purpose flowing throughout the three kāṇḍas, from the Brahmakāṇḍa to Padakāṇḍa.

तद् द्वारमपवर्गस्य वाङ्मलानां चिकित्सितम्।
पवित्रं सर्वविद्यानामधिविद्यं प्रकाशते॥

Vākyapadiya 1.14

It is perfectly in keeping with the Vedic perception of value of life, according to which any human act leads the performer of that act either to *svarga* (i.e., *abhyudaya*) or to *niḥśreyasa*. *abhyudaya* generates a feeling of achievement whereas *niḥśreyasa* generates a feeling of fulfillment.

It is in this context that we have to understand Bhartṛhari. It is this reason that Bhartṛhari interprets the words *puṣpita* and *phalita* of Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya in the sentence:

सोऽयमक्षरसमाम्नायो वाक्समाम्नायः पुष्पितः फलितः चन्द्रतारकवत् प्रतिमण्डितो वेदितव्यो ब्रह्मराशिः।
Mahābhāṣya I.36, 1.16

as *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa* in his Dīpikā. He says: *puṣpitaḥ phalitaś ca dṛṣṭādrṣṭābhyām abhyudaya-niḥśreyasābhyām*.

Dīpikā, p. 92, 1.14 (BORI edition)

Therefore, doing good grammar is considered to be royal road to *mokṣa*.

इयं सा मोक्षमाणानामजिह्वा राजपद्धतिः।

Vākyapadiya, 1.16

तद् व्याकरणमागम्य परं ब्रह्माधिगम्यते।

Vākyapadiya, 1.22

तस्माद्यः शब्दसंस्कारः सा सिद्धिः परमात्मनः।

तस्य प्रवृत्तितत्त्वज्ञः तद् ब्रह्मामृतश्नुते॥

Vākyapadiya, 1.132

Looked at from this angle, I understand why the first kāṇḍa of Vākyapadiya is called Brahmakāṇḍa. This kāṇḍa states the very purpose of doing grammar. Why should one study grammar? Patañjali answered:

महता देवेन नः साम्यं यथा स्यादिति अध्येयं व्याकरणम्।

Mahābhāṣya I, p. 3, 1.22

Bhartṛhari interpreted the word *sāmya* as *sāyujya*:

अपि प्रयोक्तुरात्मानं शब्दमन्तरवस्थितम्।

प्राहुर्महान्तमृषभं येन सायुज्यमिष्यते॥

Vākyapadiya 1.131

Thus, the ultimate aim of doing grammar, like doing anything else, should be the union with the Ultimate Reality, the Śābdatattva or

Śabdabrahman. It is this purpose (*prayojana*) that provides *ekavākyatā* to the entire text of Vākyapadīya (cf. *arthaikatvād ekam vākyam sākāṅkṣam ced vibhāge syāt* — Jaiminisūtra, 2.1.46)

Bhartr̥hari himself has given a broad list of contents of his Vākyapadīya (1.24-26). They are four pairs of issues:

1. Two types of *śabda* : (a) *anvākhyeya* and (b) *pratipādaka*;
2. Two types of *artha* : (a) *apoddhāra padārtha* and (b) *sthitlakṣaṇa*;
3. Two types of relation : (a) *kāryakāraṇabhāva* and (b) *yogyatā*;
4. Two types of purpose : (a) *dharma* and (b) *pratyaya*.

These eight terms conveying the subject matter of the Vākyapadīya need to be thoroughly analysed and discussed. Traditional understanding of these as given by the commentators are something like this:

1. *apoddhāra padārtha* : a meaning which is analytical or derived or obtained by analysis.
2. *sthitlakṣaṇa* : a meaning which is of a fixed nature or of fixed character.
3. *anvākhyeya* : a *śabda* which is to be described grammatically.
4. *pratipādaka* : a *śabda* which acts as a means to explain the *anvākhyeya*.
5. *kāryakāraṇabhāva* : the relation called cause-and-effect relationship.
6. *yogyabhāva* : a relation which is fit to express meaning.
7. *dharma* : extraordinary merit or spiritual merit.
8. *pratyaya* : understanding or knowledge of meaning.

No doubt, there is ample scope to offer better rendering of these terms. Although we do not find treatment of these topics mentioned here in a sequence, the commentators have tried to show how the actual topics discussed in the three kāṇḍas are within the scope of these eight broad topics or subject matter of the Vākyapadīya.

The eight broad topics too are required to be viewed from still higher objective of Bhartr̥hari to give the status of philosophy to the science of grammar. Take any *darśana-prasthāna* of the Vedic or the non-Vedic traditions, the prime function of each *prasthāna* has been to initiate a deep enquiry into the source of the plurality of our experience presented by *vaikharī*. What is the source of this world of plurality which is presented to us with a name (*nāman*) and a form (*rūpa*)? In other words, what is the source of the *bheda*, presented by *vaikharī* the language that we speak? Unless such a question is addressed, no framework of thought can be designated as philosophical framework.

When we look back at the Vedic tradition we find: Be it the Puruṣa-sūkta (10.90) or the Hiraṇyagarbha-sūkta (10.121) or the Nāsadiya-sūkta (10.129), of R̥gveda, all are the testimony of Indian enquiry into the source of this universe of our experience. Advancing this enquiry deeper and deeper through the Upaniṣadic period, Indian minds kept on theorising resulting into divergent philosophical frameworks. The quest remained one and the same but philosophical frameworks differed due to the divergence in philosophical presuppositions. Experience of plurality could never be denied, although explanations differed.

Broadly speaking the issue was whether we should accept 'One' as the starting point to explain the 'Many' or should we posit 'Many' to explain 'Many' of our experience. Given these presuppositions as 'One' and 'Many' there can be four possibilities.

(A) + One + Many which presupposes that at the beginning there was One Reality which itself assumed the form of 'Many'.

(B) – 'One' + 'Many' which presupposes that in the beginning there was not one Reality, but there were many Realities and the 'Many' of our experience has emerged from those 'Many' in the beginning.

(C) + 'One' – 'Many' which means the Reality is only One in the beginning, the 'Many' of our experience was mere 'appearance' and not 'real'.

(D) – 'One' – 'Many' which presupposes that both, the beginning 'One' and the 'Many' of our experience are appearances and hence not real.

B is the presupposition of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika school of thought which claims that there is plurality right from the beginning. Hence the entire world of plurality of our experience is real. **C** is the position of the idealists of the type of Advaita Vedānta where 'One' is postulated as the ultimately Real and 'Many' is treated as mere appearance and hence unreal. **D** is the position of the idealists of the type of the Mādhyamika or Śūnyavādins according to which every entity is devoid of its nature (*sarvaṃ svabhāvaśūnyam*). **A** seems to be the position of Vāllabha Vedānta according to which there is 'One' (Kṛṣṇa) and the 'Many', of our experience, i.e., the *samsāra* is manifestation of the same Kṛṣṇa and hence the world of plurality is as much real as Kṛṣṇa.

I think, Bhartṛhari's *śabdādvaita* philosophy should go with 'A' because here too the 'One' Śabdātattva or Śabdabrahman reveals Itself as 'Many' and hence the world of plurality is as much real as the Śabdabrahman.

Moreover, Bhartṛhari considers the world of plurality of our experience as both *vivarta* and *pariṇāma*.

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम्।

विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः॥ Vākyapadiya 1.1

शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयमित्याम्नायविदो विदुः।
छन्दोभ्य एव प्रथममेतद्विश्वं व्यवर्तते॥

Vākyapadīya 1.120

Now, unless we treat both the words *vivarta* and *pariṇāma* as synonyms, the apparent contradiction cannot be removed. Interestingly, Śāntarakṣita also paraphrases the verb *vivartate* of Vākyapadīya 1.1 as *pariṇāma* while elaborating the *śabdabrahmavāda* for refutation. He says:

नाशोत्पादासमालीढं ब्रह्म शब्दमयं परम्।
यत्तस्य परिणामोऽयं भावग्रामः प्रतीयते॥

Tattvasaṅgraha 128

Kamalaśīla too retains the same word *pariṇāma* in his commentary Pañjikā on the above. It runs as follows: पूर्वापरादिविभागरहितमनुत्पन्नमविनाशि यच्छब्दमयं ब्रह्म तस्यायं रूपादिर्भावग्रामः परिणाम इति प्रतीयते।

Thus, the phenomenal world is real, and not an appearance as the Advaitin's view will hold. But the same Śāntarakṣita presents Bhartṛhari in a way which is nearer the Advaitin's view. He says:

अथाविभागमेवेदं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं सदा स्थितम्।
अविद्योपप्लवाल्लोको विचित्रं त्वभिमन्यते॥

Tattvasaṅgraha 144

On this Kamalaśīla says: न च तस्य परमार्थेन परिणामः, किन्तु अविद्यातिमिरोपहतबुद्धिलोचना नीलादिभेदेन विचित्रमिव मन्यन्ते। This has created confusion among scholars. While Gaurinath Shastri and M. Biardeau take the position that the world of plurality is real, Subramania Iyer thinks that the difference is an appearance because of the acceptance of *avidyā* by Bhartṛhari.

But one would like to know the source of *avidyā* too. When the whole universe of plurality has emerged from the Śabdabrahman, *avidyā* too must come from the same source, which is only 'One and Real'. One may also remember that the undifferentiated indivisible whole reveals Itself in all forms of the phenomenal world through various *śaktis* like *kālaśakti*, *kriyāśakti*, *dikśakti* etc. which are also identical with the Śabdatattva as they emerge out of that Śabdabrahman.

Thus, it appears to be more convincing to treat the world of plurality to be as much real as the Śabdatattva. In any case, this is a very important issue and it needs to be settled, as there is controversy over it.

As the reality is indivisible, a sentence which is the minimum unit of communication and which presents an indivisible picture of reality is also indivisible. Any unit postulated below the unit of a sentence, like *pada* or *prātipadikas*, or *dhātu* or *pratyaya* or *varṇa* is without independent ontology

outside a sentence. There are two forms of śabda (1) the meaning-carrier or *vācaka* called *sphoṭa* and (2) the revealer śabda called *nāda* or *dhvani*. As *vācaka* is a *sphoṭa* the *vācya* or expressed meaning is also *sphoṭa* and hence the relation between the two is identity.

All this analysis presupposes the relationship between language and reality. If the function of language is to express reality, it is necessary that the reality becomes content of the thought of the speaker. The speaker acquires that thought or knowledge through various processes of internalizing the phenomenal world.

Bhartṛhari has declared that a thought or knowledge and its content are intermingled in such a way that it is difficult to separate one from the other.

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृतो।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते॥

Vākyapadiya, 1.123

Not only the thought and the world but even the agent and the process of internalisation are the manifestation of the same Śabdabrahman.

This is what I had in mind while suggesting the topic for this seminar. We should address our discussion to the following questions:

- (a) What is language according to Bhartṛhari?
- (b) What is thought according to him?
- (c) What is reality according to Vākyapadiya?
- (d) What is the relationship between Language and Reality?
- (e) What is the relationship between language and thought?
- (f) What is the relationship between thought and reality?
- (g) What is the nature of an agent or knower?
- (h) What is the relationship between knowledge and knowledge?

While addressing these questions one should rely more on Vedic tradition, because Bhartṛhari himself relies more on that tradition and on certain matters tradition is more reliable than logic (*tarka*) since logic has limitation in the sense that there is always a possibility of a better reason than the reason forwarded by someone.

Moreover, one should also withhold the temptation of deconstruction, taking out the text outside the context in which it came into being, lest we land into anarchy. Extension of ideas for application has always been encouraged in Indian intellectual traditions, but not at the cost of traditional interpretation. It is not the fact that there is no place for logic in a tradition. On the contrary, Bhartṛhari says, logic provides you the real eyes to see the

truth. But such a logic should not ridicule the universal values cherished and lived through ages:

वेदशास्त्राविरोधी च तर्कश्चक्षुरपश्यताम्।
रूपमात्राद्धि वाक्यार्थः केवलान्नावतिष्ठते॥

Vākyapadīya, 1.136

We should not forget that we are interpreting Bhartṛhari of seventh century A.D. and not our own text written today. Naturally, we enjoy restricted freedom. And restricted freedom alone can take us to *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa* both, Indian traditions believe.



Editor's Introduction

MITHILESH CHATURVEDI

This volume is an outcome of the international seminar on *Bhartrhari: Thought, Language and Reality* held in New Delhi on 12-14 December 2003 as part of the centenary celebrations of Motilal Banarsidass. In this seminar, scholars from all over the world presented their interpretations of Bhartrhari's philosophy, some in the light of the modern trends in philosophy and linguistics, others on the backdrop of Indian tradition. This volume contains almost all the papers presented at the seminar along with some other papers invited from scholars who could not participate in the seminar to make the volume comprehensive. The papers discuss the metaphysics of Bhartrhari and his ideas about questions concerning language and reality. Some of the papers compare Bhartrhari with Western philosophers and linguists like Wittgenstein, Grice, Searle, Humboldt, Chomsky and Goldberg, thus showing his relevance to problems in contemporary philosophy and linguistics. It is clear that after the initial efforts in the fourth to sixth decades of the twentieth century, Bhartrhari studies have now gained a significant momentum.

The keynote address delivered by V.N. JHA at the beginning of the seminar raises a number of questions about language which have drawn the attention of philosophers since the Rgvedic period. Some of them are: How do we speak? How does the listener understand an utterance? What is the nature of language? How does it capture human thought? Jha also

touches upon a number of other issues such as the purpose of grammar, the subject-matter of the Vākyapadiya and the philosophical presuppositions of Bhartṛhari. He also cautions against taking Bhartṛhari's text outside the context and losing track of the tradition in which Bhartṛhari's work came into being.

In his paper "Veda Revelation according to Bhartṛhari", ASHOK AKLUJKAR discusses the connotations of words like *sākṣātkṛta-dharman* and *pratyakṣadharman* used in Bhartṛhari's Vṛtti and earlier by Yāska and Patañjali. He interprets *dharma* as 'properties of things'. According to him, Bhartṛhari uses the word *veda* in more than one sense: Veda in a subtle form as appearing in the vision of seers comes before the sequential language form or the textual corpus that is later divided into four Vedas and different śākhās. Aklujkar equates Veda in pre-revelation stage with para-pāśyanti-rūpa or the language principle itself and the first revelation with pāśyanti, i.e., the active or the extrovert stage of it. He also thinks that Bhartṛhari's account of Veda revelation is not an expression of faith only but also has philosophical content and there is empiricist spirit in the account. He further draws the conclusion that although Bhartṛhari has genuine reverence for the Veda, he opts for theoretical fictions when necessary. Aklujkar has added four appendices, mainly discussing the relevant Vṛtti and Nirukta passages textually, to his paper.

JOHANNES BRONKHORST examines the question of Bhartṛhari's Vedic tradition. On the basis of an examination of Bhartṛhari's Vedic quotations and ritual details, Bronkhorst concludes in his earlier papers that Bhartṛhari belongs to the Mānava Maitrāyaṇīya school of Veda. In the present paper, he tries to explore the extent to which this school may have influenced Bhartṛhari's thought. He compares Bhartṛhari's ideas with those found in the available Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad and in Manusmṛti. His conclusion is that the original Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad might have influenced Bhartṛhari's thought. He also maintains that Bhartṛhari knew and probably used a Mānava Dharmaśāstra, which was a predecessor of the present Manusmṛti.

GEORGE CARDONA presents Bhartṛhari as a faithful follower of the tradition. In Cardona's opinion, although Bhartṛhari on many occasions innovates, he does not lose track of the tradition. Cardona discusses in detail Bhartṛhari's view regarding the sentence and sentence meaning as impartite wholes and shows that this thesis is not without traditional support. Bhartṛhari says that he bases his conclusions on linguistic behavior and may sometimes ignore ontological considerations (cf. *śabdapramāṇakā vāyam*). In this context, scholars have talked about his spirit of accommodation and his perspectivistic approach. Cardona discusses the background behind Patañjali's and Bhartṛhari's treatment of different semantic issues and the

reasons why they felt an obligation to include different views in their works. He shows that in spite of presenting several views, both Patañjali and Bhartṛhari have a distinct preference for a particular viewpoint. Wherever essential tenets of grammarians are concerned Bhartṛhari seriously defends his own position.

MADHAV M. DESHPANDE revisits the notion of śiṣṭa in Bhartṛhari, which he has discussed in some of his earlier publications. While the śiṣṭas of Patañjali are an idealized contemporary community, for Bhartṛhari śiṣṭa is both a ṛṣi and an ācārya. Pāṇini makes a distinction between ṛṣi and ācārya (grammatical authority and teacher) but Bhartṛhari calls grammarians like Pāṇini and Patañjali ṛṣis as well as śiṣṭas. He lays emphasis on āgama on which śiṣṭas also depend. This added emphasis on āgama suggests that Bhartṛhari is engaged in re-establishing the Vyākaraṇa tradition which according to his own description had become obsolete. He claims āgamic foundations for his grammatical tradition in order to distinguish it from non-Vedic traditions. In Deshpande's view, the ṛṣification of grammarian sages was only a small part of this project.

K.D. TRIPATHI looks at the Vākyapadiya as a work of vyākaraṇa-āgama and its first five verses as the core of that āgama. Tripathi discusses Bhartṛhari's idea of thought being impregnated by the word and states that it does not mean that Bhartṛhari admits savikalpaka cognition only. Tripathi views Bhartṛhari's notion of vivarta as fundamentally different from that of Śaṅkara. In Bhartṛhari's philosophy it is the free will of Brahman which is responsible for its appearing as experiencer, experienced and the experience itself. The notion of power as freedom is implicit in the Grammarian's doctrine while it is explicit in Kashmir Śaivism.

TANDRA PATNAIK discusses the relation between language and thought and tries to explore whether thought is independent of language or language-determined in Bhartṛhari's philosophy. She presents a study of Bhartṛhari's philosophy vis a vis the Western language philosophers. How does a listener understand a unitary meaning from a stretch of sounds? And how does language function in limitless ways? Patnaik feels that most Western philosophers have failed to pay attention to such problems because they take much for granted. Bhartṛhari's answer here would be that the power to use language in limitless ways is rooted in the linguistic competence (*śabdabhāvanā*) inherent in each human being. Sphoṭa is connected with this linguistic competence. Following B.K. Matilal, Patnaik understands Bhartṛhari's sphoṭa as language principle. She prefers to interpret sphoṭa and dhvani distinction in terms of the distinction between propositional content and the speech act.

MITHILESH CHATURVEDI in his paper discusses the relation between language and reality according to Bhartṛhari. To explain this relation, Bhartṛhari admits a two-fold existence in the field of linguistic usage: mukhyā sattā and bauddha- or upacāra-sattā. Our linguistic usage takes place on the basis of an existence created by mental constructs. The paper shows how, by admitting this two-fold existence, Bhartṛhari solves various problems concerning language such as the problem of negative statements and that of usage expressing absolutely unreal objects like hare's horn, barren woman's son, etc. This also explains the two way cause-effect relation between word and meaning and leads to the grammarian's thesis that word and meaning have a mental status.

PIERRE-SYLVAIN FILLIOZAT discusses the concept of time in Bhartṛhari's thought. According to Filliozat, Bhartṛhari conceives time as independence of the supreme principle and thus reconciles the unity of Brahman with the multiplicity of phenomena. Kālaśakti is the first power which holds its sway over other powers, and which is the main location of transformational process. Filliozat shows how Bhartṛhari's concept of time has considerably influenced Śaiva Siddhānta philosophy. He also points at the close resemblance between Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Maṭaṅgaparameśvarāgama.

HIDEYO OGAWA analyses Bhartṛhari's notion of 'power' (*śakti*) which plays a critical role not only from the point of view of his metaphysics but also from the point of view of his linguistic theory. Bhartṛhari's postulation of power enables him to defend his advaitic position. At the semantic level, a power is viewed as distinct from substance while at the metaphysical level it is non-distinct from its locus.

VLADIMIR P. IVANOV studies Bhartṛhari's advaita taking into consideration the concept of vidyā and avidyā. Although Bhartṛhari considers śāstra as belonging to the sphere of avidyā, he says that the vyākaraṇa-śāstra is a means to liberation. Ivanov solves this apparent contradiction by saying that progression from avidyā to vidyā is a natural process in Bhartṛhari's philosophy that presupposes the necessity of both. According to Ivanov, Bhartṛhari's position seems to be close not to Advaita Vedānta but to Kashmir Śaivism.

P.K. MUKHOPADHYAY feels that Bhartṛhari cannot be called a philosopher of language in the modern sense on the basis of his theories of śabdabrahma and sphoṭa. But, according to him, these theories are not integral to Bhartṛhari's thought. They are only incidental aspects of his grammar. There are other theses made by Bhartṛhari by virtue of which his philosophy can be classed with modern philosophy of language, viz., 1. Language and Reality are one; 2. Language and Thought are one; and

3. Sentence is the primary unit of language. Mukhopadhyay refers to modern philosophers' versions of these theses, which are not as radical as Bhartṛhari's and are easier to understand, as they do not mix up metaphysical doctrine with philosophy of language. Examining from a realist's position, Mukhopadhyay does not find arguments supporting these theses as sound and convincing. He raises some important questions and also reiterates some old criticism against Bhartṛhari, although the answers to some of his objections may be found in the present volume itself.

R.C. PRADHAN in his paper discusses Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language. Bhartṛhari's śabda stands for language in the universal sense which is eternal and timeless while speech or linguistic utterance is a descent from the ideal essence of language. It is the descent from the timeless to the temporal order. According to Pradhan, sphoṭa is the underlying reality of all languages and thus sphoṭa and śabda are identical. Pradhan also discusses Bhartṛhari's theory of meaning and his idealist position.

KARUNASINDHU DAS surveys a wide range of literature regarding different approaches to language and shows how Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya accommodates the linguistic traditions prevalent in its era and helps their further development in the days to follow. He discusses questions like the relation of dhvani to sphoṭa and that between word and meaning and śabda and apaśabda in different traditions and concludes that the Vākyapadīya is the source of all these traditions.

Bhartṛhari has exercised a sizable influence over the thought-structure of Kashmir Śaivism. Abhinavagupta, the great exponent of Kashmir Śaivism holds Bhartṛhari in high esteem. The next three papers throw light on Bhartṛhari's impact on Kashmir Śaiva tradition and how this tradition interprets Bhartṛhari. NAVAJIVAN RASTOGI looks at Bhartṛhari's philosophy from Abhinava's perspective. Abhinava adopts Bhartṛhari's terminology, reasoning and illustrations. Rastogi discusses in detail Bhartṛhari's statement that there is no cognition in which the word does not figure. He discusses Abhinava's interpretation of Bhartṛhari's thesis, elaborating in the process its treatment by the Buddhist and Nyāya logicians and the Śaiva Siddhāntin. He focusses on Bhartṛhari's use of the word *pratyavamarśa* which he tries to interpret with the help of Abhinava's works.

RAEFLLE TORELLA points out in his paper how the attitude of the Pratyabhijñā school towards Bhartṛhari has changed in the span of only one generation. While Somānanda severely criticizes Bhartṛhari, his direct disciple Utpaladeva intergrates Bhartṛhari's teaching into his own system. Torella explores the reasons behind this change of attitude. He argues that Utpala finds a main ally in Bhartṛhari and makes use of his doctrine of language-imbued nature of knowledge against the Buddhists, who were his 'most intimate enemies'.

Starting with a discussion on the notion of *dhvani* in Bhartṛhari's works – the *Vākyapadīya kārīkās* and the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* (=Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā) – ANNA RADICCHI studies the occurrences of this term in Abhinava's works. She takes into consideration Abhinava's use of the word *dhvani* in his philosophical works, as well as his musical theory and practice, and proposes that in Abhinavagupta, *dhvani* no longer means articulated sound but has a variety of meanings.

In his paper "Bhartṛhari and the Jainas," JAN E.M. HOUBEN shows that Bhartṛhari refers to the views of the Jainas along with those of the Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṅkhyas and Buddhists. He also points out that Bhartṛhari was familiar with the Jaina views on Prakrit and on how the word is articulated. Jaina authors like Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri also pay considerable attention to Bhartṛhari and a study of their works can be of help for a better understanding and appreciation of Bhartṛhari. Houben also shows that Bhartṛhari explicitly refers to the Jainas in the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* but the *Vṛtti* on the *Vākyapadīya* avoids such references, which "reinforces our impression that the *Vṛtti* is not by the same author."

TOSHIYA UNEBE studies *Vākyapadīya*, 2.119 in the light of criticisms by Kumārila, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Since the *Vṛtti* on this *kārīkā* is not available, the criticism is particularly helpful for a comprehensive understanding of the view expressed in this *kārīkā*.

Next, some of the papers study Bhartṛhari in the context of questions related to grammar, syntax and semantics. BRENDAN S. GILLON examines the structure and the placement of gerunds in a Sanskrit sentence. He analyzes the basic ideas with regard to constituency and word order in Classical Sanskrit prose and presents morpho-syntactic details to properly situate the problem about the use of the Noun Phrase to express the agent in a gerund phrase. Although the agent cannot stand on its own in a gerund phrase, its express use in the gerund phrase is not prohibited by the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. It is in this context that the author expounds 'Bhartṛhari's rule' and says that it is the 'Bhartṛhari's rule' that precludes the use of the subject in a gerund phrase since it can be construed as expressed on the basis of the agent of the verb of the principal clause. He also shows how some unacceptable sentences having a gerund which has an agent different from that of the verb phrase of the subordinating clause can be ruled out on the basis of Bhartṛhari's rule although there is nothing in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* to exclude such sentences. Conclusively, subscribing to the view of Desphande (1980), Gillon avers that Bhartṛhari's view of gerund is indeed the treatment originally found in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

ARINDAM CHAKRABARTI discusses the concept of 'object' as treated by Bhartṛhari who has discussed various uses of the accusative case in his *Vākyapadīya*. Chakrabarti starts with the question of free agency in the context of the definition of the agent in Pāṇini's grammar. The concept of the agent naturally implies the concept of the object and so Chakrabarti analyzes with the help of new examples different categories of object given by Bhartṛhari. He shows that Bhartṛhari's analysis of the object is relevant in the context of the problem of intentionality and in the context of contemporary concerns about moral and epistemological issues.

VINCENZO VERGIANI deals with Bhartṛhari's treatment of 'śeṣa relationships'. Sanskrit grammarians use the term *śeṣa* to refer to non-kāraka relations. Vergiani discusses different types of *śeṣa* relationships as discussed by Bhartṛhari and says that since kāraka is a general notion and every nominal word may be regarded as connected with action, *śeṣa* relationships may also be said to possess kārakatva in a general sense. However it is not kāraka in a formal way as the action involved is not in the foreground. Vergiani thinks that Bhartṛhari's notion of *sādhana* is broader than that of kāraka and embraces at least some *śeṣa* relationships.

YOSHIE KOBAYASHI shows in her paper how in Bhartṛhari's 'denotation theory' a thing can be spoken about only when it is connected with a delimiting factor different from it. Thus, according to Bhartṛhari, a universal should have a further universal to be denoted by a word, and the word expresses its own universal before it expresses the object-universal. In Bhartṛhari, the universals are nothing but mental representations having the property of consisting in a common characteristic.

What is the basis of masculine or feminine gender when it is applied to words that designate inanimate and asexual things? FERNANDO TOLA and CARMEN DRAGONETTI discuss Bhartṛhari's concept of *liṅga* (grammatical gender) on the background of this question. Bhartṛhari gives seven different definitions of *liṅga* in the 13th *samuddeśa* of the third *kāṇḍa*. The joint paper by Tola and Dragonetti discusses and examines these definitions. In the opinion of the authors, Bhartṛhari does not adhere exclusively to any one of these definitions or *vikalpas* and all of them are valid from a certain perspective.

NORIYUKI KUDO discusses the use of the term *vākyabheda* in Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*. While *yogavibhāga* or 'splitting of a rule' is a grammatical device among the Pāṇinīyas, *vākyabheda* or 'splitting of a sentence' is considered a fault in the *Mīmāṃsā* tradition. Kudo argues that in Bhartṛhari the term *vākyabheda* is sometimes equivalent to *yogavibhāga*, and at other times it means 'a separate rule' or is used in the sense of 'a rule having an

additional meaning'. Thus vākyabheda is a sort of interpretive method. Nevertheless it has a wider denotation than that of yogavibhāga.

While studying the Indian texts on philosophy and grammar, one is inevitably attracted to compare and contrast them with modern theoretical currents. JAN. E.M. HOUBEN in his second paper studies Bhartṛhari in the context of cognitive linguistics which is a recent development of theories that are in many respects opposite to those of Saussure and Chomsky. Houben feels that structural approaches to language formulated by Saussure and Chomsky which "implicitly or explicitly guide the students of Bhartṛhari are glaringly absent" in Bhartṛhari's approach to language and Pāṇini's grammar. On the other hand, most of the assumptions of cognitive linguistics accord remarkably well with the ideas of Bhartṛhari. Listing seven foundational assumptions of cognitive linguistics presented by A.E. Goldberg, Houben examines which of them are valid in the context of Bhartṛhari. Houben feels that further studies in this direction can be highly rewarding both for Bhartṛhari studies and cognitive linguistics.

ANA AGUD compares Bhartṛhari with Humboldt, the German scholar who, she says, was the first linguist in Europe to develop a true philosophy of language but has largely remained unknown. She points out some striking similarities between Humboldt and Bhartṛhari. For example, Humboldt talks about the spiritual force of Word which is rather unusual in European tradition. Humboldt tries to explain rationally the problem of unity and diversity which also occupies Bhartṛhari.

Towards the end of this volume, we have a fairly exhaustive Bibliography on Bhartṛhari compiled by YVES RAMSEIER, which is an updated version of his earlier bibliography published for the first time in Bhate and Bronkhorst 1993 (Indian edition 1994).

At the inaugural ceremony of the seminar, several speakers had expressed the hope that the seminar would make a significant contribution to the study of Bhartṛhari's thought. The quality of the papers and the variety of themes covered by them testifies that this hope has been fully realized.

The idea of holding this seminar germinated and took a shape in the minds of Mr. N.P. Jain, Prof. V.N. Jha and Dr. Kanshi Ram and was well executed by the team of Motilal Banarsidass with the able assistance of Dr. Rachana Sharma and Mr. A.P.N. Pankaj. We express our gratitude to them and all those who have worked to make the seminar and this volume a success. We are particularly grateful to Prof. G.C. Pande for contributing a very learned Foreword to this volume.

Veda Revelation according to Bharṭṛ-hari

ASHOK AKLUJKAR

In the present paper,* I approach Veda revelation principally as a phenomenon or experience, more for the logic of its assumption and conception than for the details of what it reveals. The paper thus supplements Aklujkar 1991a summarized in appendix 1 with some changes.

The main questions I ask of myself are: What could be the nature of the revelation process to which Bharṭṛ-hari gives expression? What world

*A very short version of this paper was presented on 30 March 1992 at the 202nd meeting of the American Oriental Society held at Cambridge, Massachusetts. It discussed only the TKV passages 1 and 2 specified below in their philological relationship with Nirukta 1.20. It was given the present extended form over the intervening years. My extraordinarily learned friend Professor Albrecht Wezler kindly referred to one such extended form in an article of his published in 2001. That form has undergone many changes in the present version. If any incongruence is noticed between the present version and what Wezler attributes to me in his 2001 article, the attribution in Wezler's article should be set aside, without any implication of error on his part; my view should be thought of as changed.

In my statements as well as the statements I cite, I italicize only those non-English words which are mentioned (as distinct from used). The titles of book length texts/works, volumes, journals, etc. are italicized only in the bibliography at the end.

The abbreviations I have employed are easy to figure out in the context of their occurrence. Yet, in order to leave no doubt, I have explained them in the bibliography.

I assume that the author of both the *kārikās* and *Vṛtti* of the *Trikāṇḍī* or *Vākyapadiya* is BH. Even if the *Vṛtti* author were to be thought of as a different person, he would be a student of BH, not far removed in time and not expressing any significantly different views.

view does he presuppose as providing the logical basis for the assertion that Veda revelation takes place? Where does the phenomenon fit, if it does, in his philosophy as a whole? Does it agree with the dharmābhivṛtya view which he presupposes? What do we learn from the exercise as to the role played by the Veda in the thinking of those who shaped India's intellectual history?

It is necessary to ask these questions not only to gain as complete an understanding of BH's philosophy as possible, but also because even a preliminary attempt made to answer the questions will help in making sense of an important but little understood part of India's history.

BH's Veda revelation view is principally expressed in two passages that have been interpreted differently (appendix 2). One of them contains a quotation from Yāska's Nirukta and shares several of its key terms with the quotation. As a consequence, our exploration requires a study of what is quoted from the Nirukta, how the traditional commentators of the Nirukta, Durga and Skanda-Maheśvara, understand the quoted part (appendix 3) and how the Nirukta tradition is related to the Trikāṇḍī (or Vākyapadīya) tradition as far as the quoted part is concerned (appendix 4).

Finally, the issues addressed at various points in the essay make it necessary that I should take into account the views expressed by modern scholars such as Halbfass, Wezler, Falk and Carpenter and by the translators of the Nirukta and the Trikāṇḍī.

The issue to which the issues to discuss lead

§1.1 In recent Indological literature, reference has been made to the astute observation by the late French Indologist, Professor Louis Renou that the traditional Indian recognition of the Veda amounts to tipping one's hat, the action one engages in when one passes someone respectable or when one sees someone respectable pass by. The suggestion is that the appeal made to the Veda as authority or as the ultimate source of all knowledge frequently amounts to nothing more than a traditional etiquette. Often, the persons making such an appeal or bestowing praise have no direct or logical use of the Veda and little or no personal knowledge of it, even if they happen to be quite knowledgeable in other areas and could justifiably be venerable to Indians for other reasons. Without attempting to determine the precise extent of truth in Renou's observation as it may apply to different periods and different thinkers of Indian history, I would like to raise the question, "Why so?"¹ Do we have examples in other

¹ Other questions that occur to me in the context of the Renou proposition are: Is the Christian recognition of the Bible or the Muslim recognition of the Qur'an significantly different in extent or essence? If it is, why would it be different? Has any Indian author made a remark similar to that of Renou, since the tradition of urging people to understand the meaning of the

intellectual, reason-dominated traditions of a text or text-complex being so distant in daily life and yet being so much like a knowledgeable and experienced older relative living nearby who can be called on for help even at odd hours? If not, what thing could be there in the minds of thoroughly or mostly rational ancient Indian thinkers that makes them reserve a certain space for the Veda?

Should the thought spring to my reader's mind, 'Oh, but the Jina and the Buddha left no such space or had no particular respect for the Veda,' let me add that, in my view, the rejection of the Veda in the Jain and Buddhist traditions begins only with certain later philosophers. Earlier, what we have is a rejection of those who misunderstand or misuse the Veda-associated institutions such as sacrificial worship and varṇa but no rejection of the true vedagu or vedāntagu or of the Veda as a body of literature. On the contrary, we have explicit acceptance of the view that in an earlier period there were true Brahmins and spiritually advanced individuals called ṛṣis, implying that the Veda-based tradition itself was not viewed as an object of criticism.²

§1.2 Let me introduce, in another way, the gain anticipated from my question stated above. While doing so, I will also provide a possible Indian analogue to Renou's 'tipping of the hat.' One of the outstanding short story authors of Marathi, the late G.A. Kulkarni, has written a rather long story titled "Svāmī."³ To summarize this story is, in a way, to kill it — to sacrifice the thrill of how it affects one as a reader. Yet the present context dictates that I summarize:

'A person travelling from one town to another realizes that the next stop of his bus is going to be near the village in which he spent his early childhood years. His mother had mentioned several things about the village over the years. On the spur of the moment, he decides to break his journey and to get down at the next stop to visit the village. As he walks back from a disappointing visit, he misses the last bus that would have enabled him to resume his journey and reach the

Veda — not to be satisfied with acquaintance of its words or sound — has existed in India? With meaning emphasized, it is unlikely that no one would query: 'What is so great about the Veda?' In fact, the Cārvāka rejection of the Veda (which must stand for a rejection of all scriptures if the Cārvākas are to be consistent) and the critique by Dharma-kīrti etc. of Veda-prāmāṇya make it almost certain that such a query was made more than once and in frequently studied texts, especially of the materialists and the Buddhists.

² I intend to discuss in a separate publication if the current depiction of the Jain and Buddhist traditions as anti-Vedic is valid.

³ The story was originally published in the Dipāvalī ("Diwali" in common Marathi usage) 1973 issue of the magazine Dipāvalī (probable popular spelling "Deepawali") published from Mumbai. I am not aware of any European language translation of it. It is reprinted in the following collection of G.A. Kulkarni's stories: 1977. *Pinṅalāveḷa*. Mumbā.ī [= Bombay]: Popyulārā Prakāśana [= Popular Prakashan]. Some libraries may have "Kulakarṇī" as the transcription of the author's last name.

originally intended destination. While he is anxiously thinking at the bus stop about how and where he should spend the night, a mahanta (head of a religious establishment) talks to him and persuades him to accompany him (the mahanta) to the maṭha on top of a nearby small hill and to spend the night there, assuring that the maṭha is well-equipped to handle even a hundred unexpected guests. The man is taken up courteously, asked to take a bath, requested to change his travel-soiled clothes into a clothing appropriate to maṭha life and given fruit and a glass of warm milk as pre-dinner refreshment. In his conversation with the mahanta during the walk to the maṭha and the reception inside, the man learns that the maṭha is a well-furnished and self-sufficient establishment with modern amenities such as electricity and bathroom showers and incorporating some aspects of an āśrama, that its head svāmī passed away three months ago and is to be replaced within 108 days, and that the mahanta, who came from a very rich family, would not himself take over as svāmī because people follow his directives without objections and resistance when he tells them that they came from the svāmī. After the refreshment, the mahanta guides the man down several levels of the maṭha building, constructed along a side of the hill, to show the meditation room of the recently dead svāmī. After the man enters the narrow quarters of the svāmī and sits on the seat of the svāmī, partly at the suggestion of the mahanta and partly to test the truth of a miracle to which the mahanta had referred earlier, he notices that a heavy steel door has closed behind the narrow opening through which he entered the meditation room and that the mahanta is on the other side of the door. In the ensuing frantic conversation, he learns that he is now the new svāmī of the maṭha and will be spending the rest of his life without any contact whatsoever with the outside world. He has access to the absolutely necessary facilities, his well-prepared meals arrive on time through a shaft, and, if he wishes, the appropriate new maṭha clothing can be supplied to him through the same shaft. There is no physical discomfort, except for the small space available for movement, but there is no talk, no communication with him even through any written note, book etc. Gradually, his pitying for himself and his family comes to an end. His sense of time and attachment to life disappear. He raises a vine that asserted itself through a crack outside his bath area, guides it through the only duct that brings him fresh air, thinks of it as the new carrier of his life, allows its stem to block the supply of air as it rushes toward the Sun and abandons his life.'

Kulkarni's carefully conceived story, full of passages touching upon the fundamental problems of life in a disturbingly direct language that alternates with unusual poetic imagery, could be read as using the concept of svāmitva ('mastery') in various ways. Its emphasis may not square exactly with the emphasis of the present essay. The remark in it that the mahanta needed the inaccessible svāmī to ensure his own effectiveness and its suggestion that, as our traveler was **confined** in the remote meditation place and was undergoing a thorough transformation, the maṭha above was being run in his (the traveler's) post-initiation name are the aspects we should particularly note. Does the Veda attain svāmīhood of traditional India's intellectual maṭha in a way similar to Kulkarni's svāmī? Is it a document like any other that has been lifted out of its historicity and enabled to transcend its ordinariness or limitations by a myth-making institution of pre-modern India's society? And, no matter how great the benefits of its being at the

highest node may be, is it historically not the case that it began its career as any other text would? Or, is there something more to its positioning than what some ancient managers of the religio-spiritual-philosophical complex engineered?⁴ Do the great ancient Indian intellectuals, however uncompromising they may be in their use of the faculty of reason, become powerless before the tradition of paying lip service to the Veda that some public relations experts started?

I hope that my attempt to determine what sort of Veda revelation BH presupposed and why he so presupposed will establish that the standing the Veda enjoys in Indian life is not merely a success story in managing public relations. There were, from time to time, at least a few thinkers in India who had a good rational understanding of why the Veda had to be respected the way it was (probably in addition to several mystics who were willing to accept the Veda as a source of fundamental knowledge or wisdom simply because what they read in it, or part of it, agreed with their own experiences). Even the possibility that such an understanding existed in some form when the Veda began to be arranged in the way we find it now need not be discounted. The excesses of studying the Veda only as a primitive document or of studying it only for gleaning historical or linguistic information should not be committed. One can, in fact, be nearly certain (a) that it was not so continuously studied simply because it was an ancient document or had a tradition of being preserved with considerable self-sacrifice, (b) that it was compiled and preserved because the agents of its compilation and preservation had not only a distinctive but also a sophisticated view of individual and social life and (c) that the same agents also had a specific understanding of how it was to function as a means.⁵

The first TK passage having a bearing on Veda revelation

§2.1 In a 1991 paper entitled “Bhartṛ-hari’s concept of the Veda,” I have pointed out the distinctive features of BH’s concept of the Veda and

⁴ (a) I mention religion, spirituality and philosophy together because, despite the abundance of all three in ancient Indian life, they were not separated from each other with separate names as academics do now.

(b) Some Indologists and historians of India write as if the complex I mention here was like the military-industry-politics complex of certain modern societies — a hegemony that did not allow the will or welfare of the people at large to prevail. I am not sure that such indeed was the case.

⁵ (a) In making these remarks, I am not denying that the Veda body grew over time. Nor am I discounting the possibility that the criteria for the application of *veda* could have been different from one time to another or from one region to another.

(b) Some readers may find it convenient to read §§4.1-6 before reading the philological analysis in §§2.1 - 3.6

its relationship with some other elements of his thought. A part of that publication relevant to our present concern is summarized in appendix 1, with some changes and additional clarifications that would connect it and the present one smoothly. Therefore, presupposing knowledge of the contents of appendix 1, I will concentrate below on passages which have a direct bearing on BH's concept of Veda revelation *as a process*. These passages are two.

Passage 1: context Trikāṇḍī (= TK) 1.5: *prāpty-upāyo 'nukāraś ca tasya vedo maharṣibhiḥ/eko 'py aneka-vartmeva samāmnātaḥ pṛthak pṛthak//'*⁶

"The means of reaching and the representative likeness of that (śabda-tattva brahman) is Veda. (It) is set down for transmission⁷ severally by the great seers as if it has more than one path, although it is one."⁸

Trikāṇḍī-vṛtti (= TKV) 1.5: *anukāra iti. 'yām sūkṣmām nityām atīndriyām vācam ṛṣayaḥ sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇo mantradṛśaḥ paśyanti tām asākṣāt-kṛta-dharmabhyo 'parebhyah pravedayiṣyamāṇā bilmaṁ samāmananti, svapna-vṛttam iva, dṛṣṭa-śrūtānubhūtam ācikhyāsanta 'ity eṣa purā-kalpaḥ. āha khalv api. "sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ. te 'parebhyo' sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmabhyo upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ. upadeśāya glāyanto 'pare bilma-graḥaṇāyemaṁ granthaṁ samāmnāsiṣur vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca. bilmaṁ bhilmaṁ [→ bilvaṁ?] bhāsanam iti ve" ti. [Yāska, Nirukta 1.20].*

§2.2 I will offer a translation and an explication of this passage in §§2.21-23. First I need to make some preparatory determinations and offer clarifying observations.

According to its presentation above, the passage contains statements of BH as well as Yāska. The former does not name the latter or his Nirukta. The introductory expression *āha khalv api* can at the most be understood as alerting the reader that the source is different from the Purā-kalpa mentioned immediately before (cf. *āgamāntaram* used by the commentator Vṛṣabha, p. 25). Secondly, there is no reflection in the non-quotation part of the passage, that is, in the part which owes its content directly to BH, of the quotation's phrase *imaṁ ... ca*. Theoretically, therefore, the possibility remains that BH cited from a source other than the currently available Nirukta. However, I see no reason to doubt that the passage incorporates Yāska's that is, the Nirukta author's, statement. The expressions *ṛṣayaḥ sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇaḥ*, *asākṣāt-kṛta-dharmabhyah*, *bilma*, and *sam+ā+mnā* are too many to be accidentally common, especially given the brevity of the passage

⁶ My translations will not be literal to the extent of matching the number of sentences in the original, and I will not always translate the 'loaded' words like *dharma* and *mantra*. If we stop at each occurrence to discuss what they mean, we will get nowhere or get somewhere when it no longer matters whether we got somewhere.

⁷ My reasons for translating *samāmnāta* in this way will be given in a separate article.

⁸ Commentator Vṛṣabha mentions specific referents for *vartman* ('paths such as Sāma-veda, Rg-veda etc.') and *pṛthak pṛthak* ('through distinction in the form of mantra etc.,' If the emendation of *maunādi* to *mantrādi* is accepted). However, it seems more likely that BH has deliberately used very general words like *vartman* and *pṛthak pṛthak*; see appendix 1, note to point 5.

and the fact that *s-k-d* (or its negation), *bilma* and *sam+ā+mnā* are not the kind of expressions that would be used in widely divergent contexts (as *ṛṣi* and *āpara/āvara*, for example, would be). Further, there are several indications in BH's works which cumulatively establish that he must have known Yāska's Nirukta. To look at the evidence from the side of the Nirukta tradition, there are indications in the commentary of S-M⁹ to the effect that BH was thought of as commenting on the Yāskiya Nirukta in parts of his works (Aklujkar 1994) — as someone who offered observations on certain Nirukta sections from a distance. It is therefore, justified to proceed on the assumption that it is in fact the currently available Nirukta that BH cites in the passage under consideration, although BH could have followed a version or recension of the Nirukta in which *āpara* was the reading in the place of *āvara* (see appendix 4).

§2.3 Two details available in BH's statement (*sūkṣmām nityām atīndriyām vācam paśyanti* and *svapna-vṛttam iva drṣṭa-śrutānubhūtam ācikhyāsantaḥ*) that undoubtedly pertain to the revelation process are not found in Yāska's statement. Therefore, we need to ask if a historically identical understanding of the revelation process is reflected in TKV 1.5 (and TKV 1.173 to be discussed later) and Nirukta 1.20. Could BH not have differed from Yāska in his view of how the revelation of the Veda took/takes place? Or, does BH simply help us in recovering what has been lost in the other intellectual traditions of India, including perhaps the Nirukta tradition itself? If he did not essentially differ from Yāska, was there any progress in the theorization about revelation such that the statements of the theoreticians concerned came to possess greater detail and clarity, or was there practically the same theory all along that was expressed in slightly different words as time moved on? Alternatively, is it possible that there was no theory as such in Yāska — he simply made an assertion, and it is philosophers like BH that gradually filled his assertion with deep significance and gave it a logical backbone that was not in the purview of the older and (hence?) simple-minded Yāska?

To give my four-part answer right away: (a) It is not possible that Yāska did not have a theory. (b) There is no evidence to prove that Yāska and BH differed, although they might have. (c) A combination of the possibilities we have entertained is what probably happened between the times of Yāska and BH. There could have been addition of detail and gain in clarity. There could also have been changes of terminology. (d) BH does help us, at least to a significant extent if not fully, in recovering, in a historically justifiable way, Yāska's thought and the thought behind the authority and sanctity accorded

⁹For the sake of convenience, I shall speak here of Skanda-svāmin and Maheśvara as if they were one author. I shall not try to decide which one of them wrote which part of the Nirukta commentary going under their name.

to the Veda. The guidance he offers is limited and scattered. Yet if we study it comprehensively and minutely we can open, at least to some extent, the door to a closed chamber of India's history. By the end of our discussion, we will probably have a relatively well-integrated account and — what is more important in historical research — an account that has an evidential, textual, basis.

I do not need to justify each part of the preceding answer individually or at length. Even if I prove that Yāska had a theory, it should suffice. Appendices 3 and 4 should take care of part (b). My part (c) is only a probability and it follows from historical commonsense. There is no evidence of knowledge traditions having been totally or irrevocably lost between Yāska and BH as far as the views or theories regarding the Veda are concerned.¹⁰ So, philosophers must have gone on refining ideas and expressing them in different words. Is this not what they most commonly do? Further, the differences between Yāska and BH are all of the nature of addition. Just as they strengthen the probability that the philosophers were elaborating on and re-expressing the views, they indicate that BH need not be read as clashing with Yāska.¹¹ As there is no other theoretician between Yāska and BH known to us at present who echoes Yāska's words,¹² it is also commonsense to proceed on the assumption that BH would help us in recovering a part of Yāska's world. Where there is almost total darkness, even a single source of feeble light can be put to use. Our reconstruction of BH's understanding of how Veda revelation took/takes place will simply demonstrate that this commonsense, like most flashes of commonsense, has put us on the right path.

Now, how can it be proved that Yāska had a theory? One only needs to look at the words *sākṣāt-kṛta*, *dharma/dharman*, *ṛṣi* and *mantra*. Each of these is a charged word of Indian culture (cf. §§2.10-16 below). Each embodies a notion that no other known culture has taken to the height to which India has taken it. How could Yāska then be without a theory while

¹⁰ Loss of vyākaraṇāgama, 'inherited knowledge in the area of grammar,' is mentioned in TK 2.481-485 in the context of Pāṇinian grammar and with specific reference to Patañjali.

¹¹ Halbfass (1991: 48 note 69): "Bhartṛhari cites and accepts the statement from the Nirukta . . . But at the same time, he transforms and reinterprets Yāska's dictum." The details given by Halbfass after this remark are all by way of addition and specification of BH's view. They do not suggest that Yāska was definitely unaware of them or would have taken issue with them.

¹² (a) I have checked as many pre-BH texts as I could for a passage in which the 'load-bearing' words of the *s-k-d* passage occur reasonably near each other. No one can assert that we will never come across a post-Yāska and pre-BH passage reminiscent of the first or second sentence of TKV 1.5. But at present we must proceed on the assumption that non-occurrence is the reality.

(b) Post-BH occurrences are found in the Yukti-dīpikā and Helā-rāja 3.1.46 (see appendix 4). Allusion to the passage through its opening word exists in Medhātithi 2.12. I am leaving out modern citations and allusions.

employing *sākṣāt-kṛta*, *dharma/dharman*, *ṛṣi* and *mantra*? Further, what author would bring the entities *dharma* and *mantra* together, suggest that access to the first results or can result in access to the second, and leave things there, if he did not presume readers familiar with the connection between *dharma* and *mantra*, that is, if he did not presume knowledge of some theory on the part of his readers (cf. appendix 4, point 2)? Is the connection between *dharma* and *mantra*, under any common understanding of these terms datable to Yāska's time, obvious? Of course, not. Even the literal or etymological meanings of these terms are not such as would naturally lead to their being put together in a seriously intended statement. There must, therefore, have been a reasonably widespread undertaking, containing what we could call a theory, in Yāska's days that enabled most of Yāska's readers to connect the two even when no explication was offered.¹³ This surmise is supported by what the pre-Yāska texts, *Samhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas*, say about *vāc* and by how they use the notion of *vāc* (cf. the passages referred to in Padoux 1990: 1-29, Śāstri 1972: 1-23, Tripāṭhī 1976: 167-175 and Holdrege 1994).

§2.4 Another question arising out of the bipartite nature of the TKV 1.5 passage is more specifically hermeneutical. Several different interpretations have been offered of the Nirukta statement. Even if one were to assume that Yāska had a well-thought view of Veda revelation, is it not likely that the relationship of that view with BH's view would depend on which interpretation one accepts? In other words, will our reconstruction of BH's view not be uncertain to the extent we use the evidence of Yāska's statement? (If we, in return, use the reconstructed BH view to understand Yāska, since we commonly use later direct and indirect commentators to interpret an older author, will the extent of uncertainty not double?)

Mutual dependence of sources is not a real problem in the present context, which is one of historical reconstruction, as it would be in an inference (understood in a technical sense of "inference" found in the system of logic, not just as a synonym of general words like "logical reasoning," "argument," "conjecture," "hypothesis" etc.). Frequently, a source produced at time T2 has a more reliable interpretation of or has more clues helpful in the understanding of a source produced at time T1 than we, living at time T3, are likely to have. We have to take both the T1 and T2 sources and the clues they contain into consideration and arrive at the most probable interpretations of the T1 source as well as the T2 source, verifying them against each other.

¹³ No reader of Yāska is known to have accused him of trying to pull wool over his/her eyes. The readers include Yāska's commentators, who showed a questioning attitude in countless areas over many centuries. While this consideration, being in the form of an absence, does not prove in itself that Yāska had a theory, it makes the absence of a theory very unlikely.

In determining how the very first stage of Veda revelation was understood, the utility of Nirukta 1.20 is limited. That text is principally concerned with the Veda transmission stage. Only the words *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayah...mantrān samprāduḥ* have a bearing on the revelation process in that they tell us who the agents were, what qualification they had and what was revealed (the last by implication: since the agents imparted mantras, they must have come to possess them, which, in turn, implies that what was revealed to them must be either the mantras or something that can result in mantras.) The implications of *avarebhyo 'sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmabhya upadeśena* would largely be deducible from *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayah...mantrān samprāduḥ* and hence of no great help.

Of the truly relevant words, (a) *sākṣāt-kṛta*, (b) *dharma/dharman*, (c) *ṛṣi* and (d) *mantra* are found also in the TKV. While different paraphrases and translations of the first two have been offered, none, as we will see below, is likely to affect our process of determination. In the case of (a), all translations would work at the literal level (albeit specific connotations may have to be coaxed out of their contexts) and, in the case of (b), none would fit literally. There is no real disagreement in the translations of *ṛṣi* (those who translate the word with “sage” do not and will not deny that in the present context sagehood comes from being a seer), and *mantra* has mostly been left untranslated.

§2.5 Several interesting questions have been raised, explicitly or implicitly, in the case of Nirukta 1.20 that pertain to the words in the first two sentences, to which I just referred, as well as to the words in the remaining two sentences. As far as I am aware, they are: Does *s-k-d* belong to the subject part ('The s-k-d became/were ṛṣis') or the predicate part ('ṛṣis became/were s-k-d'; see appendix 4, point 2)? Is the '*avara* : *apara*' difference of reading significant? Does *avara* mean only 'later' or must it have a connotation of inferiority in the present instance? Are the *avaras* also *ṛṣis*? If so, are the *ṛṣis* only in some such sense as 'śrutarṣis'? What is the significance, if any, of the tense variation seen in *babhūvuḥ* (perfect), on the one hand, and *samprāduḥ* and *samāmnāsiṣuḥ* (aorist) on the other? Which meanings of *sākṣāt* + *kṛ* and *dharma* should we accept? What was the nature of the upadeśa? Was it only oral? Did it include meaning explanation or interpretation? Does the text talk about two groups or generations or three? Toward which upadeśa was the *avaras*' fatigue or despondency directed — to the one they were receiving or to the one they were providing? What is the meaning of *bilma*? Can the meaning one prefers be reconciled with the meanings given in the case of other occurrences of *bilma*? How is the compound *bilma-graḥaṇa* to be analyzed — as an instrumental tat-puruṣa or as a genitive tat-puruṣa? How many texts or text-bodies does *imaṁ grantham ... vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca* refer to — one, two or three?

As if this list is not long enough for a passage consisting of only three short sentences (four sentences if *vedaṁ ca vedāṅgāni ca* is counted as a separate sentence), I will add: What was the precise reason for the fatigue or despondency of the avaras, lack of success in learning the entire set of mantras or lack of success in learning the mantras accurately? How should *sam + ā + mnā* be understood, especially in contradistinction to *ā + mnā*? Does *imam grantham* refer only to the direct or most explicitly acknowledged commentandum of Yāska, that is, the Nighaṇṭu, or does it include in its reference also the inherited lists such as those of the upasargas and the nipātas on which Yāska comments (compare Aklujkar 1999: fn 9)?

From among these questions, I will address the ones having a bearing on my present concern in the main body of the paper. Many of the rest will be taken up in appendices 3 and 4.

§2.6 To turn to preparatory observations not arising from the presence of the Nirukta citation, we should not expect to understand the process involved in coming to know the subtle, permanent and sense-transcending form of *vāc* (= the original form of the Veda; cf. appendix 1) that BH speaks of or the process making certain ṛṣis possessors of mantras that Yāska presupposes in the sense of “Oh, yes, X/I experienced it, and here is how it went.” A number of passages (e.g., TK/VP 2.139) make it clear that in BH’s view only certain individuals with special qualifications may be said to have the experience and that they too cannot convey it exactly as it is — in its event or process aspect. The original unitary insight cannot be transferred as a single unit. Its transmission or instruction must take place through speech, and speech, as we commonly understand it to be, is necessarily sequential. If those who, in some sense, receive the experience of the ṛṣis receive it in a sequential, divided form (see appendix 1, point 5), our understanding or reconstruction can only be theoretical.

§2.7 The assumption of a subtle or more fundamental form that becomes manifest, communicable or accessible should not surprise us. Theories of a primal cause that contain movement from the unperceived to the perceived (or perceptible) exist in practically all accounts of creation of the universe. In fact, in the very admission of the possibility of such a creation, whether unique or repeatable, there may lie the postulation of a subtle, unperceived pre-existence. Also, as I indicated in a 1982 paper on the recovery of *vyākaraṇāgama*, almost all accounts of getting back a lost fundamental teaching have reference to that teaching’s survival somewhere in a hidden or unidentified form. The very logic of the situation can be said to demand the assumption of a lost yet not-completely-lost original. The vertical double reference of the Veda (appendix 1, point 1) is similarly structured and hence the presence in it of a subtle form of the Veda should not come as a surprise.

§2.8 The process that would emerge from our theoretical understanding or model-building should be such as would fit what we know about dharma/dharman (see §2.11-13) and mantras from other sources. Seeing the highest form of *vāc* should have some plausible connection with seeing the mantras (cf. *mantradrśaḥ* in TKV 1.5 that is under consideration). Similarly, witnessing dharma/dharman should mean furnishing the cause necessary for seeing the highest form of *vāc* and/or seeing or coming to possess the mantras.¹⁴ BH had a choice to write a sentence like *yam/yām/yad ... ṛṣayah sākṣāt-kṛta-sūkṣma-vācaḥ paśyanti tam/tām/tad asākṣāt-kṛta-sūkṣma-vāgbhyaḥ pravedayiṣyamāṇā bilmam samāmananti*. The fact that he takes over *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇaḥ* from the Nirukta and makes *sūkṣmām nityām atīndriyām vācam ... paśyanti* a predicate (of the relative clause) indicates that in his view *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇaḥ* belongs to a deeper, causal level on which the assertion that the subtle and eternal *vāc* is witnessed can rest.

§2.9 On the other hand, since ordinary persons do not witness the highest form of *vāc*, the qualification *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇaḥ* must express the difference between them and the *ṛṣis*. The difference should be such as to be consistent with what we learn from other passages in which comparable persons who exhibit extraordinary powers of cognition (e.g., the *śiṣṭas* 'spiritual elite who are capable of giving informed judgements free from vested interest') are mentioned by authors sharing essentially the same world view.

Several relatively early authors like Caraka (Sūtra-sthāna 25.3), Patañjali (Paspasāhnikā, Kielhorn's edn p. I.11), and BH (TKV 1.23) speak of *pratyakṣa-dharman ṛṣis* or *śiṣṭas*, in contexts that could be considered to have a logical relation with the statements we are studying. Vātsyāyana Pakṣila-svāmin, on the other hand, in a similarly relatable statement, uses *s-k-d*.¹⁵ We should at least ensure that the sense we eventually attach to *s-k-d* does not clash with the sense of *pratyakṣa-dharman*, which, given the synonymy

¹⁴ (a) Here, my use of 'seeing' is meant to cover TKV 1.5 and of 'coming to possess' to cover Nirukta 1.20. In the latter, as the *s-k-d* *ṛṣis* impart the mantras, they must have come to possess them.

(b) The point stated here does not depend on whether *s-k-d* is taken as a predicate in Yāska's sentence, for there is a suggestion of the priority of *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva* to mantra in Yāska and BH and there is a suggestion of the priority of *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva* to the perception of *s-n-a vāc* in BH.

(c) Why *s-k-d* could not have been intended as a predicate is explained in appendix 4, point 2.

¹⁵ Under Nyāya-sūtra 2.1.68 (*mantrāyur-veda ...*), we find *āptāḥ khalu sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa idam hātavyam, idam asya hāni-hetur, idam asyādhigantavyam, idam asyādhigama-hetur iti bhūtāny anukampante*. "The reliable persons are *s-k-d*. They show sympathy for (other) living beings (thinking:) 'this is to be abandoned; this is the cause for abandoning; this is to be obtained by this person; this is the cause for obtaining.'" Perhaps this passage is studied in Srinivas Sastri 1976, which publication has remained inaccessible to me.

of *sākṣāt* and *pratyakṣa*, means that the meaning of *dharma/dharman* in one compound must be compatible, if not identical, with that in the other.

§2.10 *sākṣāt* and *sākṣātkāra* are still used in Indian languages. This is true also of some other derivatives (e.g., *sākṣya* and *sākṣin*) from the root word *sākṣa* (= *sa* + *akṣa/akṣi*) underlying them (and attested in Śabara's commentary on *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* 1.2.31). Wezler (2001: 226) informs us that *sākṣāt* by itself is attested in the *Atharva-veda* and *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, that Pāṇini 1.4.74 (*sākṣāt-prabhṛtini ca*) presupposes the possibility of its composition with forms of *kṛ* and that *sākṣāt-kṛta* in the *Nirukta* passage we are discussing is the first known realization of that possibility.

Given such an impressive continuity of use, one would expect the derivatives of *sākṣāt* + *kṛ* to be transparent in their meaning. To some extent they are. The meaning element of 'being a witness, being a perceiver' is found in all of them. A natural extension of this element would be 'being a direct witness, perceiving without intervention.'¹⁶ This semantic extension is a constant of the *sākṣāt* + *kṛ* derivatives,¹⁷ along with its understandable contextual variations (a) 'obviously, evidently,' (b) 'clearly, openly,' (c) 'in bodily form, as something incarnate,' and (d) 'intuitive' in the sense 'natural, inborn, not preceded by any training or practice.'¹⁸

¹⁶ Compare a usage like "I saw X with my eyes" which implies that the speaker's knowledge is not second-hand.

¹⁷ (a) Cf. the use of "direct," and "actually" in the following translations of *s-k-d*: Halbfass 1988: 328: "having attained a direct experience of dharma." Falk 1990: 109 and 1993: 241: "persons who had direct insight into dharma." Ruegg 1994: 308-309: "having directly witnessed/perceived dharma(s) and "who directly perceived dharma(s)." Oliver 1997: 59 (on the basis of Falk 1990: 109): "The ṛṣis had direct insight into dharma." Kahrs 1998: 28: "[those who have] direct access to Dharma (ritual and social duty)." Rajavade 1940: 289: "by whom religion was actually seen."

(b) In the context of *s-k-d* and *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatā* occurring, respectively, in *Nyāya-bhāṣya* 1.1.7 and 2.1.68., Ruegg (1994: 307 fn 15) suggests an interpretation that has the merit of being original: "having direct perception for [their] nature/quality," in which "[their]" stands for "[the āptas] = the reliable persons'." Since in the specified context Ruegg is very much aware of *Nirukta* 1.20, the same interpretation can be extended to *Nirukta* 1.20, the passage we are discussing. However, Ruegg helpfully adds: "... Indian commentators seem to have actually understood *dharma(n)* as the object of the direct perception in question. See e.g. Uddyotakara, *Nyāya-vārttika*, II.i.68: *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatā yam te padārtham upadiśanti sa taiḥ sākṣāt-kṛto bhavalīli*; and Vācaspati-miśra, *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyā-ṭikā* I.i.7: *sudṛḍhena pramāṇenāvadhāritāḥ sākṣāt-kṛtāḥ dharmāḥ padārthāḥ* (and the same commentary on II.i.68: *pratyakṣi-kṛta-heyopādeyatā*)."

Further, in his fn 17, referring to Roth's rendering "Recht" of *dharma* occurring in *Durga's* dissolution of *s-k-d* and Monier Williams' and Sarup's translations "one who has an intuitive perception of duty" and "had direct intuitive insight into duty," Ruegg rightly registers a mild protest: "But it is not established that *dharma(n)* here has the meaning of duty or virtue."

Of the two explanations given by Vācaspati that Ruegg cites above, the first agrees in spirit with *Durga's* cited in note 67(b) and the second with Vātsyāyana's given in note 15.

¹⁸ Cf. Sarup 1921: 20 "Seers had direct intuitive insight into duty." Kane 1973: 889: "the (ancient) sages had an intuitive perception of dharma."

What intrigues a researcher are the issues of whether the ablative ending of the first member contributes something specific to the meaning of the composition and, if it does, what that contribution is. That there are not many other formations in which *kr* is joined to a preceding member in the ablative makes the researcher's work difficult. *balātkāra* 'doing out of (→ with) force, acting on the basis of physical strength, compulsion' comes to mind, but *balāt* in it is not a compound like *sākṣa* in *sākṣat*. It is not given the designation *gati* by Pāṇini. *sākṣa*, being a *bahu-vrihi*, has the capability to function like an adjective and, when transformed into the neuter accusative singular (*sākṣam*) not qualifying any noun, to function as an *avyayi-bhāva* conveying an adverbial meaning. However, what we have here before a form of *kr* is neither *sākṣa* nor *sākṣam* but *sākṣāt*. Could there be an aspect of meaning present in this grammatical feature that is eluding us?

Could *sākṣātkāra*, originally, have had a meaning such as 'doing/acting out of the sense-equipped one, that is, with the mind/worldly self/soul as the basis, attention-done, concentration-accomplished'? The implication of such a meaning, then, would be either that 'the usual senses are not required, the 'mind-eye' is used, a transcendence of the ordinary senses takes place' or 'what others do not or cannot see/sense is seen'? After all, specificities of meaning do frequently come from the context in which an expression is initially used, not only from a logical or plausibly logical extension of the etymological meaning. The two connotations specified just now are present in some modern usages of *sākṣāt-kr*; e.g., Marathi *sākṣātkāra hoṇe* 'becoming (= coming into existence) of *sākṣātkār*,' includes the meaning element 'that which was not seen or known before, now became seen or known.'¹⁹ Several other modern Indian languages use forms of *sākṣāt-kr* similarly. As many modern Indian languages form continuities of usage with Sanskrit and can be shown to preserve some word connotations that have so far not been recognized as existing in Sanskrit,²⁰ our seeking a clue in them for the connotation of *sākṣāt-kr* should not be objectionable.

¹⁹ When used seriously in *ādhyātmika* etc. contexts, *sākṣātkār hoṇe* usually implies either that a great effort preceded the happening or that the person in whose case the event took place no longer remained an ordinary individual — his very way of experiencing the world changed. When the word is used sarcastically, the same meaning acquires the tinge 'taking a long time to grasp something that was already there — that was not difficult to grasp in the first place, what appears like a sudden realization should have taken place much earlier.' The suggestion is of a lapse or of going unnoticed before being seen. It would fit the context of the passages we are studying, especially if they presume recurrent creation. The seers are spoken of as recalling what they learned or knew in the preceding creation.

²⁰ Such shared connotations could have originated in Sanskrit or in the regional languages. Historically, a give-and-take has occurred in both directions. In the present case, origin in Sanskrit and its continuation in regional languages seems more likely, although the regional languages help us in suspecting the presence of the connotation in Sanskrit in the first place.

Further, BH's explanation of *pratyakṣa-dharmāṇaḥ*, occurring in the Mahābhāṣya (Kielhorn edn p. I.13), runs thus: *dharmā ye parokṣā lokasya te pratyakṣās teṣām*, "The properties which are beyond the senses for (humanity at large or the rest of) the world are accessible to their senses" (Mahābhāṣya-ṭīkā, Abhyankar-Limaye edn p. 38.7). This explanation supports the existence of a meaning element like 'that which was not seen or known before became seen or known' in *sākṣāt-kṛta*, for the convergence of meaning between *pratyakṣa-dharman* and *s-k-d* is undeniable.

§2.11 For reasons that do not need to be spelled out to most Sanskritists and Indologists, *dharma* is a word that has several related meanings and is frequently difficult to translate in a particular context (Fitzgerald 2004: 671-685; Aklujkar 2004: 693-694). The difficulty increases (as is commonly the case with words) as one reaches back in the past to the more ancient texts, of which the Nirukta certainly is one. Historical studies of the meaning of *dharma*, that is, of its semantic development over time, have naturally been attempted, for example, in Horsch 1967: 31-61 (English tr. 2004: 423-448) and Brereton 2004: 449-489, which, along with Mayrhofer 1963: 94-95, contain references to earlier discussions. The change from *dharman*, ending in *-an* and neuter, to *dharma*, ending in *-a* and masculine, at as early a time as that of the Atharva-veda and the accentual variation, *dhárman* and *dharmán*, seen at an even earlier time make the historical study of *dharma* complicated. In addition, the Buddhist usage in the sense 'an abiding entity, a more fundamental existent' and the Jain usage in the sense 'that which offers freedom of movement, space' come in the way of giving a linear account. There is also the knotty question of how the modern Indian understanding of *dharma* as 'religion' came about. It is evident that this understanding is only partially justified; *dharma* does not have some important connotations that "religion" has. Yet there must be something in its traditional meaning (cf. Aklujkar 2004: 694) that suggested to India's intellectuals after the arrival of Islam and European powers that *dharma* be used as an equivalent of the Arabic *majahab* and English "religion." It is not surprising, given the preceding facts, that in several scholarly writings *dharma* is left untranslated²¹ or a single Western word like "law" ("loi" in French, "Gesetz" in German), which carries many of the likely meanings, takes the place of *dharma* and approximates the intended meaning on the strength of context.

§2.12 In the context of the present concern, the alternatives of sticking (a) to *dharma* and (b) to a single term like "law" are not open to me, for if I follow either one of them, without first trying to determine

²¹ In those languages like Hindi, Bengali etc. which have inherited the word from Sanskrit, there is no alternative to begin with, unless the translators decide to coin new words or phrases for each meaning of *dharma* they consider contextually likely.

what *dharma* in *s-k-d* is likely to mean, I will, in all likelihood, sacrifice an important indicator of the Veda revelation theory. Secondly, as the Nirukta text in which *s-k-d* occurs for the first time is *relatively* close to the time during which the available Vedic texts acquired their present form, I cannot escape the responsibility of specifying which parts of the semantic history of *dharma* reconstructed by scholars, if any, hold good in its case.

There is also an additional consideration. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka (saṃvat 2020: 344-345, saṃvat 2030: 366, saṃvat 2041: 392-393) noticed several decades ago that a dharmābhivṛtya view — a view according to which *dharma* is manifested, not created — was associated with BH.²² But not much attention was given, until recently, to determining precisely what this observation entails and what the implications of dharmābhivṛtya as a religio-philosophical concept are.²³ As *abhivṛtya* ‘manifestation, coming to notice,’ *sākṣāt-kṛ* and “revelation” are obviously connected through their literal or ordinary language meanings, it is very likely that there is a connection between the dharmābhivṛtya view and the ideas or details associated with Veda revelation. In any case, we should not understand Veda revelation in such a way as to put it on a collision course with what emerges from the passages mentioning dharmābhivṛtya.

§2.13 A detailed demonstration of why I accept what I accept in the semantic histories of *dharma* offered so far will take us too far afield and obscure my argumentation in the present essay. I will, therefore, attempt such an explanation in a separate publication. To summarize my views:

I accept that the older form of *dharma* was *dhārman*, with accent on the first or root syllable and neuter gender, or, with accent on the last or suffix syllable and masculine gender.

The basic meaning of *dhārman* was ‘that which is held/supported/possessed,’ contextually adjusting to such meanings as (a) that which a person, thing, or groups thereof has, i.e., ‘quality, attribute, property,’ (b) ‘distinctive, unique or defining quality, strength or force,’ and (c) ‘essential or foundational nature.’ *Contra* Horsch and his predecessors, the basic meaning was not ‘(the action of) supporting, (the act of) holding’; *dhārman* was not an action noun (as distinct from an object noun). Nor was its basic meaning ‘foundation,’ unless by “foundation” a meaning like (b) or (c) is meant.

²² Although the immediate context of the dharmābhivṛtya view in most of the references is that of yāga or ritual worship, that is, the same as of apūrva or adrṣṭa in the Mīmāṃsā tradition, the view needs to be understood broadly. Its application to the ritual worship context is only a part of the domain in which it applies.

²³ I give references to earlier discussions and offer a different explanation of the dharmābhivṛtya phenomenon in Aklujkar 2004: §§3.7-9.

On the other hand, *dharmán*, the stem with accent on the final syllable, was an agentive noun conveying the meaning 'holder, supporter, ordainer' as earlier researchers referred to above have determined or accepted.

Accordingly, I take *dharmān* in *s-k-d* as meaning 'quality, attribute, property' and the compound as meaning 'those who had directly seen (= uncovered or discovered) the properties (of things²⁴ not perceived by the average human beings).'²⁵

True, we do not know if the '*dharma* : *dharmān*' difference was only a matter of compositional conditioning for Yāska (i.e., a *bahu-vrīhi* was viewed simply as requiring *dharmān* at its end, not *dharma*, regardless of the meaning and accent intended). Procedural caution, however, suggests that it is better not to rule out the possibility that the stem at the end of *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇaḥ* was meant to be *dharmān*, not *dharma*.

That accentual distinction seem to have existed in Yāska's own Sanskrit would further suggest that it would be prudent to leave room for the possibility that Yāska was aware of the '*dhárman*: *dharmán*' distinction. Since he is unlikely to have meant 'those who had seen the supporters,'²⁶ the alternative we should accept is that the last member of the *s-k-d* compound was *dhárman* in his view and that the compound meant (minimally) 'those who had seen properties' to him.

The discussion below in §3.1 of the second crucial passage will confirm that in reaching such a conclusion we are on the right track. The *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva* of the seers means direct, undistorted and extraordinary knowledge of those properties and actions or processes which make the world what it is. The following renderings of *s-k-d*, therefore, cannot be considered accurate or satisfactory, albeit some of them have greater potential for reconciliation with the evidence (i.e., the basis of my understanding of *dharma*) than the rest.²⁷

²⁴ Although in most instances below I will speak of properties of things or objects (inclusive of fleeting physical things such as sound continua or speech forms), the properties or effects of actions or states are also to be understood wherever the context is suitable and my interpretation of *s-k-d* or *pratyakṣa-dharmān* is meant.

²⁵ This meaning, which I arrived at by studying the evidence in BH and the passages collected in papers discussing the semantic history of *dharma*, has support in the 'padārtha' rendering found in the comments of Uddyotakara and Vācaspati-miśra cited in note 17b and in Durga's remark *amuṣmāt karmaṇa evam-arthavatā mantreṇa saṁyuktā amunā prakāreṇaivam-lakṣaṇaḥ phala-vipariṇāmo bhavati*. Indirect support can be read in S-M's gloss *mantra-brāhmaṇa* and Vṛṣabha's gloss *abhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-sādhana* for *dharma*, since the *brāhmaṇa* and *sādhana*, speaking of certain things and actions leading to certain results, must presuppose the presence of result-conducive properties in the things and actions concerned. see §2.15.

²⁶ *dharmán*, meaning 'supporter, holder' is not a synonym for 'god', albeit the RV speaks of gods as supporters.

²⁷ (a) Since the expression occurs also in Yāska's statement and since there is no reason to

Muir 1874: 118: "The rishis, who had an intuitive perception of duty."

Sarup 1921: 20: "Seers had direct intuitive insight into duty."²⁸

Rajavade 1940: 289: "by whom religion was actually seen."²⁹

Biardeau 1964: 33: "qui ont l'intuition directe de la loi religieuse/ qui avaient l'intuition directe de la loi religieuse."

Subramania Iyer 1965: 7: "who have realised the truth/realised that truth."

Carpenter 1995: 44: "who have directly seen the ritual ordinances."

Kahrs 1998: 28: "[those who have] direct access to ... (ritual and social duty)."

Wezler 2001: 227: "[men] by whom (the) dharma [= this universal 'law,' this order of the world, of all its inhabitants, but especially men] was directly and wholly perceived."

In like vein, we can rule out the meanings (a) 'religio-spiritual merit, puṇya' and (b) 'property of the mind, intellect, consciousness or self (= property of whatever it is that a given philosophy views as the experiencing subject).' Such a dharma, referring to a state of refinement or elevation of the cognitive apparatus which enables that apparatus to transcend its limitations, may make some persons capable of sāksātkāra of dharma. However, it can ill fit as an object of their sāksātkāra. If it does, it does so indirectly, only after the assumption of extraordinary persons who can see

assume a wide gulph in the thinking of Yāska and BH as far as Veda revelation is concerned (cf. §2.3), I include below the translations of *s-k-d* given while dealing with Nirukta 1.20 as well.

(b) Joshi-Roodbergen 1986: 156 n. 632 (as reported in Wezler 2001: 227) suggest 'what is right' and 'constituent element of reality' in the context of *pratyakṣa-dharman*. The latter meaning of *dharma/dharman* can be connected with what I am suggesting but is not exactly the same, since it is given by presupposing philosophies like Sāṃkhya engaged in listing tattvas 'constituents of universe models.'

(c) For the translations which retain the word *dharma/dharman*, see notes 17-18.

²⁸ Muir's and Sarup's translation is close to a meaning of *dharma* that is definitely and frequently attested in the pre-modern Indian tradition, but it suffers from the fact that no pre-modern text is known until now which speaks of duty and mantra in such a way that the former could be seen as a cause of the latter. Duty is usually spoken of as coming from the Veda (= mantras in the present context), not the Veda from duty. Persevering in the performance of duty may, through cleansing of the mind, eventually make one capable of mantra acquisition, but in the available evidence we do not see any direct or necessary link between adherence to duty and receipt of mantras through revelation.

²⁹ Rajavade's rendering is anachronistic and misleading (cf. Wezler 2001: 228 fn 64). Religion is not known as the object of some sort of extraordinary seeing, although its constituent scriptures, commandments etc. are. Even if we were to assume that Rajavade's phrase makes sense, there is no reason why the seers of religion would necessarily come to possess mantras (or the *s-n-a vāc*), since religion is not co-extensive with the mantras, Veda or Śruti.

qualities imperceptible to others and who can advise regarding what is wholesome is made.

§2.14 Coming to dharmābhivyakti ('manifestation, not creation afresh or acquisition, of dharma'), I have tried in Aklujkar 2004 to sketch the conception of the world, universe or cosmos in which the view would fit. One constituent of the view is the assumption that dharma, a force implicit in brahman (the ultimate or first cause), is distributed over the objects to which brahman gives rise. In other words, it is assumed that there is, in every evolute, a property or potential which persons of extraordinary insight can identify and relate to actions in such a way as to bring it out and harness for the prosperity and/or continuation of the world. The meaning of *dharma* in *s-k-d* that I am suggesting agrees with such an understanding. True, in *dharmābhivyakti*, the word *dharma* probably stands for a part of a *universal* force or energy that is typically revealed (brought to the forefront, made active) by the rites such as Agni-hotra, and in *s-k-d* (or *pratyakṣa-dharman*), as interpreted by me, the same word stands for something already existing in individual things in a scattered, delimited way that may or may not be made noticeable by the appropriate actions. However, an entity can be the same whether it is viewed as universally present or as present distributively in the individuals populating the universe. The difference observed simply means that, like the terms *brahman*, *sphoṭa*, *pratibhā* etc., the term *dharman/dharma* has a layered meaning in BH's philosophy (and probably also in Yāska's philosophy). He strings together several conceptually or analytically different entities in one label if the same essence is thought to constitute them.

We can thus determine the meaning of *dharma* in *s-k-d*, a term positioned to convey the causal background of the acquisition of the subtle, eternal and transcendental form of language (or of the acquisition of the mantras), in such a way as to abide by the guiding observations made in §§2.2-9 above.

§2.15 In Indology, there is, rightly, a tendency not to go against the interpretations of traditional commentators. These commentators had, in many cases, inherited an old understanding of the text on which they were commenting. The chain of this understanding can, in several cases, be reasonably presumed to go back all the way to the time of the commentandum author. Besides, some commentators seem to have spent long times, if not entire life spans, in studying the texts they elucidate. Therefore, some Indologist may, by way of objection, understandably draw my attention to the fact that the explanation I have offered is not found in the words of the traditional commentators of the Nirukta and TKV. S-M tell us that dharma in the present context means 'mantra-brāhmaṇa' (*dharmasyātīndriyatvāt sākṣāt-karaṇasyāsambhavāt dharma-śabdenātra tad-*

artham mantra-brāhmaṇam ucyate). Vṛṣabha (S. Iyer's edn p. 24) paraphrases *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇaḥ* with *abhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-sādhana dharmāḥ yaiḥ sākṣāt-kṛtaḥ prāptaḥ te dharmānugrhitāntaḥ-karaṇāḥ* and restricts dharma to *abhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-sādhana* 'the means of elevating oneself in the world(s) and of reaching the highest spiritual goal.'

As indicated in note 25, my interpretation, while not being identical with those of the ancient commentators, is not irreconcilable. The difference between SM, Vṛṣabha and me is not a definite difference of essence but probably a difference of using words with narrower or wider meanings. If *brāhmaṇa* stands for ritual procedure based on knowing the properties of things (*bhāva*, *dravya*) or actions (*karman*), as seems to be the case (recall the *bandhutā*, 'connectivity,' way of thinking writ large over the *Brāhmaṇas*), then S-M's *tad-artha* (= *dharmārtha*) *mantra-brāhmaṇa* conveys what I intend but in a narrower way. It presupposes a ritual context, whereas I speak of what could be the broader philosophical basis of that ritual context.

At the other end, Vṛṣabha's *abhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-sādhana* generalizes the thought involved, gives no hint of being confined to the ritual context and speaks of a further stage by incorporating the anticipated result: wordly elevation of all sorts (see Aklujkar 2004: 702 on *abhyudaya*) and *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*. It reflects an understanding extending over the collectivity of things, actions and their properties, without resorting to any expression like 'a thing/action with property P-1 leads to result R-1.'

In the gloss of Durga, we have the link between the generalized causality of Vṛṣabha and the particularistic idiom present in my understanding: [ye; see note 119] *amuṣmāt karmaṇa evam-arthavatā mantreṇa saṃyuktād amunā prakāreṇaivam-lakṣaṇaḥ phala-vipariṇāmo bhavati paśyanti te ṛṣayaḥ*. "ṛṣir darśanāt" [Yāska 2.11] *iti vakṣyati. tad etat karmaṇaḥ phala-vipariṇāma-darśanam aupacārikayā vṛttyoktaṁ sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa iti. na hi dharmasya darśanam asti. atyantāpūrvō [→ °ntārūpyo?] hi dharmāḥ*. "Ṛṣis (are) those [who] perceive that from action k, combined with a mantra having meaning m, a transformation (in the form of) result r; having such and such characteristic, comes about in such and such manner. It is this perception of the result-transformation³⁰ of an action that has been

³⁰ I am not sure about why Durga uses *vipariṇāma* in addition to *phala*. His intended meaning could be 'transformation that is the outcome, the result itself is the transformation' (*phalam eva vipariṇāmaḥ*, a karma-dhāraya) or, what amounts to the same thing, 'transformation into the result' (*phale vipariṇāmaḥ*, a locative tat-puruṣa). However, it is possible that Durga meant to convey that, because of its association with a mantra and a Veda-recommended process, the ordinarily expected outcome of an action undergoes a transformation — that what are outwardly or physically the same actions produce extraordinary results when performed as a part of a ritual. In that case, even a genitive tat-puruṣa dissolution (*phalasya vipariṇāmaḥ*) could have been intended. The phrase *karmaṇaḥ phala-vipariṇāmaḥ* would then have the same structure as *deva-dattasya guru-kulam*.

expressed (by Yāska with the word) *s-k-d* through a metaphorical mode (of expression), for (really speaking) there can be no perception of dharma. Indeed dharma is something that cannot at all be given a form."³¹

As the explanations of S-M, Vṛṣabha and Durga can thus be linked and as the explanation of Durga, the most ancient of the three commentators, is closest in spirit to my explanation, I consider my explanation to be free from conflict with their explanations. Even if it were to be thought of as conflicting, I would retain the freedom to recover an earlier understanding on the basis of evidence preserved in the works of a relatively early author like BH, who lived before S-M and Vṛṣabha and may not have been far removed in time from Durga.

§2.16 As stated in §2.8, we should accept as correct that interpretation of TKV 1.5 which agrees with the notion of mantra. It would be natural to maintain such an expectation or requirement because the Vedas have primarily been considered to be mantra.³² Now, the invariant understanding of mantra, whether we speak of the Vedic/Brahmanical, Buddhist or Jain tradition, is that a mantra is a formulation in language that is assumed to have the power to affect the physical world or what, at the moment of the formulation's application, is thought to be reality. This implies that a close connection between language and material objects or forces seen as material is assumed.³³ Statements such as Bhava-bhūti's (Uttara-rāma-carita 1.10) capture this understanding: *ṛṣiṇām punar ādyānām vācam artho 'nudhāvati*. "In the case of the foremost (or most ancient) seers, content comes running behind the utterance (that is, in the case of such seers the meaning of

³¹ Since I cannot make a contextually appropriate sense of the reading found in the edns, which literally means 'exceedingly/absolutely unprecedented,' I have followed the emendation that occurred to me as expressing a contextually suitable meaning. Besides, a corruption of *°ntārūpyo* into *°ntāpūrvō* is plausible.

³² In the thinking of the believers, the special power of the Vedic word must have something to do with its source or the way in which it is formed. Either way, there will be a close connection with the power or the process through which the Veda comes into being or is revealed.

³³ (a) Alper (1989: 12) reports that Agehananda Bharati (1965: 102) saw, in the mantra concept, generation of a "somewhat complex feeling-tone" in the practitioner. Alper speaks of the same as "emotive numinous effect" on the practitioner. Such a generation or effect, being physical, supports my observation here. However, it will only be a part of what I mean by "physical effect." Closer to what I have in mind is Hacker's (1972: 118) remark (reported in Alper 1989: 14): "From ancient times there has been in India the conviction that mental representations, if reaching a high degree of intensity, are capable of bringing about a reality not only on the psychological level but even in the domain of material things."

(b) The terms "material" and "non-material" are useful, but we should not forget that the distinction between the material and the non-material is not always made in the same way in the Sanskrit tradition as it is in the Western. For example, prakṛti, distinguished from the non-material puruṣa, is viewed as the cause of mind etc., generally considered to be non-material, in the philosophy of the Sāṃkhya. There, materiality has gradation.

what they say is anxious to transform itself into reality, whereas, in the case of the ordinary good people, reality simply corresponds to what they say; such people are only truthful; they are not makers of truth)." The mantras are unlikely to have been assigned this power to transform material reality if an intimate connection between them and the properties of objects was not admitted.³⁴ The situation should be analogous to the one noticed in the determination of merit-producing grammatical expressions. (*sādhū śabdas*). Just as the *śiṣṭas* are said to be able to determine which expressions have the capacity to lead to merit in a given period, the *ṛṣis* of the creation stage should be able to determine which realizations of *vāc* are conducive to the good of men and hence should be transmitted or admitted in Veda formation.³⁵ The connection of such realizations with the contents of creation itself should be, in early Brahmanical or Indian thinking, the basis of their efficacy at the physical level.

§2.17 One need not establish a one-to-one correspondence between the Veda statements, their correspondence with the real world, and their mantratva, 'ability to affect the real world.' That *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva* is a cause of the *vāc* experience need not necessarily mean that a capturing or publicly accessible verbalizing of the experience has a mantric effect or an ability to recreate the experience or the reality. X leading to Y need not give Y's resemblance an uplifting quality (a potential for causing spiritual growth) or an ability to affect the world, or to acquire X (*sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva*) itself. One, therefore, needs, also the persons who know or can know the real properties of things in terms of which properties are beneficial and which ones harmful and under what situations. In the ancient Indian view as preserved or presented by BH (and probably also by Yāska), the Veda the first seers make accessible has the potential to shape and affect³⁶ reality, that is, it has mantratva, but, to be operative or useful, that potential of it needs seers who have the knowledge of properties of objects

³⁴ Passages in BH which speak of mantras affecting objects are: TKV 1.33, 174; TK 2.323 and its Vṛtti.

³⁵ (a) The maharṣis may also be able, in BH's universe, to determine which particular benefits can result from a particular variation (*ūha*).

(b) Although I speak only of *dharma* and benefits in most contexts in order not to make any statements more complicated than they need to be, the opposites *adharma*, harm and absence or blocking of benefit should also be understood wherever appropriate.

³⁶ TK 1.10 and its Vṛtti speak of the Veda as a *vidhātṛ* ('fashioner, maker'), through *prakṛitva* ('being the constituting material') and through *upadeṣṭṛ-rūpa* ('teaching role'). The second attribution applies to *vyavasthās* ('establishments, arrangements, fixities, a series of regularities') subsequent to creation. Under it, the programmatic or gene-like role of the Veda is replaced by a textbook-like role. The Veda then does not shape creation organically but by being a kind of manual or blue print that the *ṛṣis* acquire or retrieve and interpret. A similar thought is expressed in Mānava-dharma-śāstra/Manu-smṛiti 1.21: *sarveṣāṃ tu sa [= Ādi-brahmā] nāmāni karmāṇi ca prthak prthak/veda-śabdebhya evādau prthak samsthās ca nirmame//*

and who know which of the Veda's linguistic units or sequences go with which object properties.

§2.18 We need to respect the 'avara : āpara' difference of reading as appendix 4 points out. While the connotation of *avara* may clash with that of *āpara* (Wezler 2001: 218-222), there can be no doubt that both words convey otherness. This common ground suffices for our understanding. The secondary differences will not affect our reconstruction, for the *avara/āpara* belong to the Veda transmission stage and their qualitative difference from the *s-k-d* ṛṣis or lack of relevance to revelation *per se* is made clear by the adjective *a-s-k-d* applied to them. For the same reasons, whether they are to be thought of as ṛṣis, albeit of a different sort (śrutarṣi), should not concern us.³⁷ Further, the issue of whether they are literally one group or generation of human beings or simply a logical category distinguished from the *s-k-d* ṛṣis that, in actuality, consisted of several groups or generations need not come in our way. An abstraction or lumping together of all those who received the *s-n-a vāc* (or the mantras or the Veda text or the *bilma*) and who set down for transmission (note 7) the Veda and Vedāṅgas (including the *Nighaṇṭu* and its commentary, the *Nirukta*) will do for our purpose.

§2.19 Regardless of what the older or original meaning of *bilma* may be, it cannot be doubted that BH uses the word in the present context in some such sense as 'representation, replica, image, resemblance, reflection.' It is the only word in the *Vṛtti* that can correspond to *anukāra* 'doing/acting/fashioning after' found in the *kārikā*. The gloss *bhāsanam*, 'being/becoming visible' or 'one that makes something visible,' taken over from the then current (but not necessarily unguine) text of the *Nirukta* also points in the same direction, just as the fact that *Vṛṣabha* (pp. 22, 24-25) glosses both *anukāra* and *bilma* with *praticchandaka* 'likeness, picture, statue, image, substitute'.

As far as Yāska is concerned, the *bilma* must, minimally, be something related to the mantras. Otherwise, there will be no useful connection between his second sentence and third sentence. The two assertions, 'The *avara/āpara* got the mantras' and 'The *avara/āpara* set down for transmission certain texts,' will have a common subject or agent, but why they are made one after the other will not be known. Something relating the mantras and the texts must occur in the latter assertion. Since *upadeśa* is too general a word and *veda* comes as one among the triad (*imaṁ grantham ... vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca*), claiming no exclusive connection with mantra, only *bilma* can provide the necessary link through *bilma-grahaṇāya*. The entity it

³⁷ Wezler (2001: 225 fn 51) informs us about a new division of ṛṣis partly based on traditional considerations that Gurupada Śarma Hāldār (1955: 64) mentions in his *Vṛddha-trayī*.

refers to must either consist of the mantras or be a means to the mantras. Under the first alternative, it would be a collection, recasting (rearrangement, redaction etc.) or reflection of the mantras (the entity received by or revealed to the s-k-d ṛṣis); under the second, at least, something that follows the lead or determining status of the mantras. Neither meaning would be irreconcilable with that of *anukāra* 'doing/acting/fashioning after.'

§2.20 After this consideration of the crucial words that are common to what originates with BH and what he cites, we should briefly touch upon one final word from the first part in which some potential to influence our emerging interpretation may be seen. Although BH quotes a few passages from a text or class of texts he calls *Purā-kalpa*, the statement ending with *ity eṣa purā-kalpaḥ* is merely a summation of what BH learned from the *Purā-kalpa* text or texts, or their fragments surviving in his time, not a verbatim reproduction or quotation in the strict sense of the term "quotation." The statement's diction does not match that of the *Purā-kalpa* passage BH actually quotes in TKV 1.124-128. It has the stamp of BH's own style as it is found in the TKV.³⁸ Vṛṣabha does not take BH's *purā-kalpaḥ* as a reference to a specific text but as meaning *artha-vāda*, 'a statement stating or implying recommendation or non-recommendation of a proposition in the Veda.'

§2.21 Maintaining as much awareness of the foregoing considerations as is possible to maintain and expecting my readers to do the same, I will now translate TKV 1.5 as follows:

"*anukāra* (etc. in the commentandum is meant to convey the following):
About to reveal³⁹ to those others who have not discovered the (ordinarily

³⁸ (a) Note the expressions *pravedayiṣyamāṇāḥ*, *drṣṭa-śrutānubhūtam* and *ācikyāsantaḥ* which are unlikely to occur, especially so close to each other, in the Sanskrit exemplified by the surviving of *Purā-kalpa* passages. Also, distinctive is the sequence of adjectives *sūkṣmām nityām alindriyām* and *ṛṣayaḥ sūkṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇaḥ mantradṛśaḥ* which matches the question-anticipating style noted elsewhere in the TKV. For an explanation of this stylistic feature, see Aklujkar 1991b: §2.4h.

(b) At one point, I did lean toward the view that BH's words *yām ... ācikyāsantaḥ* were a quotation from the *Purā-kalpa* as Wezler (2001: 240) reports.

³⁹ It is unlikely that *pra* in *pra + vid* is not significant. It could be an intensifier (as in *pravarṣa* 'heavy rain,' *prasānta* 'very calm' etc.), carry the connotation of 'being ahead, being in the front, foremostly' (as in *pra + jñā* etc.) or give the verbal root a sense of 'reveal, make manifest' (as in *kāma-pravedana* of Pāṇini 3.3.153). A translation like 'about to make (that vāc) well known, wishing to enable the recipients to grasp (that vāc) well,' a translation like "about to convey for the first time," or a translation like 'as those who will reveal (that vāc)' will fit the context. I have preferred the last alternative because it would conform to Pāṇini's usage and Mahābhārata 7.52.1 (critical edn): *śrutvā tu taṁ mahā-sabdāṁ pāṇḍūnāṁ putra-grddhinām/cāraiḥ prevedite tatra samutthāya jayad-rathaḥ*/. "When the informants communicated that (thing, the news) after having heard the loud sound made by the son-loving Pāṇḍavas, Jayad-ratha, having got up (went

imperceptible) properties of things that subtle, eternal and sense-transcending (form of) speech which they (themselves) behold, the seers who have discovered the (ordinarily imperceptible) properties of things (and) to whom materially effective speech formations appear⁴⁰ set down for transmission an image,⁴¹ as they wish to convey, like something that happened in a dream, what they experienced through sighting and hearing.⁴² This (i.e., the content of the foregoing sentence) is an ancient (or traditionally handed down) thought formulation (or systematized knowledge). Indeed, [another reliable or respectable source, the Nirukta] says: 'There came about (or there were) (at a distant time) seers who had discovered the (ordinarily imperceptible) properties of things. Through instruction, they have entrusted⁴³ materially effective speech formations

to the gathering of the allied kings)." One expects an association of revealing something that had remained previously unknown in the case of informants or spies in this context.

⁴⁰ The qualification *mantra-dṛśaḥ*, to judge from its position in the sentence, could have a sense approaching that of a present participle: 'as the mantras appear to them, while they are in the act of seeing the mantras.' In other words, there is no essential difference between seeing the mantras and seeing the subtle, permanent and sense-transcending form of *vāc*. However, the mantras do not exhaust the specified form of *vāc*; the domains covered by the two terms are overlapping but not coextensive.

⁴¹ (a) As §2.19 indicates, I do not need to make a special effort to find a perfect translation (if there is such a thing as perfect translation) for *anukāra* in the present essay. At present, I think that "image" works best, because it can convey resemblance as well as the capability to function in the place of the original (= the s-n-a *vāc*) that are the contextually necessary meaning components of *anukāra*.

(b) The comments in Carpenter 1985: 194 are helpful in understanding the notion of *anukāra*: "To say that the Veda, as *anukāraḥ*, is the "imitative resemblance" of Brahman should not be taken to mean, however, that the Veda somehow offers us a "description" of Brahman. For Bhartṛ-hari, the function of Vedic revelation is not to provide us with a representation of the "object" Brahman. Rather, the Veda functions as an imitative "presentation" or *Darstellung* of the unity of Brahman, mediating Brahman directly through the dynamic idiom of language and action in their inseparable interrelationship. The Veda is thus the outward linguistic form of the dynamic self-manifesting act of the Word-Principle itself. By virtue of this, it can itself be described as the "arranger" of the world, as a cosmogonic principle essentially identical with Brahman. In its concrete linguistic form, however, the Veda mediates the unity of Word-Principle by manifesting the original order through which the world is related back to its unitary source." Carpenter (1995: 41) further defends the rendering 'imitative resemblance' by drawing attention to the formation of the word and its uses by BH elsewhere.

⁴² Cf. Vṛṣabha pp. 24-25: *dṛṣṭa-śrutam iti. napuṃsake bhāve ktaḥ tena darśana-śravaṇābhyām anubhūtam artham ... dṛṣṭa-śruta-grahaṇam sarvendriya-jñānopalakṣaṇāya*. "(The words) *dṛṣṭa* and *śruta* (in the commentandum are derived by adding the past participial suffix) *kta* (= *ta*), so that a neuter (noun) in the sense 'state, action' (is derived). Thus, (the compound *dṛṣṭa-śrutānubhūtam* comes to mean) 'an entity experienced through seeing and hearing. ... The employment of *dṛṣṭa* and *śruta* is meant to stand for cognition through all senses."

⁴³ *sam + pra + dā* literally means 'give forth/away in entirety (or as a collectivity).' Such a meaning could imply, at least in certain contexts, 'absence of holding back anything associated with the object being given, relinquishing of ownership or responsibility, making the recipient responsible'; cf. the use of the same prefix and root combination for the action of giving the daughter away in marriage that our standard dictionaries record. As mantras are also considered to be valuable, a sense of expecting the recipient to be responsible for their preservation is likely to be present in the transaction. Hence my translation with "entrust".

to others who had not discovered the (ordinarily imperceptible) properties of things. The others experiencing fatigue toward instruction, have set down for transmission⁴⁴ this corpus (i.e., the commentandum of the Nirukta, the Nighantus etc.; see Aklujkar 1999: fn 9) and the Veda and the Veda ancillaries in order to grasp the image.⁴⁵ (The word) *bilma* is (to be thought of as) *bhilma* or (as) *bhāsana*.⁴⁶

§2.22 The involved sentences of the foregoing literal translation can perhaps be made easier to follow by the following summary:

'The TKV 1.5 passage speaks of two groups. One group consists of seers who discover dharma(s)/dharman(s), sight mantras and behold a form of *vāc*, which is beyond the senses of ordinary people. They wish to reveal the *vāc* they have beheld to others who have not discovered dharma(s)/dharman(s). In the act or for the act of revealing, they do a *samāmnāya* of *bilma* (§2.19). The recipients of the *bilma* constitute the second group.'

It will be noticed that the syntactic simplicity of these summary sentences has come at the cost of switching from normal English to 'Indologese' — of not translating the culturally and theoretically pregnant words of the original,

⁴⁴ (a) I have attempted to indicate in my translation the change from the perfect *babhūvuh* of the first sentence to the aorists *samprāduh* and *samāmnāsiṣuh* in the second and third sentences. As Bhandarkar (1868: vi-x) pointed out, the aorist in the early period of Sanskrit functions the same way as the English present perfect (i.e., it denotes past in general and the recent past) and that this deduction of his based on a study of the attested usage is in keeping with Pāṇini 3.2.110-111, 3.2.115 and 3.3.135. In other words, the aorist forms indicate flowing of the past into the speaker's present — the actions expressed are presumed to have a connection with the speaker's present. Evidently, the gift of the mantras and the transmission of the Veda and the Vedāṅgas (including what the Nirukta comments on, the referent of *imam grantham*) were viewed by Yāska as activities related to his own time through their effects or products, while the s-k-d seers were viewed by him as coming into being or existing in a very distant past. He had no access to the s-k-ds (they were a cut-off fact), but what they gifted to the later generations and what the later generations composed to grasp the gift was within his reach.

(b) For other understandings of the difference between the meanings of the perfect and aorist forms, see Wezler 2001: 219.

⁴⁵ As our concern here is with how BH understood Yāska, and not with Yāska himself, I am presupposing BH's 'anukāra' interpretation of *bilma* and genitive tat-puruṣa dissolution of *bilma-grahanāya*.

⁴⁶ (a) In the '*bilma* : *bhilma*' equation, one can read a suggestion to the effect that *bhilma* is easier to understand for Yāska's reader than *bilma* or that *bilma* is a deviation from the familiar *bhilma*, a form current in a different time or region. The requisite phonetic similarity exists between the two forms. Such is not the case with *bhāsana*. So, if one insists that *bhilma* and *bhāsana* must be thought of as prompted by exactly the same intent, one must translate the sentence as "The meaning of *bilma* is the same as that of *bhilma* or *bhāsana*." Here, *vā* or "or" would be indicative of an alternative or of addition. There would be no commitment on the sentence author's part as to whether the meanings of *bhilma* and *bhāsana* are different. It is, therefore, possible that BH thought of both *bhilma* and *bhāsana* as leading to his rendition by *anukāra* (§ 2.19), although normally one would have thought only of *bhāsana* 'an act/instrument of reflecting' as capable of suggesting the idea of *anukāra*. Either such synonymy or the appearance of *bhāsana* in the second (i.e., final) place, which the Sanskrit authors usually reserve for stating their preferred view, could have prompted him to understand *bilma* as *anukāra*.

(b) Commentators have taken *bhilma* as a derivative of the root *bhid* 'to break.' As *bhās* is not attested in the sense of 'breaking,' a consequence of this derivation can only be that *vā* should indicate an alternative.

which required several paragraphs above for their clarification (and have been the subject of countless paragraphs in other publications).

§2.23 In the translation in §2.21, I have used “discover” for *sākṣāt* + *kr*, “appear, sight” for *-dṛś* (“catch sight of” may also do) and “behold” for *paś* (“notice” too would be acceptable to me). This is largely to highlight the fact that the original Sanskrit passage uses three historically different root words (one of them joined to a gati prefix) that are usually taken as practically synonymous. Among these, the translation of the first has received some justification from me in §2.10. It also fits the frame the other relevant theoretical concepts form. However, I would not claim that the semantic distinction I have made between *dṛś* and *paś* (found to be in complementary distribution at the formal level) is exclusively valid. I surmise on the basis of the early occurrences of *dṛś* and *paś* recorded in our standard dictionaries that *dṛś* was originally used for those situations in which the experience of seeing was thought of as initiated by the object. The root seems to have a sense closer to that of “appear.” Thus, not being subject-controlled, it could have the connotation of an experience that was occasional and time-limited. *paś*, on the other hand, seems to be closer to English “observe” or “spot” and to carry a suggestion of steadiness or intent on the part of the subject/agent (cf. the historical relationship of *paś* with *spaś* and its Indo-European cognates including “spy”). Such a distinction between the meanings of the two roots may be said to be supported by the accounts in the Bṛhad-devatā etc. that speak of mantra seeing as something happening sporadically and unexpectedly. Seeing of the s-n-a vāc, on the other hand, is more likely to be conceived as a result of intensive and sustained effort, since that vāc is the highest reality, and its experience is akin to a trance. The phenomena may essentially be the same, but the associations authors like BH have with them would determine word choice.

In his article “Justification for verb-root suppletion in Sanskrit,” Professor Madhav M. Deshpande (1992), suggests, on the basis of passages such as *uta tvaḥ paśyan na dadarśa vācam* (Ṛg-veda 10.71.4a), that *paś* expresses seeing stretched out in time (cf. English “observe” and “gaze”) and *dṛś* expresses seeing as a conclusive event (cf. English “see”). This suggestion does not conflict with what I have surmised, but the basis of the aspect difference implicit in it is different from the one I have presumed. I also consider it possible that *paś* had a connotation of wishing to locate or to spot (a presumption of searching), whereas *dṛś* had a connotation of perceiving the object as it really is (cf. *paśyantī* as the name of a language level or phase in which a speaker is thought to be in search of the appropriate linguistic form to express the meaning he/she has in mind and *darśana* as standing for a view of what is reality or is believed to be reality). Any attempt to determine the shades of meaning, however, would not succeed if the

instances of use of *paś* and *drś* in close proximity come from a period in which the usage is prompted merely by a formal or grammatical convention (as, for example, is the case with forms like “be,” “am,” and “was” in English).

Another interesting feature of the original is that all the seemingly synonymous root words have been used with respect to objects — dharma, mantra and vāc — we would not normally think of as amenable to the act of seeing taken in a physical sense. Clearly, BH expects us to take ‘seeing’ in a metaphorical sense. This, in itself, is not problematic. It is quite common, probably in all languages but particularly in the Indo-European languages, to use “see” in the extended senses such as ‘observe,’ ‘perceive,’ ‘find out,’ ‘understand’ and ‘visually imagine.’ What is problematic is that in the present case we do not know what the intended extensions could be.

The second TK passage having a bearing on Veda revelation

§3.1 Context: TK 1.173: *avibhāgād vivṛtānām abhikhyā svapnavac chrutau / bhāva-tattvaṃ tu vijñāya liṅgebhyo vihitā smṛtiḥ* // “Those (ṛṣis) who evolve from the (ultimate) unity (namely, brahman) come to know⁴⁷ the Śruti as (ordinary persons come to know something) in a dream. As for⁴⁸ the Smṛti, it is fashioned on the basis of the indications (in the Śruti) after knowing the real nature of things.”

TKV 1.173: ... *yeṣāṃ tu svapna-prabodha-vṛtṭyā nityaṃ vibhakta-puruṣānukāritayā kāraṇaṃ pravartate teṣāṃ — ṛṣayaḥ kecit pratibhātmani vivartante. te [taṃ] sattā-lakṣaṇaṃ mahāntam ātmānam avidyā-yoniṃ paśyantaḥ prabodhenābhisambhavanti.*⁴⁹ *kecit tu vidyāyāṃ vivartante. te mano-granthim ātmānam ākāśādiṣu bhūteṣu, pratyekaṃ samuditeṣu vā, viśuddham anibaddha-parikalpaṃ tathāivābhisambhavanti.*⁵⁰ *teṣāṃ cāgantur avidyā-vyavahāraḥ sarva evaupa-cārikaḥ. vidyātmakatvaṃ tu nityaṃ anāgantukaṃ mukhyam. te ca, svapna ivāśrotra-gamyaṃ śabdaṃ, prajñayaiva sarvaṃ āmnāyaṃ sarva-bheda-śakti-yuktam abhinna-śakti-yuktam ca paśyanti. kecit tu*

⁴⁷ From the way the Vṛtti renders the idea of this kārikā half (*svapna iva ... āmnāyaṃ ... paśyanti*), it is evident that the intended sense of *abhikhyā* must be something like ‘see’ or ‘grasp’. The root *khyā* contains elements of ‘seeing’ and ‘telling, conveying’ (cf. its use in *khyāli, samprakhyāna, ākhyāna, khyāta, vikhyāta* etc. and the forms resulting from its reduplication, namely *caḥ, caḥsus*). The prefix *abhi* indicates ‘facing, being in front of.’ The meanings the commonly used dictionaries record for *abhi* + *khyā* appropriately range in the same general area, with ‘impressiveness, beauty’ and ‘being well-known, celebrated’ as understandable extensions. Accordingly, I take the noun *abhikhyā* as basically meaning ‘the process of coming to know, the state of encountering someone or something.’

⁴⁸ The use of *tu* ‘however, on the other hand’ here is prompted by the intention to convey that the Smṛti needs something more to come into existence, not to suggest that there is a stark contrast or absence of relationship between the Śruti and the Smṛti.

⁴⁹ I have followed here Vṛṣabha’s reading *prabodhena* instead of the reading *pratibodhena* of the currently available TKV mss and the published edns. Also, *prabodhena* is supported by TKV 2.152, quoted in note 54 below.

⁵⁰ Unfortunately, Vṛṣabha’s commentary on this sentence is very poorly preserved.

puruṣānugrahopaghāta-viśayaṁ teṣāṁ teṣāṁ arthānāṁ sva-bhāvam upalabhyāmanāyeṣu kvacit tad-viśayāni [tat-tad-°] liṅgāni dṛṣtvā ca, dṛṣṭādrṣṭārthāṁ smṛtiṁ upanibadhnanti. śrutiṁ tu yathā-darśanam avyabharita-śabdāṁ eva, prathamam avibhaktāṁ punaḥ samgrhīta-caraṇa-vibhāgāṁ, samāmananti— ty āgamaḥ.

The inherited view⁵¹ of those who think that the (original) cause⁵² constantly (that is, again and again)⁵³ proceeds forth (to create), in the manner of sleeping and waking up,⁵⁴ fashioning itself after the individual persons (or the distinct puruṣas) is this: Some seers come about as a multiplicity⁵⁵ in the unitary entity pratibhā (that is, at a stage which is just one step short of reaching brahman and to reach which most persons must go through a long process of spiritual cultivation). They, seeing that (pratibhāman which is the same as) mahat ātman, the one characterized by Being (alone, that is, the one which is the undifferentiated or highest-level existence), matrix of nescience,⁵⁶ join that

⁵¹ The relative clause beginning with *yeṣāṁ* finds its fulfilment in *teṣāṁ . . . ity āgamaḥ*. (I have separated, with dashes, the sentences between *teṣāṁ* and *ity āgamaḥ* that specify the nature of āgama). In the translation, I have brought this syntactic connection forward to facilitate comprehension.

⁵² The use of *kāraṇa*, 'one which makes something else active,' is attested elsewhere in the context of the very first cause; cf. Sāṃkhya-kārikā 16: *kāraṇam asty avyaktam. pravartate tri-guṇataḥ . . .*; 'There is (thus) the unmanifest cause. It becomes active on account of the three strands ...'

⁵³ Vṛṣabha p. 226: *nityam iti śāśvatam. kāraṇam iti sambandhaḥ*. However, I think that *nityam* here is an adverb connected with *pravartate* and has the sense 'as a given' or 'recurringly, constantly'; cf. *nitya-prahasita* 'frequently laughing,' *nitya-prajalpita* 'chattering, talkative' etc. cited by Patañjali (MB 1.7 and under P 8.1.4 III.364). Given the specification *svapna-prabodha-vṛttyā* ('as sleep is followed by awakening and awakening by sleep') and the presence of *vibhaktapurūṣānukāritayā* between *nityam* and *kāraṇam*, such an understanding of the sentence would be more natural than Vṛṣabha's, unless by *kāraṇam* Vṛṣabha means the phrase *kāraṇam pravartate*.

⁵⁴ TKV 2.152: *kācīt svābhāviki pratibhā. tad yathā parasyāḥ [prakṛteḥ pra] thamaṁ sattā-lakṣaṇam ātmānaṁ mahāntaṁ praty ānugūṇyaṁ, suṣuṭtāvasthasyeva prabodhānugūṇyaṁ phala-sattā-mātram [→ phala-mātram?] nidrāyāḥ*. "Some action-prone knowledge exists naturally (i.e., arises from its very context or state of being — does not need a conscious effort). An example (of this is the) conducive stance of the highest nature (i.e., the most primary cause, the śabda-tattva brahman or prakṛti) toward the mahat ātman, the first (evolute) characterized by (worldly) existence (which stance is) like a sleeping person becoming prone to waking up merely as a consequence (*phala*, or as an existence of a consequence) of the sleep (he/she had)."

This Vṛtti passage which is related in content to TKV 1.173, suggests that the intention in TKV 1.173 too is more likely to be to speak of the fact that sleep and waking follow each other naturally (at least in the case of most persons considered to be normal).

⁵⁵ BH has used the root *vi + vṛt* or its derivatives in speaking of the seers, a group of whom receives revelation. As *vi + vṛt* (taken in the sense 'change only apparently') is later contrasted rather sharply with *pari + nam* (taken in the sense 'to change really, to undergo an actual transformation'), a question may arise as to the truth of the arising of the seers and of the revelation experienced by them. BH's use of the dream analogy may further be used to question the revelation's truth. However, the primary import of *vi + vṛt* in BH's writings is not illusory change but 'arising of many effects from a single source or cause.' When these many effects are thought of as a collectivity, even *pari + nam* can be used. I have substantiated this semantic reconstruction in an unpublished article.

⁵⁶ Nescience is the cause of the subsequent evolutes in the view being stated at this point. When these evolutes are looked at from the point of view of the original or highest reality, they do not

(pratibhātman),⁵⁷ through awakening (that is, through advanced awareness, realizing the ultimate futility of multiplicity). Some⁵⁸ (seers), on the other hand, come about as a multiplicity in vidyā.⁵⁹

They, likewise,⁶⁰ join the ātman that has the knot of mind (that is, the atman equipped and delimited for engagement with the world and that, yet, remains) pure (and) conception-free with respect to the elements ether etc., taken jointly or severally. Their adventitious, nescience-based interaction (with the world) is not literally so (that is, it can be predicated of them only through a transfer of ordinary persons' attributes to them). What is constant, intrinsic and primary (to them) is (their) vidyā-nature. They see (our) traditionally handed down text in its entirety with insight alone as one would hear in sleep a word (or sound) inaccessible to the sense of hearing — (the text) having all the powers of differentiation and having the powers inseparable (from itself, i.e., the subtle

really exist. Yet at the level of ordinary experience they are very much real. Therefore, a force that would account for their not-true-to-reality apprehension needs to be presumed between them, on the one hand and either the mahān ātman or the ultimate cause, on the other.

⁵⁷*abhi + sam + bhū*, which must literally mean 'come into existence as a whole and as something facing (= appear next to, link up with),' is appropriately attested in the senses 'reach, arrive at' and 'obtain the shape of, be changed into' (cf. Monier-Williams, p.73) and glossed with *prāpnuvanti* and *ekī-bhavanti* (Vṛṣaṭ-ḥa, pp. 226-227).

⁵⁸(a) A contrast between *pratibhātmani vivartante* and *vidyāyām vivartante* is intended in the context. The essence in different uses of *pratibhā* by BH seems to be that of 'action-centred knowledge, a state in which what will happen or is to be done presents itself to the mind.' An element of passivity or neutrality (of which 'lack of conscious control' and 'spontaneity' would be other descriptions) may be said to be implicit in the present context. How *pratibhā* differs from *vidyā* is not entirely clear, but the contextual indications lead me to surmise that *vidyā* is knowledge in which informational content is prominent. Knowledge of itmes as well as how they work or are to be used, association with mind or worldly personality (*mano-granthi*) and engagement with the constituents of the world (*bhūtas*) seem to shape it in the translated passage. Those who come to exist in *vidyā* are not said to differ in wisdom, spirituality or capability from those who come to exist in *pratibhātman*. However, they are open to an engagement with the world and are capable of descending, without becoming 'polluted,' to a level that would be lower in the estimation of liberation-seekers. The ones coming to exist in *pratibhātman*, on the other hand, have no proneness to engagement with the world. They remain at what would be thought of as a higher stage on the path of liberation.

(b) The myths in which *Brahmā* or *Prajāpati* first gives birth to some sons who turn away from the world to asceticism and are utterly free from delusion and in which only the second batch of *Brahmā*'s or *Prajāpati*'s sons help him in continuing with the creation of the world should be recalled, as also the passages speaking of the mind-born sons of *Brahmā* or giving one or both lists of *Saptarṣis*; cf. *Agni-purāṇa* ch. 17.15-16; *Mahā-bhārata* 12.160.15-16; *Vāmama-purāṇa*, *Saro-māhātmya* section, *Adhyāya* 22, A.S. Gupta's critical edn., p. 247; O'Flaherty 1975; Dimmitt 1978: 155-156, which translates *Kūrma Purāṇa* 1.10.1-38, and p. 310; Mitchiner 1982, particularly pp. 233-248. The structure implicit in these myths etc. is reflected in the philosophical statement translated here. BH may have preserved for us the earliest Indian understanding of the specified complex of texts.

⁵⁹The word *tathaiva* of the original could not have been meant to convey that the object of becoming one is exactly identical; *mano-granthi* is not mentioned in the case of the first merger. The intention behind the use of *tathaiva*, therefore, must be to convey sameness in the manner ('without delusion, without any loss of purity') or intensity of merger.

form of the authoritative Veda.).⁶⁰ Some (of them), additionally,⁶¹ having ascertained the nature of specific entities as it concerns the helping or harming of humans and having seen indications to that effect in some parts of the traditionally received texts, compose the Smṛti, meant for mundane and non-mundane objects. As for the Śruti, they set (it) down for transmission (note 7) as it was seen (in the experience described above), without a change of wording (or sound) whatsoever — initially, undivided (i.e., as a single corpus), later incorporating the caranā division (see appendix 1, note to point 5).⁶²

§3.2 A part of the second passage, TKV 1.173, is structurally parallel to the first passage, TKV 1.5. The phrases *svapna ivāśrotra-gamyam śabdam* (echoing *abhikhyā svapnavac.chrutau* of the *kārikā*) and *prajñayaiva sarvam āmnāyam sarva-bheda-śakti-yuktam abhinna-śakti-yuktam ca paśyanti* establish its connection with the first passage, since they mean “as one would hear in sleep a word (or sound) inaccessible to the sense of hearing” and “They see (our) traditionally handed down text in its entirety with insight/mind alone — (the text) having all the powers of differentiation and having the powers inseparable (from itself).”⁶³ The additional details TKV 1.173 provides can, therefore, be used in pursuing our objective.

The seers who arise as a multiplicity ‘in vidyā’ are credited with the transmission of the Veda as Yāska’s s-k-ds are credited with the bestowing of mantras and BH’s s-k-ds are credited with the conveying of the s-n-a vāc.

⁶⁰(a) I have taken *sarva* as a qualification of *śakti* in light of TK 1.2 and its Vṛtti. It is also possible to take the word as qualifying *bheda* and translate as ‘power (or potential) for all differentiation.’ But what such a translation conveys may not ultimately be different from “all powers of differentiation.”

(b) Vṛṣabha p. 228: *sarva-bheda-śakti iti nānā-phala-janaka-karma-prakāśakatvāt. abhinna-śakti iti, yad anekam apy ekam karma prakāśayati. yad utkam sarva-śākhā-pratyayam ekam karma iti.* “The author speaks of the āmnāya as *sarva-bheda-śakti-yukta* because the āmnāya enlightens us about variously productive actions. He employs the adjective *abhinna-śakti-yukta*, because more than one Vedic text throws light upon the same action. As has been said, the various recensions of the āmnāya jointly enlighten us about a single ritual action.” Although it is thus possible to make sense of the adjectives as informing us about the āmnāya text, I think the adjectives were really meant for the basis of the āmnāya text (the subtle form of language or brahman). They are too ontological to be applicable to a text literally. One would not normally ascribe a *bheda-śakti* (all *bheda-śaktis* at that) to a text in the conventional sense. Nor is a query like ‘Are the powers separate?’ likely to be raised in the case of a text.

⁶¹The function of *tu* at this place cannot be to suggest a contrast of the predicate of the preceding sentence with the predicate of the sentence underway. The particle is meant simply to indicate that the author is now turning to another ‘scene’ or adding a new thought.

⁶²The stages spoken of in this passage remind one of the śabda-pūrva-yoga process mentioned in TKV 1.14-22 and of the process of paramātma-siddhi, attainment of the amṛta brahma or kṣema-prāpti mentioned in TK 1.144 and its Vṛtti (which includes TK 1.145-48).

⁶³In TKV 1.5, we do not have a clear mention of the cosmogonical context of Veda revelation. Perhaps only a hint to the effect that it is a phenomenon belonging to the beginning of creation can be read in the assertion that division is absent in the beginning. However, in TK 1.173 and its Vṛtti, it is made explicit that the revelation talked about takes place at the time of cosmic creation.

The same vidyā seers are also credited with the knowledge of what in a thing brings benefit and what causes harm, as well as with the composition of the Smṛtis which preserve this knowledge. The sāksāt-kṛta-dharmatva must, therefore, have a close connection with knowing the properties of things, and the meaning of dharma in its context must be 'property, quality, attribute' (cf. §2.13-15).

§3.3 The fact that we are not required to propose any unusual meaning but can make do with one of the most common meanings (in my view, the oldest meaning) of *dharma* should suggest that we are on the right track.

Our surmise receives support from a few other TK passages. Just before our passage 2, BH brings up the topic of whether the śāstra (of which the Veda is the foremost in his view) invests actions with the capability for unseen, non-mundane results or whether the śāstra merely throws light on the specific capability (śakti) or nature (sva-bhāva) that an object (bhāva, dravya) employed in such an action already has.⁶⁴ His acceptance of the second view is indicated (a) by the subsequent placing of that view and leaving it unrefuted and (b) by what he conveys elsewhere, including TK 1.173 translated in §3.1 above:

TK 1.171: *sva-bhāvajñaiś ca bhāvānām dṛśyante śabda-śaktayaḥ*. "And the powers of the words are seen by those who know the natures of things."

TKV 1.171: *te [= śiṣṭāḥ] ... dharmādharmasādhana-bhāvena samanvitām śabda-śaktim avyabhicāreṇa paśyanti*. "The śiṣṭas see, without fail, the power of words which can be an instrument of religio-spiritual merit or its opposite."

In such passages, the śakti or sva-bhāva, which is substitutable with 'what an entity possesses or displays' and hence is indistinguishable from 'property,' is spoken of as something bestowed on an object. To the extent it relates to dharma (or adharma), it is spoken of simply as detected or determined by persons capable of extraordinary cognition. The relation of dharma to object properties thus presupposed should hold also in the case of the sāksātkāra of dharma.

§3.4 The understanding toward which we are moving conforms to the role BH associates with the śiṣṭas, 'the learned spiritual elite acting without any vested interest.' These individuals are similar to the ṛṣis in some respects. In the following passages, they too are spoken of as having a type of acquaintance with the properties of objects that the ordinary persons cannot have:

TKV 1.37, which has the context of cause-and-effect relationship: *atha ca tapasā nirdagdha-doṣā nirāvaraṇa-khyātayaḥ śiṣṭāḥ pratibimba-kalpena*

⁶⁴The text in question, *latra kecid ācāryāḥ ... parānudyate*, a part of TKV 1.172 (pp. 224-225 of Subramania Iyer's edn), is cited and translated in Aklujkar 2004: 695.

pratyakṣam iva svāsu khyātiṣu samkrāntākāra-parigrahaṁ avyabhicaritaṁ sarvaṁ paśyanti. “Then too (i.e., even under such circumstances), the śiṣṭas, who have thoroughly burnt (any) detracting elements (that might have once existed in their personalities) by ascetic heat and whose cognitions are free from obscurations, see everything, without mistake — (everything) that has transferred (its) form to their cognitions, as if it is right before them, through the formation of a mental counterpart.”⁶⁵

TKV 1.171: *santi tu ... śiṣṭāḥ sarva-jñeyeṣu apratibaddhāntaḥ-prakāśaḥ.* “But there (indeed) are śiṣṭas whose inner light (i.e., power of cognition, intuition including inductive capability) is not impeded with respect to any object.”

TK 3.13.21 in the context of accounting for the difference the grammatical genders constitute: *bhāva-tattvadṛśaḥ śiṣṭāḥ śabdārtheṣu vyavasthitaṁ / yad yad dharme 'ṅgatām eti līṅgaṁ tat tat pracakṣate //* “The śiṣṭas see the real natures of things. They specify the grammatical genders existing in word meanings as they may be conducive to (the revelation or generation of) religio-spiritual merit.”⁶⁶

§3.5 The preceding discussion forms a link with the passages in which pre-BH authors like Caraka and Patañjali speak of *pratyakṣa-dharman* persons. The context of these passages is most commonly that of establishing the properties of things. There probably was a difference of connotation between *s-k-d* and *pratyakṣa-dharman* but, given the obvious overlapping of the core content ‘direct perception of dharma,’ there must be a conceptual relation, too (§2.10).⁶⁷ It makes sense, therefore, that the dharma cognized

⁶⁵If *pratibimba-kalpena* is taken as an adjective having the sense ‘resembling a reflection, functioning in the manner of a reflection,’ as my first instinct would be and as Viṣabha (p. 93) seems to have done, the problem would be that the sentence contains no noun with which the adjective would connect. Taking *kalpa* as a noun and taking *pratibimba-kalpena* as a genitive *tat-puruṣa* would remove this difficulty. However, then, *pratibimba* in its literal and usual sense ‘reflection, the image on the other side’ would not make a significant addition to what the sentence conveys with *pratyakṣam iva*. The translation I have attempted is not entirely satisfactory either, as it overlaps with *samkrāntākāra-parigrahaṁ*.

⁶⁶Cf. Helārāja on this passage: *teṣāṁ [=śiṣṭānāṁ] ca vastu-paramārtha-sākṣātkāritā lakṣaṇam. te hi nirāvaraṇa-khyātayo 'bhīdheyeṣu samavetaṁ strītvādi līṅgaṁ abhyudaye yad yad yasya śabdasya sādhanatām eti tat tad eva tasyācakṣate.*

⁶⁷(a) From the contexts of the occurrences of *s-k-d*, the explanations of Durga and S-M reproduced in appendix 3, the analysis offered in §2.10-14, the glosses cited in notes 15 and 17 above and (b) below, and the considerations advanced in §§5.1-3, I conclude that *s-k-d* connoted knowledge of properties of things based on verification, whereas *pratyakṣa-dharman* conveyed directness of knowledge of properties of things without the specified qualification. Additionally, *s-k-d* may have carried the connotation of coming into being at the beginning of creation and (hence?) of being independent of instruction, which connotation *pratyakṣa-dharman* did not have as a part of its meaning.

by the persons referred to by the two adjectives should be the same, namely properties of things.

§3.6 In both TK-TKV 1.5 and TK-TKV 1.173, having a direct bearing on Veda revelation, we learn that the experience of the seers who witness the subtle, eternal and supra-sensual form of language or the mantras is comparable to a dream (*svapna-vṛttam iva dṛṣṭa-śrūtānubhūtam, svapna ivāśrotra-gamyam śabdām*).⁶⁸ A mixture of seeing and hearing is present in both the references. In one of them, the loss of distinction between seeing and hearing is explicitly acknowledged, and the point is underscored by addition of *anubhūta* 'experienced,' which is not associated with any particular sense faculty.

The suggestion of the passages that the revelation experience cannot be ascribed to any particular indriya has been caught by Vṛṣabha (note 42) and is borne out by TK 3.1.46: *jñānam asmad-viśiṣṭānām tāsu sarvendriyam viduḥ*. "The cognition with respect to those (that is, the universals), which persons superior to us have, is (traditionally) known to be an all-senses (phenomenon)." Interpreting the same remark of BH, Helā-rāja writes: *tathā cāgamah "nedānīm indriyair eva paśyati ghrāṇataḥ śabdām śṛṇoti, pṛṣṭhato rūpāṇi paśyati, apy aṅguly-agreṇa sarvendriyārthān upalabhate"* iti. "And, thus goes (a statement handed down in) the tradition: 'Now he (the seer or yogin) does not perceive only with the senses (or only with specific senses). He hears a sound with (his) nose as a means. He sees forms with (his) back as a means. Why, he can access all objects of senses (even) with the tip of (his) finger!'"

(b) Durga, under Nirukta 7.23, while explaining Yāska's statement *asāv āditya iti purve yājñikāḥ* "This (Vaiśvānara Agni spoken of in RV 1.59.6) is Āditya" says: *vidhi-mantrārtha-vādebhya yajña-satattvam unnīyainam yajñam prayagataḥ prathamam ye cakruḥ, te pūrve yājñikāḥ sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāna ity arthaḥ*. "The first/earlier sacrificers (referred to by Yāska's phrase *pūrve yājñikāḥ*) are those who, having figured out the true nature of sacrifice on the basis of injunctions, mantras and ancillary remarks, performed a sacrifice for the first time; (in other words) the first/earlier sacrificers are sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāna (or the meaning of the phrase *pūrve yājñikāḥ* is the same as that of *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇaḥ*)."

This gloss indicates that the s-k-ds are the ones who try to determine if what they have pieced together from the Veda is borne out by experience — if what they have understood from the Veda really works. The involvement in joining the account gleaned from the scripture with sacrificial performance and in seeking verification (a) of the nature of yajña on the basis of what the Veda actually states and (b) of true yajña on the basis of the outcome shows a spirit of empiricism.

⁶⁸It might be suggested that the entire phrase *svapna-vṛttam iva dṛṣṭa-śrūtānubhūtam* should be understood as expressing the analogy ("like what is seen, heard or experienced in a dream"). However, in that case *vṛttam* 'happened, took place, occurred' would become redundant and there would be no object left for *ācikhyāsantaḥ*. The perceptive commentator Vṛṣabha (pp. 24-25) is, therefore, right in taking only *svapna-vṛttam iva* as expressive of the analogy.

One possible reaction to such passages may be that they contain nonsense or show the 'typical Indian/Asian' tendency of being satisfied with mystic experience as an answer to all problems. However, we should not rule out the possibility that if something is said to be known by all senses simultaneously or by any sense whatsoever, the person making the statement may, in effect, be saying that the thing is not known by perception in the ordinary sense of "perception" but is as undeniable as a perceived object would be. A vivid experience inexplicable in the usual way is not necessarily invalid or mystic. It could be an instance of induction.

Theoretical reconstruction of the Veda revelation process

§4.1 With this much of accumulation of evidence and its analysis, we can now attempt a reconstruction of the Veda revelation process as understood by BH and also try to provide a straightforward account, presupposing that we have by now left behind the difficulties of readings, translations and interpretation. Sometimes it is helpful to read an ancient text in its entirety, translate its passages bearing on a concept as literally and precisely as possible and then forget about the problems of translation etc. and reconstruct the various statements in a sequence convenient to oneself and in one's own words. For this reason, the shoes that have so far traversed the hard rocks of philology should now try to traverse the tilled soil of philosophy.

§4.2 According to BH, there are two kinds of seers at the beginning of creation. Some seers arise as distinct entities at the level of *pratibhā* and do not get involved with the creation process or the world to which the creation process gives rise. Other seers arise as a multiplicity at the level of *vidyā*, 'wisdom' with a wordly profile or use that does not become corrupt and lose its ability to lead to *brahma-prāpti*. The self of these latter is associated with a mind but really remains unsullied. It is they who, in unitary sweeps of cognition, perceive the Veda without the involvement of the usual extrovert senses (or, to state the same extraordinary character of the process differently, with the simultaneous involvement of all the senses or with the cognitive limitations of individual senses transcended). Some among them find out what qualities of things are beneficial and what are harmful and under what circumstances. In some cases, they find supporting indications for this in the Veda or *āmnāya* which they have perceived. With these two streams of information, they compose the *Smṛtis* 'the texts of the recalled, that is, traditionally handed down, knowledge,' which are useful, positively or negatively, to ordinary people.

Secondly, Veda revelation is a recurring process, just like the created world itself. In fact, it co-occurs with creation (presumably without losing the ability to occur within creation). Just as creation is thought to move

from an age of absolute purity to increasing impurity and dissolution, the Veda, in its differentiated form, is suggested to be increasingly in danger of dissipation as the creation ages.

In its subtle form, as something identical with brahman itself, the Veda shapes the world. As an evolute in the early phase of creation, it provides a blueprint, readable by the qualified, for arranging social, cultural, religious and spiritual life. It contains the seeds or principles of guidance regarding how things should be and should not be done.

The continuity or link between the cycles of creation is provided by the seers. Some of them remain in direct contact with the first evolute, the pratibhātman (also expressible as *sattā-lakṣaṇa mahat ātman avidyā-yoni*), not to be involved in differentiation and diversity, preserving the creative energy (probably for the initial phase of the next round of creation). Others, have or acquire and spread the specific knowledge of the properites of physical objects and actions and, being or having become s-k-ds, participate in the transmission of the Veda as a text in the subsequent creation.⁶⁹

§4.3 TKV 1.5, which we studied earlier, mainly informs us about the later part of the process. The place where *mantradīśaḥ* occurs in it indicates that the causal sequence is *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva* 'being those who have directly discovered dharma/dharman,' → *sūkṣma-nityātīndriya-vāg.dṛktva* 'being those who have seen the subtle, eternal and sense-transcendent speech' → *mantra.dṛktva* 'being a seer of mantras.' When read with TKV 1.173 and other less directly relevant passages, it suggests the concept sequence: properties → thing-action relationship (including mantra and Brāhmaṇa) → means of worldly elevation (*abhyudaya*) and of reaching the most beneficial state (*niḥśreyasa*).

The wording of TKV 1.5, further, gives the impression that the mantras are a relatively concrete part derived from the s-n-a vāc. The latter is limitless

⁶⁹(a) Recall the categorical statement TK 1.30: *ṛṣiṇām api yaj jñānam tad apy āgama-pūrvakam* ("The knowledge of even the seers is preceded by inherited knowledge") and its justification in TKV 1.30: *svābhāviḥ hi tasmin [= artha-jñāne] prayatnaḥ phalād vyatiricyeta, svābhāvatāś ca pratyavāyo 'pi lathā-bhūtaḥ prasajyeta*. "If that (knowledge regarding what is good and bad) were natural, the effort (put in) would be delinked from the outcome and there would be the unwelcome outcome that an impediment too would present itself by nature (just as the desired outcome is thought to present itself in the possibility being considered)." Cf. the explanation of *carāṇa-nimittā pratibhā* given in TKV 2.152.

(b) A parallel offering indirect support: Śaṅkara on Vedānta-sūtra 1.3.30: *īśvarāṇām hiraṇya-garbhādīnām varlamāna-kalpādaḥ prādur-bhavaṭām paramēśvarānugrhitānām supta-prabuddhavaṭ kalpāntara-vyavahārād anusamdhānopapattiḥ*. "It makes sense that the lords Hiranya-garbha etc., appearing at the beginning of the present cycle of creation and helped by the Great Lord (the brahman), be able to reconnect (with the earlier creation cycle), for they deal with the other (earlier) creation cycle, as a man awakened from sleep (would deal with what happened before he went to sleep)."

and has no identifiable or expressible self. The mantras, however, have a specific sequence of phonemes. They are precious stones separated from a vast mine. Therefore, the relationship between them and the bilma is practically one of identity. The latter contains them as an *anukāra*, 'likeness' and 'sample,' of the *s-n-a vāc*. Consequently, the bilma is also practically the same as the Veda, although it would primarily refer to an undivided and unorganized collection or pile (*rāṣi*) of mantras, while *veda* would primarily refer to the separated and arranged bodies of mantras (that are like anthologies and have association with practically useful knowledge).⁷⁰ In this form, the Veda is a tool for the bilma, since its manageable size helps one in approaching the undivided bilma (just as the bilma facilitates one's approach to the *s-n-a vāc*). The function it serves in this toolhood is the same as that of the commentandum of Yāska and other Vedāṅgas (although the latter in historical times would connect with the bilma through the Veda). The logic through which the concepts would then be linked for BH can be visually presented as follows: *s-n-a vāc* → (individual) mantras = (as a collection) bilma → Veda → Vedāṅga (including the Nighaṇṭus and the Nirukta; see appendices 1 and 2 for other related considerations).

§4.4 If, as this essay has proceeded, it has been felt that there are related but different forms of the object of revelation, the feeling is justified. From one angle, it is the subtle or eternal form of the Veda that is revealed. As the revelation takes place, this form (one must assume) expands, acquires contours and gains in perceptibility as mantras or mantra-*rāṣi*. It is not specified if it has a limit or if all of it is made the object of communication by the *s-k-d ṛṣi*s, but we should assume that it, though unorganized, has a limit (albeit the individual *ṛṣi* may not be aware of it at the time of witnessing) and that the *s-k-d*s attempt to communicate all of it.

Whether the individual *ṛṣi*s each perceive the same entity or parts/profiles of the entity is also not specified, but, again, given the separateness of the hymns and the accounts available in texts like the *Bṛhad-devatā* (or *Devatānukramaṇi*), we should assume that the latter is the case.

Whether all of the perceived *s-n-a vāc*, i.e., all of the mantras perceived by the various seers become the Veda is the next question that may arise in our minds. The answer would depend on how we interpret *bilma* and *veda*.

⁷⁰(a) Carpenter 1995: 41 does not entertain the intermediate bilma stage: "One presumes that the Veda, prior to its fourfold division by the *ṛṣi*-s, is identical with that True Word itself."

(b) At this point, I am ignoring the inclusion of texts such as the *Brāhmaṇas* in the Veda. See appendix 1, point 6 and notes to point 2, for the reason. Also, the practice of applying the same term (*veda* in this instance) to cover entities which were viewed to be practically or essentially the same needs to be borne in mind. Thus, even if our texts use only *mantra*, it is possible that their authors meant the inclusion of *Brāhmaṇas* etc. by implication; cf. comments of Durga and S-M reproduced in appendix 3.

In BH's statement, it is clear that (a) the s-n-a vāc and (b) the mantras or bilma (as anukāra of the former) are overlapping in content but different. In Yāska's statement, the mantras and bilma may be in a similar relationship, but there is no mention of s-n-a vāc, and the nature of the relationship between mantra and bilma would depend on the meaning one attaches to *bilma* in *bilma-grahaṇāya*. One could even attach such a meaning to *bilma* as would preclude the bilma's inclusion or reflecting of the mantras (see appendix 3).

At the other end, the relationship between the bilma and the Veda would also depend on how one interprets the compound *bilma-grahaṇāya*. There, from BH's side, we have a genitival dissolution (*bilmasya grahaṇāya*) and the possibilities (a) that the bilma is larger than the Veda (b) that the bilma, unlike the Veda, lacks a specific settled shape (§4.3) and (c) that the Vedāṅgas, although touching only parts of the Veda from various view-points, are essentially its replication. The Veda is declared to be an anukāra in the kārikā, and the Vṛtti would not make sense if the word *bilma* is not taken in a sense like 'anukāra.' While Yāska could have held a similar view, it is a historical reality that his commentators Durga and S-M do not present him as subscribing to it (see appendices 3 and 4). As the Nirukta part *upadeśāya ... vedāṅgāni ca* has not found a paraphrase or echo in BH's own words, that is, as it was not necessary for BH's immediate purpose to comment on the specified Nirukta part, we do not know from him as well how he reconciled his understanding of *bilma* with the words actually employed by Yāska.

In any case, if it is felt that, as we discussed revelation, the object of that process has shifted somewhat, the feeling would be justified. What is said to be revealed has a range formed by the related concepts such as s-n-a vāc → mantras/bilma → Veda.⁷¹

§4.5 The Veda revelation process has parallels in what BH puts forward (a) as his concept of language and (b) as his explanation of the process of articulation. The former, in theory, must be viewed as if static entities are stacked up. In that kind of view, the subtle form of the Veda or the

⁷¹(a) Holdrege (1994: 52) correctly concludes that the Brāhmaṇas give the impression that the Veda is a closed canon which, in a specific way, is still open to expansion. The fringe area where I may disagree with her is the suggestion in her very last remark to the effect that the Brāhmaṇas were dropping hints of expansion in order to make room for themselves. I consider it more likely that the philosophy behind the Veda saṁhitā/anthology notion itself left scope for expansion along certain lines.

(b) The possibility that some slippage can occur between what the first group of seers wishes to impart and what the Veda contains is not explicitly denied by Yāska or BH. However, while noting this, we should also note that the two authors did not have any reason to consider the possibility. They did not claim that the Veda known to them was the entire text Veda.

unrevealed Veda corresponds to the highest form of language, *para paśyanti-rūpa* or *śabda-tattva-brahman*, the language-principle itself. The Veda of the first revelation stage, that is, the total corpus of the mantras or the *bilma* (appendix 1) corresponds to the *paśyantī* stage, along with parts from that corpus which are memorized (the individual *Samhitās* etc.; see note 70). Both are reflections of the seer's revelation experience, albeit a difference of extent and arrangement may exist and the total corpus 'seen-heard-experienced' may not be preserved. Both, while being close to the revelation phenomenon, are associated also with the transmission process. In the former aspect, they parallel the steady or at-rest phase of the *paśyantī* and the active or extrovert phase of *paśyantī*, respectively.⁷² When the Veda preserved in the mind or memory is reflected over or is uttered, it appears in the *madhyamā* or *vaikhari* stages, but, then, it is indistinguishable from other human-made realizations of language (except, of course, for the importance attached to it).

The process of articulation as theorized by BH follows the same model as the one he accepts for language. The only difference is that the constituents of the model are now viewed dynamically — as involved in a process. The Veda in its subtle form then corresponds to the sentience or pure formless consciousness. Its form made accessible to the ordinary persons has an analogue in the *paśyantī*. That form is a particular assemblage of what could come from a limitless, amorphous source, just as the *paśyantī* is a storehouse of specific realizations of the boundless language principle capable of taking the form of any language. From this storehouse can emerge

⁷²(a) TKV 1.159-170: *pratisamhṛta-kramā, saty apy abhede, samāviṣṭa-krama-śakith paśyantī. sālācalā pratilabdha-samādhānā cāvṛtā viśuddhā ca, samniviṣṭa-jñeyākārā pratilīnākārā nirākārā ca, paricchinnārtha-pratyavabhāsā samśṛṣṭārtha-pratyavabhāsā praśānta-sarvārtha-pratyavabhāsā cety aparimāṇa-bhedā*. "Paśyantī has a limitless (internal) variation. It is an entity in which sequence is withdrawn (i.e., is not overtly present, but it is also) an entity of which the capability for sequence is ever present, although it is not different (from that capability). It is unsteady, steady and (also) one from which the 'steady : unsteady' transformation is absent, namely) one which is entirely settled (having no need to move from one object to another). It is covered (by impurities) and absolutely (*vi-*) pure. It is one in which the forms of objects to be known are placed, one in which forms merge and (also) one which has no form. It is one in which the reflections of (spatially or temporally) separated entities exist, one in which the reflections of mutually joined entities exist and (also) one in which the reflections of all entities utterly subside."

(b) In translating the last triplet in the preceding passage, one could, grammatically, take *paricchinnā, samśṛṣṭa* and *praśānta* as adjectives of *artha-pratyavabhāsa* instead of just *artha*. However, in that case the triplet's difference from the preceding triplet would diminish.

(c) The adjectives *pratilabdha-samādhānā, viśuddhā, nirākārā* and *praśānta-sarvārtha-pratyavabhāsā* apply to the higher form of *paśyantī*, that is, to the language principle.

(d) Carpenter (1995: 47-48) equates the "crucial intermediary stage at which the unity of direct vision intersects with the multiplicity of spoken words" with the *madhyamā* stage of speech.

a bounded specific text that is the Veda accessible to us, very much like a sentence of the language one accesses in the madhyamā phase. When transformed into sound, the text steps down to the vaikhari level, as any sentence we utter for the purpose of communication does.⁷³

§4.6 BH's model of language parallels the one he presupposes for his epistemological account. In fact, the two can be viewed as identical in reality but separated for the sake of convenience in talking about them. The entities presupposed in the Veda revelation process, therefore, have their counterparts also in the entities making up BH's epistemological model (see appendix 1, point 3).

Beyond this, there is a suggestion in the Veda revelation account of parallelism with deep sleep and dreaming. As naturally as waking up from sleep is, the universe emanates from brahman.⁷⁴ The Veda, as a part of this emanation, must also be understood as moving from its subtle form to the perceptible form, very much like the signless para paśyantī-rūpa making way for the paśyantī. When the form perceptible to the seers is perceived by them, the experience is very much like that of dreaming, and when the seers wish to transmit what they have perceived, the activity is similar to that of narrating a dream experience (*svapna-vṛttam iva*; see note 62 for other parallels).⁷⁵

⁷³Carpenter (1995: 45) has sensed the parallel I point out here. However, I part company with him when he confines the idea to ritualistic life, beginning with the phrase "as a form of dharmic activity." Writes he: "... the transition from vision to actual utterance is conceived of as the manifestation of the essential form of speech itself rather than the use of speech to express what is beyond it. The primary function of the seers is to cause that essential Word to attain the sequential, temporal form of actual utterance. They do not 'compose' the Veda; they 'enact' it. They 'translate' or 'transform' it from its unitary visionary state to its temporal, manifested state as a form of dharmic activity, originally the sacred speech employed as an integral component of the ritual action of the sacrifice. The function of a seer is thus first to *see* and then to *act*, to speak and thereby to 'repeat' (as is implied in the verb *sam-ā-mnā-*) or 'imitate' (as is implied in the term *anukāra*) the unitary Word in the medium of actually spoken sounds, in the activity of speech. They function merely to bring about *a change in state in the Veda*; they are not its 'authors.' [Fn 24 at this point: Bhartṛhari says this explicitly at 1.148, where he contrasts the Veda with tradition by describing the former as being like consciousness itself (*caitanyaval*) and as *apauruṣeya*, literally 'non-human.'] They are rather its 'agents.' They 'act-ualize' or 'en-act' the potencies immanent within the True Word itself."

⁷⁴See TKV 2.152 cited in note 54, in which too the references to pratibhā, mahat ātman, and sattā occur as they do in our second passage, TKV 1.173.

⁷⁵(a) From the preceding internal connections in BH's philosophy and the seeds of his revelation account found in the Veda that are pointed out in §§5.11-12 below, it should be evident that the possibility entertained in Halbfass 1991: 48, namely that BH's āṛṣa cakṣus may be an implicit response to the Buddhist notion of divya cakṣus, need not be entertained. In fact, the employment of *divya* as an adjective in *divya cakṣus* by the atheist Buddhists indicates that they took the notion from the Vedic tradition or from the popular tradition shared by the Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas.

Larger significance of the attempted reconstruction⁷⁶

§5.1 Philologically, our exploration has led to a Veda revelation view or theory that is textually supported, does not take undue liberties with the meanings of words (especially the meanings of crucial words such as *dharma*, *vāc*, *mantra* and *veda*) and connects BH's thinking in one part of his works with the thinking in other parts. Beyond these features which are required by the very theme of the essay, the exploration has, in the last few sections, suggested how BH achieves an impressive economy of theory and gives a very defensible explanation of Veda apauruṣeyatva with his Veda revelation account. In my statements, there also has been a suggestion that the account may be philosophical, not just an expression of faith.

Given our present acculturation, our first reaction can expectedly be to see mythology or the realm of the irrational and the untestable in texts speaking of scriptures, persons with extraordinary capabilities, dream-like experiences in which the distinction between seeing and hearing is effaced and the beginning of the world from a supra-mundane entity culminating in a merger with the same entity (such features are particularly present in passage 2, which reads like a creation myth). Such a reaction can even have a tone of conviction when we come across a text that speaks of all of these entities and ideas cumulatively, appealing to a source (Purākalpa) similar to the Purāṇas and claiming for its scripture and scriptural language the status of the mother of all scriptures and languages.

However, our exploration has resulted in the finding that there is an empirical spirit too in what BH has written (note 67). He speaks of śāstra as simply informing us about the properties of things, not as investing things with properties. His seers parallel the physical scientists *to the extent* they uncover what is hidden and unknown to ordinary people. The activity that primarily sets them apart is that they connect their discoveries with words in certain received texts and they see in some of these words (when uttered properly by qualified persons) the potential to activate the properties. As the words are sounds or vibrations, the distinctive activity becomes one in which the focus is on the relationship between two physical entities: produced vibrations and the properties of things. There is nothing exclusively or primarily appealing to faith in this feature either. Could it, therefore, be the case that Veda apauruṣeyatva and the revelation account associated with it are, at bottom, inspired by a desire to solve or block some

(b) The role of the ṛṣi that Mitchiner (1982: 246-248) establishes with a different purpose in mind is indirectly helpful in understanding some aspects of the revelation process I have reconstructed.

⁷⁶The appendices following this section contain some incidental conclusions that hold larger implications.

basic problem in epistemology? Could the myths, nurtured by a tradition that enjoyed riddles and put different 'spins' on the essentially same message (e.g., as pointed out in note 58b), be disguised philosophy?

§5.2 What is involved in the further consideration suggested by the question just asked is (not conviction or faith but only) willingness to concede the possibility that what we call rationality could have preceded our reconstructed frame of Veda revelation — in particular the possibility that the passages under consideration could be indicative of a point in theorization (carried out by the predecessors of BH and, perhaps, of Yāska) at which a reference to something beyond the terms and axioms accepted in the investigation was felt to be necessary (in words unknown to us, in a way unfamiliar to us and, probably, dimly and vaguely). The interpretation of the passages, justified above on independent grounds, suggests an investigative spirit in the midst of a mysterious-sounding or myth-like talk. The passages make a clear reference to things and properties, express concern with the questions of how the properties can be known reliably and how we can be sure that they are known reliably, and allude to the importance of understanding the nature and role of language properly. The texts we have studied cannot be viewed as totally lacking interest in analyzing the material or empirical world, which we associate with science, or as being entirely innocent of the problem of understanding the human thought process, with which is associated the issue of rational thinking. One is free to consider the texts' engagement with science or rational thinking as elementary or primitive until evidence to the contrary emerges, but one can certainly not be justified in brushing them aside as nothing but the writings of credulous persons brought up in a tradition dominated by mystical religious teachings.

§5.3 The plausibility of a non-mystic interpretation can be argued for in one more way. The word *dharma* conveys three meanings in BH's writings:

(a) 'norm, what an individual person is expected to do' or 'what the *śāstra* or *āgama* advises one to do,'

(b) 'a positive and unseen, that is, non-mundane effect generated by sticking to a norm,' and

(c) 'an attribute, property or quality.'

One may view the relationship between meanings (a) and (b) in one of the following two ways: Because the *śāstra*⁷⁷ knows that the effect spoken of in (b) is good for human beings, it advises the way it does. Or,

⁷⁷In order to be able to avoid a tiresome repetition of "*śāstra* or *āgama*," I will assume here that "*śāstra*" stands for both. For the same reason, I have left out the opposites of "good," *dharma* etc. from the following statement. The larger question that is said to arise in the case of *dharma* should be understood as applicable to *adharma*, *dharmābhāva* etc.

because the śāstra advises something, one's following of that advice must produce a positive effect for oneself (§3.3, note 64).

Either way, there will be appeal to trust or faith and arbitrary blocking of further logical inquiry. The second kind of relationship, namely the investing of an action with capability to produce a beneficial effect because of a śāstra statement, also presupposes that the śāstra knows what is good.⁷⁸ In other words, both alternatives end up in an unquestioned or uncritical acceptance of the śāstra. They stand in need of giving people the tools that can help in determining which śāstra is good for them (in its entirety or in parts). The discussant faces the question, 'Why should one empower the śāstra in the first place? What need is there of śāstra? Why should one not stop just with the advice of rationality, empiricism etc.?' But experience and logical considerations themselves establish (as BH points out in TK 1.31-40) that one cannot stop at rationality, empiricism etc. and that it is a misconception that there is something called pure rationalism or total objectivity.

So, one cannot do without the śāstra, and one cannot accept it simply as an article of faith. What can one do when faced with this dilemma? BH's solution (and perhaps that of the Vedic tradition in general) can be said to consist of four steps:

(a) Reject the propositions implicit in the preceding statements that knowledge has a beginning at some point and that all circularities can be avoided. Instead of postulating that either the human beings get their knowledge from the śāstras or the śāstras are invested with knowledge by human beings, postulate that an interplay, a give-and-take, between the śāstras and human beings has been going on all the time, that is, without any temporal beginning as such. The śāstras have been advising human beings about what is good for them from time immemorial, and human beings, following the śāstra advice, have been discovering truths to add to the śāstras also from time immemorial.

(b) Imagine a theoretical source or beginning for each for ease of statement: Veda for the śāstras and ṛṣis for the human beings.

(c) Think of these sources as co-existing right from the beginning of creation, regardless of whether any real creation took place or not.

(d) Go beyond the language of 'investing with properties.' Neither the śāstras nor human beings do that (the latter may do so at a later stage in the development of the physical world when they compound the items

⁷⁸If one takes the position that the śāstra *acquires* this capability, there arise questions such as 'From whom did the śāstra acquire this capability?', 'When did it acquire the capability?' and 'Can śāstra function like an agent as human beings etc. do?'

that have been given to them, but that is not the level we have in mind here.). Accept the physical world, in itself or in the way it comes to us, as consisting of things that have certain properties.

Here, a thought system's incompleteness or ultimately not being absolutely autonomous comes to the surface. By the very nature of things, such a system needs unquestioned acceptance of something. The contradiction between starting with insistence on proof for everything and ending up with unproved acceptance of something comes across as inevitable.

§5.4 At the same time, a logic-transcending yet logical explanation of why BH and certain other Brahmanical thinkers could have situated the Veda where they have begins to emerge as Halbfass (1991: 39) senses:

"They [= BH and the great thinkers of the Pūrva- and Uttara-mīmāṃsā] invoke this idea [= the idea of the Veda] as a response to epistemological problems, and to the dangers of religious and ethical pluralism and relativism."

While anticipating and excellently expressing the point toward which I was moving in developing the present essay over the years (note * above), Halbfass has not elaborated upon the point as I would prefer. There is another *possible* epistemological consideration behind the kind of conception of the Veda BH has accepted and the kind of revelation process he seems to have accepted in its case. To indicate the importance of that consideration, I should, however, first refer to two related questions that Halbfass (1991: 39) eloquently asks:

(a) "Why did they [= BH and the great thinkers of the Pūrva- and Uttara-mīmāṃsā] not face and articulate these problems as such, instead of relegating the answer to a particular text, the Veda? Their reliance on the Veda may be associated with a genuine sense of the limits of human thought and understanding, an awareness of the confusions, the aporias, and the existential and spiritual vacuum human reasoning may produce. Yet the question remains: why did they rely on the Veda, and only on the Veda? Why not on any other kind of "revelation"? Why did they not simply recognize the need for "revelation," or "objective epiphany," as such and in general? Are there any truly philosophical reasons, apart from cultural, psychological and ideological motivations?"

(b) "Is the "Veda of the philosophers essentially a fiction and projection?"

The first reaction of some specialists of Indian philosophy who are used to thinking along the lines that have become standard among academics may be to reject the very possibilities implicit in Halbfass' questions. They may point to the frequently asserted conflation of religion and philosophy and to sectarian affiliations of the philosophical traditions in pre-modern India and declare pre-modern Indian philosophers to be incapable of articulating problems and solutions in non-sectarian terms and/or of entertaining logically or theoretically necessitated fictions. However, just as India has abundance of both religion and philosophy without having a word for either,

it could have theoretical fictions without having a class name for them.⁷⁹ The fact that linguists have given credit to India for the zero morpheme fiction and the Indian grammarians have declared the verbal roots etc. to be non-existent (in the grammarian-postulated forms) in the object language makes the existence of theoretical fictions in philosophy quite probable. The idiom of 'theoretical/philosophical fiction' may be missing, but the incidence of 'articles of faith' that, upon inspection, turn out to be articles accepted only for the sake of logical necessity or system completion may still be there.

§5.5 In our effort to determine if the 'fiction possibility' can be claimed for the Indian philosophical tradition, let us first note two instances: (a) acceptance of *sāmānya-lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti* under *yogaja pratyakṣa* to account for the first perception of universals — to meet a part of the need for which induction is accepted in Western philosophy;⁸⁰ (b) taking the position that universals are not destroyed in the dissolution of the world prior to its re-creation. Religion or spiritual life will not suffer (at least in any direct or convincing way) if the problem of the genesis of universals is not solved or if the problem of the fate of the universals in a *mahā-pralaya* is left out there 'to dry.' Both the problems are primarily and ultimately philosophical problems. Yet, when the philosophers deemed it necessary

⁷⁹I do not wish to leave the impression that not having distinctive names for religion and philosophy is a failure. My intention is simply to convey (a) that doing X should not be mistaken for being conscious of how (with which label) or why one does X and (b) that absence of conscious doing of X does not imply absence of doing of X.

⁸⁰(a) We need universals (real or fictitious) to account for the use of the same word with respect to all members of a class; e.g., we do not use a new word for each chair we encounter. But we cannot be certain about how many instances of the 'same' object we need to see before we come up with the notion that the instances are related and form a class. Even if we were to come up with a statistical average, we would not have a 'philosophical' explanation of how the inclusion under one name took place. In such a situation, there is no real difference between (a) admitting it to be inexplicable and (b) saying that it is an extraordinary phenomenon — that, at some point in our encountering of (what in the future will be) a chair, suddenly, a link between all chair instances or tokens is established and all chairs become members of a class amenable to a single name. Western logic accounts for the phenomenon by admitting induction as a process in addition to deduction in its logical theory. The Indian tradition, particularly that of Nyāya, accounts for the same phenomenon by making room for *yogaja pratyakṣa*, specifically its *sāmānya-lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti* variety.

(b) Although the following remark of Kaiyaṭa is made in the context of Patañjali's use of *pratyakṣa-dharmāṇaḥ*, it corroborates the point made here: *yogaja-pratyakṣeṇa sarvaṃ viditavantah*.

(c) Awareness of universals has been ascribed to *asmad-viśiṣṭas* (TK 3.1.46), the cognitively extraordinary persons, by BH, very much in the manner of ascription of Veda revelation to the ṛṣis.

(d) Every use of the word *yoga* should not be thought of as landing us in the realm of the irrational or of mysticism. An element of what Indian philosophers like BH would call *antah-prakāśa*, 'internal light, a (sudden flash-like) realization from within,' (TKV 1.135, quoted in §3.4) is present in the notion of induction, too.

and economical to adopt the positions they could neither prove nor disprove, they did adopt them in a manner hardly distinguishable from a believer's manner of accepting certain 'religious' truths.

§5.6 It will be appropriate at this point to note the following statements showing awareness of the limit of philosophical thinking or of the unavoidability of acceptance of (what we would call) a priorities:

(a) TKV 1.30: *sarve 'pi hi vādino dūram api gatvā na sva-bhāvaṃ vyativartante*. "No party to a discussion can go beyond the own nature of a thing, no matter how far they go (in pursuing an issue; i.e., all parties to a discussion are forced at some point in the discussion to take the position 'things are what they are')."

(b) TK 3.1.95: *sva-bhāvo 'vyapadeśyo vā sāmāthyam vāvatiṣṭhate / sarvasyānte yatas, tasmād vyavahāro na kalpate* // "At the end of all (that a philosopher proposes or an exploration of cause leads to) an unnamable nature or capability (of a thing or postulate) remains (i.e., the discussion or investigation boils down to 'this is the way things are; we cannot identify anything more fundamental or enlightening'). Since (what the preceding sentence states is a fact of life), therefore, there is (ultimately) no (purely logical) enabling for communication (i.e., it takes place, but we cannot explain how it takes place without accepting some notions as unquestionable givens)."⁸¹

(c) TK 3.6.18: *caitanyavat sthitā loke dik-kāla-parikalpanā / prakṛtiṃ prāṇinām tām hi ko 'nyathā sthāpayiṣyati* // "In the world, the conception of time and space is as deep-rooted as (that of one's own) being alive. Who can change that (conception, which is the very) nature of living beings!"

(d) From the Kevalādvaita tradition (source not specified in the Nyāya-kośa or by the teacher from whom I heard the verse): *jīva īśo viśuddhā cit tathā jīveṣayor bhidā/ avidyā tac-citor yogaḥ ṣaḍ asmākam anādayaḥ* // "For us (i.e., in our philosophical school or system), six things have no beginning (do not ask when they came into existence; that would be an inappropriate question; these six things are:) (i) individual self, (ii) god (postulated as

⁸¹ (a) Helā-rāja takes *tasmāt* as standing for *avyapadeśyāt* (qualifying) *sva-bhāvāt / sāmāthyāt*. This forces him to ignore *yataḥ*. In any natural construing of the verse *yataḥ* and *tasmāt* should be related, even if English may not allow us to include the literal translations of both the words in the sentence. There is no masculine or neuter noun in the preceding verse to which *tasmāt* can refer. Therefore, I have taken it as referring to the content of the proposition *sarvasya ante avyapadeśyaḥ sva-bhāvaḥ (avyapadeśyam) sāmāthyam vā avatiṣṭhate*.

(b) The precise meaning of the seemingly simple words *vyavahāro na kalpate* is not easy to determine. It would depend on which of the related but different senses of *vyavahāra* and *klp* one chooses and what one expects BH to say in the context. I have taken *klp* 'to be enabled, to become able' as meant in the sense of logical accounting or justification and *vyavahāra* 'exchange, transaction' as applicable to the arena of language.

brahman's first evolute that manages the creation to follow as note 69b bears out), (iii) pure consciousness, (iv) distinctness of the individual self and the (managing) god, (v) nescience and (vi) the association of nescience and pure consciousness."

§5.7 That BH was aware of the need, felt by the different philosophical traditions, to allow unfalsifiable or logically untestable entities at the highest or most fundamental level is corroborated also by the following *kārikā-vṛtti* continuum:

TK 1.38: *atīndriyān asaṁvedyān paśyanty ārṣeṇa cakṣuṣā/ye bhāvān vacanaṁ teṣāṁ nānumānena bādhyate* // "A statement of those who, with a seer's eye, see things that are beyond the senses and cannot be felt is not invalidated by inference."

TKV 1.38: *antar-yāmiṇam, aṇu-grāmam abhijāti-nibandhanam, anabhiivyaktaṁ śabda-brahma śakty-adhiṣṭhānam,⁸² devatāḥ, karmaṇām anubandha-pariṇāma-śakti-vaikalyāni, sūkṣmam ātivāhikam śarīram, pṛthag anyāṁs ca tīrtha-pravādeṣu prasiddhān arthān, rūpādivad indriyair agrāhyān, sukhādivac ca pratyātman asaṁvedyān ye śiṣṭā vyāvahārikād anyenaiva cakṣuṣā mukta-saṁśayam upalabhante, teṣāṁ anumāna-viṣayātītaṁ vacanaṁ vyabhicāribhir anumānair apākartum aśakyam.* "A statement of those śiṣṭas, who, through an extraordinary eye, grasp entities such as the ones specified below) with total certainty cannot be set aside by using inferences (because what the śiṣṭa statement pertains to) falls beyond the domain of inferences (and the inferences) are prone to deviation. (The entities meant as examples bearing out the preceding observation are:) the inner controller; atom groups which form the basis of creation; unmanifest Word Principle that is the seat of (various) powers; deities; impressing, maturation and dissipation of actions (saṁskāra formation etc. in the case of individual selves), the subtle transmigratory body, and (similar) other entities well-known in various philosophical exchanges — entities which cannot be (perceptually) grasped as form (or color) etc. can be and which cannot be felt inside like happiness etc."

Here, the fundamental entities admitted in several different schools or the final causes or supreme truths as advanced by different schools are said to have been perceived through an extraordinary eye, functionally parallel to intuition, insight and induction. It is noted that they are not accessible to sense experience like the features of external objects or to

⁸²I have followed Vṛṣabha's commentary in taking certain nouns as qualifiers of the nouns next to them. However, I do not rule out the possibility that *abhijāti-nibandhanam* and *śakty-adhiṣṭhānam* were meant to be independent nouns standing for entities at higher or deeper logical levels in schools such as Jainism and Mīmāṃsā. We cannot be certain about our understanding until similar passages or the sources utilized by BH become accessible.

feelings like happiness etc. and that one cannot expunge them on the strength of logic alone.

§5.8 On the strength of the evidence given so far, we may view BH as a philosopher capable of opting for theoretical fictions when necessary. He might have accepted such fictions for purely logical reasons accompanied by “cultural, psychological and ideological motivations,” if I may repeat Halbfass’ phrase.⁸³ Two questions then present themselves: Would BH do so in the case of the Veda? If he were to do so in the case of the Veda, why would he do so?

There is no indication in the words BH actually uses to the effect that his acceptance of the Veda as authority or source is anything less than heartfelt and genuine or that the Veda is something to be invoked just to make up for a desideratum in one’s philosophy. This justified impression, however, does not rule out two possibilities: (a) a tradition of thinking of the Veda as useful beyond its historical context and literal form had become established before BH’s time, making it easier for thinkers to lean on the Veda without having to defend their leaning or without realizing every time that this is what they were doing. (b) There was something in BH’s philosophy that made it particularly natural for that philosophy to seek a complementation in the Veda and to feel no need to state explicitly that a complementation was being sought.

§5.9 The śākhādi-bheda-bhinna apauruṣeyatva of the Mīmāṃsā was known to BH (appendix 1, points 4-6). It has the flavor of fiction. Further, a dehistoricized view of Vedic texts, particularly of the RV, is likely to have existed for a long time. Something viewed as appearing at the dawn of creation or in an inaccessible past even by an ancient author like Yāska (cf. note 44) is unlikely to have been gathered and preserved exclusively or mainly because it, in some sense, contained history, even if that history pertained to religio-spiritual life. The activities of collection and preservation of mantra or hymns are, in fact, more likely to have been preceded by a philosophy or theory of religio-spiritual life that delinked such life from (what we would call) history or at least de-emphasized the importance of history to that life.⁸⁴ The reliability of a religio-spiritual teaching was probably

⁸³The space for ideological motivations, however, seems small in BH’s case. An evenly accommodative philosophical temperament is writ large over his works.

⁸⁴The observations made in this section hold implications for the efforts that are made to recover the most ancient history of India and of the speakers of Indo-European languages on the basis of the Vedic texts. While such efforts should continue to be made, they need to be made with the awareness that we may be trying to recover history from texts that were (a) either chosen because they contained no or few historical clues or (b) were edited, as far as possible, to remove historical clues. Also, we need to be aware that whatever history can reasonably be said to be reflected in the texts may pertain to a period which had ceased to be historical —

not to be made dependent on whether its articulator actually lived or how he lived. Such a surmise would accord with at least two curious absences or seeming incongruities in the Vedic tradition:

(a) This tradition has kept a record of the names of persons to whom the hymns belong. It has attached importance to remembering the names. In several cases it has also preserved the traditional stories about how the hymns came into being. It has not hidden the details that might indicate that the canon grew over time (either in the form of genres such as the *Samhitā*, *Brāhmaṇa* etc. or in the form of *śākhās*). Yet it does not accord a greater value to a seer's teaching because that teaching was imparted in an older period or was closer to the time of the original revelation. Nor does it make efforts to resolve the differences in teaching by comparing the available variant readings and deciding which one of them could be older and hence more likely to be genuine. On the contrary, accommodation of the variation in detail is sanctioned in statements such as *sarva-śākhā-pratyayam ekam karma* (TKV 1.6, probably quoting from Sabara 2.4.8, 9, 30 or 32) and *sarva-vedānta-pratyayam* (*Vedānta-sūtra*/*Brahma-sūtra* 3.3.1).⁸⁵

(b) Yāska gives us a 'history' of how the mantras or the Veda came down to him: seerhood qualified by unmediated knowledge of dharma → mantras → upadeśa → Veda and Vedāṅgas. But he refuses to go along with the *Aitiḥāsikas*, the Legendarians or Mythologists, who may occasionally give us some history because legends and myths do in some cases arise out of historical facts. He also offers *nirvacanas* or *niruktis* for which being historically justifiable is evidently not the concern. They are in fact context-

which was distant enough and had no political, economic etc. implications left — for the gatherers of the Vedic hymns.

⁸⁵This apparent incongruity was pointed out by Muir as early as 1874 (= reprint 1967, p. III. 210), albeit with a different purpose in mind. His attempted refutation of the Brahmanical/Hindu acceptance of the authority of the Veda is still heard in different words from the proponents of Christianity. The refutation rests on discounting the possibility that a tradition could deliberately decide to de-emphasize history. It reads thus: "The same [as in the case of the ancient view of the origin of the river Nile] might be said of the Indian speculators, who argue that the Veda must have had a supernatural origin, because it was never observed to have had a human author like other books;—that by thus removing the negative grounds on which they rest their case into the unknown depths of antiquity, they do their utmost to place themselves beyond the reach of direct refutation. But it is to be observed (1) that, even if it were to be admitted that no human authors of the Vedas were remembered in later ages, this would prove nothing more than their antiquity, and it would still be incumbent on their apologists to show that this circumstance necessarily involved their supernatural character; and (2) that, in point of fact, Indian tradition does point to certain rishis or bards as the authors of the Vedic hymns. It is true, indeed ... that these rishis are said to have only "seen" the hymns, which (it is alleged) were eternally pre-existent, and that they were not their authors. But as tradition declares that the hymns were uttered by such and such rishis, how is it proved that the rishis to whom they were ascribed, or those, whoever they were, from whom they actually proceeded, were not uttering the mere productions of their minds?"

fitting meaning determinations, made or recorded by Yāska's predecessors in many/most instances, which are to be explained by following the technique of the grammarians (not necessarily Pāṇinian grammarians). They may in some instances coincide with what we call (historical or true) etymologies, but whether they do so or not would not have mattered to Yāska.

§5.10 Additionally, the surmise in §5.9 is indirectly but substantially supported by the following facts or independently reached conclusions:

(a) Halbfass 1991: 41 "The Veda itself exhibits a paradigmatic commitment to an absolute origin and foundation, and seems to provide clues for its own later role in Hindu thought. It has its own retrospective and reflexive dimension and refers back to the Ṛg-veda as its center and source."

Particularly relevant in the present context is Halbfass' first sentence. A text conscious of its role to come is unlikely to bind itself tightly or obviously with historical strings.⁸⁶

(b) The tradition of interpreting the Veda at different levels — adhi-yajña 'ritualistic,' adhi-daiva 'mytho-theological' and adhyātma 'spiritual, metaphysical, philosophical' — is at least as old as Yāska's time (the terms themselves are attested in the oldest Upaniṣads Bṛhad-āraṇyaka and Chāndogya). As I hope to point out in a separate publication, the *Parīśiṣṭa* part of the *Nirukta*, in which this three-pronged approach is evident, has not really been proved to be late, although claims to that effect have been made.⁸⁷ To judge from its language, the *Nirukta* belongs to a period that was an extension of the period of Brāhmaṇa composition. Its awareness that the Veda can be amenable to adhi-yajña, adhi-daiva or adhyātma interpretation is a fairly early awareness, justified to a considerable extent by the contents of the Veda anthologies.⁸⁸ The wide scope thus given at an early date to varied interpretations strengthens the probability that the Veda has been used in innovative, as distinct from literal or historical, ways for a long time before BH.⁸⁹

⁸⁶As religions usually gain much by emphasizing history (they can then arrange more rites, ceremonies, festivities etc. and remain in greater contact with the followers), it is quite unusual, especially for a culture unabashedly having a large number of rituals, worships etc. in its immediately following periods, to attempt to place its premier scripture beyond history. Such a move is unlikely to have been made without much thought and planning.

⁸⁷In a forthcoming paper dealing with the semantic history of the term *vedānta*, I have observed how, in the ancient Indian perspective, the functions expected of the Veda must have included a metaphysical or spiritual-philosophical function from an early time (in fact, right from the start). See also my other forthcoming paper "Unity of the Mīmāṃsā."

⁸⁸The implication of the awareness is not that each mantra can be or has been interpreted in three ways.

⁸⁹An incidental but important implication of how I have so far specified the larger significance of the present study is this: Available research has much to say about historical

§5.11 It would thus be not only an inoffensive but also a familiar move in BH's days to utilize the Veda as a theoretical fiction. In addition, BH has something in his philosophy that would make it natural for his philosophy to be very close to the Veda. It is a philosophy mainly concerned with speech and thought. There are references to speech and thought in parts of the earliest Veda.⁹⁰ The effectiveness of speech, whether it be of the composer's community or of the 'other' community, is presupposed several times (a wish for the greater efficacy of one's own speech and non-efficacy of the speech of the other community is expressed or implied). The Veda shows its fascination with language also in the language of its poetry, which, besides figures of speech such as simile, includes riddles, puns and shocking statements reminiscent of what the later Hindi tradition has called *ulaṭavāmsī* style.

Secondly, word and meaning relationship and hence language has no beginning in BH's thought. The argument behind this position is that even to establish a relationship between the first word in history and its meaning a community would need language.⁹¹ A text, therefore, must always exist at least in the form of a single sentence (which, in turn, must be preceded by at least the nebulous text of community living or culture, for sentence formation without some concept linking is inconceivable). The Veda is also a text that has always existed (according to the view or belief of

layers within the Vedic anthologies (particularly the RV books), but it seems to have given very little thought to how the anthologies themselves were made. As far as I could ascertain, not many attempts to answer the following questions have been made: How were the various parts collected? What were the criteria for their selection? What ends beyond the conveying of certain linguistic meanings were the texts or anthologies intended to serve? Existing research, as far as I am aware, leaves the impression that the anthologization was a largely haphazard process mainly guided by practical convenience and shaped by inevitable accretions, generally going through the same stages as are found in the histories of other religious canons. Without denying that the stages could have been broadly similar, I would like to observe that research in the future needs to explore also the possibility that the Vedic anthologization had a specific, perhaps distinctive and sophisticated, philosophy of religious and socio-political life behind it. Remarks like Halbfass' (1991: 19) "The Veda itself frequently presents itself as a cosmic or cosmogonic reality" need to be pursued seriously and studied in depth.

⁹⁰(a) Cf. Padoux 1990: x-29, in which the existence of a speech philosophy from the time of the earliest Veda is asserted with clear evidence several times, the continuity of that philosophy until the time of the later Upaniṣads is perceptively established and references to earlier allied explorations by K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, Louis Renou, Otto Strauss etc. are provided.

(b) Tripāṭhī 1976 provides a collection of Vedic pronouncements on speech.

⁹¹The implications are: (a) Even if there were to be a biological beginning for language, a philosopher would not be able to make use of it; he must proceed by assuming language to be beginningless. (b) Individual languages should be thought of as forming a continuum, not replacing each other completely. (c) If a 'Tower of Babel' type account were to be written by an Indian philosopher like BH, it would not mention dispersion in such stark terms as loss of all contact between languages.

certain theoreticians or systematizers). Therefore, there is economy in identifying the theoretically needed, conceptual or abstract, ever-existing text with the Veda. The language of the Veda then can perform the same role as a postulated first language would, and the ultimate or subtle form of the language of the Veda can be equated with the language principle itself.⁹²

§5.12 Obviously, something special must have been seen in the Vedic hymns before their preservation was deemed necessary. That this something special had an aural or sound aspect is evident from the fact that so much effort was made to preserve even the accents of the words in the hymns. Further, that the nature of the special thing was close to what BH says can be deduced in a somewhat indirect way: The elements of BH's thinking that play a special role in the present context (s-n-a vāc, dharma, mantra/Veda, and creation or revelation in a very distant past) are found to an extent in Yāska's Nirukta. But they are not confined to that text. They appear with essentially synonymous expressions and different configurations in a number of diverse sources in a scattered or incidental way such as the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, Upaniṣads (note 90), Epics and Purāṇas, suggesting a broad base, which, in turn, increases the probability of their being present in the more ancient period of Indian history.

As a particularly informative passage Mahābhārata 12.224.55 and 12.671.1 may be noted:⁹³ *anādi-nidhanā nityā vāg utsṛṣṭā svayambhuvā // ādau vedamayī divyā yataḥ sarvāḥ pravṛttayaḥ //* "At the beginning was issued, by the self-born (brahman/Brahmā), the eternal (or latently existing) speech, which consists of the Veda, which is divine, which has neither a beginning nor an end (and) from which all proceedings (initiatives or actions) come about." Here, the connection between creation, Veda and speech is evident.

Since the ṛṣis are intimately connected with mantra and dharma, the following passages which support the detail that certain seers are born at the beginning of creation should also be taken into account: Mādhyandina Śata-patha Brāhmaṇa 6.1.1.1 (quoted in TKV 1.2; cf. Vṛṣabha p. 31): *asad vā idam agra āsīt. kiṁ tad asad āsīt. ṛṣayo vāva te 'gre tad asad āsīt, ya ṛṣayaḥ*

⁹² I cannot cite passages from BH's works that explicitly state the content of "there is economy... the language principle itself." However, the identifications in appendix 1, point 3, are certainly there in BH's works. The reasoning they would require cannot but be in terms of theoretical economy: 'If an entity with a different name cannot be proved to be bodily different, then why should one not think of it as the same entity?' Lāghava ('economy of postulates and/or reasoning steps') was a recognized criterion among India's śāstra authors.

⁹³ Although, as indicated by the numbers here, the original is found in the critical edn with its halves separated from each other, there can be no doubt that the halves need to be read together as in some ms traditions and citations by pre-modern authors. In their present places in the critical edn, the halves do not connect well with what follows and precedes.

*prāṇā iti. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 5.2:*⁹⁴ *ṛṣim prasūtaṁ kapilaṁ ... tam agre ... Gauḍa-pāda on Sāṁkhya-kārikā 43: bhagavataḥ kapilasyādi-sarga utpadyamānasya catvāro bhāvāḥ sahotpannāḥ dharmo jñānaṁ vairāgyam aiśvaryaṁ iti. Yukti-dipikā on Sāṁkhya-kārikā 69 (Wezler-Motegi edn p. 267): bhavāgrotpannair api sanaka-sanātana-sanandana-sanat-kumāra-prabhṛtibhir Vṛṣabha p. 225.21, explanation of abhikhyā occurring in TK 1.173: brahmaiva ṛṣi-rūpeṇa vivartate iti khyātam/vyaktam; also, the passages collected and translated in Muir 1868, pp. I.36, 64, 65.*

§5.13 In the initial section of this essay I wondered about the extent to which Renou's remark about the 'tipping of the hat' treatment of the Veda was applicable (and suggested the comparability of the position accorded to the Veda with the position assigned to a maṭha head in Kulkarni's profoundly disturbing story). It was not my intention to determine the extent of applicability. I leave that difficult work for the community of scholars to undertake if it so wishes. However, I hope that I have succeeded in establishing at least the possibility that the seeds of the phenomenon so succinctly captured by Renou were sown long before the phenomenon is thought to have come into existence — that the sowing may go back to the time the Saṁhitās were put together. It is likely to have been preceded by considerable contemplation on the human condition, particularly on the type of authoritative text societies need for proper functioning. I have also put forward evidence and reasoning to the effect that, in authors like BH, who were well-versed in the Veda, the acceptance of the Veda could have been a consciously adopted and logically justified fiction that co-existed with a believer's reverence for the Veda — that the situation was more complex than the dichotomy Renou's remark presupposes. If and how the 'tipping of the hat' phenomenon influenced the post-BH periods of Indian thinking (e.g., that of Kashmir Śaivism or of the modern mystics such as Ramaṇa and Aurobindo) is a determination to be made by other researchers (such as the ones whose writings appear in Patton 1994).

⁹⁴Larson 1987: 109: "When this reference is compared with other Śvetāśvatara references, namely IV.12, VI.1-2, VI.18, and III.4, it becomes clear that *kapila* is to be construed with reference to Hiranya-garbha and Rudra."

APPENDIX 1

Summary and supplementation of Aklujkar 1991a
 ("Bharṭṛ-hari's concept of the Veda")

1. Vertical double reference of *veda*:

(a) the subtle, original form of the texts we know as Veda, which form is also called *praṇava* (probably when it is in the mode of creating or engaging with the world; cp. Sāṃkhya use of *pradhāna*).

(b) the texts themselves, either in the bilma/rāṣi form or as the Saṃhitā(s) etc.

The Veda referred to in (a) is, as it were, at the top or the source node, with the second as its descendent. The order is primarily logical, although, when we speak of it, it may come across as chronological.⁹⁵

NOTES TO POINT 1:

(a) Here, the word "text" does not primarily stand for a written composition. Nor does it necessarily stand for a text in a particular book-chapter-section etc. order that the designations like *R̥g-veda*, *Yajur-veda*, *Sāma-veda* and *Atharva-veda* have come to connote or the designations like *ṛc*, *yajus* and *sāman*, taken to stand, respectively, for the verse, prose and 'sing-mode' compositions, may convey. Being in a specific word order and/or a sentence order is all that texthood implies in the present context. One may think of such ordered linguistic matter as leading to the distinct text-bodies or collections like the RV right from the start, but one is not logically obliged to do so in the present context.

(b) As evidence of BH's acceptance of the subtle form, note the phrases under (d) in point 3 below. Note also that in TKV 1.5 (reproduced in point 5 below) the *darśanātmani sthita dṛśya artha*, that is 'the entity in the vision-unit,' comes before the *labdha-krama vāg-ātma-rūpa* 'sequential form consisting of language' and *saṃhitā-pada-krama-vibhāga* 'division into the text modes Saṃhitā-pāṭha, Pada-pāṭha and Krama-pāṭha.'⁹⁶

(c) The subtle single Veda meant here is different from the unity it may have as a *rāṣi* 'pile, mass, collection' before Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana divided

⁹⁵See point 7 below for some consequences of Halbfass' not identifying the two related but distinct referents of *veda* in the way I have identified them.

⁹⁶In a remark echoing *eko 'yam vedākhyo darśanātmani sthito dṛśyo 'rthaḥ*, Helā-rāja (TK 3.1.46) observes: *viśiṣṭa-racanāvala eva vedasyeśvara-buddhau darśanātmani sadāvasthitatvam*. However, the elements *viśiṣṭa-racanāvalaḥ*, *īśvara*- and *sadā* of the remark are not supported by the relevant passages of BH. In other words, Helā-rāja's attempt cannot be said to be historically valid in the present state of our sources. BH does not accept *īśvara* in the sense of 'the supreme lord' or 'personal godhead.' The eternal Veda is subtle, not a particular sequential text, in his thinking. He leans toward thinking of the text Veda (in any Śākhā form) as a later or second-stage development.

it into the four major Vedas (as a traditional account or legend says) and also from the unity the Mīmāṃsakas presuppose for their hermeneutical endeavor in remarks such as *krtsno veda ekam vākyam* "All the (texts in the) Veda form one sentence (with no discordant constituents)" or *sarva-śākhā-pratyayam ekam karma* "All Veda-branches inform us about one (and the same) ritual act (although there may be differences of detail in them when they speak of that particular ritual act; i.e., the branch differences pertaining to what is essentially the same ritual act are not to be taken as calling for performance of separate ritual acts; the differences are to be reconciled)."

2. Horizontal double reference of *veda*:

(a) a narrow or specific meaning: revealed or heard literature (Śruti) only; more probably, the mantras only and, less probably, the mantras and Brāhmaṇas, with the Upaniṣads either being viewed as parts of the Brāhmaṇas and Mantras (and thus as Śruti) or not being viewed as Śruti at all (that is, viewed only as recasts of or comments on the Śruti — as Trayyanta, which may not be exactly synonymous with Vedānta).

(b) a wide or general meaning:

Variety (i): the Upaniṣads are a distinct part of the Veda.

Variety (ii): all vidyā-bhedas or lores are Veda, because they consist of words and meanings, which, in turn, are reducible to praṇava.

That in the case of some early Upaniṣads the division into Brāhmaṇa and Upaniṣad is not clear is well-known.

We may speak of variety (ii) as assigning the widest sense to *veda*. However, while doing so, we should not overlook that it is based on the subtle form of the Veda, that is, on the non-text Veda. It can potentially include any number of branches of knowledge and not be subject to any question presupposing a specific extent. In this respect, Aklujkar 1991a; note 42 and the following remark of Eliot (1921: I.76), extendable to the Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas, are relevant: "According to Indian ideas there is no a priori objection to the appearance now or in the future of new Upanishads. All revelation is eternal and self-existent but it can manifest itself at its own good time."

NOTES TO POINT 2:

(a) The evidence for the inclusion of Brāhmaṇas in the reference range of *veda* or *śruti* is indirect and scanty in BH's works as Aklujkar 1991a: §2.3-6 indicates.

(b) We usually use the words *brāhmaṇa* and *upaniṣad* for books or titled next continua. However, there is also another usage in which these

words denote passages or content serving specific functions within the Vedic thought complex. These passages or contents may not, in all cases, be found in the existing texts having the same genre title, but would probably have been thought to be eligible for inclusion; cf. the usage of *brāhmaṇa* in the following quotation made by Vṛṣabha (1.148 p. 203) that, in turn, quotes a passage which agrees with Chāndogya Upaniṣad (also called Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa in the tradition) 8.12.1 entirely in thought and almost entirely in wording: *tasya sāṅgāṁś caturo vedān āvartayataḥ kramenedaṁ brāhmaṇam ājagāma* "To him, who was repeating the four Vedas along with (their) ancillary texts, this brahman-associated text (= Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa/Upaniṣad 8.12.1 quoted next) occurred in due course";⁹⁷ also, the usage of *upaniṣad* in Bṛhad-āraṇyaka 2.1.20, Chāndogya 1.13.4, Kena 4.2, Śvetāśvatara 1.16, Taittirīya 1.3.1 etc.⁹⁸

There seems to be only one occurrence of *brāhmaṇa* in the surviving part of BH's scholarly bequest in a sense other than 'a specific varṇa or social class' or 'a member of a specific varṇa'. This occurrence is Mahābhāṣya-ṭīkā, Abhyankar-Limaye edn p. 30: *yathā brāhmaṇa-śabdā abhyāsa-kāle 'narthakāḥ. para-pratipādane sva-rūpa-padārthakāḥ 'evam paṭhaivam paṭhe' ti. viniyoga-kāle 'rthavantah.* "(This is) like (the following): The Brāhmaṇa expressions do not convey meanings when one is reviewing (i.e., is reciting them for memorization); at the time of imparting (them) to others, the meaning they have is their own form (i.e., they are mentioned, not used, as is borne out by the instruction) 'recite thus, recite thus'; (however) at the time of employment (in a ritual act), they have (the usual denotative,

⁹⁷On 02 May 1997, Dr. Elliot Stern drew my attention to the fact that a passage strikingly similar to what Vṛṣabha quotes with *evam hy āha* occurs in Vyoma-śiva's ṭīkā on Padārthadharma-saṁgraha (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series edn. p. 19.23-26). In my response of 06 May to him, I observed (a) that we cannot be certain that Vyoma-śiva is Vṛṣabha's source, although the possibility of his being the source is not to be discounted, and (b) that the word *brāhmaṇam* next, which has the appearance of explicating the hidden significance of a brahman 'an earlier Saṁhitā statement, a Vedic mantra/prayer,' not for a Brahmin person. The texts we call Brāhmaṇas could easily have been first thought of as collections of brāhmaṇas in such a sense (very much like *sūtra* standing for an individual aphoristic statement as well as a work consisting of such statements). In his 2004 publication, Professor Johannes Bronkhorst incidentally notes in fn 63 that a similar meaning of *brāhmaṇa* ('single formulations rather than whole texts') has been suggested by Professor Walter Slaje in the context of *yājñavalkāni brāhmaṇāni* occurring in Patañjali's comment on the Vārttika *purāṇa-prokṣeṣu brāhmaṇa-kalpeṣu* (Pāṇini 4.3.105.). Compare the usage of Durga and S-M in the passages from their commentaries cited in appendix 3 below.

⁹⁸The passages referred to here establish that even within the text bodies we call Upaniṣads there is usage of *upaniṣad* in some such sense as 'truly effective/transforming knowledge, precious proposition,' implying 'thought/information not to be indiscriminately spread.' This usage continues even after the word comes to be associated with a particular body of texts as the Artha-śāstra, Kāma-sūtra etc. indicate.

non-self-referential) meanings.” Here a text which is employed in ritual worship as something settled and around which a tradition of learning has grown is obviously meant, but the passage is opaque as to whether textual wholes are meant or shorter brahman-associated pronouncements and revelations that could be incorporated in the textual wholes are meant.

As for *upaniṣad*, the word does not occur in BH’s available writings. However, his most ancient commentator accessible to us writes in a way in which there is a suggestion that *upaniṣad* is a function-based term like *artha-vāda*. In explaining the TKV phrase *vedākhyasya prasiddhasya brahmaṇaḥ* “Of the well-known/established brahman called Veda,” Vṛṣbha (p. 39) writes: *loke sārthavādakasya sopaniṣatkasya brāhmaṇasya mantrāṇām ca vedākhyā*. “In the world, the word *veda* is used to refer to the Brāhmaṇa (a text/text-complex), inclusive of artha-vādas and upaniṣads, and the Mantras.”

(c) If the text bodies we now call Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads are included, the bodies should be understood as not extending beyond what we, *as historians*, generally consider to be the older Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. BH himself may not have made any distinction in terms of old and new, but it is justifiable to presume that some of the works that now pass as Brāhmaṇas or Upaniṣads either did not exist in his time, were not known to him or were not known to him as Brāhmaṇas or Upaniṣads.

(d) Many Indologists state or presume that the Saṃhitās first came into existence, then the Brāhmaṇas, and so on. The better ones among them are aware that this sort of temporal reconstruction is only generally true; it does not mean that every part of a Saṃhitā is older than every part of a Brāhmaṇa, and so on. The better ones among the better Indologists, further, do not make the mistake of taking the lateness of language as proof of the lateness of content or thought. It is important to be aware, however, that, for a thinker coming from a milieu like that of BH, the text bodies the Indologists (and, because of them, most modern scholars concerned with the issue) see as developing over time, were a synchronic or atemporal text complex. If this thinker privately thought of one text as coming before or after another, his *theoretical* thinking was rarely, if ever, based on that possibility.

3. Place of the subtle form of the Veda in BH’s philosophy:

- (a) *vaikharī* language-1 = speech.
- (b) *madhyamā* language-2 = *jñāna* cognition.
- (c) *paśyantī* language-3 = *buddhi* mind or intellect.
- (d) *param paśyantyāḥ rūpam*, = *citi* sentience = *chandasām yoniḥ*,

sūkṣmā nityā alīndriyā vāc,
vācaḥ uttamaṁ rūpam,
śabda-tattva-brahman
 language-principle, language-4

chandomayī tanuḥ,
vedākyah darśanātmani
sthitah dṛśyah arthah,
vedaḥ ... prakṛitvena ...
vivarteṣu ... vidhātā,
pranavaḥ, subtle form
of the Veda

NOTE TO POINT 3:

The remembered Veda or the Veda performing the function of a teacher (*vedaḥ ... upadeṣṭṛ-rūpatvena ... vyavasthāsu ... vidhātā*; note 36) could be a part of the paśyantī in the case of those who know the Veda text. However, it would not be the totality of paśyantī.

4. Different views regarding how Veda as a specific textual body is revealed:

(a) Vṛṣabha on TKV 1.6 p. 27: 23-24: *ayaṁ vedo brahmaṇaḥ sakāśāt śākhādi-bheda-bhinna eva vivartate*. "This Veda appears from brahman in no form other than (*eva*) the one which has the division based on the mutual difference of the branches etc."

(b) *eka-rūpa eva vivartate. [anantaram] pravibhaktaḥ*. "(The Veda) appears as having one (undivided) form. It is divided (later)."⁹⁹

NOTE TO POINT 4:

As BH speaks later in the same Vṛtti of a view according to which the division of the Veda into branches is made again and again, with interruptions in between, (*yeṣāṁ tv ayaṁ śākhā-pravibhāgo vicchedena punaḥ punar bhavati ...*), it follows that the views stated in the earlier part of Vṛtti 1.6 must be of those who think of the Veda divisions, not just of the Veda, as eternal.

This view should perhaps be distinguished from the view stated in TK 1.172 and at the beginning of V 1.173 (the view of the Mīmāṃsakas according to Vṛṣabha p. 226: 9-10). In that view too, the Śruti with its divisions and variations is eternal (and so is the Smṛti as far as its content is concerned). However, there is no revelation, at least as a cosmogonical event.

⁹⁹To provide exact contrast with the preceding, I have made up the two sentences in (b) utilizing BH's own diction. BH's acceptance of the view they express is established in point 6 below.

5. Ways in which the subsequent division comes about:

TKV 1.5: *eko 'yaṁ vedākhya darśanātmani sthito dṛśyo 'rthaḥ. sa maharṣibhir bhedenābhedasya¹⁰⁰ pratipādayitum aśakyatvād, abhivyakti-nimittāt labdhakrame vāg-ātma-rūpe prāpitah, ekatvānatikrameṇa samhitā-pada-kramavibhāgena pravibhakta-mārgo 'dhyayana-nimittām adhyetṛṇām caraṇa-samākhyāṁ vyavasthāpayadbhiḥ samāmnātaḥ.*

apara āha. yathā vāg deśā[di-]bhedenā bhinnā, saty api sva-rūpa-bheda, ekābhidheya-nibandhanatvam avyatikrāntā, saiva ca deśādi-bheda-prakalpana-vyavasthā-hetuh, evaṁ caraṇabhede 'py ekārtha-nibandhanatvam avyatikrāntāni śruti-vākyaṇi, sva-rūpa-bheda eva caraṇa-bheda-prakalpana-vyavasthā-hetur iti.

apare manyante. yathāṣṭāṅga āyur-vedaḥ purā-kalpa eka evāsit, sa eva hi kalau śakti-vaikalyān nṛṇām pravibhaktāṅgo dṛśyate, tathāyam apy aparimāṇa-mārga-śakti-bhedo brahma-rāśir iti.

A translation of the preceding, segmented to show the different ways stated by BH, would be as follows:¹⁰¹

(a1) "This visible entity called Veda, as (an entity) existing in the vision unit (of the great seers), is one. It was, through division, set down for transmission (note 7) by the great seers, for (the) unity (of vision they have in the revelation experience) cannot be transmitted (as it is; i.e., the great seers must follow a sequential form if they are to transmit the Veda). It (= the Veda entity) is (first) given a linguistic form that has sequence due to the causal factors which bring about (its) manifestation (that is, due to the organs of articulation etc.).

(a2) "(then) its ways are differentiated due to the division into samhitā-pāṭha, pada-pāṭha and krama-pāṭha."

(a3) "(finally) they establish the caraṇa designations of the (Veda) students which are based on the form of the Veda text they study."

(b) "Speech becomes different due to the difference of region etc., despite that difference of (phonetic) form, it continues to express the same meaning (i.e., the dialectal variations do not imply variation in what is conveyed). (In turn,) it itself becomes the basis in setting up the differences of regions etc. In the same way the Śruti sentences express the same (pre-variation) meaning (that is, have a unity through meaning), despite the difference of caraṇas (Veda-learning

¹⁰⁰One should imagine a comma here after *bhedena* ('through division') and take that word as syntactically connected to *samāmnātaḥ*. It is possible to connect *bhedena* to *vāg-ātma-rūpe prāpitah*, but, in that case, the great seers need not be invoked as agents. Whether they give the linguistic form or someone else does, the non-unity or sequential nature in the linguistic form will be inevitable. In other words, the phrase *abhedasya pratipādayitum aśakyatvāt* should be taken as a separate unit explaining why what was unitary in the vision of the great seers must assume a sequential form in transmission.

¹⁰¹As the main concern of the present essay is not what happens after the initial revelation of the great seers and as the differences to be noticed in the translations by Biardeau, Subramania Iyer etc. are minor, I will not note them here.

traditions), for the *carana* difference is set up on the basis of difference of speech form itself."¹⁰²

(c) "Just as the *Āyur-veda*, consisting of eight specialties, was only a single (field of learning) at an earlier age (and) the same (*Āyur-veda*) is seen divided into specialties in the (present) Kali age, because of the decline in the capabilities of human beings, in the same way is seen this Veda (textual) mass also, as one having the difference of powers of countless paths (or as one having countless path power differences)."

Thus, TKV 1.5 points out three basic ways in which the unitary Veda revealed to certain seers becomes diverse without really losing its unity: (a) Division is unavoidable in speech. (b) Speech changes from region to region. (c) The inability of the recipients to grasp the original in its entirety means that they will grasp only parts of it and thus introduce division into the unity.

Although (b) and (c) are prefaced with *apara āha* and *apare manyante*, they are a part of the thinking of the author himself. BH's commentators have rightly abided by this convention behind the use of *apara* in their interpretation of his thought (cf. *Helā-rāja* 3.14.615).

NOTE TO POINT 5:

A suggestion of the sequence in which things happen must be seen in the word sequence *vāg-ātma-rūpe prāpitah ... saṁhitā-pada-krama-vibhāgena pravibhakta-mārgah*, for the talk of division into *Samhitā* etc. would not make sense unless the (subtle) Veda is assumed to have gained a linguistic form. However, we should not infer from the sequence '(a2) → (a3)' that, in BH's view, the generation of *pada-pāṭha*, *krama-pāṭha* etc. and the generation of the *caranas* of the Veda necessarily takes place in that order. True, we normally think of the four Vedas, the division of each of them into *saṁhitā-pāṭha*, *pada-pāṭha* etc. or the division of each of them into *śākhās*, and the expansion of each Veda through *Brāhmaṇa*, *Āraṇyaka* etc. as forming a top-to-bottom or earlier-to-later diversity, but a specification of this type is not to be found in BH's works. In the relevant passages of his works, in which TKV 1.5 analysed above is the most detailed, the emphasis is on the ways (i.e., the various manners) in which the diversity comes about, not on how the noticed or recognized constituents of the diversity are related to each other. BH does not tell us what the sequence of occurrence is between (a) the division into four Vedas, (b) the division into *ṛc*, *yajus*, and *sāman*, (c) the division into *saṁhitā-pāṭha*, *pada-pāṭha*, *krama-pāṭha* etc., (d) the division into *śākhās*, and (e) the division into *Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas* etc. The absence of an exhaustive and explicit statement on the divisions could simply be due to absence of need in the relevant contexts,

¹⁰²What BH states here is valuable in that it anticipates the most commonly given modern explanation of the origin of Veda *śākhās*: regional speech peculiarities were bound to affect Veda recitation despite the effort made to ensure its uniformity.

but it could also be a reflection of the time. Variety on all the indicated fronts and in all the indicated ways existed, but either there was no interest in determining how it historically came about or there was no possibility of being able to make a historical determination. Although, it is frequently taken for granted in modern statements that, first, the four major Vedic traditions (RV, Yajur-veda, Sāma-veda and Atharva-veda) took shape and then each began to show internal variation due to geographic spread, dialect influence etc., leading to the recognition of śākhās, it is possible that at least some of the śākhās came into existence, say, before the RV and Atharva-veda, having the verse mode, were separated or before the RV and Sāma-veda were set apart to do justice to the 'verse mode : sing mode' distinction. The only justifiable course open to BH was to write in such a way as to reflect synchronically the scene of his time. Further, we should also be aware of the fact that, for a believer, the validity of the different parts of a scripture does not depend on which part is more recent (although it can depend on the purpose of the part).

In accordance with this surmise, BH's usage of *carāṇa* is neutral as to the difference between a whole Veda and a Veda-śākhā. The ground reality was that the Vedic community known to him was primarily associated with specific śākhās. The etymological meaning of *carāṇa* suggested that the word should cover what the groups in the community lived by or practiced. Thus, the coverage could be in a wider sense (by the Veda division) or in a narrower sense (by the śākhā division).¹⁰³

Depending on the context, *carāṇa* could also refer to the accepted ways of non-Vedic communities.

6. Establishment of what the first revelation should include in BH's view:

As Vṛṣabha, in 4(a) above, notes for us, BH was aware of a view which considered even the division of the Veda into śākhās etc. as part of the revelation. In this view, the unfolding of the Veda diversity would not be gradual. Even the śākhās would be eternally present in the Veda whole (although the texts of some of them could be lost on the human level). But BH does not seem to prefer this view. In his thinking, the Veda coming from the unitary vision of the great seers is initially undivided; it is a (brahma) rāṣi. Its division into four major or nodal traditions, the branches associated

¹⁰³Carpenter (1995: 41), while commenting on TK 1.5 writes: "The apparent multiplicity involved here would seem to refer to the differentiation of the Rg, Yajur, Sāma and Atharva Vedas rather than the various branches (śākhā-s) of each of these, since these branches are dealt with separately in [TK] 1.6. The unity that Bhartṛ-hari has in mind here thus precedes or underlies the fourfold division with which we are familiar." As my discussion here indicates, the first sentence in this statement may not be accurate.

with these traditions etc. is something that happens predominantly on the level of ordinary (non-maharṣi) humans, in what we would call 'historical' time and not always with planning or deliberation.

We can determine this to be the case on the basis of the following direct and indirect evidence:

(a) The kārīkās form the main text of the TK. The main text in the traditional Indian genre consisting of 'main text + author's own commentary' is primarily given to stating the author's own views. Unless a kārīkā is followed by a kārīkā stating a different view, it can generally be taken to express an author's own thinking. In TK 1.5, the wording is *aneka-vartmeva samāmnātaḥ*, 'transmitted as if it has more than one way,' indicating that the vartmans, 'ways,' are not the ultimate state — the Veda continues to remain one even when the vartmans come into existence. Such a statement indicates that unity is the starting point.

(b) Explicit support for the inference made in (a) is furnished by TKV 1.5 and TKV 1.173; *eko 'yaṁ vedākhyo darśanātmani sthito dṛśyo'rthaḥ* "This entity which abides in the vision unit (or unitary vision) is one" and *te ca ... sarvaṁ āmnāyaṁ sarva-bheda-śakti-yuktam abhinna-śakti-yuktam ca paśyanti* "And they (= the seers in the second group) ... see the entire traditionally transmitted (Veda) text body, which possesses all powers of differentiation and which possesses (those) powers in such a way that they are not different (from it)."¹⁰⁴ As (c) below will establish, these two statements appear in contexts that state BH's own views. They speak of the vision as unitary. Logically, the first phase for the object of such a vision, when it appears on the ordinary level of human experience, must be one in which it is free from labeled or labelable segmentation and phonetic deviation.

(c) In TKV 1.6, an explicit statement (or refutation) of the view that the *śākhās* are always there (and hence they must be there even in the first revelation) is missing. However, it is obviously implied by *tu* in the text that is available: *yeṣāṁ tu ayaṁ śākhā-pravibhāgo vicchedena punaḥ punar bhavātīty āgamaḥ, teṣāṁ, prāk pravibhāgād, avyabhicāra eva saṁhṛta-kramāyā vāca, ity etad darśanam*. "But, the view of those whose inherited position is that this (Veda) division into branches comes about again and again, with loss (of the division in between), is that, prior to the division, language as an entity with withdrawn sequence invariably exists." Such a statement clearly presupposes the presence of *yeṣāṁ tu ayaṁ śākhā-pravibhāgo vicchedena punaḥ punar na bhavātīty āgamaḥ ...*. This latter kind of statement seems to have been available in the mss on which Vṛṣabha (p. 27) based his commentary. His wording indicates that the lost statement began with *yeṣāṁ tu*, which

¹⁰⁴If BH had thought of the seers as seeing the āmnāya in its diversity or as a divided object, he would have used the expression *sarva-bheda-yuktam*, not *sarva-bheda-śakti-yuktam*.

made the later scribes lose it through haplography. These considerations make the preserved statement a second (i.e., the final) statement in the present case. Normally, when a śāstra author states alternative views, the view in the final position is the *siddhānta*.

A similar situation is noticed in TK 1.172-173 and their *Vṛtti*. The view that the *śākhās* come and go is stated after the view that the *śākhās* are permanently there.

(b) Statements elsewhere in the TK establish that if the possibility of world (universe or cosmos) creation must be entertained BH would prefer to entertain it as something happening cyclically (Aklujkar 1991a: §3.2 fn. 40). The facts in (a)-(c) are consistent with this conclusion. Thus, we should view BH as a proponent of the view mentioned in point 4(b). At the same time we should note that BH does not have anything of fundamental importance in his philosophy to lose by leaving room for the possibility in 4(a). Such a gesture would agree with his perspectivistic way of doing philosophy, that is, with his philosophy of philosophy. The ultimate truth of BH's philosophy does not depend on accepting a creation of the physical world. There are two versions of his śabda-tattva brahman thesis. According to the weak one of the two, the śabda-tattva would be the ultimate 'given' or truth even if the world is not thought of as actually coming into being from it. It can be thought of as a cause of the world only in the sense that the world exists for someone only as long as the śabda-tattva exists in that someone (cf. Aklujkar 2001).

Further, it is reasonable to hold that BH thought of the object or content of genuine Vedic revelation to be Mantra as distinct from Brāhmaṇa (see point 2, note (b) above) etc. At least that seems to be his subconscious association from the employment of phrases like *mantradṛśaḥ paśyanti* in TKV 1.5. Such an association would agree with the evidence Bhagavad-datta (1978: 94-116), Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka (1974: 139-78, 1977: 68-86, 1980: 17-18) and Holdrege (1994) have collected.

7. Halbfass' understanding of BH's Veda concept:

Wilhelm Halbfass (1991) addresses the topic of the place of the Veda in BH's thinking with much learning, insight, and sensitivity. His discussion is broader in its concern than mine. It is also spread over several intervened pages and is frequently comparative in spirit (most of the comparison takes place with respect to Kumārila, Śāṅkara, and Jayanta). Also, he pays greater attention to role of the Veda than to the concept and revelation process of the Veda.

In what follows, I point out how some pertinent remarks of Halbfass would have been more defensible had he clearly stated that there are (at

least) two senses in which BH uses the term *veda*. In other words, I offer further justification of the explication strategy adopted in Aklujkar 1991a, as well as seek to ensure that the wording of Halbfass' remarks does not mislead future researchers. As I see it, by not telling his readers that BH uses the word *veda* in more than one sense — by presenting as one complex the senses that BH indicates to be different — Halbfass unintentionally leaves the impression that BH has some mystical or mysterious and possibly inconsistent concoction of elements in his Veda concept¹⁰⁵ — that BH lumps together ideas we would normally keep apart.

My procedure will be to cite Halbfass's remarks and indicate how they support the critique offered just now. I give, in square brackets, the numbers Halbfass assigns to his notes (printed toward the end of the chapters in his book) and the textual references the notes contain.

(a) Halbfass 1991: 4-5: "Understanding the role of the Veda in Indian thought involves more than textual hermeneutics. It also involves what we may call the hermeneutics of an event. The different approaches to the Veda are not just different interpretations of a text, and commitment to the Veda is not only, and not even primarily, acceptance of a doctrine. In another and perhaps more fundamental sense, it means recognition of a primeval event, and a response to a fundamental reality. In the understanding of those who accept it, the Veda itself is beginning and opening par excellence. It not only speaks, in its own elusive fashion, about the origin and structure of the world and the foundations of society; it is also their real and normative manifestation and representation."

The observation is very good. The questions that remain are:

(i) How do thinkers that otherwise show great sophistication in rational thinking accept the position that a text could contain nothing but what is really there or what ought to be there always — a comprehensive actual or potential matching with the present or would-be worldly reality? They were obviously aware that not all texts are reliable. Are they engaging in only dogmatic assertions? Are they deliberately refusing to question faith in some areas, or do they have simply 'human' weaknesses and understandable blind spots? Is their position not different, in some essential way, from that of those who place their faith in a person (e.g., the Buddhists, the Jainas) or from that of those who declare a certain text to be the unquestionable guide in order to ensure that followers in the subsequent generations do not put their trust in another human being (e.g., the Sikhs)?

(ii) How did the thinkers concerned reconcile the Veda being an event with the Veda being a text? Were event and text not different categories in their thinking?

¹⁰⁵The inconsistency would be with the distinction BH clearly makes elsewhere between language and reality or between a text and the world.

I think Halbfass would have agreed with me in holding that BH's credulousness — if that is what we are noticing here — would not go to the extent of confusing event and text. BH *may* be a man of faith and he may even have his favorites chosen non-rationally at some level (that is, in effect chosen for him by the situation in which he was born and brought up), but he is not so naive as not to realize when his statements would appear opaque, confusing or contradictory.

(b) Halbfass 1991: 5: "The language of the Veda is primeval reality. Bhartṛ-hari says that the Veda is the "organizing principle" (*vidhātṛ*) of the world, that is, not only its "teacher" or principle of instruction (*upadeśṭṛ*), but also its underlying cause and essence (*prakṛti*). [12: TK 1.10 and V; ch. 3 §8f.] This may be an extreme and somewhat unusual form of expression, but the basic viewpoint it articulates is by no means isolated. The Manu-smṛti, as well as the other dharma texts, characterize the Veda as an organizing and sustaining principle, and even as the real basis of the social and natural world. [13: Manu 2.76ff; 3.75; 12.99; 2.7 with Medhātithi's expl. of Veda as *sarva-jñānamaya*] It would be wrong to view such statements as merely metaphorical. The Veda is the foundation of language, of the fundamental distinctions and classifications in the world, and of those rituals which are meant to sustain the social and natural order. It is itself the primeval manifestation of those cosmogonic occurrences which establish the dharma. [14: India and Europe ch. 17] Text and world, language and reality, are inseparable in this world-view and self-understanding. [15: The Veda itself frequently presents itself as a cosmic or cosmogonic reality. See, for instance, Rg-veda 10.90.9; Muir III.3ff.] The text itself opens and sustains the "world" in which it appears, to which it speaks, and by which its own authority has to be recognized and sustained."

I am not aware of anyone else who has so perceptively noted the notions contained in the relevant Sanskrit texts and articulated them so succinctly. Still the following question occurs to me: How could the individuals who knew that all language is not reality — that the text and the world cannot be identical if commonsense is to be respected — subscribe to a position of the described kind in the case of the Veda? Is it really likely that they did not see the contradiction? And, if they did not see it themselves, would their contemporary Buddhist and Jaina philosophers not bring it to their attention? If they made an exception, what was special about the Veda that distinguished the Veda as language or text from ordinary language(s) or texts? Could it not be the case that BH, possibly following his predecessors, explicates what is implicit in the statements found in works like the Manu-smṛti? In other words, there must be a notion in addition to the ones so nicely recorded by Halbfass which helped the thinkers involved to reconcile their statements — to satisfy the rational man and responding individual in them. This notion must be that of levels and two different senses of *veda* relative to the levels as the Vṛtti sentence *vedo hi lokānām prakṛitivena copadeśṭṛtvena ca vivarteṣu [ca] vyavasthāsu ca vidhātā* confirms. Here, the role as fashioner (*vidhātṛ*) through being *prakṛti* and through

being a teacher are distinguished as obtaining in the contexts of *vivarta* and *vyavasthā*, respectively (note 36). BH tends to use two *ca*-s when two notions that should be kept apart as belonging to different categories are paired (cf. Aklujkar 1991b). Thus, the repetition of *ca* seen in *prakṛitivena copadeṣṭṛtvena ca* is significant. Vṛṣabha (p. 38), too, states that two different explications of *vidhātus tasya lokānām* in the *kārikā* are offered in the Vṛtti sentence. He is careful to point out the 'respectively' or *yathā-saṁkhyā* construction implicit in it and thus to convey that two functionally different Vedas, that is, two meanings of *veda*, are intended: *yasmād ayaṁ vedo brahmākhyo jagat sṛjati varṇāśramāṁś ca sveṣu karmasu vyavasthāpayati*.¹⁰⁶ *yato 'yaṁ prakṛitivena vivarteṣūtpattiṣu lokasya vidhātā, ādye vyākhyāne. dvitiye tu varṇāśrama-vyavasthopadeśakatvād upadeṣṭṛtvena vidhātā*. Later, in the same V 1.10, BH himself suggests that his preceding remarks were based on a wider, functionally bipartite, concept of the Veda (and *brahman*) when he uses the phrase: *vedākhyasya prasiddhasya brahmaṇo 'ṅgebhyaḥ*.¹⁰⁷

(c) Halbfass 1991: 35: "Unlike Bhartṛ-hari [51: see below §12], they [= Kumārila and his followers; AA] do not recognize a dynamic extension of the Veda into the world of human speech and thought."

Here Veda must be what I call the subtle form of the Veda. The Veda as text cannot so extend. Any talk of it doing so will puzzle a reader. What Halbfass' point, therefore, boils down to is this: BH and his followers are willing to admit the language principle as the ultimate reality and to accept its equation with the Veda, in one sense. Kumārila's side rejects both the steps.

(d) Halbfass (1991: 37-38: "Unlike Kumārila, Bhartṛ-hari does not draw a strict border between the uncreated Veda and the traditions of human thought and exegesis. And unlike Śaṅkara, he does not postulate a radical dichotomy between absolute and relative, empirical-practical truth (i.e. *paramārtha* and *vyavahāra*). Bhartṛ-hari's Veda is *brahman*'s unfolding into the world; it extends into the social and natural world as its underlying structure and basis. The Veda itself is a dynamic process, initiating its own divisions into different parts, branches and recensions; this process of differentiation and expansion is continued and extrapolated in the work of human exegesis. Not only the "seers" (*ṛṣi*) who manifest the Vedic texts, but also their exegetes and interpreters, are agents and instruments of the self-manifestation, self-differentiation and self-explication (*vivarta*) of the absolute "word-brahman" (*śabda-brahman*). ... they are not only speakers about, but agents and representatives of the reality of the Vedic word and they are participants in cosmic and cosmogonic processes. The Veda, in

¹⁰⁶Up to this point Vṛṣabha exploits the two meanings of *veda* ('a particular textual corpus' and 'śabdatattva/sūkṣmā vāc') and *brahman* ('śabda-tattva/sūkṣmā vāc' and 'Vedic corpus') as BH himself exploits them (but only in the case of *veda* at the beginning of his remark).

¹⁰⁷Vṛṣabha rightly points out here that *veda* is now meant in the narrow sense of 'a specific body of texts': *laukikīm prasiddhim āsthāya veda-śabdārthasya vyākhyāṁ karoti. loke sārthavādakasya sopaṇīṣatkasya brāhmaṇasya mantrāṇaṁ ca vedākhyā*.

whose manifestation they participate, is not just a text *about* brahman, but its actual “imitation” and representation (*anukāra*).”

Here too, for most of the passage, Veda must be what I call the subtle form of the Veda. Halbfass seems to realize this when he states “The Veda ... is not just text,” but he still leaves the impression that the non-text Veda is simply an addition to or an extension of the text Veda without a difference of levels and that the functioning of one takes place, in BH’s perception, at the same time as that of the other in the same realm. Actually, the subtle, formless creation-prone (*praṇava*) Veda pervading human reasoning, exegesis etc. as the language principle or creator source of ṛṣis, is distinguished from the specific text body that appears as diverse and is bestowed by the ṛṣis.

This is not to say that BH is a Kevalādvaita Vedāntin or that he does not differ from Kumārila. I am only pointing out that a clear awareness of the meaning of *veda* would put us in a better position to locate the differences of thought accurately. Halbfass’ way of differentiating between the philosophies of BH and Śaṅkara raises the question of how he would account for the acceptance of avidyā by BH. On the other side, his way of differentiating between the philosophies of BH and Kumārila makes the reader curious about how he would explain the convergence of BH and Kumārila in locating the source of even (what we consider to be) non-Vedic philosophies in the Veda.

(e) Halbfass 1991: 38: “Thinking and reasoning (*tarka*) have to be supported and upheld by the Vedic tradition. They are “permeated” (*anuviddha*) [67: TK 1.131] by the Vedic words; legitimate human reasoning is ultimately nothing but the “power” and manifestation of these words (*śabdānām eva sā śaktis tarko yaḥ puruṣāśrayaḥ*). [68: TK 1.153; cf. Bhartṛ-hari’s citation of Pāraskara Gṛhya-sūtra 3.6.5 *vidhir vidheyas tarkaś ca vedaḥ* in V 1.10]”

The qualification “Vedic” employed by Halbfass is not supported by the contexts in which the cited remarks of BH occur. The remarks are general in nature: thinking and reasoning are not language-independent (even though most persons are not aware even of the possibility that language could be determining how they think or reason). The reference to Pāraskara’s definition is made under the alternative ‘*praṇava* = *sarva-śabdārtha-prakṛti* (= language principle) = Veda,’ that is, with the subtle form of the Veda or the wider sense of the term *veda* in mind. The tradition and the words Halbfass has in mind here ultimately go back to the Veda but in a non-textual sense of *veda*. While maintaining that all language or the language principle and the Veda meet and/or merge at some level of his theory or that all traditions (*āgamas*) are ultimately derived from the Veda, BH is not claiming that thinking and reasoning, to be legitimate, must have a basis in a particular realization of language, namely the Veda. Words coming from the subtle Veda can even be used to articulate positions

that run counter to the Veda text and the Vedic tradition. TKV 1.8 (*asad asato ... avastukād avastukam jāyate*) speaks of what we would take to be a Buddhist view as arising from an artha-vāda or artha-vāda-like sentence in the Veda, which sentence, by definition, would be a part of the Veda text and the Vedic tradition.

Thus, as a result of not specifying which of the two senses of *veda* (my “vertical double reference” in point 1 above) he has in mind while offering a particular observation, Halbfass’ account becomes misleading at points. BH’s view of the process and extent of Vedic revelation comes out as more faith-based, that is, as less philosophical and more dogmatic or blindly assertive, than it actually is.

APPENDIX 2

Other translations and interpretations of TK and TKV 1.5 and 1.173¹⁰⁸

TK 1.5 and its Vṛtti:

Biardeau 1964: 33:

TK 1.5: “C’est de Lui que le Veda est moyen d’accès et figure; quoiqu’ Il soit un, les grands voyants l’ont transmis comme comportant de multiples voies séparées les unes des autres.

TKV 1.5: <<Figure>> : cette Parole subtile, éternelle, au-delà des sens, les voyants qui ont l’intuition directe de la loi religieuse, qui voient les formules, la voient, et désirant la faire connaître à d’autres qui n’ont pas l’intuition directe de la loi religieuse, ils la transmettent fragment par fragment, comme on essaie de décrire ce que l’on a vu, entendu, éprouvé en rêve, C’est, du moins ce que l’on raconte de l’origine. En effet, on l’a dit : <<Il y eut des voyants qui avaient l’intuition directe de la loi religieuse; aux autres qui n’avaient pas l’intuition directe de la loi religieuse, ils

¹⁰⁸In the case of the Vṛtti, I will reproduce translations only of the parts relevant to Veda revelation. Secondly, I will generally refrain from commenting on the differences from my translations and interpretation. In most cases, those with good reading ability in Sanskrit should be able to decide which translation is preferable.

Only Carpenter has made an attempt to provide separate elucidations and interpretations, some of which have already been acknowledged in the main body of this essay. From Subramania Iyer and Biardeau we do not get much more than literal translations (generally the latter is closer to the original Sanskrit). These translations are, in some cases, unclear *in their intent* even to those who are at home in Sanskrit and Indian philosophy, for no effort has been made by the translators to unravel the reasoning that may lie behind the propositions in the original Sanskrit. The lack of effort of the indicated kind is probably due to the fact that Biardeau and Iyer were translating the Vṛtti for the first time (the latter mainly as an aid to his edition).

transmirent les formules par l'enseignement; ceux-là, trop faibles pour (transmettre cet) enseignement, a fin d'en donner une connaissance par fragments cherchèrent à transmettre cet ouvrage, le Veda et ses annexes. Bilma signifie <<division>> ou <<explication>> [Nir. 1.20].>>

Subramania Iyer 1965: 7:

TK 1.5: "A means of attainment and a symbol of that One is the Veda, which though one, has been handed down as though in many recensions by the sages."

TKV 1.5: "By the word symbol (*anukāra*) the idea contained in the following ancient saying (*purā-kalpa*) is meant: The Ṛṣis[,] the seers of the mantras, those who have realised the truth (*dharma*)[,] see that subtle, inaudible Word and, wishing to communicate it to those who have not realised the truth, teach the symbol of it which is like a dream¹⁰⁹ in their desire to tell what they have seen, heard and experienced. It has indeed been said:— The Ṛṣis realised that truth (*dharma*); they taught the mantras to those who had not realised the truth; these others, also anxious to teach, proclaimed the Vedas and the Vedāṅgas, in order that the symbol of Brahman may be understood (*bilma-grahaṇāya*). *Bilma* is *bhilma* which means something which illuminates (*bhāsanam*)."

Carpenter 1995: 44-45¹¹⁰

TKV 1.5: "The seers who have directly seen the ritual ordinances, who see the mantras, see the subtle, eternal Word which is beyond the senses. Desiring to make it known to others who have not directly seen the ritual ordinances, they proclaim [literally, repeat from memory] an image [bilma] of it, desiring to relate what they have directly seen, heard or experienced, as if in a dream. [AA: translation of the quoted Nirukta 1.20:] The seers saw the ritual ordinances directly. To others who had not seen the ritual ordinances directly they proclaimed the mantras by way of instruction. What is called the Veda is a single object of vision established in vision itself (*darśanātmani sthito dṛśyo 'rthaḥ*). Because it is impossible to

¹⁰⁹Iyer's note on "which is like a dream" reads: "Just as one's experience in a dream is a kind of reflection of our experience in the wakeful state, in the same way, the Vedas are a kind of reflection of what the ṛṣis saw in their vision." I agree with "the Vedas are a kind of reflection of what the ṛṣis saw in their vision," but think that Iyer has misunderstood the intent behind *svapna-vṛttam iva*, just as his "also anxious to teach" is a mistranslation of *upadeśāya glāyantaḥ*. He should have accepted the guidance of traditional commentators (Vṛṣabha, Durga and S-M) in both the instances. The omission of *nityām* and *imaṁ grantham* from his translation does not constitute a crucial loss, but it should nevertheless have been avoided.

¹¹⁰In the parts copied from Carpenter, the brackets contain his additions, except where "AA:" appears.

explain that which is [thus] undifferentiated, the great seers caused the essential form of speech to acquire sequence, for the sake of [its] manifestation in a differentiated form. Then, without overstepping the unity, [the Veda] was proclaimed in different paths because of its different [modes of recitation]: *saṁhitā*, *pada*, and *krama*, by the great seers who established schools for the Vedic study of the students."

TK 1.173 and its Vṛtti:

Biardeau 1964: 185:

TK 1.173: "La Révélation fait connaître les choses qui se déploient à partir de l'indivision (primitive) comme en un rêve; tandis que la tradition est prescrite à partir de signes indicatifs, une fois que l'essence des choses est connue."

TKV 1.173: "... Mais il y en a pour qui la cause (du monde) passe perpétuellement par des phrases de sommeil et de veille et prend la forme d'hommes distincts lorsqu'elle entre en activité; selon ces derniers, des <<voyants>> apparaissent au plan de l'intuition elle-même, qui ont la vision du grand Soi, être pur et matrice de l'ignorance, et s'identifient à Lui par connaissance directe. Mais d'autres (voyants) apparaissent au plan de la connaissance; ils (voient) leur soi avec les noeuds du *manas*, (mais) pur par rapport aux éléments, éther, etc.; soit pris séparément soit pris tous ensemble, et non enchaîné par l'illusion, et ils s'identifient à lui de la même manière. Pour eux, toute activité au plan de l'ignorance est adventice et fictive, tandis qu'être fait de connaissance est pour eux perpétuellement essentiel et premier. Ce sont eux qui, ayant la connaissance de la parole non audible par l'ouïe, voient comme en rêve toute la Révélation à la fois douée du pouvoir de toutes les différenciations et douée d'un pouvoir indifférencié. [#] D'autres encore, voyant la nature des choses en tant qu'elle est un bien ou un dommage pour l'homme, et voyant aussi dans les textes révélés çà et là des signes indicatifs qui s'y rapportent, composent la tradition, celle qui a des résultats visibles et celle qui a des résultats invisibles. Tandis que la Révélation, ils ne font que la transmettre telle qu'ils la voient sans changer sa formulation, mais tout d'abord à l'état indivis, puis divisée en recensions. Telle est la Tradition."

[The relevant part of Biardeau's fn 1 at this point]: La suite [= what follows the allusion to the Mīmāṃsā view in the preceding paragraph] est beaucoup plus obscure quoiqu'elle ait probablement sa racine dans le texte de Yāska, trad. p. 33 (Nir. I-20), mais on peut évoquer à son sujet la littérature āgamique plutôt que le Vedānta śāṅkariien; une expression telle que *avidyā-yoni* par exemple, appliquée à l'ātman universel, rend un son bien peu vedāntique. De même, il est question de <<voyants>> qui se manifestent au plan de la *vidyā* en un second stade de l'émanation cosmique; le terme *vidyā* doit se distinguer du

pratibodha qui précède : *pratibodha* — que l'on peut comparer à *pratyakṣa* — connote l'idée de connaissance directe, immédiate et sans distance qui correspond à *pratibhā*; ce'st l'intuition par identification à la Parole même. *Vidyā* serait au contraire une connaissance d'ordre plus naturel et discursive?

Subramania Iyer 1965: 131:

TK 1.173: "In those who evolved out of the undifferentiated, there is knowledge of the Śruti (revealed Scripture) as in a dream. The written Tradition, on the other hand, is composed by the sages, after understanding the nature of things and following the indication (found in the Vedas).¹¹¹

TKV 1.173: "... According to those who hold that the ultimate cause works in the manner of sleep and wakefulness and the differentiated individuals,¹¹² some sages manifest themselves as identical with Intuition; they see it, the great Self in the form of Being, the source of Nescience and endowed with all knowledge and they become one with it. Some sages manifest themselves together with (the means of) knowledge. They identify themselves with their Self in the form of mind-knot, free from the elements ether etc., either severally or collectively, i.e., devoid of any sense of 'I' in regard to them. All the activity of those sages is the product of Nescience and, therefore, adventitious and secondary. Their being essentially knowledge is eternal, non-adventitious and primary.¹¹³ They see the whole Scripture, endowed with all power of differentiation and all power of unity, as one hears sound in a dream, inaudible to the ear.

Some other sages, after perceiving the nature of objects, conducive either to the welfare or to the harm of man and after seeing in the Scripture indications thereof, compose the tradition, (the observance of which) leads to visible and invisible results. At first, they hand down the Scripture in an undivided manner, without any deviation in the words, as they saw it and later, they hand it down, divided into branches. Such is the tradition."

Carpenter 1995: 46-48 (see note 110):

TK 1.173: "Insight into śruti [or Veda] belongs to those who become manifest out of the undifferentiated. The smṛti is composed on the basis of indications [found in the śruti] after the nature of existent things has been examined."

¹¹¹This translation does not differ in intent from mine. It would have been better if Subramania Iyer had not used "written" and made "nature" reflect the force of *tattva* in the original *kārikā*.

¹¹²Here, Iyer renders the two words *vr̥t̥tyā* and *anukāṛitayā* with a single phrase 'in the manner'.

¹¹³I do not understand the syntax or intended meaning of this sentence.

TKV 1.173: "... But those who believe that the eternal cause develops by an activity of sleeping and waking that imitates [the sleeping and waking] of an individual man [understand śruti and smṛti this way]: Some seers become manifest in intuition [pratibhā] itself. Seeing the great Self that is defined as Being and that is the source of Nescience, they become identified with it through direct insight. Some, however, become manifest in knowledge [vidyā]. They become identified with the Self [which has acquired the form of the] mind-knot, which is free from the elements such as the ether, whether individually or collectively, and which has an unbounded power of imaginative construction. In their case, whatever is adventitious, being the activity of Nescience, is all secondary. But whatever is knowledge per se, eternal and non-adventitious, is primary. Through their intuitive knowledge [prajñā] they see the entire Veda [āmnāyam], joined with the capacity for every differentiation and with the capacity for indifferentiation, like a word that cannot be approached through hearing. Some, however, after examining the nature of those objects that relate to the welfare and harm of man, and having seen indications relating to them in the Vedas, composed the tradition with its visible and invisible purposes. Śruti, however, is proclaimed first in an undivided state, according to vision, with words that are without deviation, and then again, divided into schools."

[Carpenter's elucidation and interpretation:] "Bhartṛ-hari describes three types of seers here, which can be ranked according to the intensity of their vision and their stage in cosmic evolution. The first type, being the first to become manifest at the beginning of a "day of Brahmā," is identified with pure vision. Here knowledge and being are identified. Though they see the source of the Nescience (avidyā) that will soon cast a veil over Being's luminosity, there is no indication that this Nescience itself is as yet actual. The picture is one of perfect self-conscious unity.

"At the next stage, and among the seers of the second type, the power of Nescience becomes active and we now have a less perfect vision, mixed with what is adventitious, but still inward, independent of the subtle elements from which the material world will evolve. These seers see the Veda that is still one, but that already displays its capacity for differentiation, for becoming the Veda as actually proclaimed in human speech.

"Finally, Bhartṛ-hari describes the third type of seer, which is really to be identified with the śiṣṭa-s, the learned author of the various traditional texts and derive their authority from the Veda, but are also based on the experience of their authors.

"It is the second type of seers described here that helps us understand the manner in which the Veda as a unitary, visionary Word takes on the form of actually uttered words, for it is clearly this type that actually "proclaims" the Veda.¹¹⁴ ... here the context is not purely individual or psychological but cosmogonic, and the role of the imagination is assimilated to the creative activity

¹¹⁴In contrast to Carpenter, I see evidence for only two types of seers in TKV 1.173. I think of them as appearing in a logical sequence, not in a chronological sequence.

of the True Word in its self-manifestation. It is the True Word itself that introduces the factor of diversification, the power of Nescience or self-veiling (*avidyā-śakti*) that makes possible the manifestation of the world of multiplicity. ... For Bharṭṛhari, this fundamental cosmic mystery is likewise the fundamental mystery of language and consciousness.

"... even in their limited role of proclaiming or "enacting" the Veda, "translating" it from its visionary to its uttered state, the seers function not purely as individuals but also as vehicles of the True Word's own intrinsic dynamism. In introducing diversity and temporal differentiation into the essential form of Speech, they are merely imitating the True Word itself in its move to self-manifestation. Indeed, they are themselves perhaps best understood as symbols of this process.¹¹⁵ It is a process that ends not with the *vikāra*-s, or manifold forms of the world of ordinary experience and action (*vyavahāra*), but with the Veda as the *anukāra*, the True Word, with the world revealed as language and the order that that language reveals, the *dharma*."

APPENDIX 3

Explanations and translations of Nirukta 1.20¹¹⁶

1.

The passage *sākṣāt- ... vedāṅgāni ca* has its difficulties of interpretation, but it is not one of the unusually difficult passages of ancient literature. The difficulties it presents cannot, except for *bilma*, be said to arise out of use of obscure words. The central meanings of *sākṣāt*, *kṛ*, *dharma*, *ṛṣi*, *bhū*, *avara*, *upadeśa*, *mantra*, *saṁ + pra + dā*, *glai*, *grahaṇa*, *grantha*, *saṁ + ā + mnā*, *veda* and *vedāṅga* are well-attested. The difficulties of interpretation are, thus almost entirely due to ambiguity of relations between the notions that appear in the sentences. Their links must have been immediately clear to Yāska's hearers or readers but are not so to us as §2.5 indicates.

The passage is preceded by a discussion of the importance of knowing the meaning of the *mantras*, which discussion, in turn, is prompted by a desire to establish the usefulness of the Nirukta. Yāska cites three verses (two of them identified as Ṛg-veda 10.71.4-5)¹¹⁷ which state or indicate

¹¹⁵The agency I attribute to the seers in my interpretation is much greater. Also, since I view the discussion also as belonging to a philosophical mode, I do not personify or deify the true word or language principle as much as Carpenter does.

¹¹⁶The immediately relevant parts of the texts covered here have been referred to or cited at the appropriate points in the main essay. The continuous presentation of the texts made in this appendix is intended to provide the larger context necessary to ensure that the views of other scholars are not misunderstood and to facilitate precise comparison. More importantly, the reader should get some sense of how much careful textual work is still to be done in the case of the valuable commentaries of Durga and S-M.

¹¹⁷Wezler (2001: 216) speaks of the source of the verses with this specification and also as *Samhitopaniṣad Brāhmaṇa* 3, following Bhadkamkar 1918: 139.

that the meaning of the Veda should be known or that one should go beyond the perceptible form of *vāc*. However, there is no *compelling* reason why the passage *sākṣāt*- ... should be connected to the explanation of the last verse or, as Wezler (2001: 216) prefers, to the common point of *jñāna-praśamsā* and *ajñāna-nindā*, 'praise of knowing and censure of not knowing,' that the three verses jointly make. If the reference to *imaṁ grantham* and *vedāṅgāni* in the passage is taken as a reference to the tools of making sense of the Veda, the passage could be connected to the common point. But then there are several details in the part of the passage preceding *imaṁ grantham* and *vedāṅgāni* which have no obvious or easy connection with *jñāna-praśamsā* and *ajñāna-nindā*. Besides, Yāska, who begins the adhyāya with *samāmnāyaḥ samāmnātaḥ*, can justifiably be thought of as indicating to his hearers or readers through *samāmnāsiṣuḥ* that he is now returning to the delineation of the nature and 'historical' background of his commentandum (§2.5, paragraph 2) after commenting on some general concepts and issues involved in his undertaking. Therefore, the traditional commentators seem right to me in taking the passage as marking the conclusion of the first adhyāya of the Nirukta and, in effect, tying the end of that adhyāya to its beginning by telling us how the *samāmnāya* and the Nirukta based on the *samāmnāya* came into being.

2.

The text of the passage does not vary significantly as far as the details crucial to our inquiry are concerned. It appears as follows in the edns commonly used: *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ. te 'varebhyo 'sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmabhyā upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ. upadeśāya glāyanto 'vare bilma-graḥaṇāyemaṁ grantham samāmnāsiṣur vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca. bilmam bhilmam, bhāsanam iti vā.*

The Yukti-dīpikā (Wezler-Motegi edn p. 251-252), citing this text, uses the stem *apara* in the place of *avara*. In this, it agrees with the TKV, Helā-rāja 3.1.46, Nārāyaṇa's commentary on Kaiyaṭa's Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa cited in appendix 4. The '*avara* : *apara*' difference will, therefore, be considered in appendix 4. Despite the difference of connotation and possible significance in terms of attitudes of the authors concerned, the meaning of 'other' remains constant. We should also be open to the possibility that this 'other' may refer to a single historical generation but is more likely to stand for a conceptual group comprising several generations.

3.

Rajavade (1940: 290-91, 686) has written: "... I think *vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca* is an interpolation. *samāmnāyaḥ samāmnātaḥ* is said [at the beginning of the Nirukta] about the Nighaṇṭu; to use *samāmnāta* [→ *samāmnāsiṣuḥ*?] about the Veda would be something like an insult to the seers who must have seen the Veda in all its several branches. Yāska would not include his

Nirukta which is a *Vedāṅga* among helps composed by the old teachers to facilitate Vedic study; he would never say *niruktaṁ samāmnātam* [→ *samāmnāsiṣuḥ*?]. Besides what follows is about the Nighaṇṭu only and not about the Veda and its helps.”

This comment is only one among the many whimsical, overconfident and logically loose comments by Rajavade. He would have been better off, albeit not correct, if he had given a reason like ‘*vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca*’ is an interpolation, because it occurs after the verb *samāmnāsiṣuḥ*, which already has an object in *imaṁ grantham*.

Three old sources, Durga, BH and S-M, attest to the existence of *vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca*. If the phrase is an interpolation, it must be such an old interpolation as to leave no room for its determination as such. Further, does *sam + ā + mnā* become a dirty root word inapplicable to the Veda simply because it is employed for the Nighaṇṭu? Would Veda, which is called *āmnāya*, be insulted if it was called *samāmnāya*? Are there not first person occurrences *sam + ā + mnā* with which the authors of certain sūtras refer to what they wish to plant in the tradition? Thus, none of Rajavade’s arguments has any substance.

4.

Some discussion has taken place as to the referent of *imaṁ grantham* (cf. Wezler 2001: 238). Does it refer to the text on which Yāska is commenting, namely the Nighaṇṭu, or to the Veda that is mentioned after *samāmnāsiṣuḥ* (i.e., as a phrase standing in apposition to *vedam*)? In other words, are there two grammatical objects of *samāmnāsiṣuḥ* or three?¹¹⁸ There may be the fault of a little (indirect) overlapping in taking the Nighaṇṭu as a referent of *imaṁ grantham*. The Nighaṇṭu, being a part of the Nirukta tradition, can be viewed as covered by *vedāṅgāni*. However, it would not amount to accepting a strained or arbitrary interpretation if one pointed out that the very existence of the phrasing *imaṁ ... ca* commonsensically suggests that the *vedāṅgas* mentioned later should be understood as referring to the usual territory of the *Vedāṅgas* minus the territory covered by *imaṁ grantham*, i.e., the Nighaṇṭu (on the analogy of *vasiṣṭha āyātah. brāhmaṇā apy āyātāḥ*). Cf. Durga (p. 147) who supplies *itarāṇi* and S-M who supply *anyāny api* after *vedāṅgāni ca*. Besides, the part of the Nirukta which follows the *sākṣāt* ... passage mainly explains the division of the Nighaṇṭu. It would have no organic or a particularly strong logical relationship with the *sākṣāt* ... passage if *imaṁ grantham* were not employed as standing for the Nighaṇṭu (as a part of the *Vedāṅga* called Nirukta) as the traditional commentators do (cf. Durga p. 147, S-M p. 116: *gav-ādi-deva-patny-antam*). Also, since Yāska is not commenting on the whole Veda,

¹¹⁸Vṛṣabha (p. 25) offers a variation in the appositional or ‘two objects’ understanding. He takes *imaṁ grantham* as equal in extent to *vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca* collectively.

he is unlikely to use *imam*, a form of *idam* 'this,' to refer to the Veda. Thus, three grammatical objects (Nighaṇṭu, Veda and Vedāṅgas) standing for two physical or conceptually joined objects (Veda and Vedāṅgas, with the latter including the Nighaṇṭu and pre-Yāska Nirukta parts; §2.5), seem right for the sentence, even if constructions giving the appearance of three grammatical objects and using a demonstrative pronoun for the first grammatical object, identical in fact with the second or third grammatical object, were to be found elsewhere.

5. Traditional explanations in their text-critically improved form:

Durga:

āha. kutaḥ punar idam āyātām nirukta-sāstram pradhānam, itarāṇi cāṅgānīti?

ucyate. sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛsayo babhūvuh. sākṣāt-kṛto yair dharmāḥ sākṣād dṛṣṭaḥ prativiśiṣṭena tapasā ta ime sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇaḥ. ke punas ta iti. ucyate. ṛsayah. ṛsyanty [... ye ...]¹¹⁹ amuṣmāt karmaṇa evam-arthavatā mantreṇa saṃyuktād amunā prakāreṇaivam-lakṣaṇaḥ phala-vipariṇāmo bhavatīti paśyanti te ṛsayah. "ṛṣir darśanāt" [Yāska 2.11] iti vakṣyati. tad etat karmaṇaḥ phala-vipariṇāma-darśanam aupacārikyā vṛttyoktam sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa iti. na hi dharmasya darśanam asti. atyantāpūrvō [→ °ntārūpyo?] hi dharmāḥ. [see §2.15]

āha. kim teṣām iti.

ucyate. te 'varebhyo 'sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmabhyā upadeśena mantrān saṃprāduḥ. te ye sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇas te 'varebhyo 'vara-kālīnebhyah śakti-hīnebhyah śrutarṣibhyah. teṣām hi śrutvā tataḥ paścād ṛṣitvam upajāyate, na yathā pūrveṣām sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmaṇām śravaṇam antareṇaiva.

āha. kim tebhya iti.

ucyate. te 'varebhyā upadeśena śiṣyopādhyāyikayā vṛttyā mantrān granthato 'rthataś ca¹²⁰ saṃprāduḥ saṃpradattavantaḥ [→ "prattava"?]. te 'pi copadeśenaiva jagṛhuḥ.

¹¹⁹I do not see how the meanings of root ṛṣ that the dictionaries give could fit the context of Durga's statements. Durga is unlikely to have stated the derivation of ṛṣi from ṛṣ without providing some specifics bringing the meaning of the noun close to that of the root. Hence my assumption that a textual loss has occurred before *ye*, the addition of which is warranted by the pronominal form *te* in the following part of the sentence. As the presence of *ye* immediately before *amuṣmāt* would have resulted in the absorption of *a* through sandhi and as such an absorption has not taken place in the mss of Durga's commentary used by Sāmaśramī, Bhadkamkar and Rajavade, we need to postulate a text loss also after *ye*. See §2.15.

¹²⁰Yāska's *mantrān saṃprāduḥ* becomes *mantrān arthāṃś ca saṃprāduḥ* in Durga's hands. Given the probability that *brāhmaṇa* stood for comment (including meaning, application, purpose etc.) on the mantras in (Yāska's and) Durga's perspective, the paraphrase *mantrān arthāṃś ca saṃprāduḥ* is close in essence to *mantrān brāhmaṇānīti saṃprāduḥ* of S-M.

atha te 'pi upadeśāya glāyanto 'vare bilma-graṇāyemam grantham samāmnāsiṣur vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca iti. upadeśāya upadeśārtham. katham nāmopadiśyamānam artham ete śaknuṣur grahītum ity-etam artham adhikṛtya glāyantah khidyamānās, teṣu agrhṇatsu tad-anukampayā teṣām āyusaḥ saṁkocam avekṣya kālānurūpāṇ ca grahaṇa-śaktim,¹²¹ bilma-graṇāyemam grantham gav-ādi-deva-patny-antaṁ samāmnātavantah. kim etam eva? nety ucyate. vedam ca vedāṅgāni cetarāṇi.

katham punaḥ samāmnāsiṣur iti. āha. [→ āha. katham punaḥ samāmnāsiṣur iti].¹²²

śṛṇu. vedam tāvad ekam santam atimahattvād duradhyeyam aneka-śākhā-bhedena samāmnāsiṣuḥ sukha-graṇāya vyāsenā samāmnātavantah. tad yathā. eka-vimśatidhā bāhuvṛcyam. eka-śatadhādhvaryavam. sahasradhā sāmā-vedam. navadhātharvaṇam.¹²³ vedāṅgāny api. tad yathā. vyākaraṇam aṣṭadhā, niruktaṁ

¹²¹(a) Scholars have understood Durga as speaking of two generations of seers and S-M as speaking of three generations. Note, however, here that the referents of Durga's *avare*, *glāyantah* (taken over in the pratika part from the Nirukta), and *khidyamānāḥ*, on the one hand, and of *ete* and *teṣu*, on the other, must be distinct. This means that, in Durga's understanding of the Yāska passage, (i) the s-k-ds teach the avaras as upādhyāyas would teach śiṣyas, (ii) the avaras become despondent and compose the helpful tools out of compassion (iii) for their recipients/students who are showing diminishing capabilities.

(b) Vṛṣabha (p. 25) too hints at the presence of the third group, namely the students of the avaras/paras/aparas (see appendix 4, point 1), in his mind: *svayam viditam tādṛk katham sākṣād upadekṣyāma iti khidyamānāḥ. upadeśārthaḥ kheda iti tādarthye caturthi*. The part up to *khidyamānāḥ* can go only with *pare/apare* in Vṛṣabha's preceding text. His use of the future form *upadekṣyāmaḥ* and his next sentence presume that the paras/aparas are concerned with instructing students (the third generation).

(c) The avaras are a-s-k-d but good enough to put together for transmission not only the Nighaṇṭu (-Nirukta) and the other Vedāṅgas but also the Veda. Their ranking is only moderately lower. Wezler (2001: 218-222) comes to a similar conclusion on the basis of other considerations.

(d) Durga's statement confirms the 'settled text' connotation in the meaning of *veda* that I have deduced from other considerations in §4.3.

(e) As confirmation of the thought in (a) and (b), note Durga, introductory section, p. 29: *sā [=Pañcādhyāyī = Nighaṇṭu] ca punar iyaṁ sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmabhyo maharṣibhya upadeśena mantrārtham upaśrutya śrutarṣibhir avara-śakti-daurbalyam avekṣya ... samāmnātā*.

¹²²One expects this *āha* to be before the immediately preceding sentence (*katham punaḥ ... iti*). In its present place, *āha* would have Durga (the Uttara-pakṣin or Siddhāntin) as the speaker. But then the following *śṛṇu* also would suggest a speaker change to the same effect and come across as unnecessary or odd. In the commentary style adopted by Durga, the appropriate role for *āha* in most places is to indicate that a questioner or pūrva-pakṣin is speaking (cf. *āha. kim tebhya iti*, which occurs earlier). When a certain short expression is repeated many times in a work, its occasional misplacement in the mss of that work is but to be expected. The Yukti-dīpikā, which too assigns the same function to *āha*, has also suffered similarly in transmission.

¹²³In Durga's understanding, Veda refers to the text divided in śākhās etc. as in the 'other' view known to BH; cf. appendix 1, points 4 and 6. He does not clarify how the śākhās contrib-

catur-daśadhety-evam-ādi. evam samāmnāsiṣur bhedena grahaṇārtham. 'katham nāma bhinnāny etāni sākṣāntarāṇi laghūni sukham gṛhṇīyur ete śakti-hīnā alpāyuso manuṣyā ity-evam-artham samāmnāsiṣur iti.

bilma-grahaṇam bhāṣya-vākya-prasaktam nirbravīti. yad etat [→ etad] bilmam ity uktam etad bhilmam vedānām bhedanam. bhedo vyāsa ity arthaḥ.¹²⁴ bhāsanam iti vā. athavā bhāsanam eva bilma-śabdenocyate, vedāṅga-vijñānena bhāsate prakāśate vedārtha iti ata [→ ity-ata?] idam uktam bilmam iti. evam bhider bhāsater vā bilma-śabdaḥ.¹²⁵

evam idam ṛṣibhyo nirukta-śāstram āyātam itarāṇi cāṅgānīti pariśodhita āgamah.

Skanda-Maheśvara (pp. 113-117):¹²⁶

evam ukta-prayojanasya niruktasya pareṇāgamah kathyate.

sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ. dharmasyātīndriyatvāt sākṣāt-kāraṇasyāsambhavāt [→ °vād] dharma-śabdenātra tad-artham mantra-brāhmaṇam ucyate. tat sākṣāt-kṛto¹²⁷ dharmo yais te sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayaḥ.

katham punas taiḥ sākṣāt-kṛtam?

ucyate. smṛtikārair aitihāsikaiś cābhyupagatatvāc chrutyā cāvirodhād antarāla-pralayaḥ punaḥ-sṛṣṭiś cāsti. tatra sṛṣṭy-ādau ya ṛṣayas te 'tīta-sṛṣṭāu

ute to sukha-grahaṇa. If they all are approximately equal in length, their creation or coming into existence would not be of much help when the life span is shrinking. Therefore, Durga could be suggesting that specialization (assigning responsibility for the preservation of only certain Veda versions or realizations) made the situation manageable.

¹²⁴Durga could have known the legend that Vyāsa divided the Veda-rāsi into the four Vedas. Bhagavad-datta (1978: 159-172) is useful for attestations of this legend in the surviving sources.

¹²⁵Durga's explication of *bilma* leaves something to be desired. From what he says in the paragraph beginning with *ṣṇu* and from his phrase *bhedena grahaṇārtham*, it is evident that he takes 'bheda' as the meaning of *bilma*. But then when he comes to the second nirvacana, *bhāsana*, of *bhilmā* available in his commentandum, he does not go beyond saying that *bhāsana* stands for 'illumination of the meaning of the Veda through the knowledge of the Vedāṅgas.' He does not expand on how this fits the Nirukta sentence in which *bilma-grahaṇāya* and *imam grantham* (= Nighaṇṭum) as well as *vedam* occur. A sentence like *vedāṅga-vijñāna-prakāśita-vedārtha-grahaṇāyemam grantham samāmnāsiṣur vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca* is logically possible, but it would be awkward.

¹²⁶The syntax of several sentences is problematic in Sarup's edn, despite much dedicated work on his part. Where a mere change in Sarup's punctuation removes the problem, I have silently changed the punctuation, as in dealing with Bhadkamkar's and Rajavade's edns of Durga's commentary.

¹²⁷I am not certain about how this word is related to the preceding; *tat* could refer to mantra-brāhmaṇa of the earlier sentence and give us the compound *mantra-brāhmaṇa-sākṣāt-kṛtaḥ*, meaning 'seen with the help of mantra-brāhmaṇa, (implying) not directly seen because dharma is imperceptible.' However, such a compound sounds unnatural in the company of the following words. On the other hand, *tat* taken in the sense of *tasmāt* 'therefore' seems superfluous. The next sentence would be natural if confined to dissolution only of the compound *s-k-d*.

*adhītam supta-pratibuddha-nyāyena mantra-brāhmaṇam smaranti. kaścit kimcid yo yat smarati tat 'tena dr̥ṣtam,' 'tena sākṣāt-kṛtam,' 'tena proktam,' 'tasyārṣam' iti cocyate. yasya yāvad āṛṣam tena tāvad eva sākṣāt-kṛtam. anyat tu tenāpi yat sākṣān na kṛtam tad upadeśenaivādhigatam.*¹²⁸

na ca janmāntarānubhūtam niyamena na smaryate. dr̥ṣyante hy adyatve 'pi jāti-smarāḥ kimcit smarantaḥ.

te carṣayo yady api prati-sṛṣṭy anye 'nya utpadyante tathāpy atīta-sṛṣṭi-kṛta-puṇya-viśeṣa-vaśāt tat-karmāṇas tan-nāmānaś cotpadyante. tenaikasyām sṛṣṭau viśvāmitra-nāmnā yat smṛtam sṛṣṭy-antare 'pi viśvāmitra-nāmaiva tat smarati. ato nityatve 'pi vedasya nārṣa-vyapadeśasya nāpi sākṣāt-karaṇasya kaścid virodhaḥ.

etad abhipretyaitad ucyate sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāna ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ iti.

*te 'varebhyo 'vara-kālīnebhyaḥ śakti-hīnebhyo 'tīta-sṛṣṭi-kṛta-puṇya-viśeṣābhāvāt*¹²⁹ *asākṣāt-kṛta-dharmabhya upadeśena śiṣyopādhyāyikayā vṛtṭyā mantrān granthato 'rthataś ca samprāduḥ. teṣu hi pūrva-sṛṣṭāv adhīteṣu teṣām upadeśa-mātreṇaiva smṛtir babhūva, yathedānīm chando-naṣtam gaṇayataḥ [→ °naṣte guṇavataḥ/puṇyavataḥ?] kasyacit.*¹³⁰

¹²⁸If this phrase is accepted as it is printed, S-M would come across as admitting the presence of first-degree ṛṣitva and śrutarṣitva (§2.18, Wezler 2001: 221) in the same person. If the phrase is split differently and printed as °deśe naivā, the meaning conveyed would be: "Anything else which has not been directly seen even by him has certainly not/has never been received in (the line of Vedic) instruction." It is difficult to see how S-M could make a bold assertion like this or why they would find it necessary to make it at all. Secondly, from the use of *ata eva* in the explanation of *samāmnāsisuḥ* below (note 135), we can gather that the first-degree seers were capable of providing some Vedāṅga content too in S-M's understanding. One would expect that they would have to receive some instruction in the meaning of (a part of) the Veda (in an earlier life) to be capable in this way. Therefore, Sarup's way of reading the phrase here should be allowed to stand. S-M, evidently, look upon the s-k-ds as well as the avaras as persons who had exposure to the Veda in the past (cf. *teṣu hi ... kasyacit* below) and upon the Veda as an ever-existing entity.

¹²⁹Following ms A, Sarup reads *śaktibhāraiḥ* after this word. His ms C has *śaktihārera* and ms. B none. As nothing is lost in terms of meaning by not reading the word and as it could have come about from a redundant writing of a part of *śakti-hīnebhyo* occurring a little before, I have decided to drop it.

¹³⁰S-M do not think of the avaras as radically different from the s-k-d ṛṣis. Both are involved in shaping the Veda and composing the Vedāṅgas. Both have previous exposure to mantras. Both have religio-spiritual merit (puṇya) to their credit. However, the merit of the s-k-ds is something special. That is why, whereas the avaras need instruction to remove the blockage of their memory and receive the mantras into their being, the s-k-ds do not. On this background and assuming that S-M use *chandas* in the sense of 'Vedic recitation tradition', I would take the intended analogy to be this: The avaras come to possess the mantras as soon as they receive instruction, very much in the manner in which a virtuous/meritorious person recalls a text lost in the Veda recitation tradition. The implication of the analogy would be twofold; (a) Recovery of lost Veda parts can take place at the hands of persons strong in religio-spiritual merit. (b) The Veda is not revealed only once or all at once at the beginning of creation. It is eternally present, but it reveals itself only to those who have exceptional religio-spiritual quality. Such an interpretation would need the emendation proposed. While it is contextually and transcrip-

*mantra-grahaṇam cātra brāhmaṇānām pradarsanārtham. mantrān brāhmaṇānīti samprāduḥ.*¹³¹

*upadeśāya glāyanto 'vare. te 'py avaratamebhya [/tarebhya] upadeśāya upadeśārtham*¹³² *glāyanto, "glai mlai harṣa-kṣaye"* [Dhātu-pāṭha 928, 929], *upadeśa-mātreṇa grahītum [-> grāhayitum?] asaknuvantas tad-anukampayā kṣīyamāṇa-harṣās tān anukampamānā ity arthaḥ.*

*bilma-grahaṇāya. bilma upāyaḥ. tena granthasya cārthasya ca grahaṇārtham. granthasya grahaṇopāyo 'ṣṭa-saṁdhakena daśa-saṁdhakena*¹³³ *vādhyayanam.*¹³⁴ *arthasyopādhyāyāt punaḥ punaḥ śravaṇam. vedāṅga-jñānam ca.*

*imaṁ grantham samāmnāsisur, vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca. yad yasya sāksāt-kṛta-dharmaṇa ārṣam tat tasmād upaśrutyā kṛtsnam vedam grantha-grahaṇārtham samāmnātavantah, artha-grahaṇārtham [ca?] vedāṅgāny ata*¹³⁵ *evopaśrutyā*

tionally probable, it cannot be accepted as certain until the mss are restudied or new mss furnish readings in its favor.

¹³¹Here, S-M seem to have used *brāhmaṇa* in the sense 'brahman-associated, (a text) following prayers in the Saṁhitās, one that comments on the mantras or sūktas (especially from the point of view of their hidden meaning and application in ritual worship).' cf. appendix 1, point 2, note b; also Durga's *amuṣmāt ... paśyanti* above. S-M frequently express Durga's (and their other predecessors') thoughts differently.

¹³²Sarup's mss B and C do not contain *upadeśāya*. If haplography or dittography is considered possible, the reading of ms A, which is simply *upadeśārtham*, would be better. Since *upadeśāya* is included in the pratika part, there is no need to repeat it after only three words.

¹³³The intended meaning of *aṣṭa-saṁdhakena daśa-saṁdhakena vā* is probably 'through eight repetitions or ten repetitions.' Dr. Parameswara Aithal kindly informs me that in the process of Veda memorization, in which the teacher typically recites a text and the student repeats after him, the repetition takes place 8, 10 or 12 times (the twelvefold repetition seems not to have existed in the time or region of S-M) and that the Kannada term for the Veda memorization process of the specified type is *santa/santhe/sante*. This information corroborates my guess that the term *saṁdhā* present in S-M's remark is related to Marathi *saṁthā*.

¹³⁴The reading adopted by Sarup is *vā grahaṇam adhyayanam arthaḥ*. The word *grahaṇam* occurring after *vā* would be strange, for one cannot say *grahaṇopāyo ... grahaṇam* (unless the intention is to say something like 'the trick to learning is learning itself,' which is clearly not the intention of S-M, as they use *aṣṭa- ... vā*). Secondly, Sarup informs us that mss B and C do not read *daśa-saṁdhakena ... grahaṇam*. Of this, the omission of *daśa-saṁdhakena* could have been due to haplography. At *aṣṭa-saṁdhakena* the scribe's eye could have moved to *saṁdhakena* beyond *daśa*. The presence of *grahaṇam* in the remaining ms A could be a case of redundant writing. In the following part, a phrase like *arthasya ca grahaṇopāyaḥ* is needed. The text I have given above is based on these considerations. Contextually, one expects S-M to write phrases having the following structure: *granthasya grahaṇopāyo X, arthasya [/arthasya ca] grahaṇopāyo Y*. This expectation is also satisfied by the adopted text.

The absence of *ca* does not pose a serious problem, and S-M could have expected their readers to import *grahaṇopāyaḥ* from the phrase *granthasya grahaṇopāyo*.

¹³⁵Sarup accepts *ṅgānīty-ata* of ms A against *ṅgāny anyata* of mss B and C. I have used the latter reading to the extent of considering *iti* of the former reading dispensable. What would *ity-ata* convey after a syntactically complete clause *artha-grahaṇārtham vedāṅgāni*? On the other hand, *eva* would become vacuous if *anyataḥ* of mss B and C is followed. Apparently, in

*svayaṁ ca kalpayitvā. niruktaṁ ca vedāṅgam tad [... tad]*¹³⁶ *evam āgamikasyedam āgama-kathanam.*

*ye tu sṛṣṭi-pralayaṁ necchanti ta etaṁ grantham evaṁ vyācakṣate. sāksād dharma-vacanopadeśa-nirapekṣaṁ kṛtaḥ*¹³⁷ *pratipanno dharmo yais te sāksāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ te 'varebhyo 'sāksāt-kṛta-dharmabhyo veda-vacanād evopadeśa-nirapekṣaṁ dharmam pratipattum asamarthebhya ity arthaḥ. upadeśena cārthasya mantrān brāhmaṇāni ca samprāduḥ asya mantrasyāyam, asya cāyam ity-evam [/ ayam asya mantrasyāyam asyety-evam] upadeśena mantrārtham brāhmaṇārtham ca kathitavanta ity arthaḥ. upadeśāya glāyanto 'vare ye tu tato 'py avare veda-vacanāt svayaṁ*¹³⁸ *upadeśa-mātreṇa vā tad-artham pratipattum asamarthās ta ātmana upadeśārtham samāmnātasya sata 'upādhyāyā artham upadekṣyanti, upadiṣṭārthāt [→ °ṣṭārthās?] tato vedārtham pratipatsyāmaha' ity-evam-artham ity arthaḥ. imaṁ grantham gav-ādi-deva-patny-antaṁ samāmnātavantah. vedam dharma-pratipatty-artham. vedāṅgāni ca anyāny api vedārtha-pratipatty-artham.*

*bilma-graṇāyā. bilma upāyaḥ. tasya nirvacanaṁ bhilmam bhāsanam iti vā iti. bilmam [→ bhilmam?] iti bibharte rūpam. upāyo bibharty upeyam, bhāsate ca prakāśi-bhavati tat tena.*¹³⁹ *bilma-śabdasya cāprasiddhasya loke yad upādānam nirvacana-karaṇam*¹⁴⁰ *ca, kvacit tasya mantreṣu prayogo 'sti tad-artham. tad*¹⁴¹ *darśayiṣyāmaḥ [Rg-veda 2.35.12:] "asmai bahūnām avamāya sakhye yajñair vidhema namasā havirbhiḥ / sam sānu mārjmi, didhiṣāmi bilmair, dadhāmy annaiḥ pari vanda ṛgbhiḥ //"*¹⁴² *... didhiṣāmi ... dhārayitum cecchāmi gārhapatyādīm*

S-M's view, although the avaras are the authors of the Vedāṅgas, some content of the Vedāṅgas comes from the s-k-ds. This would be consistent with S-M's understanding that the s-k-d ṛṣis impart both the form and meaning of the object of revelation to the avaras. See note 128 above.

¹³⁶The reading of ms A given by Sarup, *dīḍipante*, is too different to be reconciled with that of B and C. It is more likely to be a remnant of some other sentence. The introduction of *āgamika* is rather sudden. S-M, up to this point in their commentary, have not glossed *imaṁ grantham* of their commentandum. For these reasons, the problem felt here cannot be solved simply by punctuating the text as *niruktaṁ ca vedāṅgam. tad evam āga°*. A relatively long textual loss seems to have taken place.

¹³⁷The paraphrase of *kṛta* with *pratipanna* seems odd. I wonder if the original reading was *kṛtaḥ svataḥ*, which through haplography was reduced to *kṛtaḥ*.

¹³⁸The reading *śuśryam* of A could have been a corruption of something like *śuśrūṣayo°* leading to the phrase *svayaṁ śuśrūṣayopadeśa-*.

¹³⁹The original readings here could also have been *upāyo bibharty [upeyam]*, *upeyam bhāsate ca. prakāśibhavati tat tena*, with *tat* standing for *upeyam* and *tena* for *upāyena*.

¹⁴⁰The reading of Sarup's mss B and C, modified as he suggests.

¹⁴¹That is, the fact that it is found in the mantras, albeit rarely.

¹⁴²I have dropped most of the explanation of this ṛk in the following reproduction of S-M's comments. The explanation establishes a fire-kindling context for the ṛk.

agnim bilmair upāyair jvalanasyādho bhasmani gomaya-nikhananādibhir ...¹⁴³ evam asmin mantre bilma-śabdasya prayogād ihopādānam nirvacanam caivam-artham draṣṭavyam.

S-M's understanding of Nirukta 1.20 is not as different from that of Durga as may seem at first blush. Like Durga, they note that dharma cannot be an object of the senses and take *imam grantham* as standing for the Nighaṇṭu. Durga takes witnessing of dharma to mean witnessing the relation between ritual actions and their consequences. The latter take it to mean witnessing of the Mantra-Brāhmaṇa. However, as §2.15 points out, this may only be a difference of phrasing. As note 121a states, Durga too thinks of three groups while explaining Yāska's passage. The main difference is that Durga interprets the Nirukta remark without referring to the possibility of cyclical creation, and S-M first adopt cyclical creation as the context. Their version of cyclical creation is interesting in that it invokes cyclicity in order to explain how there is knowledge of Mantra-Brāhmaṇa on the part of seers at the dawn of creation. But then the quandary of there being either eternal seers or there being a different set of seers and hence a different Veda collection in each creation presents itself. S-M get over it by adding: 'Although the seers are born anew in each creation, they perform the same actions and have the same names because of the excellent good karman they acquire in the preceding creation.'

As in some other parts of their exposition of the Nirukta, S-M could have interacted with BH's thought, directly or indirectly, in their handling of Nirukta 1.20 (compare §4.2 and appendix 1, points 4 and 6 with the observations above). However, as point 7 in appendix 4 states, the evidence of interaction is not strong in the case of Nirukta 1.20.

Durga does not display even feeble signs of interaction.¹⁴⁴

6. Translations and/or interpretations by modern scholars

Muir 1874: 118: "The rishis, who had an intuitive perception of duty, handed down the hymns by (oral) instruction to men of later ages, who had not that intuitive perception. These, declining in their power of giving instruction, compiled this work (the Nirukta), the Veda, and the Vedāṅgas, in order to facilitate the comprehension of details."

Belvalkar 1915: 6: "It [= Nirukta 1.20] mentions three distinct periods of intellectual development corresponding roughly to sections 2-5 above

¹⁴³Rajavade (1940: 291) remarks that in Ṛg-veda 2.35.12 the word *bilma* "probably means Rk [= ṛc] or food." He does not state why he thinks so.

¹⁴⁴See appendix 4, point 4 for other observations helpful in understanding the preceding reproductions of the relevant parts of the commentaries by Durga and S-M.

[= to the sections in which Belvalkar discusses the appearance of the Vedas, the appearance of the Brāhmaṇas and the appearance of the texts meant to help in the preservation and study of the Vedas in their pariṣads and caraṇas, i.e., the appearance of the manuals on phonetics, Pada-pāṭha, pre-Yāska Niruktas, other Vedāṅgas etc. Fn 1 elaborates on this remark:] *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuh*. These are the original “Seers of Mantras.” *te ’varebhyo ’sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmabhyā upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ*. These correspond to the authors of the Brāhmaṇic speculations; possibly also to the compilers of the family-books. *upadeśāya glāyanto ’vare bilma-grahaṇāyemaṁ grantham samāmnāsiṣur vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca*. These are the authors of the Pada-pāṭha, the Nighaṇṭu, and other allied works, including possibly the prototypes of our modern Prātiśākhya.

Sarup 1921: 20: “Seers had direct intuitive insight into duty. They by oral instruction handed down the hymns to later generations who were destitute of the direct intuitive insight. The later generations, declining in (power of) oral communication, compiled this work, the Veda, and the auxiliary Vedic treatises, in order to comprehend their meaning. Bilma = bhilma (division or illustration).” [Fn 1 at this point: Cf. Muir, op. cit. [= Original texts ...] vol. ii, p. 165; vol. iii, p. 118.]

Sköld (1926: 7), who, as far as I could check, does not offer a translation or interpretation of his own of the Nirukta passage, remarks: “Belvalkar is doubtless right, when he says, Systems of Sanskrit grammar, p. 6, that this passage “mentions three periods of intellectual development.” I am not quite sure, however, that the authors of the pada-pāṭhas can be put in one line with the authors of the Nighaṇṭu, for I believe ... that the padakāras were no authorities even in the time of the niruktakāra. [Fn 1 at this point: Weber remarks that even in the time of Patañjali the pada-pāṭha had no higher authority, but was subject to criticism.]”

Falk 1990: 108: “persons who had direct insight into dharma turned into poets (“seers”). They handed down their verses by way of teaching to those who were inferior, (i.e.) who had no direct insight into dharma. These inferior persons were tired of this teaching and arranged this opus, i.e. the Veda and its ancillary literature in order to grasp (or: it with) a bilma.”

Carpenter 1995: 44: “The seers saw the ritual ordinances directly. To others who had not seen the ritual ordinances directly they proclaimed the mantras by way of instruction.”¹⁴³

Wezler 2001 does not offer a continuous translation but comments on practically all significant expressions in the Nirukta passage, frequently

¹⁴³ Carpenter does not translate the rest probably because he did not need it for his purpose.

taking into account the views of the scholars to whom I have referred above. I have mentioned several of his distinctive observations in the main essay itself. One additional reaction I should offer is this: I do not agree with Wezler's (p. 232) proposal that *upadeśena* should be taken as a comitative instrumental, functionally equivalent to constructions like *putreṇa sahāgataḥ pitā*.

APPENDIX 4

TKV 1.5 vis-à-vis Nirukta 1.20

Some observations on the relationship between TKV 1.5 and Nirukta 1.20 have already been offered in §2.2-3, 8 above. A few more observations that have an indirect or limited significance for our main concern will be made below.

1.

In the edns of the Nirukta, *avara* is the stem in the two padas or words (*aparebhyah* and *apare*) found in the TKV's Nirukta citation. No variant readings are recorded. The glosses of the commentators Durga and S-M confirm that they knew no reading other than *avara*. On the other hand, the BH tradition is consistent within itself. It has *apara* as the stem in the citation as well as the non-citation part of the Vṛtti. The reading found in the mss of the oldest accessible commentary of the Vṛtti, namely Vṛṣabha's, is *para* according to the edn available at present, which is unlikely to be an error for *avara/apara*, since in that case the last syllable of the preceding *anyebhyaḥ* would have been changed to *bhyo* and the phrase would have become *anyebhyo 'varebhyah/'parebhyah*. However, *para* is obviously closer to *apara*.

Further, when Helā-rāja cites the Nirukta passage under TK 3.1.46, he cites it thus: *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ. te 'parebhyo 'sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmabhya upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ. apare upadeśāya glāyanto bilma-grahaṇāyemaṁ grantham samāmnāsiṣur vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca*.¹⁴⁶

Such consistency in textual variation — one side has only the *avara* forms and the other only the *apara* forms — is unusual. Normally, ms traditions show random variation. Here, we have absence of variation despite the fact that the confusion of *p* and *v* is very common in mss (*p* and *v* have similar appearance in most Indian scripts), that both *avara* and *apara* would not conflict with the immediate context, that BH and his commentators were almost certainly acquainted with the Nirukta and that the *s-k-d* passage

¹⁴⁶ The readings my readers will find in Subramania Iyer's edn conform to the printed edns of the Nirukta. In this instance, Iyer has acted unlike a critical editor. He should have allowed the Prakīrṇaka-prakāśa mss to speak for themselves. The *apara* readings have the support of the largest number of geographically spread-out mss. On this objective criterion of textual criticism, Iyer should have given preference to them.

must have been one of the most commonly mentioned passages in circles of Brahmanic thinkers.

The Yukti-dīpikā citation of the passage under Sāṃkhya-kārikā 51 (Wezler-Motegi edn pp. 251-252) is made after explaining the ūha/tāraka and śabda/sutāra siddhis. It is made to explain the adhyayana/tārayantam siddhi. It, too, displays *apara*:¹⁴⁷ *yadā tv anyopadeśād apy asamarthaḥ pratipattum adhyayanena sādhayati, sā tṛtīyā siddhis tārayantam ity [/ity apy] apadiśyate. tad etat tāraṇa-kriyāyā adyatve 'py avyāvṛttatvān mahā-viśayatvāt (/°ṣaye) tārayantam ity apadiṣtam, ta ete trayāḥ sādhanopā<yā> yair¹⁴⁸ ā brahmaṇaḥ prāṇino 'bhipretam arthaṃ prāpnuvanti. āha ca "sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuh. te 'parebhyo¹⁴⁹ 'sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmabhya upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ. upadeśāya glāyanto 'pare bilma-graḥaṇāyemam grantham samāmnāsiṣur vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca"* [Nir. 1.20] *iti. bilmam bhāsanam samyak-pratibhāsasya viśiṣṭaḥ saṃketa uktāḥ.*

Nirukta 1.20 is also quoted in the Nārāyaṇīya commentary on Kaiyaṭa's Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa 6.3.109 (*pr̥ṣodarādīni yathopadiṣtam*). The mss of this commentary used by the editor M.S. Narasimhacharya, p. IX. 260) read *aparebhyo* and *apare*, as in the TK tradition and the Yukti-dīpikā. The editor has, however, changed the readings to *avarebhyo* and *avare*, probably to make them agree with the Nirukta edns. After citing the Nirukta passage, the commentator Nārāyaṇa indicates that he took the passage as implying three groups of Veda recipients: *anena veda-vedāṅgādiṣu tri-vidhā adhikāriṇa uktāḥ. tathā vyākhyātam* [source not specified] *"prathamāḥ pratibhānena, dvitīyās tūpadeśataḥ/ abhyāsenā tṛtīyās tu vedārthān pratipedire //*" *iti.*

The support these outside citations give to the feeling the TK tradition generates, namely that *apara* must be the genuine reading for that tradition, is significant. *avara* has a strong association with 'later' and 'inferior' (Wezler 2001: 218-223), whereas *apara* does not.¹⁵⁰ One would thus be justified in

¹⁴⁷ I have not recorded the obviously insignificant variations noted by Wezler-Motegi. Given the precarious survival of the YD, they needed to record such ms variations. We can overlook them for our present purpose.

¹⁴⁸ Wezler-Motegi fn 13: "All the Mss read *sādhanoḥyair*." The emendation effected by the editors through the addition of *yā* is transcriptionally probable and hence very good. They should have only separated *yair* by a space from *sādhanoḥ[yā]*.

¹⁴⁹ Ms D: *parebhyo* [AA: i.e. as S. Iyer's edn of Vṛṣabha has it].

¹⁵⁰ (a) Recall the glosses of Durga and S-M: *avara-kālīnebhyaḥ śakti-hīnebhyaḥ* "to those belonging to a later time, lacking the (necessary) capacity." A qualitative gradation is not generally suggested by *apara*. When in certain traditions it implicitly incorporates a qualitative judgement, it in fact functions as an antonym of *avara*, connoting acceptability and respect (cf. Helā-rāja 3.14.615). As for connoting anteriority or posteriority, it draws a blank. Spatial distinction is also not a natural part of its meaning as it is in the case of *para* in some occurrences.

suspecting that the '*avara: āpara*' variation reflects a consciously and/or carefully maintained tradition.¹⁵¹

Why would such a tradition be maintained? Perhaps because there was historical memory preserved that, in the view of the Yāskīya Niruktas, the recipients of the mantras from the s-k-ds were to be ranked lower and/or that BH and certain other thinkers like the Yukti-dīpikā author did not favor the suggestion that the recipients were inferior. Their resistance to such a suggestion becomes all the more probable because the recipients in this case were the arrangers of the Veda and composers of the Vedāṅgas. They had been venerated with such epithets as *śrutarṣi*. Also, BH's temperament as a thinker is that of a perspectivist. He tries, as far as possible, to preserve different ways of solving grammatical and philosophical problems by assigning those ways to the appropriate levels and contexts. Using adjectives of negative import is not his style.

2.

The Nirukta passage concerned does not speak of s-n-a-vāc (it can at the most be said to have presupposed such a vāc)¹⁵² or the mantras as what the s-k-ds see. The seeing of the mantras, however, can be read in it by implication. Since the s-k-ds later transmit mantras, they must have somehow come to possess them in the first place. However, theoretically, it is possible that what was directly seen by the seers in Yāska's view was only the dharmas/dharmans. As a result of that or independently of that, they came to possess the mantras (in a way which was familiar to Yāska's readers and hence he did not feel the need to clarify).

Relatable to the preceding possibility is the possibility that Yāska intended *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇaḥ* to be the predicate, a possibility discussed

(b) Rajavade (1940: 290) comments: "Durga calls these inferior men *śrutarṣi* because they heard first and then saw what the Veda was. ... But I think Yāska did not mean that these inferior men were Ṛṣis." There is no suggestion in Durga's use of *śrutarṣi* that the *avaras* later saw the Veda or that they saw the way the s-k-ds saw it. However, I think that Rajavade is correct in suspecting that the *avaras* may not have been *ṛṣis* in Yāska's view.

¹⁵¹ The other possibilities are (a) that there were different versions of the Nirukta text at an early time and (b) that the Nirukta is not the direct source for the TKV author. But these possibilities lack external corroboration. Unless the evidence extends beyond Nirukta 1.20, we cannot entertain them seriously. The farthest we can justifiably go in conjecturing in the current state of our information sources is that a ms tradition of the Nirukta or of a text quoting the Nirukta that was accessible to the TKV and YD authors read *āpara* instead of *avara* or wrote *v* in such a way as to be mistaken for *p*.

¹⁵² Yāska cites some vāc verses of the RV that speak of the difference between knowing vāc superficially and knowing it really as it is. If the evidence in the Nirukta-parīṣiṣṭa is admitted, as I think it should be, it almost becomes a certainty that Yāska knew a vāc philosophy developed from the RV times.

but not accepted by Wezler (2001: 229-230).¹⁵³ The meaning of the first two sentences in the Nirukta passage then would be: "Seers (at a distant past) became/were (persons) who had directly seen dharma(s)/dharman(s). (As a result, they could compose mantras, utterances that can affect physical reality). Through teaching, they have entrusted (note 43) the mantras to some inferior (or later) persons who had not directly seen the dharma(s)/dharman(s)."

However, it is unlikely that *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇaḥ* was meant to be a predicate. Ṛṣis or seers are so called because they have seen something that ordinary people do not see. If *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva* is predicated of them, it would be something over and above that which, after being seen, made them seers. Therefore, "Seers became s-k-d" is unlikely to be said unless there is a specification in the context of what made them seers in the first place. But there are no syntactically or conceptually connected sentences before the sentence *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuh*. That very sentence introduces a new topic. Yāska's stance must, therefore, be one of assuming that his readers know what makes a person a ṛṣi or what the different types of ṛṣihood are.

Under the first alternative, *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuh* would, in effect, mean "Those whom you readers know as seers became s-k-d." Yāska's readers would then expect him to tell what the difference is, that is, to provide some description of what *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva* consists in. Such a description is missing.

If, on the other hand, Yāska expected his readers to know the different possibilities through which one could become a ṛṣi, his statement "seers became s-k-d" would be odd in the subject part. Contrary to our expectation that he would refer to a seer type distinct from the s-k-d type, he would come across as referring to seers in general. The discontinuity of thought between the first sentence and the second sentence would also continue to afflict the interpretation.

Thus, the best way in the given hermeneutic situation is to assume that Yāska expected his readers to know the connection between *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva* and the ability to impart mantras and that his first sentence is to be understood as "s-k-d ṛṣis became/were" → "There came to be/there were s-k-d ṛṣis" → "Seers who had seen dharma came about (were born, appeared on the scene)," that is, with *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇaḥ* as an attributive adjective in the subject part.

If the connection between dharma and mantra is presumed in the passage as known, Yāska must be assumed to know it too — in other words,

¹⁵³ Wezler rightly rejects Falk's attempt to take the first sentence in the sense "Persons who had direct insight into dharma became poets."

to have a 'theory' of language that connected dharma and mantra (§2.3). On the mantra side the connection is obvious, since any mantra is a realization in language. On the dharma side, the connection is anything but obvious. At least a few elements of the thought of BH and his grammarian predecessors on the relation between *vāc* and dharma must have been known to Yāska and his readers.

Despite the absence of *s-n-a vāc* in Nirukta 1.20, therefore, there is unlikely to be a great distance or essential difference between how BH saw the religio-spiritual universe and how Yāska saw it.

3.

The object of transmitting, as well as that of seeing, is *vāc* in BH's statement. In Yāska's, it is *mantras*. The employment of *mantradṛśaḥ* shows BH's awareness of the implication of *mantrān samprāduḥ* ('the ṛṣis must have come to possess the mantras if they conveyed them to others') in the Nirukta. This implication could have allowed BH to choose *mantras* as the object of *pravedayiṣyamānāḥ* 'as those who will reveal/convey'. Yet it is *tām*, referring to *vāc*, that figures as the object of transmitting in his statement. He must have understood mantras as essentially identical with the *s-n-a vāc*—as having a difference of extent but not of kind.

4.

Just as the relation between dharma (or the *sākṣātkāra* of dharma) and mantra is not specified in the Nirukta, the relationship between the mantras and bilma is left unspecified. Depending on how we interpret *bilma* and, partly, on how we dissolve the compound *bilma-grahaṇāya*, it could be the *s-k-ds* or the second group members characterized as *a-s-k-ds* who fashion the bilma. With *bilma-grahaṇāya* as a genitive *tat-puruṣa*, the implication would be that the bilma has already been created by the *s-k-ds* and the *a-s-k-ds* are supposed to grasp it. On the other hand, if *bilma-grahaṇāya* is taken to be an instrumental *tat-puruṣa*, the implication would be that the *a-s-k-ds* have access to the bilma as an instrument — (a) as something created by others for them or (b) as something they created — for their own use or (c) for enabling others to grasp the mantras.

Under (a), the instrumentality between the mantras and bilma, on the one hand, and the relationship between bilma and the referents of *imam ... vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca* would remain unspecified. Questions about how the first instrumentality is different from the instrumentality of upadeśa mentioned in the preceding sentence, about why and how the *s-k-ds* give something in addition to the mantras and about the connection between instruction fatigue and the bilma remedy for it would arise.¹⁵⁴ If what *bilma* refers to is co-extensive with the referents of *imam ... ca*, then the question

¹⁵⁴ Consequently, context would offer less help to us in the direction of determining the meaning of *bilma*.

about whether the s-k-ds can be thought of as the authors of the Vedāṅgas would also present itself. Our certainty would not extend beyond the understanding that *bilma* is something situated between the mantras and the referents of *imaṁ ... ca*.

There will be no *essential* difference between (b) and (c). The avaras, who have received mantras, can always (or relatively easily) use for the benefit of others what they have created for their own benefit. What would make a difference would be the following considerations: (i) How much is included in *upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ*? What is it precisely that creates the need for grasping with/through the *bilma*? (ii) How is the dative in *upadeśāya* to be understood? (iii) Whose fatigue is it? Who are the locus of it? The ones who received the mantras from the s-k-ds or those a-s-k-ds who are continuing the process of instruction directing it toward the later generations? (iv) Should we proceed on the assumption that the referent of *bilma* is co-extensive with the referents of *imaṁ ... ca* or should we assign some such general meaning as 'efficient method' to *bilma*? The answers to these questions, in turn, would depend on how we answer the questions about why the Nirukta passage has been composed and why it appears where it does (see appendix 3, point 1).

The traditional commentators like Durga and S-M must have asked the specified questions of themselves. Their answers show careful thinking and excellent judgment. They recognize that the situation calls for inclusion of 'meaning explanation' in the sense of *upadeśa* and that, if the sentence *te ... samprāduḥ* conveys success in transmitting to the a-s-k-ds, the extra means or methods must have been felt necessary in the case of those who came after the successful a-s-k-ds — that the means and methods must have been developed by the a-s-k-ds for use in the case of their students, that we have to think of three groups, (although the Nirukta speaks of only the s-k-ds and the a-s-k-ds), that *bilma* is best understood as referring to a generally settled (if not written) text of the mantras (Veda) and the Vedāṅgas (see appendix 3).

BH's words leave no doubt that in his view the *bilma* creators are the s-k-ds. They are the grammatical subject of his verb *samāmananti*, of which the object is *bilmam*. He views *bilma* as something that is involved in the process of transmission of the s-n-a vāc and as *anukāra* of śabda-tattva-brahman itself. It must, therefore, stand for what the a-s-k-ds receive. As, at the other end, he does not indicate any disapproval of Yāska's words ... *avare/apare bilma-grahaṇāya imaṁ ... ca*, his *bilma* must be related to the Veda but different from it, an object coming into existence at a stage preceding the composition of the Veda text by the a-s-k-ds. He does not have to get into the question of whether this composition is for the use of

the a-s-k-ds or for their students. Nor would the persons suffering from instruction fatigue be persons other than the a-s-k-ds in his understanding. Consequently, if he needs to understand *bilma-graṇāya* as an instrumental tat-puruṣa, it can only be done by attaching a sense of manner or adverb ('for grasping easily/efficiently,' 'in order to grasp in a manageable/shorter form'). But he has clearly taken *bilma* in the objective sense of 'anukāra'. Therefore, the dissolution of *bilma-graṇāya* presumed by him must have been a genitive tat-puruṣa dissolution (*bilmasya graṇāya*).¹⁵⁵

5.

A theory, a distinctive theory at that, of how extraordinary perception takes place was known to BH (cf. §3.6). Such a theory might not have been known to the author of the Nirukta.

6.

The use of the present tense forms in BH's statement in the place of the perfect and the aorist forms of the Nirukta passage indicates that BH thought of creation (and of dissolution) as recurrent. Yāska does not provide evidence of being under the influence of such thinking at least when he wrote the sentence with which we are concerned (the Nirukta-pariśiṣṭa may turn out to be an exception).¹⁵⁶ Consequently, Yāska's three sentences have the tone of reporting a one-time historical or mythic event, whereas BH's words have the tone of making the general statement, but this does not mean that Yāska must be opposed to repeated creation of the universe.

7.

In the case of Nirukta 1.20, S-M have not explained the details of the Nirukta statement in the light of what is found in BH's work or in the commentaries thereto. Their explanation does not introduce the notion of the subtle form of language. The way they paraphrase *bilma* is different. The reference they make to sleeping in *supta-pratibuddha* is not at all like BH's reference to *svapna*. An extension of BH's mantra to mantra-brāhmaṇa is seen in their comments. Evidently, the Nirukta commentators' tradition of understanding the part cited by BH was different from that of BH's

¹⁵⁵ Vṛṣabha glosses the compound *bilma-graṇāya* with another compound expression, *pratichchanda-graṇāya*. As a result, we do not know whether he understood Yāska (and, indirectly, BH) as employing a genitive tat-puruṣa or an instrumental tat-puruṣa.

¹⁵⁶ Durga does not impute the *sarga-sthiti-laya* way of thinking to Yāska. S-M recognize the possibility of being able to do so (see appendix 3). They could have been aware that a recurring creation does not rule out the possibility that an author living in one creation may speak of an earlier age in that creation as a historical fact and with a perfect tense form. Such an author has no need to watch his tenses unless the context consisted of a question put to him: "Do you, Philosopher P, think that this world is made again and again?" or "Philosopher P, is the world like things of Play-Doh that children make or is it like some structures that are meant to last for ever (that the structures do not, as the dictum *yat kṛtakam tad anityam* says, is another matter.)"

commentators, and the two have probably been kept apart deliberately (cf. point 1 above). It is also possible that BH has preserved for us an older and a philologically and philosophically sounder understanding of the Nirukta statement. This understanding does not necessarily conflict with the understanding reflected in the comments of Durga and S-M (§2.15), but it behooves us as historians to note that there is a different understanding.

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a-s-k-d = asākṣāt-kṛta-dharman.

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BH = Bharṭṛ-hari.

Bhadrakamkar: see under Yāska.

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- ed = editor, edited by.
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RV = Ṛg-veda, Rīg-veda.

Sarup: see under Yāska.

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s-k-d: sāṅkṣāt-kṛta-dharman.

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TK = *Trikāṇḍī*, frequently referred to as *Vākyapadīya*. See under Bharṭṛ-hari.

TKV = *Trikāṇḍī-vṛtti*. See under Bharṭṛ-hari.

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Vṛtti: see under Bharṭṛ-hari.

Vṛṣabha: see under Bharṭṛ-hari.¹⁵⁷

Vākyapadīya: see *Trikāṇḍī*.

VP = *Vākyapadīya*.

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¹⁵⁷ Recently, I have come to the conclusion that the form of this name should be "Śrī-vṛṣabha."

Limaye. New Delhi: Panini. Pāṇini Vaidika Grantha-mālā 11. (e) Ed. Rajavade, Vaijanātha Kashinath]. 1940. *Yāska's Nirukta*. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Government Oriental Series, class A, no. 7.

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Bhartr̥hari and His Vedic Tradition

JOHANNES BRONKHORST

In his preface to Masaaki Hattori's book *Dignāga on Perception* (1968: Editor's Foreword, p. vi), Daniel H.H. Ingalls makes the following observation: "Indian philosophers [at least till some centuries after Dignāga's time] were banded together in small groups of teachers and pupils, following set rituals of worship and well-established regiments of exercise and meditation. Their writings are directed inward, are addressed to a narrow circle of colleagues and pupils, or, in rare cases of outward direction, are concerned with refuting the views of other tightly knit groups." This observation is no doubt incorrect in this extreme form, and I think Eli Franco is right in criticizing it in the following words (Franco 1997: 37, n. 50): "This description [by Ingalls – J.B.] does not seem to be based on any external or internal evidence and goes quite contrary to the external evidence, such as the reports by the Chinese pilgrims, as well as the internal evidence which clearly shows that Indian philosophers were well informed about each other. This in turn presupposes, at least on a relative scale, a free circulation of manuscripts and access to well equipped libraries, which could only be found in larger monasteries or at kingly courts. It is only because Indian philosophers were well informed and openly engaging in a dialogue with rival philosophers, that Indological scholarship has been able to establish a quasi unshakable relative chronology for almost all Indian philosophers of the first millineum [sic] A.D., even though there are practically no

biographical data for any of them, nor, with very few exceptions, any external evidence for an absolute dating."

I repeat that I think Franco is right. Indeed, it would be impossible to understand the history of Indian philosophy without being aware of the constant interaction between the various schools. At the same time the possibility cannot beforehand be excluded that certain 'philosophical' positions were cultivated in one rather than in another 'religious' current. It seems certain that at least a number of philosophical traditions were held and preserved in family lineages that may have extended over several centuries. According to Gopikamohan Bhattacharya, the Mandara family of the Kāśyapagotra in Mithilā produced numerous great Naiyāyikas in the course of several centuries (among them Vāteśvara, Śivapati, and Yajñapati).¹ It is also remarkable that a number of thinkers of the 'old' Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools are known to have been Śaivas, or even more specifically Pāśupatas; this is true of Praśastapāda (probably), Uddyotakara, Bhāsarvajña, Vādi Vāgīśvara.² Of most other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers we do not know the religious affiliation. But we may wonder: is it conceivable that this school, for at least a part of its existence, was limited to just one religious current? Even though no answer to this question may at this moment be possible, the question is intriguing.

On a higher level of generality, however, it is clear that different schools of thought are associated with different currents of religion. All forms of 'Buddhist philosophy', for example, were elaborated and defended by Buddhists, normally by monks who followed one or another of the monastic disciplines (*vinaya*) of that religion. The Brahmanical philosophies were the property of Brahmins belonging to one or another of the Vedic schools. However, the moment we try to be more precise, the situation becomes obscure. The link between philosophical and disciplinary schools in Buddhism — and the difference between the two — is, to be sure, discussed in modern scholarly literature. The link between Brahmanical philosophies and religious currents within Brahmanism, including Vedic schools, on the other hand, remains unclear. There may be some exceptions — I mentioned the possible link between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Pāśupata religion — but they are few in number.

One might think that a clear link between Vedic school and philosophy should be visible in the case of those Brahmanical philosophies which present themselves as Mīmāṃsā: examination of the Veda. The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in particular has often been linked to the Śrauta Sūtras: many

¹ Bhattacharya 1984: 15 sq.

² See Bronkhorst 1996 (Praśastapāda); the final colophon of the Nyāyavārttika (Uddyotakara); Ingalls 1962: 284; Sarma 1934 (Bhāsarvajña); Raghavan 1942 (Vādi Vāgīśvara).

topics dealt with in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra have their counterpart in the Śrauta Sūtras, and occasionally the rules are identical. The Śrauta Sūtras belong to specific Vedic schools. Is there reason to believe that the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra and its commentaries, too, are linked to one particular Vedic school? I would not expect so. Damodar Vishnu Garge (1952: 19-22) pointed out almost half a century ago that Śabara's Bhāṣya, though citing most often from Taittirīya texts, contains convincing indications that its author, Śabara, was himself a Maitrāyaṇīya.³ This suggests that, at any rate at the time of Śabara, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā had lost any special link it may have had with the Taittirīyas, supposing that there ever was one. Madhav M. Deshpande, in a recent lecture, cites various passages which show that ritualists remained aware of the opposition between the own specific *śākhā* and the Mīmāṃsā claim that all *śākhās* teach one and the same ritual act. Regarding the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, Asko Parpola (1981: 172) has argued that this text has directly grown out of discussions involving two opposing protagonists which were a regular institution of each Vedic school in the Sūtra period. In other words, the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra uses discussions that were current in various Vedic schools, but transcends any particular Vedic school.

Perhaps it is not surprising that a school of thought which deals with, which 'examines', the whole Veda, not just the version accepted by this or that Vedic school, could not, or not for long, be confined to just one Vedic school. Seen in this way, Mīmāṃsā exceeds by its very nature the narrow confines of one Vedic school, even if most or all of its scholars must have belonged each of them to some such school.⁴

Similar reflections can be made with regard to Śārīraka-Mīmāṃsā, better known as Vedānta or, later, Uttara-Mīmāṃsā. In its classical form this school bases itself on a large number of Upaniṣads, belonging to different Vedic schools. The study of all those Upaniṣads necessarily goes beyond the territory of any single Vedic school. To this may be added that many of the classical authors of Vedānta, first among them Śaṅkara, may have been renouncers who had, along with much else, also renounced their affiliation to a particular Vedic school.

³ Garge (1952: 13-14) presents elements from which he concludes that Jaimini was associated with the Sāmaveda. Parpola (1994: 304), however, points out: "Although Jaimini ... is associated with the Sāmaveda, it is true that the [Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra] actually has more to do with the Yajurveda than with the Sāmaveda."

⁴ Interestingly, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa pays homage, in the introductory stanza of his Śloka-vārttika, to "Him who wears the crescent moon" (*somārdhadhāriṇe*), i.e., to Śiva. The commentator Pārthasārathi Miśra, perhaps embarrassed by this verse, points out that an interpretation of this term in sacrificial terms is also possible: *somasya ardham sthānam grahacamasādi taddhāriṇe* "that which is equipped with vessels of Soma" (Ganganath Jha).

Does this mean that our initial question is ill-posed? Do schools of thought by their very nature extend beyond the boundaries of one single Vedic school? Perhaps. Only future research may be able to answer these questions by collecting data from a variety of thinkers and schools. In this paper I wish to concentrate on one thinker and explore to what extent his thought may have been influenced, or even determined, by the Vedic school to which he belonged. This thinker is Bhartṛhari — a Brahmanical philosopher belonging to the fifth century of the common era, author of the *Vākyapadīya* and of a commentary, *Ṭīkā*, on the *Mahābhāṣya*, nowadays often referred to as *Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā*. The Vedic school to which he belonged is that of the *Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas*. Is it possible that this famous thinker may have borrowed, or rather inherited, some of his key ideas from this, his own, Vedic tradition?

This is indeed possible. The *Vākyapadīya* often invokes tradition, *āgama*. Vkp 1.30 states, for example:⁵ “Without tradition, logic cannot establish virtue (*dharma*); even the knowledge of seers derives from tradition.” And Vkp 1.41:⁶ “He who bases himself on tradition ... is not hindered by logical arguments.” It seems clear that tradition was very important for Bhartṛhari. It is even probable that he somehow considered the philosophy which he presented in the *Vākyapadīya* to be, at least in part, an expression of traditional points of view. But what exactly does he mean by tradition?

Unfortunately Bhartṛhari's explicit remarks on this matter do not help us much. Sometimes the grammatical tradition is clearly envisaged, like in Vkp 1.27:⁷ “Correct [words], which have been established on the basis of cultivated speakers [and] tradition (or: on the basis of tradition which comes from cultivated speakers), are a means to [realise] *dharma*. Incorrect [words] are opposite [in their effect], even though there is no difference in as far as the expression of meaning is concerned.” Sometimes one has the impression that the *Vaiśeṣika* system of philosophy, or a related system, is referred to by the word *āgama*. An example is the following verse from the *Vṛttisamuddeśa*, which discusses the phrase *kṛṣṇās tilāḥ* ‘black sesame seeds’; here a quality (‘black’), a generic property (*tilatva*) and a substance (‘sesame seed’) are distinguished. The verse reads:⁸ “According

⁵ Vkp 1.30: *na cāgamād ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate/ ṛṣiṇām api yaj jñānam tad apy āgamapūrvakam //*

⁶ Vkp 1.41: *caitanyam iva yaś cāyam avicchedena vartate/ āgamas tam upāsīno hetuvādair na bādhyate //*

⁷ Vkp 1.27: *śiṣṭebhya āgamāt siddhāḥ sādhaso dharmasāadhanam/ arthapratyāyanābhede viparītās tv asādhavaḥ //*

⁸ Vkp 3.14.20: *dravyātmānas trayas tasmād buddhau nānā vyavasthitāḥ/ āśrayāśrayidharmanety ayaṃ pūrvabhya āgamaḥ //*

to the tradition coming from the ancients, three entities (*dravyātman*) are therefore separately present in the mind, as substrates and what inheres in them.”

It would be useless to search for one single tradition that fits all the occurrences of the word *āgama* in the Vākyapadīya. Bhartṛhari recognised several traditions. But we must assume that he recognised the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya Vedic school as one of them. (Or perhaps better, if we take it that a Vedic school cannot be covered by the word *āgama*, we must assume that he recognized the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya Vedic school as a source of authority beside various traditions.)⁹ Bhartṛhari’s Vedic quotations show that he belonged to this school.¹⁰ Moreover, he refers to the manuals of the Mānavas without specifying their name; he simply refers to their *prakaraṇas* ‘chapters’. In ritual details he appears to follow the teachings of that school.¹¹ We therefore get back to the question: is it conceivable that Bhartṛhari’s philosophy, too, follows at least to some extent the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya school?

In order to investigate this question, we will have to compare Bhartṛhari’s ideas with ideas current in the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya school. Bhartṛhari’s ideas are to be found in the Vākyapadīya, and to a lesser extent in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya. But how do we find out which ideas were current among the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas? Which texts have to be taken into consideration here?

The first and main text that comes to mind is, of course, the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad. In order to carry out a comparison between the Vākyapadīya and this Upaniṣad, I repeat here some important points of Bhartṛhari’s philosophy as I have presented them in an earlier publication.¹² They concern the nature of Brahman — i.e., of the absolute — and its relationship with the phenomenal world.

(i) Bhartṛhari conceives of Brahman as being the totality of all that exists, including all that existed in the past and will exist in the future.

(ii) Brahman’s relationship with the phenomenal world is essentially that of division. The undivided whole is real, single and without modification; its division, i.e. the phenomenal world, is unreal, multiform and modified: “[Reality] does not exist and it exists; it is single and it is different; it is

⁹ The Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra (1.1.1 ff.) states that each (*śākhā* of the) Veda teaches the dharma; *smṛti* (tradition) is the second (source of dharma), the traditional doctrine (*āgama*) of the *śiṣṭas* the third; see Gonda, 1980: 4. It is not impossible, however, that Bhartṛhari may have referred to the contents of the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad as *āgama*; see below.

¹⁰ Rau 1980; Bronkhorst 1987.

¹¹ Bronkhorst 1989.

¹² Bronkhorst 1992.

joined and it is divided; it is modified and it is the opposite of that."¹³ Forms are only found in the phenomenal world: "It is because of time that actions are obtained through division, because of space that all forms [are obtained through division]. All divisions are based on [reality] which is without divisions."¹⁴ The absolute and the phenomenal world are therefore no more than two sides of the same entity. Bhartṛhari puts it as follows: "The tradition [that has come down to us] from the ancients teaches that there is no difference between reality and non-reality."¹⁵ This last quotation shows that Bhartṛhari linked this aspect of his doctrine in particular to tradition.

(iii) The shape of the unreal phenomenal world, i.e., of the division of undivided Brahman, is determined by language, more specifically by the divine language, Sanskrit; sometimes however it is rather the mind, or thought, which is presented as dividing, or even as creating, the phenomenal world.

(iv) The division of the absolute is accompanied, or even instigated, by certain 'powers' (*śakti*), among which time (*kāla*) and direction (*diś*) or space (*ākāśa*) play an important role.

(v) Bhartṛhari's absolute is not identical with consciousness. Consciousness—or perhaps better: thought — only plays a role in the division of the world.

Are there statements in the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad that correspond to these five points? That is to say, are there phrases or passages which may have convinced Bhartṛhari that his philosophy does not deviate from the Maitrāyaṇīya tradition? The Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad contains the following parallels to the points enumerated above:

(i) In connection with Bhartṛhari's view that Brahman is the totality of all that exists we can cite MaitUp 4.6, which states: *brahma khalv idam vāva sarvam* "this totality, indeed, is Brahman".¹⁶ A passage in MaitUp 6.6 speaks of Prajāpati's body "in [which] all this is contained, and which is contained in all this" (*etasyām idam sarvam antaḥhitam asmiṃś ca sarvasminn eṣāntaḥhiteti*).

(ii) The Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad does not speak of a division of Brahman, but it speaks of its two aspects in the following passage: "Brahman has two aspects, the one with form, the other one without form. [The aspect] with

¹³ Vkp 3.2.13: *tan nāsti vidyate tac ca tad ekaṃ tat pṛthak pṛthak/ saṃśṛṣṭaṃ ca vibhaktam ca vikṛtaṃ tat tad anyathā //*

¹⁴ Vkp 3.7.153: *kālāt kriyā vibhajyanta ākāśāt sarvamūrtayah/etāvūṃś caiva bhedo 'yam abhedopanibandhanah//*

¹⁵ Vkp 3.2.7ab: *na tattvātattvayor bheda iti vṛddhebhya āgamaḥ/*

¹⁶ For the meaning 'totality' of *sarva* see Gonda 1955: esp. p. 63 [505]f.; 1982.

form (*mūrta*) is unreal (*asatya*); [the aspect] without form (*amūrta*) is real (*satya*), it is the [real] Brahman."¹⁷

(iii) The role of language is mentioned in MaitUp 6.6: "This [world] was non-expressed. Prajāpati, who is the real, having practised *tapas*, expressed one after the other *bhūḥ*, *bhuvah*, *svah*. This [collection of syllables] is the most solid body of Prajāpati."¹⁸ Clearer is MaitUp 6.22-23, from which I choose the following extracts: "One must meditate on two Brahman, the word and the non-word. By the word the non-word is manifested. The word here is OM. ... For it is said: 'One must know the two Brahman: the *śabdabrahman* and the one that is supreme; he who is versed in *śabdabrahman* reaches the supreme Brahman.' ... The word is the syllable OM; its extreme is peaceful, without words, fearless, free from sorrow, blissful, satisfied, firm, immutable, immortal, unshakable, permanent."¹⁹

(iv) Bhartṛhari's 'powers' find a parallel in MaitUp 6.15, which deals with time and its relationship to Brahman, and elaborates these notions in typically upaniṣadic fashion: "Brahman has two aspects, time and non-time. That which is anterior to the sun is non-time, without divisions; that which has the sun as antecedent is time, with divisions. The form of [time] with divisions is the year. From the year these creatures are born; once born with the year they grow in this world; in the year they are destroyed."²⁰ Also the remainder of MaitUp 6.15 as well as 6.16 deal with time. MaitUp 6.17 deals with the spatial aspects of the world: "Brahman was here alone at first, infinite to the East, infinite to the South, infinite to the West, infinite to the North, infinite upward and downward, in all directions infinite. ...

¹⁷ MaitUp 6.3: *dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtaṃ cāmūrtaṃ ca/atha yan mūrtaṃ tad asatyaṃ/ yad amūrtaṃ tat satyaṃ tad brahma/*. The first half of this quotation ("Brahman has two aspects, the one with form, the other one without form") also occurs almost identically at BĀrUp 2.3.1. The remainder, which identifies *mūrta* with *asatya* and *amūrta* with *satya*, has no parallel in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, nor anywhere else in Vedic literature. Closest comes MuṇUp 2.1.1-2, which identifies 'the person without form' (*amūrtah puruṣaḥ*) with truth (*satyaṃ*), without however mentioning *mūrta* and *asatya*.

¹⁸ MaitUp 6.6: *athāvyāhṛtaṃ vā idam āsit/sa satyaṃ prajāpatis tapas taptvānūvyāharad bhūr bhuvah svar iti/ eṣaivāsya prajāpateḥ sthaviṣṭhā tanūḥ/*

¹⁹ MaitUp 6.22-23: *dve vāva brahmaṇi abhidhyeye śabdaś cūśabdaś ca/atha śabdenaivāśabdam āviṣkriyate/atha tatrom iti śabdaḥ/... evaṃ hy āha:*

dve brahmaṇi vedīlavye śabdabrahma paraṃ ca yat/ śabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ paraṃ brahmādhigacchati// ... yaḥ śabdas tad om ity etad akṣaram/ yad asyūgraṃ tac chāntam aśabdam abhayaṃ aśokam ānandaṃ tṛptaṃ sthiraṃ acalaṃ amṛtaṃ acyutaṃ dhruvam ...

²⁰ MaitUp 6.15: *dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe kālaś cākālaś ca/atha yaḥ prāg ādityāt so'kālo'kalaḥ/ atha ya ādityādyah sa kālāḥ sakalāḥ/ sakalasya vā etad rūpam yat saṃvatsaram/saṃvatsarāt khalu evamāḥ prajāḥ prajāyante/ saṃvatsareṇa vai jātā vivardhante/saṃvatsare pratyaṣṭam yanti/*

He is the *ākāśātman*. When all is destroyed, he awakes, alone. Out of this *ākāśa* he awakens this, [which is pure spirit]."²¹

(v) This last passage qualifies the world as *cetāmātram* 'pure spirit'. It is however to be noted that this expression qualifies the world that is awakened, not Brahman the awakener. Like Bhartṛhari, the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad never identifies Brahman and consciousness, contrary to certain other Upaniṣads.

The parallels just indicated should not make us jump to the conclusion that Maitrāyaṇīya influence on Bhartṛhari has now been proved beyond doubt. In fact, the text here referred to as Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad is a composite work — variously known by the names Maitri (Maitrī), Maitrāyaṇa, and Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad — whose connection with the Maitrāyaṇīya school is subject to doubt. J.A.F. van Buitenen has been able to show (1962) that the present Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad is the result of combining two originally independent texts, an original Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad that did belong to the Vedic school of that name, and another text which he calls the Southern Maitrāyaṇī and which is "without apparent Vedic relationships" (p. 21); editorial changes were subsequently added to this combined text. van Buitenen says nothing about the date or dates when these changes took place, but it seems a priori most likely — in view both of his early date and his Vedic affiliation — that Bhartṛhari was acquainted with the original Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad even though it cannot be completely excluded that he knew the inflated Upaniṣad, the one which we have now, and looked upon it as a Maitrāyaṇīya text.

The problem is that the first of the five points discussed above has only parallels in portions that do not belong to the original Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad. MaitUp 4.6, which identifies Brahman with the totality of what there is, is according to van Buitenen an editorial interpolation which was added after original Maitrāyaṇīya and Southern Maitrāyaṇī had been combined to make a new text. The portion of MaitUp 6.6 which expresses itself in a similar manner with regard to Prajāpati's body appears to be an editorial interpolation made under the influence of a passage in the Southern Maitrāyaṇī, and therefore once again posterior to the combination of the two texts. Add to this that various other texts describe Brahman, sometimes Prajāpati, as the totality of all that exists; examples are ChānUp 3.14.1, BĀrUp 2.4.6, 2.5, 4.5.7, 5.3, MuṇUp 2.2.12, ŚPaBr 7.3.1.42, KauṣBr 6.15, 25.12, Bhag 11.40.

²¹ MaitUp 6.17: *brahma ha vā idam agra āsīd eko 'nantah prāg ananto dakṣiṇato 'nantah prāṇī ananta udīcy ananta ūrdhvaṃ cāvān ca sarvato 'nantah// eṣa ākāśātmaiva/eṣa kṛtsnākṣaya eko jāgarti iti/ elasmād ākāśād eṣa khalv idam ... bodhayati/* For the interpretation of *ākāśātman*, cp. TaitUp 1.6: *ākāśaśarīraṃ brahma*.

Also the word *cetāmātram*, cited to illustrate point (v), is an interpolation according to van Buitenen (p. 48). The remaining points have each at least one relevant citation in the original Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad.

The only conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that the original Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad *may* have exerted a formative influence on Bhartṛhari's thought, but this is not certain.

There is another text that might conceivably preserve 'philosophical' or 'cosmological' ideas that were current in Bhartṛhari's Vedic school, and which therefore has to be taken into consideration here. In another publication I have drawn attention to the fact that Bhartṛhari, in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, simply uses the expression *prakaraṇa* 'chapter' where he refers to manuals of his own Vedic school, that of the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas. On one occasion he uses this same expression while citing a verse that must have belonged to a work on Dharma. It can be concluded from this that Bhartṛhari knew a Mānava Dharmaśāstra.²² However, the verse he cites at this place does not occur in our Manusmṛti, so that it is clear that the Mānava Dharmaśāstra which Bhartṛhari knew was not identical with our Manusmṛti. It is however conceivable that the text he knew — which belonged to the Vedic school of the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas — was the (or a) predecessor of our Manusmṛti which, as is well-known, is no longer the exclusive property of any one school.²³ Let us see whether Bhartṛhari shares ideas with the Manusmṛti.

The part of the Manusmṛti that might be of particular interest in this connection is its first book which, as Lingat (1967: 95) observed, is nothing but an introduction which contains nothing corresponding to it in the Dharmasūtras.²⁴ This introduction contains, among other things, a description of the creation of the world, and it is here that we might conceivably find traces of the 'cosmological' tradition of the Mānavas. A feature that strikes us immediately is that the eternal and non-manifested cause of the world is here characterized as *sadasadātmaka* 'being by nature real and unreal'.²⁵ (Śloka 12.118, too, characterizes 'the all' as 'real and

²² Bronkhorst 1985.

²³ Bühler's earlier attempts to show that the Manusmṛti must be the descendant of an earlier, now lost, Mānava Dharmasūtra, did not convince scholars; cf. Alsdorf 1962: 22 (852)f.

²⁴ There is, on the other hand, much that corresponds to the contents of the first book of the Manusmṛti in the Purāṇas; see Jahn 1904.

²⁵ Manu 1.11ab: *yat tat kāraṇam avyaktaṃ nityaṃ sadasadātmakam*. This line is 'out of place here' and the result of a modernisation of the text, as Paul Hacker (1963: 79 (391)) rightly points out. As we are not in a position to determine the date of this modernisation, it cannot be excluded (but nor can it be proved) that this line belonged already to the Mānava precursor of the Manusmṛti. For similar passages in the Purāṇas, see Kirfel 1927: 2 (Textgruppe I, verse 3), 7 (IIA, 1.4, 5), 45 (IIB, 1.8).

unreal' (*sarvaṃ ... sac cāśac ca*.) This characterization of reality occurs, as we have seen, in the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad and in the Vākyapadīya, but also elsewhere (e.g., Bhag 11.37). The Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad and the Vākyapadīya assign form (*mūrti*) to the phenomenal world, conceiving ultimate reality as being without form. The Manusmṛti does not do so, at least not in the same explicit manner, but something similar may perhaps be found at Manusmṛti 1.55-56, which speaks of the creator who periodically loses his form and adopts another one: "Lodging in darkness, he remains there with the sensory powers for a long time and does not engage in his own innate activity; and then he moves out from that physical form. He becomes the size of an atomic particle and enters into the seed of what moves and of what is still; and when he has united [with that] he leaves his [former] physical form."²⁶

Beside this point, there are some other agreements between the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad and the Manusmṛti, which we will now turn to.

MaitUp 1.2 announces in its final sentence a *gāthā*. The following two passages are not in verse, but they resemble Manu 6.76-77, MaitUp 1.3b-c reads:

*bhagavann asthicarmasnāyumajjāsukraṣaṇitaśleṣmāśrudūṣikāviṇmūtravāta-
pittakaphasaṃghāte durgandhe niḥsāre 'smiñcharīre kiṃ kāmopabhogaḥ/
kāmakrodhalobhamohabhayaṇiṣāderṣyeṣṭaviyogāniṣṭasaṃprayogakṣutpipāsā-
jarāmṛtyurogaśokādyair abhigate 'smiñcharīre kiṃ kāmopabhogaḥ/*

"Sir, in this evil-smelling body, conglomeration of bones, skin, sinews, marrow, semen, blood, phlegm, tears, eye-secretion, feces, urine, wind, bile, and phlegm, devoid of all essence, how can one enjoy desires?"

In this body, which is a prey to lust, wrath, greed, perplexity, fear, despair, envy, parting with the loved and meeting with the unloved, hunger, thirst, senility, death, sickness, and other sorrows, how can one enjoy desires?" (tr. van Buitenen, 1962: 124)

It is possible that the passage numbered MaitUp 1.3a in the edition by van Buitenen immediately preceded these two passages; it may also have been added later.²⁷ It reads:

*śarīram idaṃ...asthibhiḥ citaṃ māmsenābhiliptaṃ carmaṇāvabaddhaṃ
(or: °naddhaṃ) viṇmūtravātapittakaphamaṃjāmedovasābhir
anyaiś ca malair bahubhiḥ paripūrṇaṃ*

"This body ... is piled up with bones, smeared over with flesh, bundled up with skin, and filled with feces, urine, wind, bile, phlegm, marrow, lymph, fat and with many other kinds of filth." (tr. van Buitenen, 1962: 123-124)

²⁶ Manu 1.55-56: *tamo 'yaṃ tu samāśrītya ciraṃ tiṣṭhati sendriyaḥ/ na ca svaṃ kurute karma tadokṛāmati mūrtiḥ// yadāṇumātriko bhūtvā bījaṃ sthāśnu carīṣṇu ca/ samāviśati saṃśṛṣṭas tadā mūrtiṃ vimuñcati//*. Tr. Doniger and Smith 1991: 9.

²⁷ For a discussion see van Buitenen 1962: 74f.; and Horsch 1966: 199-200.

Consider now the two verses from the Manusmṛti (6.76-77):²⁸

*aṣṭhithūṇaṃ snāyuyutaṃ māṃsaṣaṇitalepanam/
carmāvanaddhaṃ durgandhi pūrṇaṃ mūtrapurīṣayoḥ//
jarāśokasamāviṣṭaṃ rogāyatanam āturaṃ/
rajasvalam anityaṃ ca bhūtāvāsam imaṃ tyajet//*

"He should abandon this foul-smelling, tormented, impermanent dwelling-place of living beings, filled with urine and excrement, pervaded by old age and sorrow, infested by illness, and polluted by passion, with bones for beams, sinews for cords, flesh and blood for plaster, and skin for the roof."

It would be going too far to maintain that these two verses from the Manusmṛti originally occupied the place of the passages from the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad considered above. The use of the word *gāthā* just before indicated nevertheless that a verse was found at that place at some time. The similarity between the verses and the passages is moreover undeniable. To explain this by assuming that a common tradition underlies both is not therefore altogether improbable.²⁹

Consider next the beginning of MaitUp 2.2:

*atha ya eṣocchvāsāvaṣṭambhanenordhuvaṃ utkrānto vyathamāno/vyayamāno
'vyathamānas/'vyayamānas tamaḥ praṇudaty eṣa ātm[ā]*

"He, who with the reliance on the breath goes out upward, and is restless, yet, when not restless, dispels the darkness, he is the self." (tr. van Buitenen 1962: 125)

van Buitenen (1962: 125n. 13) compares this passage with Manu 1.6 (*tataḥ svayaṃbhūr bhagavān avyakto vyañjayann idam/ mahābhūtādi vṛttaujāḥ prādur āsīt tamonudaḥ*) and asks the question whether *vyathamāna/vyayamāna* of the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad replaces an original *vyajyamāna*. This proposal rests on the unexpressed idea that a special link connects these two texts.

The similarities just considered between the Manusmṛti and the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad have one fatal flaw. The Maitrāyaṇīya passages concerned do not belong to the original Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad as reconstituted by van Buitenen. They are part of what he calls the Southern Maitrāyaṇī. This means that we must either believe that the Southern Maitrāyaṇī and the original Maitrāyaṇīya were already combined before the time the original Mānava Dharmaśāstra was composed, or conclude that the features considered do not constitute evidence supporting the originally Maitrāyaṇīya nature of the Manusmṛti.

²⁸ These same verses also occur as Mbh 12.316.42-43, with this difference, that verse 43d here reads: *bhūtāvāsam samutsṛja*. Horsch (1966: 198 f.) cites further parallels from the Pāli Buddhist canon and from the Mahābhārata.

²⁹ Horsch (1966: 202 f.) suggests the following historical reconstruction: "1. Eine gāthā buddhistischen Inhalts über den zusammengesetzten, ekelregenden Aspekt des Körpers. 2. Erweiterung durch eine zweite Strophe über das Wesen des Leidvollen, der buddhistischen Wahrheit vom Leiden entsprechend. Beide Punkte finden eine Parallele in den zwei Versen von MBh und Manu. 3. Verderbnis des Metrums durch Prosaeinschübe, die wahrscheinlich durch buddhistische Begriffsreihen ... inspiriert wurden. ..."

We fare slightly better when considering possible parallels between the Manusmṛti and the Vākyapadīya. Both texts deal with the central role which the Veda plays in the creation of the world. Vkp 1.10 calls the Veda 'creator of the worlds' (*vidhātus tasya lokānām*); Manu 1.21 explains that the names, activities and conditions of all things were made in accordance with the words of the Veda.³⁰ Another shared feature is their shared aversion of logical reasoning that is independent of tradition. This comes out clearly when we compare Manu 12.106 and Vkp 1.151ab. The Vākyapadīya has:

vedaśāstrāvirodhī ca tarkaś cakṣur apaśyatām/

"Logical reasoning, when not in contradiction with the Veda,³¹ is the eye of those who cannot see."

The same idea is expressed in Manu 12.106:

*ārṣaṃ dharmopadeśaṃ ca vedaśāstrāvirodhinā/
yas tarkeṇānusaṃdhatte sa dharmam veda netaraḥ//*

"The man who uses reason which does not contradict the teachings of the Veda to investigate the sages' [Veda] and the instructions about duty (dharma) — he alone, and no one else, knows duty."

One could further compare Vkp 1.30, which reads: *na cāgamād ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate* "Without tradition, dharma is not determined by reasoning."³²

Do these parallels justify the conclusion that Bhartṛhari borrowed the notion of the Veda as creator of the world and his distrust with regard to logical reasoning from the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya tradition, the same tradition that also finds expression in the verses of the Manusmṛti just cited? This is far from certain. Both the notion of the Veda as creator of the world and distrust of logical reasoning are too general to allow of any precise conclusions.³³ Moreover, the historical connection between the lost Mānava

³⁰ Manu 1.21: *sarveṣāṃ tu sa nāmāni karmāni ca pṛthak pṛthak/ vedaśabdebhya evādaḥ pṛthak saṃsthāś ca nirmame//*. Cp. Kūrmapurāṇa 1.7.64: *nāma rūpaṃ ca bhūtānāṃ kṛtyānāṃ ca prapañcanam/ vedaśabdebhya evādaḥ nirmame sa maheśvaraḥ//*

³¹ The word *śāstra* can refer to the Veda, as is clear from Vkp 1.43 ab, which juxtaposes the *akṛtaka śāstra* and the *smṛti*.

³² Cp. further Manu 2.11: *yo 'vamanyeta te mūle hetuśāstrāśrayād dvijaḥ/ sa sādhubhir bahiṣkāryo nāstiko vedanindakaḥ//* "Any twice-born man who disregards these two roots (of religion [viz. śruti and smṛti]) because he relies on the teachings of logic should be excommunicated by virtuous people as an atheist and a reviler of the Veda", and Manu 4.30: *pāṣaṇḍīno vikarmasthān baiḍālavratikāṇ chaṭhān/ haitukān bakavṛttiś ca vāṇmātrenāpi nārcayet//* "He should not give honour, even with mere words, to heretics, people who persist in wrong action, people who act like cats, hypocrites, logicians, and people who live like herons." Tr. Doniger & Smith, 1991: 77, modified.

³³ The notion of the creative power of the words of the Veda is fairly common. We find it, for example, in the Anugītā, in a passage which Deussen (1906: p. 908 verse 9) translates in the following manner: "Aus jenem [dem Erkennen, d.h. dem Ātman] ist hervorgegangen der Herr der Rede [das ewige, weltschaffende Vedawort]; auf ihn [auf das Vedawort] blickt das Manas

Dharmaśāstra and the surviving Manusmṛti is far from clear, and may indeed be non-existent. The claim has even been made that “the author of the Manu Smṛti ... was probably a follower of the Śāṅkhāyana Śākhā of the Ṛg Veda and not a follower of Maitrāyaṇīya Mānava Śākhā”.³⁴

However, there is evidence to think that the Mānavas in particular had at some time a reputation for being distrustful of logical reasoning not agreeing with the Vedic tradition.³⁵ It occurs in a passage from the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya. The subject-matter is *ānvīkṣikī*, a term which has recently drawn the attention of scholars.³⁶ It refers to a rational methodology which is applicable in various domains, such as ‘science of the three Vedas’ (*trayī*), the ‘science of material welfare’ (i.e., trade and agriculture) (*vārttā*), and ‘science of government and politics’ (*daṇḍanīti*). Following Halbfass, I will translate it ‘investigative science’. The Arthaśāstra specifies that *ānvīkṣikī* is useful for people in that it investigates with reasons what is right and wrong in the field of Vedic knowledge, what is advantageous and disadvantageous in the science of material acquisitions, and appropriate or inappropriate in the science of government, and moreover, the strengths and weaknesses of these three sciences.³⁷ The paragraph concerned begins with the following observations:³⁸

Investigative science (*ānvīkṣikī*), the science of the three Vedas (*trayī*), the science of material welfare (*vārttā*) and the science of government and politics

[der Weltschaffende Wille] hin, und die Gestalt [der Aussendinge] entsteht; das Manas läuft hinter dem Buchstaben [des Veda] her [d.h. die Dinge werden im Hinblick auf das ewige Vedawort geschaffen].” (Mhbh 14.21.4 reads, in the critical edition: *talo vācaspatir jajñe samānaḥ paryavekṣate/ rūpam bhavati vai vyaktam tad anudravate manaḥ* // (Deussen must have read *taṁ manaḥ paryavekṣate* in pāda b)

³⁴ Smith (1989: 198 n. 91) observes: “It is likely that the similarity between the classification system in the [Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhya Sūtra] and that in Manu is not just coincidental. Ram Gopal in ‘Manu’s indebtedness to Śāṅkhāyana’, Poona Orientalist 27 (1-2) (1962: 39-44) analyzes a number of parallel passages in the two texts and concludes that ‘the author of the Manu Smṛti who drew upon the Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhya Sūtra ... was probably a follower of the Śāṅkhāyana Śākhā of the Ṛg Veda and not a follower of Maitrāyaṇīya Mānava Śākhā.’ The question of Manu’s Vedic affiliation, if any, remains controversial, however.”

³⁵ Lindtner (1993: 207) observes: “The hostile attitude towards ‘dry logicians’ (*lāṅhika*) is by no means specific to Manu and the [Vākyapadīya]. According to Nāgārjuna, for instance, even the Buddha took exception to *lāṅhika*-s.” In a footnote he refers to Lokātīstava 21, in his Nagarjuniana, p. 134. However, it is open to question whether this verse really expresses a hostile attitude towards logicians, and it certainly is not distrustful of logical reasoning not agreeing with the Vedic tradition.

³⁶ See Halbfass 1988: 274 f.

³⁷ Arthaśāstra 1.2.11: *dharmādharmau trayyām arthānarthau vārttāyām nayāpanayau daṇḍanītyām balābale cailāsām hetubhir anvīkṣamāṇā lokasyopakaroti*. Halbfass, 1988: 275.

³⁸ Arthaśāstra 1.2.1-3: *ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś ceti vidyāḥ/ trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś ceti mānavāḥ trayīviśeṣo hy ānvīkṣikī/*

(*daṇḍanīlī*) are the sciences (*vidyā*). According to the Mānavas, [only] the science of the three Vedas, the science of material welfare and the science of government and politics are sciences, given that investigative science is a special case of the science of the three Vedas.

Read by itself, the remark to the extent that investigative science is a special case of Vedic science is obscure. Read in combination with the passages just considered of the Vākyapadīya and of the Manusmṛti it invites the following interpretation: investigative science has no place outside Vedic science, and should never be allowed to lead to conclusions that contradict the Veda.

What can we conclude from the preceding? Not very much, I fear. It seems possible, even likely, that Bhartṛhari looked upon his Vedic school, that of the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas, as one of his sources of inspiration which he refers to as authoritative tradition, *āgama*. The specific texts belonging to that tradition which he used probably include the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad. He also used other treatises of the Mānava school, among them probably a Mānava Dharmaśāstra. Whether he derived philosophical ideas from these treatises is not clear. The Manusmṛti — assuming that it is based on the Mānava Dharmaśāstra known to Bhartṛhari — does not provide much information that might support this.

The observation that Bhartṛhari probably used the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad and drew inspiration from it, might of course be interpreted differently from the way suggested here. One might surmise that he considered himself a Vedāntin who, for that reason, looked upon all Upaniṣads as authoritative. The fact that Bhartṛhari uses somewhere in his Vākyapadīya the expression *trayyantaavedin* (Vkp 3.3.72), which may mean *vedāntin*,³⁹ suggests that he may have known people who based their philosophical opinions on all, or at least a certain number of, Upaniṣads, not just on the Upaniṣad belonging to their own school.

However, some factors go against such an assumption. To begin with, Bhartṛhari does not, as Ashok Aklujkar has rightly pointed out (1991: 4), turn to the Upaniṣads as *śruti* sources of philosophical views.⁴⁰ Indeed, he does not cite a single Upaniṣadic passage, neither in his Vākyapadīya nor in

³⁹ For a discussion see Houben 1995: 293 f.

⁴⁰ Aklujkar is furthermore of the opinion that Bhartṛhari's use of the expression *trayyanta* does not go against the conclusion that the Upaniṣads do not seem to enjoy in Bhartṛhari's thinking any special status as a body of literature particularly important for a philosopher, this because, in Aklujkar's opinion, this expression does not seem to refer to the Upaniṣads (at least not primarily or exclusively), but to a literature whose nucleus or definitive content could have been what we find in works like the Brahma-sūtras. However, Aklujkar bases this conclusion on the three occurrences of the expression *trayyanta* in the Vṛtti (on Vkp 1.10; 2.22; 2.233) which was probably not composed by Bhartṛhari himself; cf. Houben 1998.

his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya.⁴¹ What is more, Bharṭṛhari is, beside with Vedānta, also acquainted with the school of (Pūrva-)Mīmāṃsā. However, for ritual details he does not draw on Mīmāṃsā but on the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya tradition, as pointed out above.⁴² Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta (also called Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā respectively) resemble each other in that the former bases itself on the Vedic Brāhmaṇa texts of all schools, and the latter on the Upaniṣads belonging to all schools. Since Bharṭṛhari attached apparently more importance to the ritual practices of his own school than to all the others, it seems likely that he also attached more importance to his 'own' Upaniṣad than to the philosophical school which derived its knowledge from all Upaniṣads combined. The very fact that Bharṭṛhari writes explicitly as a Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya — which reveals itself, not so much by his preference for Maitrāyaṇīya Vedic quotations, but above all by his habit to refer to Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya texts (and only to those) without specification that he does so — further supports the view that the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya tradition was for him much more important than the other Upaniṣads.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAWL	Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse
ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
ALB	The Brahnavidyā, Adyar Library Bulletin, Madras
AS	Asiatische Studien, Études Asiatiques, Bern
BārUp	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
Bhag	Bhagavadgītā
ChānUp	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
DRT	Disputationes Rheno-Trajectinae, The Hague
HOS	Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge Mass
IHQ	Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta
IL	Indian Linguistics, Calcutta, later: Pune
Jg.	Jahrgang
JIP	Journal of Indian Philosophy, Dordrecht

⁴¹ See Rau 1980: esp. p. 178, for a list of Vedic passages cited in these two works.

⁴² Note 11, with reference to Bronkhorst 1989.

JOIB	Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda
KauṣBr	Kauṣṭaki Brāhmaṇa
KISchr	Kleine Schriften (Glasenapp-Stiftung), Wiesbaden Stuttgart
MaitUp	Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad
Manu	Manusmṛti
Mhbh	Mahābhārata, critically edited by V.S. Sukthankar et al., Poona 1933-41 (BORI)
MuṇUp	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
Nagarjuniana	Christian Lindtner, Nagarjuniana: Studies in the writings and philosophy of Nāgārjuna, Copenhagen 1982 (Indiske Studier 4)
ÖAW	Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien
ŚPaBr	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (Mādhyandina)
StII	Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik
TaitUp	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
Vkp	Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadīya, ed. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977
VKSKS	Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, ÖAW, Wien
WZKS	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens, Wien

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Bhartṛhari and Patañjali: Traditions Preserved*

GEORGE CARDONA

1. Introduction

It is well known that Bhartṛhari treats an extensive variety of topics dealing with language and its relation to reality. It is also well known that he anchors himself in a tradition (*āgama*) of grammar. This is brought out early in the *Vākyapadiya*, in the three verses¹ which, as the *Vṛtti* notes,² serve to state the contents with which Bhartṛhari deals in his entire work. The *Paddhati* on VP 1.24-26 appropriately notes two points regarding what Bhartṛhari says here. First, in saying *smṛtyartham* ('for the sake of *smṛti*') Bhartṛhari means that he is not producing something unprecedented (*apūrvam*); instead, the eight topics stated are set forth to preserve a tradition.³ Secondly, Bhartṛhari says *yathāgamam* ('in accordance with *āgama*') in order to stress

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¹ VP 1.24-26: अपोद्धारपदार्था ये ये चार्थाः स्थितलक्षणाः । अन्वाख्येयाश्च ये शब्दा ये चापि प्रतिपादकाः ॥ कार्यकारणभावेन योग्यभावेन च स्थिताः । धर्मे ये प्रत्यये चाङ्गं सम्बन्धाः साध्वसाधुषु ॥ ते लिङ्गैश्च स्वशब्दैश्च शास्त्रेऽस्मिन्नुपवर्णिताः । स्मृत्यर्थमनुगम्यन्ते केचिदेव यथागमम् ॥

² VPVṛ. 65.1: त्रिष्वप्येतेषु श्लोकेषु प्रस्तुतस्य परिसमाप्तिः ।

³ VPPad. 64.21-23: स्मृत्यर्थमिति । न मया किञ्चिदपूर्वं क्रियते किन्तु स्मरणार्थमष्टपदार्थीसमनुगम इति प्रकरणप्रयोजनमाह ।

that he is not inventing anything out of his own fancy, that he is presenting his materials following a tradition.⁴

It is equally acknowledged that Bhartṛhari bases his positions on earlier thoughts in the Mahābhāṣya, on which he builds, and argues against positions maintained by followers of other schools of thought. Unlike many later scholars, however, he does not organize his work as a systematic presentation and refutation of conclusions accepted by others. In this respect, however, he is also faithful to his predecessor Patañjali. In fact, Bhartṛhari organizes his Vākyapadīya in a manner comparable to the organization of the Mahābhāṣya, in that the first kāṇḍa is comparable to the Paspasā: in both of these, general positions are expounded as a broad introduction. Whereas Patañjali proceeds to deal with the akṣarasamāmnāya and then individual sūtras, of course, Bhartṛhari goes on to deal first with the sentence (*vākya*) and pada and the meanings of both. The third or padakāṇḍa, after treating the broader questions of generic properties and substances as significands of padas and the possible relations between words and such meanings, has a short section that serves as a transition to the discussion of specific meanings of particular kinds of words, guṇa and so on. This is the bhūyodravyasamuddeśa, which contains two kārīkās comparable to VP 1.24-26.⁵ Here too, Bhartṛhari notes that the individual word meanings will be stated briefly, in accordance with tradition (*yathāgamam*). In his commentary, Helārāja appropriately remarks in connection with the term *yathāgamam* that Bhartṛhari means he will not transgress the tradition of grammarians, both original authors and interpreters of their works.⁶

While remaining faithful to the tradition of his predecessors in grammar, Bhartṛhari ranges widely in his treatment of pertinent topics, to the extent that he has been characterized as embracing an attitude of accommodation towards the views of others⁷ and of being not only

⁴ VPPad. 64.23: यथागममिति । नोत्प्रेक्षया अपि त्वागमानुसारेणेति । In presenting his work thus, Bhartṛhari uses language which reminds one of what Jayantabhaṭṭa says in two of the introductory verses to his Nyāyamañjarī, 7-8: न्यायोपधिवनेभ्योऽयमाहृतः परमो रसः । इदमान्वीक्षिकीक्षीराजवनीतमिवोद्भूतम् ॥ कुतो वा नूतनं वस्तु वयमुत्प्रेक्षितुं क्षमाः । वचोविन्यासवैचित्र्यमात्रमत्र विचार्यताम् ॥ As Jayanta does four centuries later, Bhartṛhari stresses his fidelity to a tradition and belittles his inventiveness.

⁵ VP 3.4.1-2: संसर्गरूपात्सम्भूताः संविद्रूपादपोद्भूताः । शास्त्रे विभक्ता वाक्यार्थात्प्रकृतिप्रत्ययार्थवत् ॥ निमित्तभूताः साधुत्वे शास्त्रादनुमितात्मकाः । केचित्पदार्था वक्ष्यन्ते सङ्क्षेपेण यथागमम् ॥

⁶ VPH 3.4.2 (186.15-17/8): यथागममिति । यादृशो वैयाकरणानामागमस्तमनुल्लङ्घ्य व्याख्यातणामुपदेशपारम्पर्यानितिक्रमेण यस्य पदार्थस्य यस्मिन्नन्वाख्यनेऽङ्गभावः स कथ्यत इत्यर्थः ।

⁷ Thus, for example, K. A. Subramania Iyer, *Bhartṛhari, A study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the ancient commentaries* (Poona: Deccan College, 1969), p. 75: 'Ordinarily, in *śāstra* works, when the views of the other systems are brought in, it is for the sake of refutation. Here, the idea being: *sarvaparśadaṃ hidaṃ śāstram*, there is a spirit of accommodation. If the facts of the

encyclopedic but also perspectivistic.⁸ Scholars who have, with some justification, emphasized this aspect of Bhartrhari's approach, though they acknowledge Bhartrhari's close affiliation with the Mahābhāṣya, to the point where in many places—especially in the third kāṇḍa—the Vākyapadīya takes on aspects of a learned commentary on this work, have not, in my opinion, sufficiently emphasized the degree to which Patañjali anticipates Bhartrhari in devoting attention to various points of view. In addition, insufficient attention has been paid to the manner in which both authors can make known their sharp disagreements with views they find unacceptable. In the present contribution, I consider examples from the Mahābhāṣya and the Vākyapadīya to illustrate the similarity in approach, then discuss some general issues concerning Bhartrhari's attitude.

2. The Mahābhāṣya

§2.1. Both Kātyāyana and Patañjali, but especially the latter, take up a range of topics concerning not only grammar and its technical aspects but also more general points of philosophical import. In doing so, they reflect a knowledge of extensive treatments of these issues by their predecessors.⁹

On two occasions, Patañjali emphasizes the status of Pāṇini's grammar as the vedāṅga vyākaraṇa which is common to all Vedas. Both discussions concern a sūtra in which Pāṇini uses the term *bahulam* 'variously'¹⁰ and additional related sūtras, which are considered to provide mere expatiations (*prapañca*) of what is provided for in general by the first rule. The main

Sanskrit language can be explained from as many points of view as possible, so much the better—that is the attitude. There is also the idea that one's own views become clarified when the views of others and other traditions are fully considered.'

⁸ Thus, Jan E.M. Houben, *The Saṃbandha-Samuddēśa (chapter on relation) and Bhartrhari's Philosophy of Language, A Study of Bhartrhari's Saṃbandha-samuddēśa in the context of the Vākyapadīya with a translation of Helārāja's commentary Prakīrṇa-prakāśa* (Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 1995), pp. 16-18; see also, by the same author: "Bhartrhari's perspectivism (3): On the structure of the third kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya", *Sambodhi* 18 (1992-93): 1-32, "Bhartrhari's perspectivism (2): Bhartrhari on the primary unit of language," in Klaus D. Dutz, Kjell-Ake Forsgren (eds.), *History and Rationality: The Skövde Papers in the Historiography of Linguistics* (Münster: Nodus Publikationen, 1995), pp. 29-62, "Bhartrhari's perspectivism (1): The Vṛtti and Bhartrhari's perspectivism in the first kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya, in *Beyond Orientalism, the impact of the work of W. Halbfass on Indian and crosscultural studies*, edited by K. Preisendanz and E. Franco (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), pp. 317-358. For my reaction to Houben's study and position, see *JAOS* 119 (1999): 88-125.

⁹ For bibliographic information with brief discussions on major issues, see PSR 253-259 and RRRS 230-231.

¹⁰ More precisely, if a sūtra contains this term, it is considered to provide that: a given operation applies in a subdomain, does not apply in another subdomain, applies optionally in still another, while a totally distinct operation applies elsewhere: क्वचित्प्रवृत्तिः क्वचिदप्रवृत्तिः क्वचिद्विभाषा क्वचिदन्यदेव.

general rules in question are 2.1.57: विशेषणं विशेष्येण बहुलम्. 6.3.14: तत्पुरुषे कृति बहुलम्. By 2.1.57, a pada signifying a qualifier variously combines with a related coreferential term signifying a qualificand to form a tatpuruṣa compound, e.g., *nīlotpala-* ('blue lotus'). 6.3.14 provides that a seventh-triplet nominal ending in a first member of a tatpuruṣa compound is variously not deleted before a second member which ends in a *kṛt* affix, e.g., *karṇejapa-* ('someone who whispers in the ear, a snitcher'). Patañjali makes the point that operations are comprehensively provided for so that anyone can comprehend what is to be provided for. There is not only a general rule but also an expatiation: one or the other alone would not equally carry out what is to be done.¹¹ He goes on to note that Pāṇini is obliged to use several terms in his grammar: *bahulam*, *anyatarasyām* ('optionally' [lit. 'in either of two ways']), *ubhayathā* ('both ways'), *vā* ('optionally' [lit. 'or']), *ekeṣām* ('according to some'). For, he says, this treatise pertains to all Vedic groups; it is not possible here to adopt only one way.¹² Details concerning the interpretation of particular expressions in the Bhāṣya passages in question are not pertinent to the present discussion, but it is important to note that Patañjali here makes two related points. First, it is acknowledged that Pāṇini's grammar stands as the representative of the vedāṅga vyākaraṇa, so that it is not particular to any specific Vedic śākhā. Accordingly, Pāṇini cannot adopt a single manner of expression in formulating his sūtras, so that he appropriately uses a series of terms.¹³

¹¹ Bh. I.400.9-10/II.634 (on 2.1.58): ते खल्वपि विधयः सुपरिगृहीता भवन्ति येषु लक्षणं प्रपञ्चश्च। केवलं लक्षणं केवलः प्रपञ्चो वा न तथा कारकं भवति। III.146.13-14/IV.593 (on 6.3.14): ते वै खल्वपि विधयः सुपरिगृहीता भवन्ति येषां लक्षणं प्रपञ्चश्च। केवलं लक्षणं केवलं : प्रपञ्चो वा न तथा कारकं भवति।

¹² Bh. I.400.10-12/II.634: अवश्यं खल्वस्माभिरिदं वक्तव्यं बहुलम् अन्यतरस्याम् उभयथा वा एकेषामिति। सर्ववेदपारिषदं हीदं शास्त्रम्। तत्र नैकः पन्थाः शक्य आस्थातुम्। III.146.14-16/IV.593-594: अवश्यं खल्वप्यस्माभिरिदं वक्तव्यं बहुलम् अन्यतरस्याम् उभयथा एकेषामिति। सर्ववेदपारिषदं हीदं शास्त्रम्। तत्र नैकः पन्थाः शक्य आस्थातुम्। In view of what is said just before, Patañjali's statement नैकः पन्थाः शक्य आस्थातुम् is most straightforwardly interpreted as concerning the use of different terms. In his Paddhati on VP 1.159/134 [142], Vṛṣabhadeva also considers the alternative possibility that Patañjali intends to refer to differences in general rules and their exceptions as well as base forms and replacements for them: Paddhati 221.24-25: बहुलमन्यतरस्यां विभाषादिग्रहणं तत इति। उत्सर्गापवादस्थान्यादेशादिभेदो वा।

¹³ Kaiyaṭa makes both points, as in the Prādīpa on 2.1.58 (II.634/II.402b): सर्ववेदाङ्गत्वादस्य सर्ववेदसाधारणं लक्षणं बहुलादिग्रहणोपेतं क्रियते। आनुषङ्गिको लौकिकशब्दसंस्कार इति वेदग्रहणं कृतम्। Kaiyaṭa explicitly says also that because the grammar is an ancillary to the entire Veda in all its branches rules common to all the Vedas are formulated, with *bahulam* and other terms. Moreover, he says that the grammatical description of non-Vedic usages is something secondary, whence Patañjali says सर्ववेदपारिषदं हीदं शास्त्रम् and not simply सर्वपारिषदं हीदं शास्त्रम्. I think it is reasonable to accept that vyākaraṇa as a vedāṅga originally was concerned with Vedic usages in general and that only subsequently was its domain expanded to include both this and mundane usage. That the description of ordinary language by Pāṇini himself is to be considered secondary, however, is a different issue. In addition, to my knowledge, the extant prātiśākhya texts do not use all the terms for option. The preferred term is *vā*. However, the Taittirīyaprātiśākhya also shows

Clearly, the Bhāṣya position is that Pāṇini's grammar is all-encompassing with respect to the Vedas. This serves as a background to Patañjali's own broad inclusion of various points of view.¹⁴ Consider three additional examples that not only illustrate this point but also show how Patañjali can sharply defend a stand particular to a Pāṇinian grammarian.

§2.2. Let us begin with a passage from the Paspasā, where Patañjali considers the question of whether a speech unit is to be considered eternal (*nitya*) or not (*anitya*), that is, something that is produced (*kārya*). He notes that this issue was the main topic of examination in the Saṅgraha,¹⁵ that the faults in and reasons for each view were stated therein, but that the final conclusion reached in that work is that whether speech unit is considered something eternal or something that is produced, under both positions one has to set into play a set of grammatical rules.¹⁶ Although Patañjali himself merely states the alternative considered and the conclusion reached in the Saṅgraha concerning this issue, Nāgeśa makes an important observation, which I consider justified: what Patañjali has in mind when he says this is that the discussion in question is fruitless because what he means to say here is that, in order to make known what is correct usage, the grammar is necessary.¹⁷ That is, discussions concerning the status of speech were being carried out by Patañjali's predecessors, and Patañjali did indeed

indirectly evidence for a general use of *vibhaṣā*, in that it has a sūtra (TPr. 22.7: वेति वैभाषिकः) stating that *vā* is used for the purpose of providing an option and uses *vaibhāṣika* ('whose purpose is vibhāṣā'). Moreover, *anyatarataḥ* is used in a manner comparable to that of *anyatarasyām*, as in VPr. 5.15: वर्णसङ्ख्येऽन्यतरतः. This provides that the members of a compound consisting of color words or number words are optionally separated by a pause in the padapāṭha. Both Uvaṭa and Anantabhaṭṭa gloss *anyatarataḥ* with *vikalpena* ('optionally').

¹⁴ Patañjali also is willing to attribute opposed views to Pāṇini. For example, he maintains that, at least as reflected in sūtras of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, Pāṇini considers that a nominal can signify both a generic property (*ākṛti*) and an individual thing (*dravya*). A 1.2.58: जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन्बहुवचनमन्यतरस्याम् reflects the former and A 1.2.64: सरूपाणामेकशेष एकविभक्तौ reflects the latter position. Bh. I.6.8-11/1.25-26: किं पुनराकृतिः पदार्थ आहोस्विद् द्रव्यम् । उभयमित्याह । कथं ज्ञायते । उभयथा ह्याचार्येण सूत्राणि पठितानि । आकृतिं पदार्थं मत्वा जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन्बहुवचनमन्यतरस्यामित्युच्यते । द्रव्यं पदार्थं मत्वा सरूपाणामित्येकशेष आरभ्यते । The two positions are traditionally associated respectively with Vājapyāyana and Vyāḍi (1.2.64 vt. 35: आकृत्यभिधानाद्वैकं विभक्तौ वाजप्यायनः । 1.2.64 vt. 45/46: द्रव्याभिधानं व्याडिः ।), while Patañjali himself elsewhere maintains that one who holds that a nominal signifies a generic does not thereby deny that it also signifies an individual and vice versa (Bh. I.246.14/II.156: न ह्याकृतिपदार्थिकस्य द्रव्यं न पदार्थो द्रव्यपदार्थिकस्य वाकृतिर्न पदार्थः ।).

¹⁵ This is presumably Vyāḍi's Saṅgraha, a grammatical-philosophical work that anteceded Patañjali.

¹⁶ Bh. I.16.12-14/I.26-27: किम्पुनर्नित्यः शब्द आहोस्वित्कार्यः । सङ्ग्रह एतत्प्राधान्येन परीक्षितं नित्यो वा स्यात्कार्यो वेति । तत्रोक्ता दोषाः प्रयोजनान्यप्युक्तानि । तत्र त्वेष निर्णयो यद्येवं नित्योऽथापि कार्य उभयथापि लक्षणं प्रवर्त्यमिति ॥ Similarly, Dīp. 21.5-6/17.28: उभयथापि लक्षणं प्रवर्त्यमित्येष सङ्ग्रहे निर्णयः ।

¹⁷ Ud. I.27: भाष्ये उभयथापीति । एवञ्च निष्कलोऽयं विचार इति भावः । साधुत्वज्ञानायोभयथापि शास्त्रमावश्यकमिति तात्पर्यम् ।

take these into account—considering that his own Mahābhāṣya should encompass such discussions—but at the same time he and Vyādi both acknowledged that the issue had no real import for a grammarian: whichever stance one considered justified from other viewpoints, a grammarian has to proceed with his description.

§2.3. That Nāgeśa's appreciation of Patañjali's statement noted in section §2.2 is appropriate follows from what Patañjali says in a related passage of the Paspasā. This concerns the interpretation of the phrase सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे of the vārttika सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे लोकतोऽर्थप्रयुक्ते शब्दप्रयोगे शास्त्रेण धर्मनियमः. The pertinent discussion in the Mahābhāṣya (Bh. I.7.9-25/I.30-32) revolves about what one should consider the meaning of a term (*padārtha*), specifically a nominal such as *ghaṭa* 'water pot', if सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे is considered equivalent to the analytic string (a) सिद्धे शब्देऽर्थे सम्बन्धे च or (b) सिद्धे शब्देऽर्थसम्बन्धे च. It is first maintained that (a) is appropriate under the view that a term signifies a generic property (*ākṛti*), since this is eternal/permanent, while a thing (*dravya*) in which such a property inheres is impermanent. On the other hand, (b) is proper under the view that a nominal signifies an individual thing, since the relation between meaningful terms and their meanings is accepted to be permanent. Patañjali goes on to show, however, that (a) is proper under the assumption that a term signifies an individual, since one can maintain that a thing is permanent while the shape (*ākṛti*) it takes is not.¹⁸ The discussion clearly revolves about what one considers the proper significand of a nominal to be, as well as what one ultimately thinks makes something permanent. Interestingly, Patañjali winds up this discussion saying, 'Or now of what import is it to us whether (what a word signifies) is permanent or not? Analysis (a) is made assuming whatever significand one considers to be permanent.'¹⁹

What Bhartṛhari says in his Mahābhāṣyadīpikā on this passage is worth considering. He begins his direct commentary by saying that this treatise (*idam śāstram*)²⁰ is not an ancillary to any single work, that it is common to all.²¹ I think it is appropriate to see in the qualifier *sarvasādhāraṇam* an echo of Patañjali's *sarvavedapāriṣadam* (see §2.1 with

¹⁸ The arguments can go both ways, since *ākṛti* is used to signify both a generic property (*jāti*) and a configuration (*avayavasamsthānaṣeṣa*).

¹⁹ Bh. I.7.23-25/I.32: अथवा किन्न एतेन इदं नित्यमिदमनित्यमिति। यन्नित्यं तं पदार्थं मत्वैष विग्रहः क्रियते सिद्धे शब्देऽर्थे सम्बन्धे चेति ।

²⁰ I think this is best considered to mean Pāṇini's grammar. For, at least as Patañjali views it, Kātyāyana's first vārttika, which begins सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे, answers to the question, how — that is, on what assumption — Pāṇini's set of rules proceeds (Bh.I.6.14-15/I.27): कथं पुनरिदं भगवतः पाणिनेराचार्यस्य लक्षणं प्रवृत्तम् ।

²¹ Dīp. 28.11-12/23.21: अथवा किन्न एतेन । न हीदं शास्त्रं कस्यचिदेकस्य सहायभूतं सर्वसाधारणम् ।

note 12), though only an echo of a general attitude.²² For Bhartrhari immediately goes on to make clear that he is not speaking of different groups of Vedic reciters. He refers to differences of opinion among Sāṅkhya scholars and others concerning whether a substance such as a pot is solely a composite of color and other constituent properties or a distinct entity, and also mentions a view concerning permanence proper to those who hold that objects are only momentary.²³ That is, Bhartrhari considers that grammar is linked to all fields of knowledge. He says this more emphatically in the second half of VP 1.14 (पवित्रं सर्वविद्यानामधिविद्यं प्रकाशते॥), which speaks of grammar as that by means of which all fields of knowledge are kept pure and which shines — casts its light — on each and every science, as well as in the Vṛtti on this passage, which says every scholar generally follows grammar in his science and stands in fear of incorrect usage.²⁴ It is also to be underlined that the Dīpikā in question is commenting on a Mahābhāṣya passage which says any given particular point of view is not of import to him as a Pāṇinian grammarian. In the same vein, Bhartrhari says that, although the points of view of others are taken into account, they are ultimately of no import to the Pāṇinian grammarian, who has his own goal to pursue. This is forcefully brought out in the alternative interpretation of the Mahābhāṣya passage with which Bhartrhari ends his comments on this section. He notes that, alternatively, Patañjali conveys the following. Of what import is it to us whether this or that is permanent? What have we to gain from a discussion that concerns a real entity considered to have substance? On the contrary, analysis (a) of the phrase सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे is maintained assuming what we as grammarians hold to be permanent and what a term signifies. For us as grammarians, a meaning is what is signified by a speech unit and not necessarily an externally real referent (*vastu* 'thing'). Whether such an externally real referent in question is truly permanent or not, a speech unit is never impermanent, as is also the associated meaning, which is its significand (*abhidheya*). This accounts for the fact that a speech unit is never not used in association with

²² Bhartrhari alludes more directly to Patañjali's statement in the Vṛtti on VP 1.159/134 [142], where he speaks of the grammar as a faultless means for acquiring the understanding of correct speech forms and further characterizes this as containing both rules and expatiations on rules and having many paths (*anekamārgaḥ*): VPVṛ. 221.5/254: निरपराधस्तु लक्षणप्रपञ्चवाननेकमार्गोऽयं शब्दानां प्रतिपत्त्युपायो दर्शितः । The Paddhati (221.22) cites Patañjali's statement सर्ववेदपारिषदं हीदं शास्त्रम् । तत्र नैकः पन्थाः शक्य आस्थातुम् and goes on to give alternative interpretations of this (see note 12).

²³ Dīp. 28.12-16/23.21-25: यथैव साङ्ख्य्यादीनां द्रव्यादेर्विप्रतिपत्तिः — रूपादिसमवायो घटोऽर्थान्तरभूतो वेति — यस्य यो घटस्तस्मिन् घटशब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते एवं यस्य यादृशी नित्यताभिप्रेता तां नित्यतामाश्रित्यार्थस्यायं विग्रहः क्रियते । तत्र क्षणिकत्ववादिनामविच्छेदेन प्रवृत्तिर्या सा नित्यता । इतरेषां प्रधानाद्यवस्थानदर्शनेन नित्यता । I have been purposely vague, since it would take too much space and in any case be beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss precisely what Bhartrhari refers to when he says *avicchedena pravṛtliḥ* and *pradhānādyaavasthānadarśanena*.

²⁴ VPVṛ. I.49.4-5: सर्वो हि प्रायेण स्वस्यां विद्यायां व्याकरणमनुगच्छति अपभ्रंशेन च नियतमपत्रपते।

a given meaning.²⁵ Under these circumstances, a signified meaning is ever associated with a word,²⁶ not only a term like *ghaṭa* but one like *śaśaviṣāṇa* ('rabbit's horn') as well; all such terms are always not lacking their meanings, associated with these meaning forms. Given that this is what is considered to be the meaning of a term (*padārtha*), analysis (a) is absolutely justified.²⁷

§2.4. As noted earlier (see §2.2), Patañjali remarks that the question of whether speech units are eternal or created entities was discussed in the Saṅgraha, where the conclusion was reached that, regardless of which view is accepted, a grammar has to be put into play. As also pointed out (see note 17), although Patañjali does not overtly say so, Nāgeśa remarks that what he has in mind is that the entire discussion is fruitless so far as the actual procedure of grammar is concerned. On another occasion, in his discussion of A 3.2.123: वर्तमाने लट्, Patañjali comes closer to asserting overtly that an opposing point of view is in fact to be treated as worthless. This concerns the issue of whether one can justifiably assume as valid the concept of a present or current time. After presenting an argument commentators consider a pūrvapakṣa and attribute to kṣaṇabhaṅgavādins,²⁸ he states what Nāgeśa explicitly characterizes as the siddhānta²⁹ as follows (see JAOS 111: 461-2). There is a reason for which one enters into an activity such as going, namely the result of such an action, reaching a goal. Taking into consideration the activity intended for the result that is the reason for entering into such an action, one should use *gacchati* without giving it a second thought.³⁰ Now, the verse Patañjali cites says *avicārayan* ('not considering, not deliberating'), which implies that one need not pay

²⁵ As far back as one can possibly go, it is not possible to establish a stage at which a word like *ghaṭa* was not yet associated with its meaning. I adopt a reading नार्थेऽप्रवृत्तपूर्वः 'not previously not used in a meaning'. The single manuscript reads नार्थोऽप्रवृत्तपूर्वः, which editors have amended in various ways: Swaminathan नार्थप्रवृत्तिपूर्वः, Abhyankar and Limaye नार्थेऽप्रवृत्तपूर्वः, Bronkhorst नार्थोऽप्रवृत्तपूर्वः.

²⁶ Bhartṛhari's phrase तत्र नित्यकालं स्वरूपेण व्यावेशात् ('This being so, because [the signified meaning] is for all time entered upon by its [associated word's] own form') is best interpreted, I think, under the assumption that he assumes here the identification of word and meaning. Similarly, he later speaks of terms like *ghaṭa*, *śaśaviṣāṇa* being entered upon by their meaning forms (व्याविष्ट एवार्थरूपेण).

²⁷ Dīp. 28.16-22/23.25-24.2: अथवेदं प्रतिपादयति । तत्र किञ्च एतेनेदं नित्यमिदमनित्यमिति । किमस्माकं वस्तुगतेन विचारेण । यदस्माकं नित्यं तं पदार्थं मत्वैष विग्रहः क्रियते । अर्थश्चास्माकं यः शब्देनाभिधीयते । तत्र वस्तु यदि नित्यं यद्यनित्यं शब्दस्तु न कदाचिदभिधेयश्चानित्य इति शब्दो नार्थेऽप्रवृत्तपूर्वः । तत्र नित्यकालं स्वरूपेण व्यावेशाद्यश्च घटशब्दो यश्च शशविषाणशब्दः सर्व एते सर्वकालमर्थैरशून्या व्याविष्टा एवार्थरूपेणेति । एवम्भूते पदार्थे युक्त एवैष विग्रहः सिद्धे शब्देऽर्थ सम्बन्धे चेति ॥ On a reading of the text, see note 25.

²⁸ For a recent treatment of the Bhāṣya and related works on the issue, see JAOS 111 (1991): 450-455, 461-462.

²⁹ Ud. III.284/III.197b: इदानीं सिद्धान्तमाह ।

³⁰ Bh. II.124.8-9/III.197b: क्रियाप्रवृत्तौ यो हेतुस्तदर्थं यद्विचेष्टितम् । तत्समीक्ष्य प्रयुज्जीत गच्छतीत्यविचारयन् ॥

attention to possible arguments such as had been set forth to maintain that one cannot operate with a concept of present time and that one can still use present forms confident that the faults alleged are not necessarily valid. In fact, Kaiyaṭa singles out this phrase for comment and speaks of the stain of poorly conceived ideas, which Nārāyaṇa further specifies are contemptible pseudo-reasons brought up by pūrvapakṣins.³¹

§2.5. In sum, as is generally accepted, in the course of discussions pertinent to grammar, the Mahābhāṣya covers a wide field of both technically grammatical issues and issues of more general philosophical import and does so usually without explicitly stating a siddhānta. Nevertheless, it can not be doubted that Kātyāyana and Patañjali do indeed consider particular positions preferable to others. Moreover, on occasion Patañjali makes his preference obvious, albeit in what might be considered a fairly subtle manner, and he demonstrates a low opinion of certain views which he nevertheless feels obliged to present.

3. Bharṭṛhari

Let us consider now examples illustrating how Bharṭṛhari's approach to controversial issues parallels Patañjali's.

§3.1. In accordance with Patañjali and others, Bharṭṛhari considers that a *kāraka* — a direct participant in an action, which contributes to its being accomplished — is not merely a thing in and of itself but a thing qualified by a capacity (*śakti*) with respect to an action. He also considers two possible views concerning the ontological status of such capacities, namely that they constitute a distinct category or that there is no need to accept such a separate category. For example, a water pot can play the role of object with respect to the act of seeing, as can a color. To account for (1) घटं पश्यति '... sees a pot' and (2) रूपं पश्यति '... sees a color' in Pāṇini's derivational system, the pot and color in question are assigned the category name *karman* since each is the immediate goal of an agent that is engaged in seeing. Accordingly, the bases *ghaṭa* and *rūpa* are followed by a second-triplet nominal ending, introduced to signify a *karman*.³² Under one viewpoint, a pot's or a color's being the object of seeing requires that this property be a capacity distinct from each such entity. Under another view, a pot is an object of seeing by virtue of having a certain size and color, and a color is an object of seeing by virtue of its being a color; these are properties which inhere in the things themselves, not any separate capacity.³³ Bharṭṛhari

³¹ See JAOS 111: 462, note 100 (continued from p. 461).

³² A 1.4.49: कर्तुरीप्सिततमं कर्म, 2.3.2: कर्मणि द्वितीया. See PWT I: 137-138, 155.

³³ VP 3.7.10: घटस्य दृशिकर्मत्वे महत्वादीनि साधनम् । रूपस्य दृशिकर्मत्वे रूपत्वादीनि साधनम् ॥ The view in question is that of Vaiśeṣikas, and in his commentary on this *kārikā* Helārāja (VPH 3.7.10 [239.9-241.10/107-110] directly cites VaiS 4.1.6 (महत्त्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वाद् रूपत्वान्नोपलब्धिः) and following. The

takes both these positions into consideration, then concludes that, whichever of them is adopted from an ontological point of view, something's being the cause of an action's accomplishment, so that it is considered to function as a *kāraka*, is based on the distinction between a thing and its possible capacities with respect to actions.³⁴

In his introduction to VP 3.7.15, Helārāja strikes the appropriate emphasis when he remarks that, having shown how a *sādhana* is a *śakti* according to the views of both Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiśeṣikas, he gives up any insistence, within his own view, on either the distinction or the non-distinction at issue.³⁵ In his commentary on the verse, he further remarks, 'Thus, in regard to this issue, let the identity doctrine be or let the capacities be distinct; we have no particular insistence here for the distinctness or identity doctrine.'³⁶ Of course, in the *kārikā* itself Bhartṛhari explicitly says that something is conceived and spoken of as a *kāraka* on the basis of (*upāśritya* 'having based oneself on') the distinction between a thing and its capacity with respect to the accomplishment of an action. This does not, however, involve any conflict. For the doctrines Bhartṛhari has been discussing are based on ontological considerations: basically, whether one should complicate the ontological scheme by admitting an inferred extra category *śakti* or do without this category. What Bhartṛhari is speaking of, on the other hand, involves language usage. Helārāja brings this out, starting with the oft-repeated phrase शब्दप्रमाणका वयम् ('We have speech as our means of knowing'), which echoes what Patañjali said.³⁷ As Helārāja notes, one does indeed speak in such a manner that things and their capacities as participants in the accomplishment of actions are referred to as distinct. Thus, in connection with (1), one correctly says (3) घटस्य दृशिक्रियायां कर्मभावः 'The pot has the property of being *karman* in the act of seeing', which assumes that being a *karman*

alternative position is that of Mīmāṃsakas, and in his commentary on VP 3.7.15 Helārāja (VPH 243.14/115) quotes a half-*kārikā* (शक्तयः सर्वभावानां कार्यार्थापत्तिगोचराः) which is obviously a version of *kārikā* from Kumārila's Ślokavārttika (Śūnyavāda 254ab: शक्तयोऽपि च भावानां कार्यार्थापत्तिकल्पिताः). Further details concerning this issue are not pertinent to my presentation.

³⁴ VP 3.7.15: स तेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तो वा तेषामात्मैव वा तथा । व्यतिरेकमुपाश्रित्य साधनत्वेन कल्प्यते ॥

³⁵ VPH 3.7.15 (243.9-10/114): एवं मीमांसकवैशेषिकदर्शनेन शक्तिः साधनमित्युपपाद्य स्वदर्शने व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकग्रहं त्यजति । Helārāja uses the term *graha*, which contextually is best taken as equivalent to *āgraha* 'insistence, persistence', as Raghunātha Sharma indicates by saying (VPA 3.7.15 [115]) नास्माकमाग्रहः in his paraphrase. *graha* is used similarly also in Helārāja's commentary on VP 3.1.92 (93.22/169)

³⁶ VPH 3.7.15 (243.19-21/115): तदत्राव्यतिरेकवादे वास्तु व्यतिरिक्ता वा शक्तयः सन्तु । नास्माकमत्र कश्चिद् ग्रहो व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकवादे ।

³⁷ Bh. 2.1.1 (I.366.12-13/II.529 [cf. Paspāśā I.11.1-2/I.41]): शब्दप्रमाणका वयम् । यच्छब्द आह तदस्माकं प्रमाणम् 'We have speech as our means of knowing. What speech says is our authority.'

(*karmabhāva*) and a pot (*ghaṭa*) are distinct. For the genitive *ghaṭasya*³⁸ is appropriate only if there is a relationship between the pot in question and something else. In view of such usage, which conveys a distinction between a thing and its property of being a *kāraka*, it is proper to conclude that talking about things as determined by the norms of speech is based on such a distinction.³⁹

§3.2. Nor is Helārāja at odds with what Bhartrhari intends in VP 3.7.15 when he invokes the principle शब्दप्रमाणका वयम्। यच्छब्द आह तदस्माकं प्रमाणम्। In a similar context, Bhartrhari himself appeals to the very same principle. After touching briefly on the views that there are six capacities which constitute *kāra*kas and whether these are truly distinct from or identical with substances, as well as on the view that there is but one capacity — agency — common to all *kāra*kas, but which is subdivided, Bhartrhari remarks: whether it be that the capacity in question is identical with or distinct from a participant, it is spoken of as distinct from it.⁴⁰ The reason for this is that the community of speakers has speech as its guide for knowing things as they are communicated, and this community is followed by the grammar.⁴¹ That is, there are indeed various points of view concerning the issue under discussion, but, as Phullarāja puts it, the capacity in question is spoken of as distinct by us as grammarians. This is because grammar follows the community of speakers, for whom speech is the guiding means of knowing. The meaning of speech units is described in detail by the grammar in accordance with what the community of speakers understands, and this community of speakers understands a capacity, which is determined by how one expresses things, to be distinct from an individual that directly participates in an action.⁴²

§3.3. A comparable issue arises concerning number (*saṅkhyā*). As Helārāja remarks in his commentary on VP 3.11.1, according to Vaiśeṣikas number is a property (*guṇa*) which resides in a substance. Helārāja also takes into account an opposed view, that there is no separate category of number distinct from things. Under this view, singularity is simply a thing

³⁸ By A 2.3.50: षष्ठी शेषे।

³⁹ VPH 3.7.15 (243.21-244.1/115-116): शब्दप्रमाणका वयम्। यच्छब्द आह तदस्माकं प्रमाणम्। शब्दश्च पदार्थानां व्यतिरिक्तमेव साधनभावं प्रत्याययति घटस्य दृशिक्रियायां कर्मभाव इत्यादाविति व्यतिरेकोपाश्रयः शब्दनिबन्धनो व्यवहारः।

⁴⁰ VP 3.7.38ab: तत्त्वे वा व्यतिरेके वा व्यतिरिक्तं तदुच्यते। The neuters *tad* ('that') and *vyatiriktam* ('separate, distinct') are used, so that *sāmarthyam* is intended here as the term referring to a capacity.

⁴¹ VP 3.7.38cd: शब्दप्रमाणको लोकः स शास्त्रेणानुगम्यते ॥

⁴² VPPh. 3.7.38 (263.12-15/155-156): वैयाकरणनयानुसारिभिस्त्वस्माभिः सामर्थ्यं व्यतिरिक्तमेवोच्यते । यस्मात् शब्दप्रमाणको लोकः । शास्त्रेण चानेन स एवानुगम्यत इत्याह स शास्त्रेणानुगम्यते । लोकप्रतीत्यनुसारेण हि शब्दस्यार्थो वितन्यते । लोकश्च शब्दक्रियानिमित्तायाः शक्तेर्व्यतिरेकमेवानुगच्छति ।

without any accompanying thing, while duality and so on are a thing accompanied by one or more other things, according to the case. Helārāja remarks that the latter position is unacceptable, since there is a difference in cognition: a cognition of something as accompanied by another or others is different from the cognitions 'two', 'three' and so on.⁴³ In the second kārīkā of the *Saṅkhyāsamuddeśa*,⁴⁴ Bhartṛhari mentions these two views, saying simply that the property in question might be considered separate or nothing more than things themselves. He also remarks that the term *saṅkhyā* is used on the basis of numbers having the property of differentiation.⁴⁵ Helārāja rightly perceives the intent of this kārīkā, as follows. Let either of the two positions noted stand so far as concerns the property of number with respect to counted things as they are considered to be (*sattvabhūtānām*). This discussion is purposeless for us, since what we have set out to discuss here is meaning as related to speech units (*śabdārthasya* 'of the meaning of a speech unit'). One says 'one', 'two', 'three' and so on. From such speech usage a certain property is determined as the reason why one can speak of a single undifferentiated thing or two or more different things. For it is not possible to speak of a mere object signified by a word, without some qualification. And this property is spoken of using the etymologically appropriate term *saṅkhyā*⁴⁶ in that it makes one perceive things in a differentiated manner.⁴⁷ That is, we have here once more the contrast between positions taken while considering things as they are assumed to be ontologically as opposed to a consideration of what one can know from linguistic usage. Helārāja brings this out forcefully in his introduction to the kārīkā.⁴⁸ As opposed to others who are involved in the debate concerning number, we depend on speech as our means of knowing. Consequently, we do not lend importance to discussing what are supposed to be things as such. For us, what are supposed to be established are the

⁴³ VPH 3.11.1(95.16-19/627-628): वैशेषिकाणां द्रव्याश्रिता गुणात्मिका सङ्ख्या । न च पदार्थ एवासहाय एकत्वं सहायश्च यथायोगं द्वित्वादीति सहायविरहतद्योगयोर्धर्मान्तरत्वाभावात् कश्चिदन्यो द्रव्यात्सङ्ख्यालक्षणो गुण इति व्यतिरिक्तसङ्ख्याभाव इति वाच्यं प्रत्ययभेदात् । अन्यो हि सहायताप्रत्ययोऽन्यश्च द्वौ त्रय इत्यादिप्रत्ययः ।

⁴⁴ VP 3.11.2: स धर्मो व्यतिरिक्तो वा तेषामात्मैव वा तथा । भेदहेतुत्वमाश्रित्य सङ्ख्येति व्यपदिश्यते ॥

⁴⁵ भेदहेतुत्वमाश्रित्य; cf. Candrānanda on VaiS 7.2.1: भेदव्यवहारहेतुः सङ्ख्या ।

⁴⁶ That is, *saṅkhyā* = *saṃ* + *khyā*, and *khyā* is a feminine action noun formed with the affixes *añ* (A 3.3.106: आतश्चोपसर्गे [अङ् 104]) and *tāp* (A 4.1.4: अजाद्यतष्टाप्) from the base *khyā*, which is in suppletive relation with *caḥ* (A 2.4.54: चक्षिङ्: ख्याव्).

⁴⁷ VPH 3.11.2 (96.7-11/629): सङ्ख्यालक्षणो धर्मस्तेषां सत्त्वभूतानां सङ्ख्येयानामात्मैवाभिन्न एव वास्तु तेष्यो व्यतिरिक्तो वास्तु । किमनेन निष्प्रयोजनेनास्माभिर्विचारेण शब्दार्थस्येह विचारयितुं प्रक्रमात् । शब्दाच्चैको द्वौ त्रय इत्यादेर्भेदव्यवहारे हेतुः कश्चिद्धर्मोऽवधार्यते । नहि पदार्थमात्रादनुपाधरेव व्यवहारो घटते । स च धर्मः सङ्गृह इति सङ्ख्येत्यन्वर्थेन नाम्ना व्यवहियते ।

⁴⁸ VPH 3.11.2 (96.3-4/629): अस्माकं तु शब्दप्रमाणकानां पदार्थविचारानादराद्यथायथं पदार्थकल्पना तीर्थिकैः कृता तामाश्रित्य लक्षणाङ्गाः पदार्था व्यवस्थाप्या इत्याह ।

meanings of particular speech units in association with grammatical rules.⁴⁹ And these are established on the basis of the manner in which established grammatical authorities conceived of them.

In sum, we are dealing once more with arguments that can take place on a level of ontological considerations, which a grammarian can ignore, since he bases his conclusions on linguistic behavior and how a grammar accounts for this behavior.

§3.4. The same general point is made by Helārāja in his introduction to VP 3.3.40-41,⁵⁰ where Bharṭṛhari speaks of the secondary or metaphorical being (*aupacārikī sattā*) to which he grants first status and another mode of being, namely outward existence at a particular moment. A linguistic item such as *ghaṭa* — as well as its significand — is first established with respect to this secondary being; the existence of the significand is not limited to a present moment but can encompass also past and future.⁵¹ This then enters into relation with properties qualifying it which can be contradictory or noncontradictory: one can correctly say not only (4) घटोऽस्ति ‘there is a pot’ but also (5) घटो नास्ति ‘there is no pot’, although *ghaṭa* of itself signifies an existent entity. This is compared to the manner in which a thing like an absolutely colorless and transparent crystal enters into relation with and takes on the colors of juxtaposed things like a red flower, without abandoning its own essential property. In his introduction,⁵² Helārāja remarks as follows. As discussed earlier, verbal interaction is fully accomplished by means of this secondary being alone. This being the case, if another being is posited due to some reason or other — such as a given thing’s carrying out a particular action for which it serves — which is actually as worthless as the rubbish left over after one has used wood, then fine; we have no concern for it. On the contrary, this assumed primary external

⁴⁹ Helārāja pointedly uses the phrase *lakṣaṇāṅgāḥ*, *padārthāḥ*, speaking not simply of categorical meanings of speech units (*padārthāḥ*) — such as bases and affixes — but of those meanings for which grammatical rules serve as ancillaries (*lakṣaṇāṅgāḥ*) by accounting for them in the way people speak about them. That is, we are dealing with meanings as associated with particular speech elements in a grammatical system.

⁵⁰ स्फटिकादि यथा द्रव्यं भिन्नरूपैरुपाश्रयैः । स्वशक्तियोगात्सम्बन्धं ताद्रूप्येणैव गच्छति ॥ तद्वच्छब्दोऽपि सत्तायामस्यां पूर्वं व्यवस्थितः । धर्मैरुपैति सम्बन्धमविरोधिविरोधिभिः ॥ In 3.3.40d K.A. Subramania Iyer and Raghunātha Sharma read ताद्रूप्येणोपगच्छति. The difference in reading does not affect the import.

⁵¹ The primary meaning of *sattā* is the property of being at present. This is an abstract noun derived from *sat*, which in Pāṇini’s derivational system consists of the base *as* ‘be’ with the affix *ṣatr*, and this affix substitute for the L-suffix *laṭ*, which is introduced on condition that an act takes place in current time.

⁵² VPH 3.3.40-41 (151.6-9/277) एवञ्चानयैव सत्तया पूरिते व्यवहारे यद्व्यर्थक्रियाकरणादिना काष्ठबुसप्रायेण केनचिन्निबन्धनेनान्या सत्ता कल्प्यते तद्वर्धतां सा । न तत्र चिन्तास्माकम् । व्यवहारे तु तस्या नास्त्यनुप्रवेशः । यदि परमस्यामेव सा प्रतिबिम्बिता व्यवहियत इत्येतत्प्रतिपादयितुं निदर्शनोपक्रममाह ...

being does not enter into verbal interaction unless it is spoken of as a property reflected in this secondary being alone.

Here again, an alternative view entertained by some is brought up but treated as unimportant within the context of a grammarian's concerns.

§3.5. The question arises: if such issues are considered not to merit the serious concern of a grammarian, why does Bhartṛhari bring them up and discuss them? The same question of course arises with respect to Patañjali. In fact, a partial answer is supplied by Puṇyarāja and Helārāja: grammar relates to all areas of concern. Let us now consider what they say.

§§3.5.1. After refuting the view that separate syntactic words (*pada*) are true units and arguing for the position that the true unit of communication is the sentence (*vākya*), Bhartṛhari comes back to speak of the position of some scholars, who say that a single word (*śabdā*) such as *go* ('ox, cow, earth, ray ...') is polysemous and that the particular meaning it conveys in any given instance is determined by differences of circumstance.⁵³ Commenting on this *kārikā*, Puṇyarāja sets out four possible positions: (a) there may be a single word with many meanings or (b) a different meaning entails a different word; (c) syntactic words and their meanings have real status or (d) according to grammarians, they do not have real status. Puṇyarāja goes on to remark that for the sake of grammatical discourse (*vyavahārārtham* 'for the purpose of talking about') Bhartṛhari accepts a stand that has been rejected, then says he does indeed accept this position again here, because grammar pertains to all branches, and this position is established therein.⁵⁴ Now given the use of *yataḥ* 'since' to introduce the sentence यतः सर्वपाषदमिदं हि व्याकरणं शास्त्रम् Puṇyarāja's additional use of *hi* in this sentence is to be understood in my opinion, as an indication that he is making a quasi-citation of the Bhāṣya's सर्ववेदपारिषदं हीदं शास्त्रम्.⁵⁵ More importantly, by rules of Sanskrit syntax, *tatra* of तत्र चायं स्थितः should refer to grammar, the referent of व्याकरणं शास्त्रम् which immediately precedes. Accordingly, Puṇyarāja says that this position, which, although it had been rejected earlier, Bhartṛhari accepts for the sake of grammatical discourse, is established therein.

⁵³ VP 2.250: एकमाहुरनेकार्थं शब्दमन्ये परीक्षकाः । निमित्तभेदादेकस्य सामर्थ्यं तस्य भिद्यते ॥

⁵⁴ VPP 2.250 (103/361): अत्रैकशब्ददर्शनमनेकशब्ददर्शनं चेति द्वौ पक्षौ । तत्रापि पदपदार्थयोः सत्यत्वं पदवादमतेन असत्यत्वं च वैयाकरणमतेनेति चत्वारः पक्षाः । प्रतिक्षिप्तमपि पक्षं व्यवहारार्थमङ्गीकरोत्येव टीकाकारः । यतः सर्वपाषदमिदं हि व्याकरणं शास्त्रं तत्र चायं स्थित इत्यत्र पुनः पदपदार्थावङ्गीकरोति । Cf. VPP 2.402 (note 169).

⁵⁵ See note 12. In his commentary on VP 3.1.19, Helārāja (32.13-14/54: सर्वपाषदं हीदं शास्त्रमिति शब्दार्थोऽर्थ इति वा पदार्थव्यवस्थेयम् ।) comparably says सर्वपाषदं हीदं शास्त्रम्. In addition, he once more invokes the view that a meaning is the significand of a term, not necessarily an external existent. I omit discussing the content of the *kārikā* in question, since this would involve considering also a major difference in readings among editions.

That according to grammarians separate syntactic words and their meanings have no true status (*asatyatvam* 'being untrue, unreal') is reconcilable with this acceptance, since Bharṭṛhari does indeed agree that constituent words in sentences are given status, but solely to allow a grammarian to describe, by means of rules, sentences, which alone have true status in communication, a point made again and again in *kārikās* and the *Vṛtti*; see subsections §§ 3.7.1-3.7.5.

§§3.5.2. The *Sambandhasamuddeśa* begins⁵⁶ with the statement that one understands, cognizes (*pratīyate* 'is understood, cognized') three things through speech units (*śabdaiḥ*⁵⁷) when these are uttered: a speaker's intent,⁵⁸ an external meaning or object, and the speech units themselves (*svarūpam* 'own form'). This initial *kārikā* also says that there is a relation between these and speech units that is permanently established.⁵⁹ Now, Bharṭṛhari has set out to discuss the relation between signifier and

⁵⁶ VP 3.3.1: ज्ञानं प्रयोक्तुर्बाह्योऽर्थः स्वरूपं च प्रतीयते। शब्दैरुच्चरितैस्तेषां सम्बन्धः समवस्थितः॥

⁵⁷ Echoing what Patañjali says in the *Mahābhāṣya* on *Śivasūtra* 1 (Bh. I.18.19-20/I.67): श्रोत्रोपलब्धिर्बुद्धिनिर्ग्राहः प्रयोगेणाभिज्वलित आकाशदेशः शब्दः।, Helārāja, (VPH 3.3.1 [122.5-6/221]: प्रयोगेणाभिज्वलितैः शब्दैस्त्रितयमवगम्यते आत्मीयं रूपमर्थश्च फलसाधनः प्रयोक्तुरभिप्रायश्च।) speaks of the speech units as *prayogenaḥ abhijvalitaiḥ* 'lighted (*abhijvalitaiḥ*) by prayoga'. Since he is speaking of meaningful speech items, Helārāja obviously means that these are manifested. This is the sense Bharṭṛhari gives to *jvalita* in the *Dīpikā* on the *Mahābhāṣya* passage cited above: Dīp. 56.14/II.9.17: ध्वनिना व्यज्यमानो न प्रदीपादिभिरभिज्वल्यते 'being manifested by physical sound, it is not lighted by a lamp or such'. Similarly, Kaiyaṭa (Pr. I.67/I.97b: प्रयोगेणेति। प्रयुज्यत इति प्रयोगः ध्वनिः तेनाभिव्यक्तः।) glosses *abhijvalitaiḥ* with *abhiyuktaiḥ* 'manifested'. In addition, he interprets *prayoga* as a derivate signifying an object: that which is used, namely a sound; Nāgeśa adds (Ud I.67/I.98a: ध्वनिरिति वर्ण इत्यर्थः।) that by this Kaiyaṭa means not just any physical sound but a sound such as *a*, which is a systematic unit of the language. Since the context of Patañjali's statement is the first *Śivasūtra* and individual sounds in particular, *prayoga* could also be interpreted as an action noun: sounds are manifested by usage, that is, through uttering physical sounds. Nevertheless, the *Bhāṣya* statement can apply more generally, as is obvious from Helārāja's use of the phrase प्रयोगेणाभिज्वलितैः in the context of VP 3.3.1. In this context, *prayoga* is preferably to be interpreted in the way that Bharṭṛhari and Kaiyaṭa have done.

⁵⁸ *jñānam prayoktuḥ*, literally 'a user's knowledge'. Helārāja (VPH 3.3.1 [122.6/221]: प्रयोक्तुरभिप्रायश्च) glosses *jñānam* with *abhiprāyaḥ* 'intent', which is obviously appropriate in the context.

⁵⁹ Helārāja (VPH 3.3.1 [122.6-8/221-222]:) न चैतदसति सम्बन्धे नियमेन घटत इति वास्तवसम्बन्धावसायो न सामयिकः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः अभिधानियमनादनादेः। अत एव समवस्थित इत्याह। स्वभावत एव निरूढो न तु पुरुषेण निवेशित इत्यर्थः।) notes that *samavasthitaiḥ* ('precisely, absolutely established') has a pregnant meaning. By using this, Bharṭṛhari means to say that the relation between a speech unit and a meaning is fixed by the very nature of these, not established by man. He says that this word-meaning relation is not conventional (*sāmayika*) but essential (*vāstavaḥ*) because a speaker of the language cognizes a meaning from a word, which would not necessarily hold unless there were a relation between the two, and because this necessary relation cannot be shown to have a particular beginning.

significand. Indeed, in the third *kārikā* of this *samuddeśa*⁶⁰ he explicitly speaks of a relation between word and meaning that is understood when one uses genitive, as in (6) अस्यार्थस्यायं शब्दो वाचकः 'this term is a signifier of this meaning' and (7) अस्य शब्दस्यायमर्थो वाच्यः 'this meaning is the significand of this term.' This being the case, remarks Helārāja, what occasion is there for speaking of a speaker's knowledge and a speech unit's own form. True, he replies, but this *śāstra* is all-inclusive, so that a speaker's intention is included in order to include also the view of those who do not accept that an external referent is what is signified by a term, it being maintained instead that being the meaning of a term is a property solely of something governed by the intention of a speaker. Helārāja also cites a verse from the *Pramāṇavārttika*⁶¹ reflecting this position, under which the relation in question is that of cause and effect.⁶²

Helārāja's use of the qualifier *sarvaparśadam* ('common to all groups'), is in consonance with his citing from Dharmakīrti. Although Bhartṛhari's position concerning the ontological status of external entities is not identical with the Buddhist position represented by Dharmakīrti, the view that in terms of verbal communication what a term signifies is something that is in the mind of a speaker as what he intends to signify and in the mind of the hearer as the intention he interprets accords with Bhartṛhari's thinking. In fact, later in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* he explicitly sets forth the position announced in the summary of his work⁶³ that word and meaning are related as cause and effect, saying that a speech unit is the cause with respect to a meaning, since it is produced by it and in

⁶⁰ VP 3.3.3: अस्यार्थं वाचको वाच्य इति षष्ठ्या प्रतीयते। योगः शब्दार्थयोस्तत्त्वमित्यतो व्यपदिश्यते॥

⁶¹ PV 1.4: वक्तव्यापारविषयो योऽर्थो बुद्धौ प्रकाशते। प्रामाण्यं तत्र शब्दस्य नार्थतत्त्वनिबन्धनम्॥ According to this, a term has the property of being a means of knowledge with respect to that meaning which is an object of a speaker's intending to refer to it, which appears in the speaker's intellect, and this property is not dependent on an existent meaning entity. In his *Vṛtti* on this passage (.... वक्तव्यापारो विवक्षा। तस्य विषयो योऽर्थः समारोपितबहीरूपो ज्ञानाकारः प्रकाशते बुद्धौ विवक्षात्मिकायाम्। तत्र शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यं लिङ्गत्वम्। शब्दादुच्चरिताद्विवक्षितार्थप्रतिभासी विकल्पोऽनुमीयत इत्यर्थः तत्कार्यत्वात्तच्छब्दस्य। ...) Manorathanandin specifies that the speaker's act (*vaktṛvyāpāra*) is his wish to express (*vivakṣā*) himself, to make a meaning known, that the meaning in question is an object (*viśaya*) of this act, that this takes the form of a knowledge (*jñānākāra*) such that an external form has been imposed on it (*samaropitabāhīrupākāra*), that this appears in the buddhi, which is actually the speaker's intent, and that the *pramāṇya* of a term is its being an inferential mark (*liṅga*). What is meant is that from an uttered term is inferred a mental image (*vikalpa* 'mental construct') that reflects the meaning intended to be expressed, since the term in question is a consequence of that mental image (*talkārya* 'its product').

⁶² VPH 3.3.1 (122.13-123.4/222): ननु च वाच्यवाचकभावलक्षणः सम्बन्धः प्रस्तुतः। तत्र कः प्रसङ्गो ज्ञानस्वरूपयोः। सत्यम्। सर्वपार्षदं पुनरिदं शास्त्रमिति ये बाह्यस्यार्थस्य शब्दवाच्यत्वं नेच्छन्ति तन्मतोपसङ्ग्रहार्थं वक्त्रभिप्रायारूढस्यैव शब्दार्थत्वे। तत्र कार्यकारणभावसम्बन्धमाह। यथाहुः वक्तव्यापारविषयो योऽर्थो बुद्धौ प्रकाशते। प्रामाण्यं तत्र शब्दस्य नार्थतत्त्वनिबन्धनम्॥ इति।

⁶³ VP 1.25ab: कार्यकारणभावेन योग्यभावेन च स्थिताः।

a like manner a speech unit is perceived (*pratīyate* 'is understood, cognized') due to a meaning that is the object of the intellect.⁶⁴ That is, a speaker intends to convey a meaning that is in his mind and therefore utters a speech unit that is perceived and conveys a meaning comprehended in the intellect of the hearer.⁶⁵

In another context, Helārāja again invokes the principle that grammar is sarvapārśada in connection with positions which are held not only among adherents of different "schools" but also among different grammarians, namely whether a term signifies a general property or an individual. The *kārikā* concerned involves the highest entity, conceived of as the overriding general property of being (*sattā*). This is said to be called *jāti* — a lower generic property inhering in particular classes of entities — as it is differentiated in cattle and other beings because of the distinction of entities in relation with it. All speech units are established as signifiers with respect to this ultimate being differentiated in this manner, so that this property of being is said to be the meaning of any of the two major classes of terms, nominal and verbal bases. This is also what abstract suffixes such as *tva* and *tal* of derivatives like *gotva* 'property of being a cow or an ox' and *puruṣatā* 'manhood' signify; it is an eternal being, the great ātman.⁶⁶ Further, this ultimate property of being takes on two aspects. On the one hand, it appears in particular actions like cooking and then has the aspect of sequence and is spoken of as action (*kriyā*); on the other hand, when this sequential aspect is eliminated, it is spoken of as *sattva* 'being'.⁶⁷ Of course, in the very

⁶⁴ VP 3.3.32: शब्दः कारणमर्थस्य स हि तेनोपजन्यते। तथा च बुद्धिविषयादर्थाच्छब्दः प्रतीयते॥

⁶⁵ In his commentary on VP 3.3.54, Helārāja cites VP 3.3.32 cd and offers an exegesis, the gist of which is as follows. An effect is in accordance with a cause, and the cause of a speech unit that is uttered is a knowledge (*pratyaya*) in the form of taking into consideration (*nirūpaṇā* 'describing') a meaning, since a speech unit has as its object such a considered meaning; this knowledge (*nirūpaṇāpratyaya*), moreover, is a mental construct (*vikalpa*). By virtue of the word and meaning being related as cause and effect, a cognition in the form of a mental construct also results from a speech unit. In support of this two-way cause-effect relation, he also cites an oft-quoted passage according to which uttered speech forms have mental constructs as their sources and mental constructs which are understood in turn have speech forms as their sources. VPH 3.3.54 (162.7-11, 13-16/301): इह कारणानुरूपं कार्यं भवति। शब्दस्य च निरूपितार्थविषयत्वान्निरूपणाप्रत्ययः कारणम्। तदुक्तम् तथा च बुद्धिविषयादर्थाच्छब्दः प्रतीयत इति। ... कार्यकारणसम्बन्धवशाद्विकल्पात्मको हि प्रत्ययः शब्दज्ञायते। तदुक्तम् विकल्पयोनयः शब्दा विकल्पाः शब्दयोनय इति।

⁶⁶ VP 3.1.33-34: सम्बन्धिभेदात्सत्तैव भिद्यमाना गवादिषु। जातिरित्युच्यते तस्यां सर्वे शब्दा व्यवस्थिताः॥ तां प्रातिपादिकार्थं च धात्वर्थं च प्रचक्षते। सा नित्या सा महानात्मा तामाहुस्त्वतलादयः॥

⁶⁷ VP 3.1.35: प्राप्तक्रमा विशेषेषु क्रिया सैवाभिधीयते। क्रमरूपस्य संहारे तत्सत्त्वमिति कथ्यते॥ That any activity such as cooking should be viewed and spoken of in two aspects is an idea that goes back at least to Yāska, who, in Nir. 1.1, speaks of *bhāva* and says that verb forms are used to signify sequential *bhāva*, from inception to termination, as when one says *vrajati* '... is going', *pacati* '... is cooking'. Such forms signify going and cooking from the moment the act is begun to when one ceases to be involved in it, from when one starts cooking by setting up a fire and so on to when

first *kārikā* of his work,⁶⁸ Bhartṛhari refers to the ultimate being, which is beginningless and endless brahman. Moreover, in the *Dravyasamuddeśa*, he deals with substance (*dravya*) from the ontological viewpoint and considers that the ultimate single substance is an entity which is characterized by various names, including *ātman*. Helārāja remarks on this duality as follows.⁶⁹ In VP 3.1.35, Bhartṛhari conveys how the ultimate being brahman, which is all that exists, evolves (*vivartah* 'evolving') in two ways: as what is to be brought about and as accomplished entities. For this alone is in all things.⁷⁰ Further, under this view — that is, the view attributable to Bhartṛhari — the general property of being is essentially not absolutely distinct and separate from beings, so that all that exists is of this nature. Since, therefore, all signifying speech units⁷¹ signify this ultimate property of being, the category of *jāti* is all-encompassing. To be sure, Bhartṛhari will also say, under the view that what is signified is an individual thing, that the individual being brahman is signified as differentiated through the difference of its individual accompanying properties.⁷² Nevertheless, this difference in the status of the ultimate being is accounted for as simply two ways of viewing brahman on the basis of what aspect of the single entity is intended. Under the view that a general property is the highest entity, Bhartṛhari means to speak of brahman as a *jāti*, the one that is in all things (*sarvatrānvyayirūpam*, see note 70); under the view that an individual is the ultimate, on the other hand, brahman as an accomplished entity is intended. Further, from the point of view of the ultimate there is a final

food has been fully cooked, and from the moment one starts going to the point where a goal is reached. Nominal forms are used to refer to *bhāva* that is viewed as embodied (*mūrtam* 'of a solid form') from beginning to end, with the property of a substance, as when one says *vrajyā* (nom. sg.) 'going', *pakṭiḥ* 'cooking', using action nouns to refer to going and cooking viewed non-sequentially. See *Storia della scienza, vol. II: Cina, India, Americhe* (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2001), p. 753.

⁶⁸ VP 1.1: अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् । विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥

⁶⁹ VPH 3.1.35 (43.3-11/73-74): ... इति सिद्धसाध्यरूपो द्विधा विवर्तः सन्मात्ररूपस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादितः । तदेव च सर्वत्रानुगतम् । न चात्र दर्शने सद्भ्यः सत्ता व्यतिरिक्ता भावत इति सर्वं तन्मयम् । ततश्च सर्वशब्दानां सत्तावचनत्वाज्जातिपदार्थव्याप्तिः । यद्यपि च द्रव्यपदार्थेऽपि ब्रह्मद्रव्यस्याभिधानमुपाधिभेदभिन्नस्य वक्ष्यति तथापि तात्पर्यभेदादवस्थाभेदः । जातिपदार्थे सर्वत्रान्वयिरूपं जात्यात्मना ब्रह्म विवक्षितम् । द्रव्यपदार्थनये तु परिनिष्ठितरूपं परमार्थतयेति दर्शनविकल्पः । अयमेव च पक्षद्वयेऽप्येकपक्षीभावरूपः सिद्धान्तः परमार्थदृष्ट्या । अत्र सर्वपार्षदत्वात्पुनरस्य शास्त्रस्य दर्शनान्तरोपन्यासः । एष च सर्वत्रैवास्य ग्रन्थकारस्याभिप्रायः पदार्थचर्चाविषये ब्रह्मदर्शननयेनैव सम्बन्धादिविचारे विनिगमनात् ।

⁷⁰ *sarvatrānugalam*. The terminology is in accordance with the context, in that a general property common to all members of a class is considered to accompany (*anugata*) every individual in which it inheres.

⁷¹ *sarvaśabdānām*; in the Pāṇinian system this amounts to all nominal and verbal bases, since preverbs (*upasarga*) and particles (*nipāta*) are also subsumed under nominal bases.

⁷² That is, individual things like oxen and pots secondarily differentiate brahman, but the essential unity of a single all-encompassing being (*sanmātra*) brahman is not thereby changed.

position which unites both these views in one, namely that there is a single final unit that can be viewed from different angles.

Helārāja ends this exposition by bringing up once more the all-encompassing nature of this work: it is because of this that different views are brought up. Helārāja also remarks that this is the author Bharṭṛhari's intent in all cases, since, when it comes to discussing entities — as in the discussion of the relation between speech units and meanings — the final decision is made by adopting the view that ultimately there is only brahman.

§3.6. Modern scholars might differ to some extent or other from Helārāja's assessment, but there can be no doubt whatever that he has captured an essential aspect of Bharṭṛhari's way of proceeding. This is that, though there are indeed various points of view adopted by various authors, these remain merely points of view of individual persons, beyond which there is final unity that is to be accepted.

§§3.6.1. Bharṭṛhari makes this point repeatedly in connection with a central concern of grammar: the ultimate object of description and the ways to proceed in describing this.

As is well known, the principal thesis Bharṭṛhari maintains is that the true unit of language as far as linguistic interaction among people is concerned is the sentence (*vākya*), which is actually indivisible and linked to an equally indivisible sentence-meaning. Thus, he remarks that there is no division associated with a speech unit and asks rhetorically why there should be a division in its meaning, then says that an imperceptive person (*avidvān* 'unlearned') accepts as true the difference in derivational procedures predicated on such divisions.⁷³ He illustrates the point by noting⁷⁴ that, as there is no independent distinct meaning of a *brāhmaṇa* in *brāhmaṇakambala* ('a *brāhmaṇa*'s blanket, shawl'),⁷⁵ in precisely the same

⁷³ VP 2.13: शब्दस्य न विभागोऽस्ति कुतोऽर्थस्य भविष्यति । विभागैः प्रक्रियाभेदमविद्वान्प्रतिपद्यते ॥

⁷⁴ VP 2.14: ब्राह्मणार्थो यथा नास्ति कश्चिद् ब्राह्मणकम्बले । देवदत्तादयो वाक्ये तथैव स्युरनर्थकाः ॥

⁷⁵ That is, a compound is to be treated as a distinct unit with its own meaning, distinct from the meanings of its putative constituents in a grammatical description. This point is emphasized in Helārāja's commentary on VP 3.1.87, where he says (VPH 3.1.87 [84.20-85.1/152: न चाप्यवयवाः केचनान्न वस्तुतः सन्ति विशिष्टेऽर्थे समासपदस्याभिन्नस्य प्रवृत्तेः । यथोक्तं वाक्यकाण्डे ब्राह्मणार्थो यथा नास्ति कश्चिद् ब्राह्मणकम्बले इति ।) that in reality (*vastutah* 'actually') there are no constituent parts in a compound word, since the single compound word alone is used in a particular qualified meaning, then cites VP 2.14ab. By using the parallel of a compound, Bharṭṛhari does not involve himself in a contradiction, since such separate words are ultimately considered constructs; see below. The same points are made in the *Vṛttisamuddeśa*, which I do not consider here because of space limitation.

manner, it is appropriate that there should be no independent meanings of Devadatta and so on in a sentence containing *devadatta*.⁷⁶

In a series of *kārikās* before those just considered, Bhartṛhari brings out the unity of a sentence and its meanings as well as of the cognition of this meaning, while accounting for the fact that people speak of agents and such as constituent meanings of sentences. The comprehension of a sentence meaning is likened to the cognition of a complex entity. There is a single cognition that casts light on all the objects being viewed, but this is divided according to the objects that are visible.⁷⁷ So also in the case of a single complex color: though this is a single entity, it is described through constituent colors blue and so on, which are distinct from each other and thus are represented as such.⁷⁸ Comparably, for a single unitary sentence, which is semantically complete so that it has absolutely no semantic expectancy to be fulfilled, an explanation is understood and given in terms of other words, considered to occur here as they do in other sentences, which have semantic expectancy with respect to each other.⁷⁹

§§3.6.2. Immediately thereafter, Bhartṛhari goes on to draw a parallel between dividing constituent bases and affixes in syntactic words and abstracting words in a sentence.⁸⁰ Moreover, just as there appears to be a likeness between independent sounds like *a*, *i*, *u* and the putative constituents of *e*, *o*, *ai*, and *au*, what are settled upon as constituent words

⁷⁶ A standard widely cited example is देवदत्त गां शुक्लामध्याज दण्डेन 'Devadatta, drive the white cow here with your stick,' which, to my knowledge, is first cited as an example of a meaningful utterance in the Mahābhāṣya on vārtika 2 to Ā 1.1.1 (Bh. I.38.4-5/I:125).

⁷⁷ VP 2.7: यथैक एव सर्वार्थप्रकाशः प्रविभज्यते। दृश्यभेदानुकारेण वाक्यार्थावगमस्तथा॥ Puṇyārāja's commentary (see note 79) is based on a reading वाक्यार्थानुगमस्तथा in pāda d, the reading of group n of Rau's stemma.

⁷⁸ VP 2.8: चित्रस्यैकस्य रूपस्य यथा भेदनिदर्शनैः। नीलादिभिः समाख्यानं क्रियते भिन्नलक्षणैः॥ K. A Subramania Iyer's edition reads चित्रस्यैकस्वरूपस्य in pāda a, so that the text speaks of a picture, which is a single complex unit. Puṇyārāja (VPP 2.7, 8 [8/28]: चित्रबुद्धिदृष्टान्तप्रदर्शनार्थमाह —, एवमान्तरं दृष्टान्तमुपदर्श्य बाह्यमुपदर्शयितुमाह —) contrasts the parallels drawn in VP 2.7, 8, noting that the first is internal — a variegated cognition (*citrabuddhiḥ*) — the latter external — a variegated color.

⁷⁹ VP 2.9: तथैवैकस्य वाक्यस्य निराकाङ्क्षस्य सर्वतः। शब्दान्तरैः समाख्यानं साकाङ्क्षैरनुगम्यते॥ In accordance with Bhartṛhari's use of *anugamyate* ('is followed', 'is understood'), in his commentary on this verse, Puṇyārāja (VPP 2.9 [8/31]: एकस्य निर्विभागस्य वाक्यस्य सर्वतः परिपूर्णस्य वाक्यान्तरगतैरन्वाख्यानं तथैव क्रियत इति!) glosses *samākhyānam* ... *anugamyate* with *anvākhyānam kriyate*. The apparent gloss of *anugamyate* by *kriyate* is mediated by understanding that the former is equivalent to *āśrīyate* ('is resorted to'). Cf. VPA 1.74 (144): ... शास्त्रीयो व्यवहारोऽनुगम्यते आश्रीयते क्रियत इत्यर्थः। In his commentary on VP 2.8, Puṇyārāja simply repeats *samākhyānam kriyate* which occurs in the *kārikā*.

⁸⁰ VP 2.10: यथा पदे विभज्यन्ते प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादयः। अपोद्धारस्तथा वाक्ये पदानामुपवर्ण्यते॥ I have cited the *kārikā* with *upavarṇyate* ('is described') in the last pāda, since this is what Puṇyārāja's commentary presupposes: VPP 2.10 (9/32): पदे हि यथा प्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागोऽसत्य एव बालव्युत्पादनाय क्रियते तथा वाक्ये वाक्यार्थप्रतिपादनायापोद्धारः पदानामुपवर्ण्यत इति बोद्धव्यम्। The same reading occurs in group n of Rau's stemma. Rau's edition has *upapadyate* ('is possible').

and constituents of words are only elements that appear to be the same as the putative constituents.⁸¹

The extraction (*apoddhāra*) of which Bhartṛhari speaks is accomplished by reasoning from the concurrent presence and absence (*anvaya-vyatirekau*) of putative elements and their meanings. Now, Bhartṛhari asserts that, though *uṣabha* ('bull'), *udaka* ('water'), and *yāvaka* ('barley gruel') appear to contain constituents *ṣabha* ('bull'), *uda* (*udan*- 'water'), and *yāva* ('barely gruel'), they are distinct words associated with such putative constituents which are meaningless here. On the other hand, *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are the source (*nibandhana* ['reason, cause']) which allows one to speak about the language and its constituents in a grammar, where such an analysis is justified.⁸²

§3.7. One of the themes that recurs throughout Bhartṛhari's work is this emphasis on a true unit which, though essentially not composed of true parts, is subject to analysis that results in abstracting putative constituents. The true unit of normal communication is the sentence (*vākya*), from which are abstracted constituent words (*pada*), themselves further analyzed into bases (*prakṛti*) and affixes (*pratyaya*). Select passages will serve to emphasize this.

§§3.7.1. The very first *kārikā* of the *Vākyapadīya*'s third *kāṇḍa*,⁸³ wherein Bhartṛhari deals with types of *padas* and their meanings, notes that *padas* are subdivided into two, four and five sorts⁸⁴ by different scholars (*kaiścit* ['by some, by certain ones']). Bhartṛhari also emphasizes that these are arrived at solely by abstracting (*apoddhṛtyaiva*) elements from sentences (*vākyebhyaḥ*) in the same way that bases and affixes are abstracted from *padas*.

⁸¹ VP 2.11: वर्णान्तरसरूपत्वं वर्णभागेषु दृश्यते । पदान्तरसरूपाश्च पदभागा अवस्थिताः ॥ In Rau's edition the final *pāda* is पदान्तरसरूपाश्च पदभागा इव स्थिताः ('occurring as though they were ...'), which fits the context even more strongly than does the reading I have cited, which is presupposed in Puṇyarāja's commentary. I have tried to capture the intent by using 'settled upon' for *avasthitāḥ*. Puṇyarāja also interprets, correctly in my opinion, *padabhāgāḥ* as ambiguously a *saptamī-tatpuruṣa* and a *karmadhāraya* (instead of the former, a *ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa* is possible): parts in a syntactic word and parts which are syntactic words. VPP 2.11 (9/32): यथा सन्ध्यक्षरेषु भागा वर्णान्तरसरूपा दृश्यन्ते परमार्थतस्त्वव्यपवृत्तत्वात्त्रिविभागा एव एवं वाक्ये पदान्तरसरूपाः पदरूपा भागाः पदभागाः पदे वा निश्चे ये भागा प्रकृतिप्रत्ययरूपास्तेऽवस्थिता इति ।

⁸² VP 2.12: भागैरनर्थकैर्युक्ता वृषभोदकयावकाः । अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ तु व्यवहारनिबन्धनम् ॥

⁸³ VP 3.1.1: द्विधा कैश्चित्पदं भिन्नं चतुर्धा पञ्चधापि वा । अपोद्धृत्यैव वाक्येभ्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिवत् ॥

⁸⁴ The twofold division comprises nominal forms (*nāman*) and finite verbal forms (*ākhyāta*), that is, those that contain nominal and verbal endings; cf. A 1.4.14: सुप्तिङन्त पदम् । In the fourfold classification, in addition to these, preverbs (*upasarga*) and particles (*nipāta*) are recognized as distinct groups. This classification is widely known, from Yāska (Nir. 1.1: तद्यानि चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्याते चोपसर्गनिपातश्च तानीमानि भवन्ति ।) and elsewhere. The fivefold classification recognizes additionally the group called *karmapṛavacanīya*. In the present paper, it is not necessary to discuss details concerning the reasons for the various divisions.

Moreover, he unequivocally states that *padas* are not true real units of language in the sense that in actual communication single words like *puruṣaḥ* 'man' regularly do not function as fully independent sentences that have no semantic expectation.⁸⁵ Thus, he says that individual words like *devadattaḥ* in sentences are meaningless (*anarthakāḥ*, VP 2.14, see note 74). Similarly, in VP 2.60⁸⁶ he draws a parallel between the position of those who accept that *padas* are meaningful units and the view that the true meaningful unit is a sentence. As a cognition of a word-meaning cannot be discerned for each sound, so is the cognition of a sentential meaning undiscernible for individual words. The *Vṛtti* introducing this *kārikā* is unambiguous in saying that this depicts what others — that is, those who deny the absolute validity of independent words and word-meanings — think: there is a single sentential meaning so that separate words which one might consider to make up a sentence are nothing other than absolutely meaningless.⁸⁷

Elsewhere,⁸⁸ comparing words to sensory faculties, Bhartṛhari remarks that all words of themselves lack the property of being meaningful as elements signifying their individual separate meanings, distinct from sentences, just as what is to be done by individual faculties, though these range among distinct objects and have distinct essential characters, is not possible without the body. Similarly, he says,⁸⁹ the form of all words is dependent on a sentential meaning. That is, as Puṇyarāja makes clear,⁹⁰ the meanings of separate words in a sentence by themselves are without purpose, and without this sentence meaning their putative meanings would merely be like meaningless scattered sound; they gain purposefulness only by being absorbed into a single sentential meaning. The *Vṛtti* makes overt the link between speaking of meanings of separate words in a sentence and the reasoning by *anvaya* and *vyatireka* which serves to abstract such words and their meanings. Through this reasoning the settled relation of these meanings (*arthavyavasthā* 'meaning settlement') is explained

⁸⁵ In saying this, I skirt the issue of single-word utterances like *dvāram* 'close the door' or *pidhehi* 'close (the door)' to which Bhartṛhari devotes a section of the second *kāṇḍa* (2.326-341/326-339).

⁸⁶ VP 2.60: प्रतिवर्णमसंवेद्यः पदार्थप्रत्ययो यथा । पदेष्वेवमसंवेद्यं वाक्यार्थस्य निरूपणम् ॥

⁸⁷ VPVṛ. 2.60 (214/117): अपरे तु मन्यन्ते वाक्यार्थ एकः तेनात्यन्तमनर्थकान्येव पदानि ...

⁸⁸ VP 2.423-424/419-420: पृथङ्निविष्टतत्त्वानां पृथगर्थानुपातिनाम् । इन्द्रियाणां यथा कार्यमृते देहात् कल्पते ॥ तथा पदानां सर्वेषां पृथगर्थनिवेशिनाम् । वाक्येभ्यः प्रविभक्तानामर्थवत्ता न विद्यते ॥

⁸⁹ VP 2.325ab: रूपं सर्वपदार्थानां वाक्यार्थोपनिबन्धनम् । I say 'similarly' because both Puṇyarāja in his *ṭīkā* and Bhartṛhari, in the *Vṛtti* on this passage allude to VP 2.423-424 (see note 88), the former by citing these overtly, the latter indirectly; see notes 90-91.

⁹⁰ VPP 2.325 (133/435): एकस्मिन्वाक्यार्थ उपनिबद्धास्ते साफल्यं भजन्ते अन्यथा विशरारव एवेति वाक्यार्थ एव तेषां परस्परसमन्वये निबन्धनम् । Immediately after saying this, Puṇyarāja cites VP 2.423-424 (see note 88).

(*anvākhyāyate*) by dividing each word of a sentence from each other one (*vibhajya vibhajya* 'repeatedly dividing'), this settled relation involves a mentally (*buddhyā* 'by the intellect') constructed differentiation (*prakalpitabhedā* [*arthavyavasthā*]) arrived at by anvaya and vyatireka and in accordance with how one speaks about such elements (*vyavahārānupātini*); despite such division, the settled relation of all such words depends solely on the sentence in which they occur, just as the activity of each sense faculty depends on the body.⁹¹

This idea antedates Bharṭṛhari. For the Vṛtti on VP 1.26 cites a verse attributed to the Saṅgraha,⁹² according to which no word is ever absolutely fixed (*niyatam*) as to form (*rūpeṇa*); a word's form or meaning arises solely from a sentence.

§§3.7.2. Bharṭṛhari is of course ready to accept syntactic words, just as earlier grammarians did, including Pāṇini, but he emphasizes that these are merely means (*upāya*) to an end. In the context of a grammar, they are means allowing one to describe comprehensively sentences of a language and in everyday affairs, they are means allowing a child to associate particular units with certain meanings. Bharṭṛhari refers to talking about (*vyavahārah*) sentences, both in everyday life (*loke*) and in a grammar (*śāstre*), in a manner that is encompassing (*vyāptimān*) and economical (*laghuḥ* 'brief'), namely by letting this be based on words (*padāśrayaḥ*), but he also says this is a construct (*kalpitah*).⁹³

That is, the recognition of words and of word constituents is a product of human analysis. Moreover, such analysis is subject to variation, since different persons can and do analyze a given thing in different ways. As Bharṭṛhari puts it, though a sentence-meaning is devoid of constituent divisions that are constructs (*avikalpe'pi*, see note 94), such divisions are known, but they are based on the impressions various people have from

⁹¹ VPVṛ. 2.325 (278): यद्यपि क्वचिदर्थश्रुतिमात्रान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां व्यवहारानुपातिनी बुद्ध्या प्रविकल्पितभेदा विभज्य विभज्यान्वाख्यायते तथापीन्द्रियाणामिव शरीरेपनिबन्धनार्थक्रिया वाक्योपनिबन्धनेनैव सर्वपदार्थानामर्थव्यवस्था। I have followed Aklujkar's electronic text. The printed edition has *vyavahārānupādinī* instead of *vyavahārānupātini* and *vākhyopanibandhanaiva* instead of *vākhyopanibandhanenaiva*, which is the reading of the Madras transcript.

⁹² VPVṛ. 1.26 (77.45/76): सङ्ग्रहेऽप्युक्तम् न हि किञ्चित्पदं नाम रूपेण नियतं क्वचित्। पदानां रूपमर्थो वा वाक्यार्थादेव जायते॥ I have followed K.A. Subramania Iyer's edition in punctuating the text. Raghunātha Sharma's edition has *nāmarūpeṇa* which is interpreted (VPA 76) as a form of a samāhāra dvandva equivalent to *nāmarūpābhyām*. Although the second half of the verse refers to the form (*rūpam*) and the meaning (*arthaḥ*) of putative words, the Ambākartrī interpretation would also require that *nāma* refer to the meaning of a word.

⁹³ VP 2.345/343: व्याप्तिमांश्च लघुश्चैव व्यवहारः पदाश्रयः। लोके शास्त्रे च कार्यार्थं विभागेनैव कल्पितः॥ A similar idea is expressed in the Vṛtti on VP 2/344 (283), which I do not discuss here because of textual issues. See also section 4.5.

their backgrounds, and views propounded by earlier teachers concerning this topic diverge.⁹⁴

§§3.7.3. Such differences of analysis are most glaring in connection with constituents of padas and their meanings. Probably the most famous example involves the verb *as/s* 'be' (pres. *as-ti*, *s-taḥ*, *s-anti*; imperf. *ās-īt*, *ās-tām*, *ās-an*). In Pāṇini's system, the base is posited as *as*, and the vowel of the stem is deleted when *sārvadhātuka* affixes marked with *k* or *ñ* follow.⁹⁵ According to certain grammarians, whom commentators identify as Āpiśali and his followers, however, the base posited is *s*. Forms with *as*, *ās* are now accounted by introducing initial augments to *s* or letting these base forms replace *s*.⁹⁶ Bhartṛhari remarks on a comparable pair *yaj* (e.g. 3sg. pres. act. *yajati*), *ij* (e.g. 3sg. pres. pass. *ijyate*) 'venerate, perform a ritual act' and says the following.⁹⁷ *ij* and *yaj* are distinct verbal bases, restricted each to its own domain but are taught by particular grammarians in a particular manner. For the way of conveying the facts is varied. According to Puṇyarāja's commentary, there are two ways of describing the facts in addition to simply saying that *ij* and *yaj* are distinct independent entities. Some grammarian assumes *yaj* is the basic item and accounts for *ij* by having *samprasāraṇa* substitution apply before affixes marked with *k*.⁹⁸ Some other

⁹⁴ VP 2.116: अविकल्पेऽपि वाक्यार्थे विकल्पा भावनाश्रयाः। अत्राधिकरणे वादाः पूर्वेषां बहुधा गताः॥ I have adopted the reading *avikalpe* 'pi vākyaṛthe for the first pāda in accordance with what Puṇyarāja assumes as the text; this is also the reading in K.A. Subramania Iyer's and Raghunātha Sharma's editions. Rau's edition has *avikalpitavākyaṛthe*. The import is the same under either reading: *avikalpe* 'pi vākyaṛthe 'even though a sentence meaning lacks any division due to mental construction', *avikalpitavākyaṛthe* 'a sentence meaning being such that it is not divided through mental construction.' Puṇyarāja glosses *vikalpa-* with *vibhāga-* 'division', noting that it is proper to accept that a sentence meaning is always devoid of division. He goes on to say one should consider that those divisions which are attributed to a sentence meaning even though it has this essential characteristic are due to human beings, based on the impressions of various grammars (or ontology (*vastuānupātinaḥ* ['following what is real'])), so that the meaning of a sentence is properly only unitary. The second half of the verse is meant to convey the following. The doctrines propounded by earlier teachers diverge, and the persons who divide sentence meanings into constituents do this not because there is some true semantic division but because their minds are influenced by the traces of what they have absorbed from the works of these earlier teachers. Hence, which one should be subject to inquiry? That is, these views are all equally just constructs. VPP 2.116 (57/224): वाक्यार्थोऽविकल्प एव निर्विभाग एवाभ्यनुगन्तुं युक्तः। तस्मिंश्च तथाभूतेऽपि येऽमी विकल्पास्ते पुरुषाणामनेकशास्त्रभावनाश्रया बोद्धव्या न वस्त्वनुपातिन इति तद्वाक्यार्थ एक एव युक्तः। एतदेव प्रतिपादयितुमाह—अत्राधिकरणे वादाः पूर्वेषां बहुधा गताः। अस्मिन्नधिकरणे विचारस्थाने पूर्वेषामाचार्याणां प्रवादा बहुधा गताः। शास्त्रसंस्कारवासितचेतसां तेषामिति कस्य पर्यनुयोगः क्रियते।

⁹⁵ A 6.4.111: शनसोरल्लोपः ।

⁹⁶ See PWT I: 523-524, 541-542.

⁹⁷ VP 3.178: भिन्नाविजियजी धातू नियतौ विषयान्तरे । कैश्चित्कथञ्चिदुद्दिष्टौ चित्रं हि प्रतिपादनम् ॥

⁹⁸ *yaj* → *iaj* → *ij*; this is Pāṇini's procedure (see PWT I: 529-530).

grammarian posits basic *ij* and lets *yaj* replace this before particular affixes.⁹⁹ The Vṛtti on VP 2.178 explains that, although the base in question is taught in the grammar by adopting a general basic form, *ij*, which occurs specifically before affixes marked with *k*, is an element distinct from *yaj*. Similarly, *s*, as in *s-tah*, *s-anti*, is totally distinct from *as*, with a domain of its own. Bhartṛhari also makes an important remark concerning the status of posited verbal bases. All this, he says, is in approximation to what is ultimately true (*paramārthapratiṛūpakam*) but not ultimately real; it is a view (*darśanam*) that pertains solely (*eva*) to talking about language (*vyāvahārikam*) in a grammar. For, he emphasizes, from the ultimate point of view there is no root-form, but a way of talking about what is real in grammar is created by some, and this involves such base forms.¹⁰⁰

That is, verbal bases such as *yaj* or *as* are merely constructs which grammarians abstract from elements actually used in everyday discourse, such as *yajati*, *asti*, and it is only the latter to which one can attribute true status.

§§3.7.4. Bhartṛhari also remarks on the fact that one cannot maintain absolutely a division of constituent meanings attributed to bases and affixes. Consider the terms *tāvat-* (nom. sg. masc. *tāvān*) 'that much', *kiyat-* (*kiyān*) 'how much?', *iyat-* (*iyān*) 'this much'. In Pāṇini's system, *tāvat-* is derived by introducing the taddhita affix *vatup* after a pada *tad-s*, where *tad* 'that' is used with reference to a measure (*parimāṇa*), to form a derivate signifying something whose measure is that:¹⁰¹ *tad-s-vat* → *tad-vat*¹⁰² → *tā-*

⁹⁹ VPP 2.178 (75/288-289): अन्यो यजिरन्य इजिरिति नियतौ बोद्धव्यौ इजिः कित्येव यजिस्तु तदितरस्मिन्निति। आचार्यैः पुनः क्वचिद्भेदाश्रयेण निर्दिष्टौ क्वचिदभेदेनेति प्रतिपादयितुमाह कैश्चिदित्यादि। कश्चिद्यजेः किति सम्प्रसारणं शास्ति इष्टः इष्टा इति। तृजादौ तस्य तन्नेच्छति। कश्चिदिजिमेवोपदिशति तस्य तृजादौ यादेशं विदधातीति प्रतिपादनवैचित्र्यम्। Although Puṇyārāja mentions that some teachers list *ij* and *yaj* as distinct bases, I do not know of any non-Pāṇinian grammar that proceeds in this way. Note that Puṇyārāja uses *nirदिष्टौ* and *upadiśati* while commenting on a text that contains *uddiṣṭau*. It is reasonable to conclude that in this context he considers these synonymous. This value of *uddiṣ* is comparable to the value of *uddeśa* in the triad *uddeśa* (merely stating an object), *lakṣaṇa* (the property that characterizes the object in question), and *parīkṣā* (examining the characterized object) as given, for example in the introductory Bhāṣya on NS 1.1.3 (8). Patañjali mentions (Bh. I.259.17-23/II.198-199 [on A 1.3.2]) a distinction between *upadeśa* and *uddeśa*: the latter refers to instruction about something directly, as when one has a person touch and look at a cow to show that person what a cow is, the former to a descriptive teaching such that someone is taught what someone or something is by means of properties or constituent elements.

¹⁰⁰ VPVṛ. 2.178 (231/288): ... अर्थानुगमसामान्ये सत्यपि शास्त्रे च स्वरूपसामान्यपरिग्रहणोपदेशो कृतेऽपि यजेरन्य एवेजिः किद्विषयः अस्तेष्टान्यदेव समात्रं स्तः सन्तीत्यन्यदेव विशिष्टविषयम् । एतदपि च सर्वं परमार्थप्रतिरूपकं व्यावहारिकमेव दर्शनम् । न हि धातुरूपं परमार्थेन किञ्चिद्विद्यते । व्यवहारस्तु कैश्चित्कियते । केचिदस्तिं सकारमातिष्ठन्ते । तस्य त्वकारागमो विषयविशेषे तैर्विधीयते । As can be seen, the Vṛtti also mentions the view that a base *s* is posited by some, who account for *as* by introducing an augment *a*.

¹⁰¹ A 5.2.39: यत्तदेतेभ्यः परिमाणे वतुप् (तदस्य 36)

¹⁰² A 2.4.7: सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोः (लुक् 58)

¹⁰³ A 6.3.91: आ सर्वनाम्नः (दृग्दृशवतुषु 89)

vat.¹⁰³ Similarly, *kiyat-* and *iyat* are derived as follows: *kim-s-vat* ... → *kim-ghat*¹⁰⁴ → *kim-iyat*¹⁰⁵ → *kī-iyat*,¹⁰⁶ → *k-iyat*,¹⁰⁷ *idam-s-vat* ... → *idam-ghat* (see note 104) → *idam-iyat* (see note 105) → *i-iyat* (see note 106) → *-iyat* (see note 107). *tāvat* and *kiyat* are bipartite items, divisible into a pronominal base — though modified — and an affix, but *iyat*, which is semantically parallel to these, contains no base. In the same vein, consider *as-ti*, *ās-it* and *han-ti* 'kills', *ahan* 'killed'. Both *as-ti* and *han-ti* are bipartite, consisting of a base and a verbal ending, and *ās-it* also contains a verb ending, though augmented with *ī*.¹⁰⁸ *ahan*, on the other hand, consists simply of the verbal base *han* augmented with initial *a*. In Pāṇini's derivational system, the ending *t* is replaced by zero:¹⁰⁹ *ahan-t* → *ahan*. Again, consider *pac-a-ti* '... cooks, is cooking', *pac-anti* 'cook, are cooking'. The singular form *pac-a-ti* is tripartite, with a verb base followed by two affixes. The plural *pac-anti* does not contain two overt affixes, but in Pāṇini's system *pac-anti* is indeed derived from *pac-a-anti*, with two affixes; *-a-* and the immediately following *a-* of *anti* are both replaced by the latter.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, *at-ti* 'eats, is eating' and *juhoti* 'offers an oblation' are bipartite. Thus, the meaning ('agent') which the two affixes *śap* and *anti* signify concurrently in *pacanti* is signified by a single affix in *atti* and *juhuti*. In connection with such forms, the Vākyapadiya aptly remarks:¹¹¹ in the grammar, at times a base meaning is signified by an affix, with the base gone, and at times a single affix signifies the meaning which two separate affixes signify elsewhere; and a verb base alone at times signifies that meaning, without the two affixes in question.

Further, grammarians differ concerning the distribution of constituent meanings. Meanings which in one grammatical tradition (*anvākhyānasmṛtau* 'explanatory smṛti') are considered to pertain to affixes and are stated as the condition for introducing these are said in another tradition to be base meanings.¹¹²

§§3.7.5. The position taken in the Vākyapadiya concerning the status of bases and affixes abstracted from words and words abstracted from sentences

¹⁰⁴ A 5.2.40: किमिदम्यां वो घः।

¹⁰⁵ A 7.1.2: आयनेयीनीयियः फढखछघाम्प्रत्ययादीनाम्।

¹⁰⁶ A 6.3.90: इदङ्कमोरीशकी (दृग्दृशवतुषु 89)

¹⁰⁷ A 6.4.148: यस्येति च (तद्धिते 144 लोपः 147)

¹⁰⁸ A 7.3.96: अस्तिसिचोऽपृक्ते (ईदृ 93)

¹⁰⁹ A 6.1.68: हल्ङ्याभ्यो दीर्घात्सुतिस्यपृक्तं हल् (लोपः 66)

¹¹⁰ A 6.1.97: अतो गुणे (अपदान्तात् 96 पररूपम् 94 एकः पूर्वपरयोः 84)

¹¹¹ VP 2.229-230: शास्त्रे क्वचित्प्रकृत्यर्थः प्रत्ययेनाभिधीयते । प्रकृतौ विनिवृत्तायां प्रत्ययार्थश्च धातुभिः ॥ यमर्थमाह तुर्भिन्नौ प्रत्ययावेक एव तम् । क्वचिदाह पचन्तीति धातुस्ताभ्यां विना क्वचित् ॥

¹¹² VP 2.231: अन्वाख्यानस्मृतौ ये च प्रत्ययार्था निबन्धनम् । निर्दिष्टे प्रकृत्यर्था स्मृत्यन्तर उदाहृताः॥

is well summarized in the Vṛtti on VP 1.24-26,¹¹³ which makes the following major points.

(a) An abstracted constituent meaning is totally fused¹¹⁴ in a single unit, from which it is abstracted in a guise that is posited through inference, a construct that is inferred,¹¹⁵ so that its discrimination from other constituents is merely posited. For this segregated entity has a form that is beyond normal usage.¹¹⁶

(b) Moreover, this abstracted posited constituent meaning¹¹⁷ is itself generally settled upon through a conjectural assumption, reflecting one's understanding according to a given tradition, as a result of the impressions left by the repeated exposure to such teaching.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ VPVṛ. 65.1-6/57-58: (a) तत्रापोद्धारपदार्थो नामात्यन्तसंसृष्टः संसर्गादिनुमेयेन परिकल्पितेन रूपेण प्रकृतविवेकः सन्नपोद्ध्यते। प्रविविक्तस्य हि तस्य वस्तुनो व्यवहारातीतं रूपम्। (b) तनु स्वप्रत्ययानुकारेण यथागमं भावनाभ्यासवशादुत्प्रेक्षया व्यवस्थाप्यते। (c) तथैव चाप्रविभागे शब्दात्मनि कार्यार्थमन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां रूपसमनुगमकल्पनया समुदायादपोद्धृतानां शब्दानामभिधेयत्वेनाश्रीयते। 72.4-73.7/66-67: (d) अपोद्धारो हि शास्त्रव्यवहारार्थं समुदायात्संसृष्टायाः कस्याद्धिदर्थमात्रायाः क्रियमाणे तं तमवधिं प्रति निमित्तत्वेनार्थानां पुरुषाधीनो विकल्पभेदः सम्भवति। कथमिदं विज्ञायते हेतुमत्यभिधेये णिज्भवति आहोस्विद्धेतुमति यो धातुर्वर्तत इति हेतुमति वर्तमानादिति। तथा स्त्रियामिति किं स्त्र्यर्थाभिधाने टाबादयः स्त्र्यर्थवृत्तेः प्रातिपदिकात्स्वार्थं वेति। तथा नञिति किम्प्रधानोऽयं समास इति। न ह्येते विकल्पा लौकिकाः समुदायार्थं हि लौकिके व्यभिचाराभावात्। The passages alluded to are from the Mahābhāṣya on A 3.1.26: हेतुमति च (Bh. II.31.7-8/III.80: कथमिदं विज्ञायते हेतुमत्यभिधेये णिज्भवति आहोस्विद्धेतुमति यो धातुर्वर्तत इति।), A 4.1.3.: स्त्रियाम् (Bh. II.198.20-199.22./III.452-455; II.199.20-22/455: नैवं विज्ञायते स्त्रियामभिधेयायामिति नापि स्त्रीसमानाधिकरणादिति। कथं तर्हि। स्त्रियां यत्प्रातिपदिकं वर्तते तस्माट्टाबादयो भवन्ति। कस्मिन्नर्थे। स्वार्थे।), A 2.2.6: नञ् (Bh. I.410.8/II.666: किम्प्रधानोऽयं समासः।)।

¹¹⁴ *atyantasamsṛṣṭaḥ*. The Paddhati (VPPad. 1.24-26 [64.26-65.8]) remarks that *atyanta* 'absolute' is used to preclude a complex unit made up of previously existing parts: विभागपूर्वकसंसर्गनिषेधायान्तग्रहणम्।

¹¹⁵ The constituent meaning is merely assumed to be associated with a part of a larger unit that is thought to be the same as an element heard elsewhere. In reality, a sentence or a word — depending on what higher unit one is considering — is an indivisible whole. The Paddhati remarks that *anumeyena* and *kalpitena* (its reading, though the Vṛtti has *parikalpitena*) are used to bring this out. First, Vṛṣabhadeva notes that the Vṛtti says *anumeyena* because the entity from which a constituent meaning is abstracted is without parts, so that one can rightly ask how it is possible to separate constituents: one only infers parts through reasoning by *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Moreover, one might ask how *anvaya* and *vyatireka* could apply with respect to an entity that has no parts, so that Bharṭṛhari also says *kalpitena*, thereby showing that *anvaya* and *vyatireka* themselves are here not real but assumed. VPPad. 1.24-26 (65.10-12): कथं निरवयवात्पृथक्कियेत्याह अनुमेयेनेति। अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां भागानुमानात्। तावैव निरवयवे कथमित्याह कल्पितेनेति। असत्यतामन्वयव्यतिरेकयोराह।

¹¹⁶ *vyavahārātītam*. By *vyavahāra*, Bharṭṛhari here intends normal verbal interchange, as is noted by Vṛṣabhadeva, who adds that such interchange is carried out solely by means of meanings that are inextricably fused in unitary utterances. VPPad. 1.24-26 (65.15-16): यतः प्रविभक्तैः पदार्थैर्न प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिलक्षणो व्यवहारोऽस्यास्ति अपि तु संसृष्टैरेवेति।

¹¹⁷ Syntactically, *tal* ('that') which begins (b) is coreferential with the final term *rūpam* ('form') of (a), as Vṛṣabhadeva points out: VPPad. 1.24-26 (65.16): तत्त्विति कल्पितं रूपम्।

¹¹⁸ Vṛṣabhadeva explains that one effects a division following one's understanding, and that the understanding one has is based on the tradition to which one has been exposed. Thus, one grammarian will understand a particular meaning distribution based on the grammatical

(c) The extraction of constituent meanings is inextricably connected with the extraction of speech units which signify these meanings, and this analysis proceeds in a comparable manner for a speech unit which in reality has no divisions. In order to carry out what is done in grammar, such constituent speech units are abstracted from a whole through reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka under the assumption that the putative segment is identical with a putative segment heard elsewhere with the same meaning. The meaning abstracted¹¹⁹ is then used as the significand of these abstracted speech units.

(d) When the abstraction from a whole of a certain (*kasyāścīt*) meaning part fused in that whole is being carried out in order to speak about the language in a grammar, there is a possible difference of conceptualization concerning the particular limit with respect to which various meanings should serve as conditions for operations, but this difference is based on human beings, not on the language. Thus, concerning A 3.1.26 (see note 113), Patañjali asks how this sūtra should be interpreted: should it provide that the affix *ṇic* is introduced after a verbal base on condition that an action which has a causal agent (*hetumati*) is to be signified (*abhidheye*) or that this affix is introduced after a base which itself occurs in the meaning of an action with a causal agent? Under the first alternative, *ṇic* signifies causation, but under the second alternative, the verb itself signifies this. Similarly, is A 4.1.3. (see note 113) to be interpreted as providing that the affixes *tāp* and so on provided for by subsequent sūtras are introduced after nominal bases if the meaning 'feminine' is to be signified or after such bases as occur in the feminine, so that these affixes are introduced redundantly. Again, Patañjali asks what the principal meaning is for a negative compound formed by A 2.2.6. (see note 113). All such differences depend on human analysts, grammarians, just as grammarians differ concerning whether endings that follow nominals signify number and so on or whether all these meanings are to be considered signified by a nominal itself.¹²⁰

tradition to which he has been exposed, another grammarian a different distribution based on a distinct tradition. Repeated exposure to such teachings leaves impressions (*bhāvanā*) which affect how one performs an analysis. VPPād. 1.24-26 (65.17-21): कुत उत्प्रेक्षेत्याह स्वप्रत्ययानुकारेणेति। स्वान्प्रत्ययानुगच्छन्तो विभागं कुर्वन्ति। तथा प्रत्ययानां मूलमाह यथागममिति। तं तमागममाश्रित्य। भावनाभ्यासवशादिति। आगमतः प्राप्तस्यार्थस्याभ्यासाद् भावनाभिप्राप्तिः। एतदाह तं तमागममाश्रित्य तदभ्यासात्स्वयं प्रत्ययमनुगच्छन्त उत्प्रेक्षया व्यवस्थापयन्तीति।

¹¹⁹ Although Bhartṛhari here speaks of speech units (*śabdānām* [gen. pl.]) that are abstracted (*apoddhṛtānām*), the singular *āśrīyate* is best taken as linked with *rūpam* (see note 117).

¹²⁰ This issue, as well as differences concerning the distribution of meanings signified by verb forms are mentioned subsequently in the Vṛtti (VPVṛ. 1.24-26 [73.8-74.4/67-68]). The same issues come up again in the Vākyapadīya proper and earlier, in the Mahābhāṣya, but a discussion of these is beyond the scope of the present paper.

These differences in conceptualizing how sentences, words, sentential meanings and others are made up of constituent terms and their meanings do not pertain to the world of everyday usage. Here the semantic unit that has a fixed, unwavering character is the single qualified sentence-meaning, grasped through a sentence, namely an action,¹²¹ which has posited for it a division into constituents. This can be analytically conveyed by a certain means, namely through grasping separate word meanings.¹²²

§§3.7.6. Adopting various constituent segments and meanings through analysis is, as has been noted, a means towards describing larger whole units. Bharṭṛhari not only emphasises that there is no necessarily settled limitation with regard to such means¹²³ — which is to be expected in view of there being different grammatical traditions — he also declares unequivocally that only ignorance is reflected (*upavarnyate* ['is described']) in various works through different procedures of derivation.¹²⁴ He goes so far as to say that such means are to be considered deceptions for inexperienced persons (*bālānām* ['children']) seeking instruction, then emphasizes that these are only means to an end: one does remain for a time on the untrue path, but after staying on this path, one leaves it and, through effort, reaches what is true.¹²⁵

Thus, the descriptive means used in grammar are just that, only means which are to be left behind once one has reached the desired goal of knowing the whole units described.¹²⁶ This indeterminacy of descriptions is nicely illustrated by two derivations Kātyāyana proposes¹²⁷ to account for

¹²¹ That is, an action qualified by its participants is the single unified meaning of a normal utterance.

¹²² VPVṛ. 1.24-26 (67.1-2/60): स्थितलक्षणस्तु वाक्यरूपोपग्रहः कल्पितोद्देशविभागो विशिष्ट एकः क्रियात्मा विच्छिन्नपदार्थग्रहणोपायप्रतिपाद्यः ... Bharṭṛhari also acknowledges that in everyday usage too, speakers break down utterances into constituent words; see section 4.5.

¹²³ VP 2.38cd: उपायानां च नियमो नावश्यमवतिष्ठते ॥

¹²⁴ VP 2.33ab: शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते। I have used 'works' to render *śāstreṣu*, although the specific context is works of grammar, because the Vṛtti does not limit the reference to grammar. This accords also with the way this *kārikā* is cited in the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* (DNC 242). I cannot enter into further details concerning this point or the second half of the verse.

¹²⁵ VP 2.238: उपायाः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामुपलापनाः । असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ॥

¹²⁶ VP 2.38ab: उपादायापि ये हेयास्तानुपायान्प्रचक्षते । 'Those are called 'means' which, although they are taken on to begin with, are to be abandoned.' Puṇyārāja captures the essentials when he remarks that a grammar is a means with respect to the full knowledge of speech units; once these are known, the means no longer has a use, since the intended purpose has been achieved, so that it is abandoned. VPP 2.38 (18/87-88): शास्त्रमुपायः शब्दपरिज्ञाने । ज्ञातेषु तेषु प्रयोजनसम्पत्तेरनुपयोग इति तस्य परित्यागः । It is fairly obvious that VP 2.38 assumes an etymological connection between *upāya* and *upā-dā*, but this need not be considered here.

¹²⁷ 3.1.96 vt. 2-3: वसेस्तव्यत्कर्तरि णिञ्च। तद्धितो वा ।

the term *vāstavya* ('dweller, resident'): (a) the *kr̥tya* suffix *tavyat* is introduced after the verbal base *vas* ('dwell'), but instead of signifying an object,¹²⁸ this suffix is now introduced on condition that an agent is to be signified. Thus, *vāstavya* refers to someone who dwells (*vasati*) in a place. In order to account for the *-ā-* of *vāstavya*, moreover, *tavyat* is also considered to be marked with *ṇ*, so that the penultimate *a* of *vas* is replaced by the corresponding *vṛddhi* vowel *ā*.¹²⁹ (b) Alternatively, the *taddhita* affix *yat* is introduced after a *pada* consisting of *vāstu* ('dwelling') and a locative ending to form a derivate meaning 'located in'; *vāstavya* is equivalent to *vāstuni bhavaḥ*.¹³⁰ In his commentary on the *Bhāṣya* to A 3.1.94, Kaiyaṭa aptly cites VP 2.38 as stating the principle that applies in such an instance.¹³¹

§§3.7.7. Nevertheless, a grammarian has no other choice but to proceed in this analytic manner. The reason is straightforward and has been pointed out by Pāṇinīyas on various occasions. Thus, commenting on V P 3.1.1. (see note 83), Helārāja notes why the abstraction of constituent words from a sentence, which is actually an indivisible unit,¹³² is necessary. It is not possible in a grammar to explain sentences in their true characteristic guise of indivisible units signifying a unitary meaning, since they are innumerable, so that this explanation succeeds by means of abstracted words, which appear to be similar from utterance to utterance.¹³³ Similarly, commenting on VP 2.13c (see note 73), Bhartṛhari remarks as follows.¹³⁴ There is a single aim, acquiring knowledge of an undivided meaning and speech unit. This is associated either with a brief procedure

¹²⁸ A 3.4.70: तयोरेव कृत्यक्तखलर्थाः ।

¹²⁹ A 7.2.116: अत उपधायाः (जिति 115 वृद्धिः 114) Bh. 3.1.96 (II.81.20/III.201): वसेस्तव्यत्कर्तारि वक्तव्यः । णिञ्चासौ भवतीति वक्तव्यम् । वसतीति वास्तव्यः ।

¹³⁰ A 4.3.54: दिगादिभ्यो यत् (तत्र भवः 53) Bh. 3.1.96 (II.81.22/III.201): तद्धितो वा पुनरेष भविष्यति । वास्तुनि भवो वास्तव्यः ।

¹³¹ Pr. III.201/141b: नित्यानां शब्दानां यथाकथञ्चिदन्वाख्यानं कर्तव्यमिति मन्यते । यथोक्तम् उपादायापि ये हेयास्तानुपायान्प्रचक्षते । उपायानां च नियमो नावश्यमवतिष्ठत इति ।

¹³² This is the view maintained ultimately by Bhartṛhari, but there are also grammarians who operate with an indivisible word as the highest unit; see section 4.4.

¹³³ VPH 3.1.1 (2.4-5/3): आनन्त्याद्धि वाक्यानां स्वालक्षण्येनाशक्या व्युत्पत्तिः कर्तुमिति सदृशपदद्वारा तदुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः । Similarly, VPH 3.7.3 (235.1/96): न तु वाक्यस्यानन्त्यात्साक्षादन्वाख्यानं युज्यते । There is another reason: learners of the language could not possibly acquire a knowledge of the relation between every possible sentence and its meaning; see section 4.5.

¹³⁴ VPVṛ. 2.13 (198/35): भेदग्रहणं हि तस्यार्थात्मनः शब्दात्मनश्चाभिन्नस्य प्रतिपत्तिद्वारम् । पदप्रतिपत्तिपूर्विका हि सामान्यविशेषावग्रहणोपाया लघुप्रक्रमा विभागेनाविभक्तस्य प्रतिपत्तिः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिप्रतिपत्तिवत् । गुरुप्रक्रमा त्वत्र संसृष्टरूपस्य प्रतिपत्तिरविभागेन प्रतिपदं पाठवत् । कुशलस्तु प्रतिपत्ता सर्वमेव भेदमभेदानतिक्रमेण पश्यति । I have cited the text with *pratipadam pāṭhaval*, as in Raghunātha Sharma's and Akujkar's editions; K. A. Subramania Iyer's edition has *pratipade pāṭhaval*. The reading with the *avyayībhāva* *pratipadam* ('word-for-word') makes more immediate sense than the locative *pratipade*. The *Mahābhāṣya* text to which implicit allusion is made (Bh. I.5.23-6.7/I.24-25) has *pratipadapāṭhaḥ* ('word-for-word recitation').

or a prolix procedure. The former involves as a means one's grasping words both in general — not involving any particular context — and in particular — involving a specific utterance. Under the latter, there is an acquisition of a fused entity as a whole. The former is comparable to acquiring the knowledge of words and their meanings through the means of constituent bases, affixes and such along with their meanings, while the latter is comparable to having grammar be a mere recitation of all correct speech units. Thus, grasping divided constituents is simply a means of acquiring the knowledge of an impartite speech unit and its equally impartite meaning. An adept student see that all division does not transcend the actual impartite nature of units.

In Bhartṛhari's opinion, the same point was made much earlier, by Yāska. The Nirukta reports the opinion of Audumbarāyaṇa, according to whom the quadripartite division of words (see note 84) is not possible because an utterance always occurs in the indriya.¹³⁵ Bhartṛhari alludes to a view shared by Vārtākṣa and Audumbarāyaṇa.¹³⁶ Seeing that it is a sentence that is always located in the intellect and that a sentence bears a relation with a meaning in everyday usage, these scholars say that the quadripartite division does not apply. As interpreted by Puṇyarāja,¹³⁷ the *kārikā* says the following. Seeing that what occurs in the intellect of a hearer is always an impartite sentence and that this itself bears a relation with a meaning that is a *pratibhā* ('flash'), the two teachers cited say that the supposition of a separate *pada* and its word meaning is absolutely not justified.¹³⁸ In the next *kārikā* (see section 3.7.2 with note 93) Bhartṛhari states what advantages there are to speaking about sentences in a manner that is based on words absolutely distinct from each other, though this be an analytic construct. This way of describing for the sake of operations to be carried out is adopted because it is encompassing and brief. That is, this allows one

¹³⁵ Nir. 1.1-2 (29): इन्द्रियनित्यं वचनमौदुम्बरायणः। तत्र चतुष्ट्वं नोपपद्यते । Commentators on the Nirukta consider that *indriya* refers to an organ, either the speech organ (*vāgindriya*) of a speaker alone (NirSM I.13) or both this and the aural faculty (*śrotrendriya*) of a hearer (NirD I.20. 12-13). As will be seen below, Bhartṛhari considers the *indriya* in question to be the intellect (*buddhi*). I cannot enter here into the interpretations given by commentators on Yāska, both ancient and modern.

¹³⁶ VP 2.344/342: वाक्यस्य बुद्धौ नित्यत्वमर्थयोगं च लौकिकम् । दृष्ट्वा चतुष्ट्वं नास्तीति वार्ताक्षौदुम्बरायणौ ॥

¹³⁷ VPP 2.342 (140/452): वाक्यस्याखण्डस्य बुद्धौ प्रतिपत्तुबुद्धौ नित्यत्वं दृष्ट्वा तथा तस्यैवार्थेन प्रतिभालक्षणेन योगं सम्बन्धं दृष्ट्वा यदेतत्पदपरिकल्पनं पदार्थपरिकल्पनं च तन्नास्त्येव नैवोपपद्यत इत्याचार्यावाहतुः।

¹³⁸ As emended (correctly, in any opinion) by Aklujkar in his electronic text, the Vṛtti on VP 2.342 (p. 283 of K. A. Subramania Iyer's edition) has the same thrust: ... बुद्धीन्द्रिये संप्रत्ययलक्षणे (K.A.S.I. सुप्रत्ययलक्षणे) संसृष्टार्थप्रत्ययमर्शिनि वाक्यमेव स्वमर्थं (K.A.S.I. समर्थं) सन्निवेशयति। 'An utterance alone produces (*sanniveśayati* ['makes to enter']) its meaning in the organ of intellect, whose character is to cognize (and) which considers a fused meaning.'

to account for any number of combinations of words in sentences in a generalized manner.

§§3.7.8. By the same token, of course, instead of listing all the words of sets such as *puruṣaḥ*, *puruṣau*, *puruṣāḥ*, *puruṣam*, and so on, it is incumbent on a grammarian to abstract from such elements affixes which can occur with any number of bases, so that he has to operate with constituents of words and meanings assigned to these also.

Of course, once this procedure is adopted, it opens the doors to serious disagreements among grammarians concerning possible analyses and meaning assignments (see section §§3.7.3).

4. The background

Although Bhartṛhari is probably original in maintaining that an indivisible sentence — a *vākyasphoṭa* — alone is the true signifying unit, much of what he says in support of this position has well documented antecedents.

§4.1. Consider some aspects of Vedic *padapāṭhas*. Compound words of the *saṃhitāpāṭha* are usually split into constituents. For example, corresponding to *mitadrūḥ* of the *Ṛgveda saṃhitāpāṭha*, the *padapāṭha* has *mita-drūḥ*.¹³⁹ On the other hand, the *padapāṭha* does not split into constituent *padas* the nominative plural of *haridrū-*, *haridrāvah*, although it does split the preceding word *hariṣācāḥ* into constituents.¹⁴⁰ This is one of several examples given in the *Vṛtti* on VP 2.13c. Continuing the presentation considered earlier (see note 73 and section §§3.7.7 with note 134), Bhartṛhari says as follows.¹⁴¹ In a technical work (*śāstre*) differences in derivational procedure (*prakriyābhedaḥ*) determine word division. Several examples are given, among them the ones noted above. Bhartṛhari not only remarks that *mitadrūḥ* is split into constituents and *haridrūḥ* is not, he also notes that the latter has two possible analyses: *harit-rava-*, *hari-drava-*.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ RV 4.6.5a: परि त्मना मितद्रुः इति होतुः, *padapāṭha*: परि। त्मना। मितद्रुः। इति। होता।; RV 7.7.1d: त्मना देवेषु विविदे मितद्रुः।, *padapāṭha* त्मना। देवेषु। विविदे। मितद्रुः। *Sāyaṇa* interprets the first constituent *mita-* as derived from different bases *mā* and *mi*, since he glosses *mitadrūḥ* of the respective passages as *parimitagatiḥ* ('of measured gait') (मितद्रुः परिमितगतिः सन्) and *dagdhadrumaḥ* ('by whom trees have been burned') (मितद्रुः दग्धद्रुमोऽग्निरिव).

¹⁴⁰ RV 10.94.12c: अजुर्यासो हरिषाचो हरिद्रवः, *padapāṭha* अजुर्यासः। हरिऽसाचः। हरिद्रवः।

¹⁴¹ VPVṛ. 2.13 (198/35-36): प्रक्रियाभेदास्तु शास्त्रे विभागनिबन्धनम्। तथा हि हरिद्रुर्मितद्रुर्दुर्दृशो दुस्तर इत्यत्र मितद्रुनवगृह्यो हरिद्रुनवगृह्यः। तत्र विभागे प्रक्रिया भिद्यते हरिद्रुर्हरितरवो हरिद्रव इति वा। तथा दुस्तर इत्यपि तरतेस्तृणातेर्वा। अतश्च विभागे भिद्यमानायां प्रक्रियायामनवग्रहः।

¹⁴² In the *Pradīpa* on the *Bhāṣya* ad A 3.1.109 (III.207/III.145b: तदुक्तम् हरिद्रुनवगृह्यत इति। हरिद्रुर्नित्यत्र किं हरिशब्द इकारान्तः अथ हरित्शब्दस्तकारान्त इति सन्देहात्।), *Kaiyaṭa* alludes to this *Vṛtti* passage and says no break is made because of the doubt whether the first constituent should be *harit-* or *harit-*.

Accordingly, the derivational procedure is ambiguous if the item itself is to be divided. For this reason, no word division is made in the padapāṭha.¹⁴³

The same reasoning is given in prātiśākhya to account for certain terms left undivided in padapāṭhas. Consider two examples: *uddraḥ* ('a particular aquatic animal'¹⁴⁴) and *uttambhānam* ('prop') in the Vājasaneyisaṁhitā, the padapāṭha to which leaves both terms undivided.¹⁴⁵ The Vājasaneyiprātiśākhya gives reasons for this. Though both items are indeed recognized as composite, so that a disjunction would apply between constituents,¹⁴⁶ the terms in question are included among items for which disjunction is disallowed. *uddraḥ* is left undivided on account of doubt concerning its constituents.¹⁴⁷ Uvaṭa explains that *uddra-* could be a derivate consisting of the preverb *ut* and a kṛdanta derivate from either of the verbal bases *dru* ('run') or *rā* ('give').¹⁴⁸ *uttambhana-* is part of a group of composite terms for which disjunction is also disallowed because of doubt, only now the doubt concerns the initial sound.¹⁴⁹ As commentators recognized, *uttambhana-* is derived from the preverb *ud* and the base *stambh* ('prop'). If, then, the padapāṭha simply gave an analytic sequence *ut-tambhānam* comparable to *-ut-tarāṇāya* ('upward crossing'),¹⁵⁰ it would leave obscure the underlying analysis, possibly implying a base *tambh*. If, on the other hand, the padapāṭha gave *ut-stambhānam*, it would leave in doubt the procedure for arriving at *uttambhānam*, which the prātiśākhya does not specify. As Uvaṭa notes,¹⁵¹ one could let the *s-* of *stambhana-* be replaced by

¹⁴³ The same reasoning applies for the other examples given in the Vṛtti. I cannot discuss these in detail here. See note 148.

¹⁴⁴ According to Mahīdhara and Uvaṭa in their commentaries on VS 24.37, it is a crab (*karkaṭa*).

¹⁴⁵ VS 24.37: ... अपामुद्गो ..., padapāṭha अपाम्। उद्गः । VS 4.36: व्वरुणस्योत्तम्भनमसि ..., padapāṭha व्वरुणस्य। उत्तम्भनम्। असि।

¹⁴⁶ VPr. 5.1: समासेऽवग्रहो ह्रस्वसमकालः। The disjoining pause has the duration equivalent to that of a short vowel, that is, of one mora.

¹⁴⁷ VPr. 5.34: पाङ्त्रानुद्गोऽब्राय संशयात् (नावग्रहः 24)

¹⁴⁸ VPrU 5.34: तथा उद्गः उत् ऊर्ध्वं द्रवतीति उद्गः। उल्हाब्दः पूर्वपदं द्रवतेरुत्तरपदम्। यद्वा उत् रातीति उद्गः। उत् पूर्वपदं रातेरुत्तरपदम्। Anantabhaṭṭa explains similarly. This example is thus similar to *dustara-* (*duṣṭara-*) given in the Vṛtti on VP 2.13 (note 141), where Bharṭṛhari explains that *-lara* can be a derivate from *lṛ* of the bhvādi or kryādi class (*larati*, *lṛṇāti*).

¹⁴⁹ VPr. 5.38: उत्तम्भनादीन्यादिसंशयात् (नावग्रहः 24)

¹⁵⁰ VS 16.42: ... नमः प्रतरणाय चोत्तरणाय च, padapāṭha ... प्रतरणायेतिप्र तरणाय। उत्तरणायेत्युत्तरणाय।

¹⁵¹ VPrU 5.38: एतानि त्रीणि पदान्युदाहरणान्युत्पूर्वपदानि। स्तम्भेत्युत्तरपदं प्रथममुदाहरणम्। तिष्ठत्युत्तरपदे उत्तरे। तत्र उदः स्थास्तम्भोः पूर्वस्येति पाणिनिः पूर्वरूपतां विदधाति। अन्ये तु सकारलोपं विदधति। अत उत्तरपदस्यादिसंशयादेतानि पदानि नावगृह्यन्ते। The other two examples Uvaṭa cites are *utthāya* ('after rising up', VS 11.64), and *utthitāyā* ('to ... gotten up', VS 22.8), derivatives of *sthā* with the preverb *ud*. Uvaṭa lets Pāṇini's rule (A 8.4.61) replace *s-* with *d-*, at least to judge by his precise words, though in Pāṇini's system *s-* is actually replaced by *th*, which is then deleted, but such a detail does not matter for our discussion.

a sound identical with the preceding *-d*, thus approximating Pāṇini's procedure (see note 151), but others allow for deleting *s* here. Because of such ambiguity, no division is made, since the choice would be apparently arbitrary.¹⁵²

Bhartṛhari thus has ancient antecedents in viewing the undivided word as a unit that is subject to analysis which may vary according to different procedures adopted by various grammarians.¹⁵³ Indeed, he has predecessors in the very authors of *padapāṭhas*, who posited analyzed texts—admittedly man-made (*pauruṣeya*)—to account for the true texts, the *saṃhitāpāṭhas* inherited from ṛṣis.

§4.2. Let us turn now to another illustrious predecessor of Bhartṛhari's. Although Pāṇini reflects the earlier procedures of positing *padapāṭha* texts to account for *saṃhitāpāṭha* texts, he goes beyond his predecessors in that he posits strings with *padas* and their constituents to account for an entire language, not just a particular corpus, through a derivational system. In his system, although *vākya* does not have status as a separate class name, Pāṇini accounts for utterances through derivations that, starting from a semantics, derive syntactic words related to each other.¹⁵⁴ In this connection, we should consider a contrast made in the *Vākyapadiyavṛtti* with respect to the scope of grammars. Bhartṛhari remarks that the grammatical explanation of some grammarians had the *pada* as its limit and for some the limit was the sentence.¹⁵⁵

The first position confronts difficulty when dealing with qualifier terms like *śukla-* ('white'), as in (8) शुक्लः पटः (9) शुक्ला गौः (10) शुक्लं वस्त्रम् (11) शुक्लाः कम्बलाः, where different forms occur according to the gender and number of the qualificand. All the instances of *śukla-* are identical in that they contain this physical sound complex, so that one can speak of understanding a single word. Moreover, if one is deriving single *padas*, then one will first consider *śukla-* denoting its most general meaning; any white thing. Consequently, the immediate derivation proper to *śukla-* alone, would be a

¹⁵² I say 'apparently' because within a full system such as Pāṇini's it is possible to justify one choice over the other. Any choice, nevertheless, would indeed depend on a particular grammatical system and not on actual usage.

¹⁵³ There is also evidence to indicate that Kātyāyana viewed words such as *śiṣye* 'lay, slept' as single wholes which are analyzed into constituents that are to be considered simply constructs. See LAIT 154-156.

¹⁵⁴ See PWT I:143 (227) and LAIT 117-121.

¹⁵⁵ VPPr. 1.24-26 (68.5-6/62): केषाञ्चित्पदावधिकमन्वाख्यानं वाक्यावधिकमेकेषाम्। Vṛṣabhadeva notes that the explanation of the first—the *padavādins*—does not go beyond the *pada*, while for the latter grammarians—the *vākyavādins*—*padas* are merely means of explaining utterances and have no status as true entities (*asatyāni* 'unreal'). VPPad. 1.24-26 (68.28-69.5): पदावधिकमिति। अवधिर्मर्यादा। पदात्परेणाप्रवृत्तेरन्वाख्यानस्य। पदवादिनां चैतत्। वाक्यावधिकमिति। वाक्यावादिनाम्। तेषां हि पदान्यसत्यान्युपायभूतानीति।

pada *śuklam*, with the default neuter gender and undifferentiated singular. Given that the pada is considered the final result of derivation, moreover, even after considering the use of *śukla-* with terms like *paṭa-* ('cloth'), *go-* ('cow'), or *vastra-* ('piece of clothing'), it would theoretically retain the original number and gender, resulting in unacceptable juxtapositions such as (8*) शुक्लं पटः. To prevent this, a rule is then necessary¹⁵⁶ providing that terms which signify properties and entities possessed of these properties take the gender and number of the entities in which the qualities in question inhere.¹⁵⁷ Under the second view, however, complexes like (8)-(11) are units and a quality is always fused with the entity that bears the property in question, so that it is not separate from a particular entity in which it inheres, with the result that the very property of being a general meaning does not exist.¹⁵⁸ That is, terms like *śukla* are now considered never to occur in isolation, only in sentences such as (8)-(11), so that they never have occasion to signify a generalized white something instead of a particular white thing.

Under the respective positions noted above, in any grammar the fixed meaning subject to analysis is then the meaning of a pada or of a sentence.¹⁵⁹

§4.3. Pāṇini does indeed recognize the notion of utterance or sentence with respect to certain operations (see note 154 for references) and his derivational system involves related padas of whole utterances. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the Aṣṭādhyāyī to indicate whether he subscribed to a position maintaining that a sentence as a separate unit bears a signifying relation with a sentential meaning. Similarly, Kātyāyana and Patañjali also commonly speak of a sentence meaning (*vākyaārtha*). For example, in connection with examples like (12) वीरः पुरुषः 'the man is heroic', where there are coreferential terms, they consider that *puruṣa-* of itself signifies a man and that the additional feature of his being heroic is a sentence meaning.¹⁶⁰ There is, however, no indication that they held this to be signified directly by an impartite sentence.

¹⁵⁶ Bhartṛhari invokes A 1.2.52: विशेषणानञ्जातेः (लुपि व्यक्तिवचने 51) as though it were applicable to all instances involving qualifiers, which is not the case; see PWT I: 593-594. This is not crucial to the present discussion.

¹⁵⁷ VPVr. 1.24-26 (68.6-69.1/62-63): तत्र पदावधिकेऽन्वाख्यानं श्रुत्यभेदादेकपदरूपोपग्रहे सामान्यमात्रे लब्धसंस्काराणि पदानि पदान्तरसम्बन्धप्राप्तसन्निधानेष्वर्थेषु सन्निपतितेष्वपि विशेषेषु सामान्ये प्रतिलब्धमन्तरङ्गं संस्कारमुपादायैव प्रवर्तेत। तदर्थं विशेषणानाञ्जातेरित्यनेन योगेन भाविन्याश्रये बहिरङ्गे प्रक्रान्ते गुणवचनानां शब्दानामाश्रयतो लिङ्गवचनान्यनुगम्यन्ते।

¹⁵⁸ VPVr. 1.24-26 (69.1-2/63): वाक्यावधिके त्वन्वाख्यानं नित्यसंसृष्टस्य गुणस्याश्रयविशेषणाविवेकात्सर्वतो व्यवच्छेदे सामान्यार्थत्वमेव न विद्यते।

¹⁵⁹ VPVr. 1.24-26 (77.1/72): स्थितलक्षणस्तु शास्त्रे पदार्थो वाक्यार्थो वा।

¹⁶⁰ 2.3.46 vt. 2: न वा वाक्यार्थत्वात् Bh. I.462.4-5/II.815: न वा वक्तव्यम्। किङ्कारणम्। वाक्यार्थत्वात्। यदत्राधिक्यं वाक्यार्थः सः।

There are thus two variants, weak and strong, of the thesis that there is a sentential meaning over and above word meanings: (a) this is a function of combining words and their meanings, (b) a sentence meaning is an impartite whole signified by an equally impartite sentence. The latter is Bhartṛhari's position, and, as far as can be seen from the evidence, he is, if not the actual originator of this view, at least the first one known to articulate it.

§4.4. There are comparably two variants of the positions held by those who maintain that *padas* have separate status: (a) *padas* occur in utterances, where they not only denote the meanings signified by their bases but also the relational meanings — such as object, agent, instrument — signified by affixes included in them. (b) individual *padas* signify simply their own meanings and cease to function; what is referred to as *vākyārtha* ('sentence meaning') is actually made known by the meanings of individual words thus signified, these meanings being interpreted by a listener according to the intent he attributes to the speaker. (a) is pretty clearly Pāṇini's position and can be seen reflected in Kātyāyana and Patañjali. (b) is equally clearly the position held by Śabara and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas.¹⁶¹ This is also the position against which Bhartṛhari argues in the *Vākyakāṇḍa*.¹⁶²

§4.5. As Bhartṛhari repeatedly says, even one who maintains the primacy of the sentence (section §4.3 position (b)) has to operate with subsentential units as a means to convey the true unit of communication (see section §§3.7.7), and commentators point out the obvious reason why this has to be done (see note 133): it is not possible to describe in a generalized manner all possible sentences of a language unless an analysis is performed. Pāṇinīyas make this point repeatedly and in connection not only with grammar but also with ordinary language usage. Thus, commenting on the *Mahābhāṣya* on A 1.2.45, Kaiyaṭa says¹⁶³ the sentence alone is the main speech unit and a sentence meaning alone is the main meaning of a linguistic unit. However, for the sake of brevity — allowing a grammatical description — *padas* and their meanings are established based on assumed *anvaya* and *vyatireka* of subsentential items and their meanings, due to the similarity one sees between tokens in various utterances. Moreover, he continues, since it is impossible to learn a signifying relation with respect to individual sentences, not following this procedure would result in the impossibility of verbal communication. Similarly, Nāgeśa says that because it is impossible to grasp a conventional signifying relation with respect to

¹⁶¹ See LAIT 148-151.

¹⁶² See JAOS 119 (1999): 94-99, where I considered some evidence adduced in the present paper also.

¹⁶³ Pr. II.74/II.45a: ... वाक्यमेव मुख्यः शब्दो वाक्यार्थ एव मुख्यः शब्दार्थः। सादृश्यात्स्वन्वयव्यतिरेकौ कल्पितौ लाघवार्थमाश्रित्य पदपदार्थव्यवस्थापनं क्रियते। प्रतिवाक्यं व्युत्पत्त्यसम्भवाच्छब्दव्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गात्।

each and every individual sentence and a sentence cannot be described by any brief means otherwise, teachers fictitiously separated out words in sentences and fictitiously separated out bases and affixes in a word and, through assumed anvaya and vyatireka, they posited such and such meaning divisions, the domains of which are solely the grammar.¹⁶⁴

Bharṭṛhari differs from this last in one way. He does not insist that the subdivision of sentences into constituents pertains exclusively in the domain of grammar. Thus, in VP 2.345/343 (see note 93), he explicitly says that speaking in terms of padas is not exclusive to grammar but also occurs in normal usage. The Vṛtti on VP 1.24-26 too says that the constituent meaning extracted from a total sentence meaning fits (*anupatati* ['follows']) not only with grammatical discourse but also everyday discourse that is similar to that in grammar in that it involves divisions.¹⁶⁵ That is, both in grammar and in wordly discourse, people assume a division of a sentential meaning into constituent meanings such as an action, an agent, an object, and so on. Moreover, in VP 2.345/343, Bharṭṛhari says that this discourse involving division in both grammar and wordly usage is intended for what has to be done (*kāryārtham*). That is, just as a grammarian analyzes sentences into constituent padas and the latter into bases and affixes in order to describe in a brief and generalized manner utterances of the language and their meanings, so also do people carry out such analysis in ordinary life. This is of course not to say that all speakers of the language are grammarians. It is the case, nevertheless, that, as traditionally represented, in acquiring knowledge of relations between speech units and meanings, speakers do engage in reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka. This does have a purpose, namely learning such relations, and this procedure is necessary, since no speaker could possibly acquire separately a full knowledge of each and every possible individual sentence with its particular sentential meaning.

5.

Necessary as such analysis is, it has a serious consequence in that different grammarians can, in the context of their particular systems, adopt different analyses (see sections §§3.7.2-3.7.3). Since, moreover, this analysis involves not only speech units but also meanings attributed to them, the differences necessarily involve also semantic issues. It is understandable, therefore, that Kātyāyana and Patañjali engage in arguments, some quite protracted, concerning just such issues in the context of Pāṇini's grammar and that, in the course of these discussions, other scholars and their views are brought

¹⁶⁴ LM 5: तत्र प्रतिवाक्ये सङ्केतग्रहासम्भवात्तदन्वाख्यानस्य लघुपाथेनाशक्यत्वाच्च कल्पनया पदानि प्रविभज्य पदे प्रकृतिप्रत्ययभागकल्पनेन कल्पिताभ्यामन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तत्तदर्थविभागं शास्त्रमात्रविषयं परिकल्पयन्ति स्माचार्याः।

¹⁶⁵ VPVr. 1.24-26 (65.6-7/58): सोऽयमपोद्धारपदार्थो शास्त्रव्यवहारमनुपतति शास्त्रसदृशं च लौकिकं भेदव्यवहारम्।

in. Indeed, the *Mahābhāṣya* is justifiably viewed as a compendium of various views and arguments concerning these issues, which doubtless were equally subjects of discussion in the *Saṅgraha* of Patañjali's predecessor. Both in its overall content and in its manner of presentation, the *Vākyapadīya* can rightly be considered the third major compendium. Moreover, as has been shown, Bhartṛhari is quite traditional in his mode of presentation and faithful to grammatical tradition. He is also an innovator in at least one major respect: he has pushed to the ultimate the unification of language by arguing that the true unit of communication is the impartite sentence manifested by physical utterances and connected with an equally impartite sentence meaning.¹⁶⁶ Since, however, he must and does accept posited constituent *padas* and so on as a means of knowing these ultimate units, Bhartṛhari appropriately discusses not only the *vākya* and its *vākyārtha* in the *Vākyakāṇḍa* but also goes on, in the *Padakāṇḍa*, to take up individual *padas* — including derivatives such as compounds — and the semantics associated with these.

Here we must revert to a question posed earlier (section §3.5). One might ask why Bhartṛhari finds it necessary to include in his work a consideration of so many views to which he does not subscribe. For reasons already noted, it would be improper to say that such questions lie outside the purview of grammar. As commentators on the *Vākyapadīya* bring out repeatedly, grammar is *sarvapārṣada*. Grammar in India was from very early on incorporated into a body of six *vedāṅgas*, so that it immediately came into contact with areas of concern some of which did not deal with language as a principal object. Moreover, from earliest times, as reflected in Pāṇini's work, the procedure adopted for grammatical description started from a semantics, with meanings to be signified serving as conditions for the introduction of affixes after bases. Consequently semantics — and also to an extent pragmatics — are intimately linked with grammar. Thus, from a very early time grammarians had to deal not only with issues of formal systems of grammar but also with semantic issues and questions concerning how language relates to a reality, however one conceive of the latter. In other words, grammar and philosophy of language came to be inextricably related. It is therefore understandable that in a work of Pāṇinian grammar like the *Mahābhāṣya* such issues come up for elaborate discussions in various contexts.

Another consequence of this background and procedure is that grammar had to come into contact with other systems, which, whether or not they accepted verbal testimony as a separate *pramāṇa*, had to confront

¹⁶⁶This position is actually not easily defended from the strictly linguistic point of view, since, taken absolutely, it precludes grammatical description and language learning. As noted, Bhartṛhari does therefore accept subsentential units, though he grants them only the status of means to an ultimate end. In my opinion, this is motivated by his philosophical position that all is unified in brahman, whose nature is speech.

comparable issues. By Bhartṛhari's epoch such questions had been topics of discussion for a considerable time among Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṃsakas and others. It is understandable, then, that in the Vākyapadīya, as in the Mahābhāṣya, these various positions were taken into consideration. By its very nature, then, grammar is indeed sarvapārṣada, so that Bhartṛhari quite rightly feels an obligation to deal not only with various positions taken by grammarians but also with issues to which other schools of thought devoted attention. In this, he reflects what Kātyāyana and Patañjali had done before him and the Saṅgrahakāra had done earlier still.

This does not mean that Bhartṛhari simply presented all such views as somehow valid in their own contexts and left it at that. On the contrary, the evidence shows that he could and did show serious disagreement where essential tenets of grammarians are concerned. He argues at length against what is now known as the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka view that there is no direct signifier-signified relation between a sentence as a unit and a sentential meaning, though he also presents arguments which had been presented in favor of this position. He rejects the possibility that a śakti, qua a property of a kāraka should not be considered distinct from this, though he does not ally himself with the Mīmāṃsā position concerning a separate ontological category of śakti. In brief, he has his own positions to defend, those which Pāṇinian grammarians maintained in general.

In this context, consider one final example where the notion of grammar's being sarvapārṣada is invoked (see sections §§3.5.1-3.5.2). Bhartṛhari (VP 2.400-401/396-397) takes up part of an issue discussed at length by Kātyāyana and Patañjali,¹⁶⁷ namely whether individual sounds are meaningful or not, then remarks¹⁶⁸ that meaningfulness is not distinguished in padas, sounds, and sentences. That is, one can argue not only that sentences and padas are meaningful, but also that individual sounds too are meaningful, as can be seen from the presentation in the Mahābhāṣya. In addition, he says that one methodological procedure appears to be contrary to another because of the repeated study devoted to one or the other. In other words, there are different schools of thought, and devotees of one or the other consider themselves in opposition to others. Puṇyarāja begins his commentary on this kārīkā by presenting an objection to which the second half of the verse is a reply.¹⁶⁹ In what precedes, the position that

¹⁶⁷ ŚS 5 vt. 9-15, Bh. I.30.1-32.11/I.101-106, 1.2.45 vt. 11/10, Bh. I.220.10-24, II.79-80.

¹⁶⁸ VP 2.402/398: नार्थवत्ता पदे वर्णे वाक्ये चैवं विशिष्यते। अभ्यासात्प्रक्रमोऽन्यस्तु विरुद्ध इव दृश्यते।

¹⁶⁹ VPP 2.402/398 (161/505): ननु पूर्वं वाक्यस्यैवार्थवत्त्वं महता प्रबन्धेन व्यवस्थापितं पदान्यनर्थकान्येवाभिहितानि। वर्णानामर्थवत्त्वे कैव कथा। इदानीं वर्णे पदे वाक्ये च समं कृत्वैवार्थवत्तोद्घोष्यत इति किमेतदुच्यत इत्याशङ्क्याह अभ्यासादिति। इह भिन्नान्यागमदर्शनानि लौकिकैश्चार्वाकैर्दार्शनिकैश्च विविधैः परस्परं शास्त्राणां पृथक्पृथक्प्रक्रमाः परिपाटयो दृश्यन्ते विरुद्धा इव। परमार्थतस्तत्त्वं सत्यरूपमेकमविरुद्धमेव सर्वत्र स्थितमिति। अतश्च सर्वपार्षदत्वादेतदनुषङ्गात्कथञ्चिदाश्रितम्। नैतावताभ्युपेतस्याखण्डपक्षस्य त्याग आयात इति बोद्धव्यम्।

meaningfulness is a property solely of a sentence has been established at great length and padas have been declared to be absolutely meaningless, not to speak of individual sounds. Now, how can you level all these and declare that sounds and padas as well as sentences have the property of being meaningful? It is to answer this possible objection that the second half of the verse is stated. There are different traditional views (*āgamadarśanāni*). Moreover, the various distinct methodological procedures of śāstras are viewed as mutually contradictory by upholders of such views in the world, who come after they were established¹⁷⁰ and are devoted to them. But they are only seemingly contradictory. For, from the standpoint of the ultimate, there is one true entity, which is fixed in all of these and does not conflict with them. That is, the single impartite true unit is the sentence. This position does not truly conflict with the possible view that a pada or a sound is meaningful, since these are on a different level: they are posited entities abstracted from larger units. There cannot be true conflict between one thing and others which are not on the same level. Therefore, concludes Puṇyarāja, the view that all the entities in question equally are meaningful has been taken up and maintained in some way or other incidentally, since Bhartṛhari's work is sarvapārśada. This does not mean that the accepted position that the true unit is the impartite sentence has thereby been given up as a consequence.

In brief, just as Patañjali did before him, Bhartṛhari considers and adopts, under particular circumstances, positions which he ultimately rejects in favor of his own accepted thesis. One last question that arises in this connection touches directly on Bhartṛhari's spirit of accommodation or perspectivism. Differing views which Bhartṛhari sets forth are maintained by others generally in a spirit of upholding these as their siddhāntas, rejecting other possibilities. Thus, for example, Śabara explicitly rejects the possibility of a sentence meaning being directly related to a complex of padas.¹⁷¹ Given that adherents of other systems of thought deal so commonly with issues of language and grammar and frequently disagree with grammarians, it is to be expected that Bhartṛhari has felt it appropriate not only to present various positions but also to maintain his own siddhāntas and to reject views which conflict importantly with these. As has been shown here, he does just this on several occasions.

¹⁷⁰ I think it appropriate to interpret *aruṅgdarśibhiḥ* ('by later upholders of views') combined with *laukikair* ('mundane') in harmony with what Yāska says (Nir. 1.20 [41-42]: साक्षात्कृतधर्माणः ऋषयो बभूवुः। तेऽवरोभ्योऽसाक्षात्कृतधर्मभ्य उपदेशेन मन्त्रान्स्मृद्दुः।). There were ṛṣis of old who had directly witnessed dharma; they handed the mantras down traditionally as teaching to successors, who had not witnessed dharma directly. Similarly, the later 'worldly' scholars — that is, those lacking the status of the earliest teachers like Pāṇini, who are treated as ṛṣis — maintain the various views. This also accords with what Puṇyarāja says in his comments on VP 2.489/484; see section 6.

¹⁷¹ See LAIT 151, note 363.

6.

In connection with this issue, let me finally consider a very famous passage, the penultimate verse of the second kāṇḍa,¹⁷² the first half of which says that one's intellect gains discriminatory skill through the different established views of various traditions. Commenting on this, Puṇyarāja¹⁷³ glosses *bhinnaiḥ* with *nānāvidhaiḥ* ('of different sorts'), *āgamadarśanaiḥ* with *āgasiddhāntaiḥ* ('final views of traditions'), *vivekam* with *vaiśāradyam* ('skill, mature learning'), and goes on: to elaborate as follows. Thence, through the final views of various traditions, there arises the capacity (*śaktiḥ*) to perfect (*sampariṣkartum* ['polish, adorn precisely']) one's own final view (*vasiddhāntam*) leaving no doubts (*niḥsandigdham*). The intent as Puṇyarāja understands it is patent. The study of traditions other than one's own sharpens and clarifies one's intellect, giving one the capacity to maintain the established conclusions of one's own tradition. In the second half of the verse, Bhartṛhari presents an opposed alternative (*vā*) by way of a rhetorical question: how much is it possible for one who follows (*anudhāvātā*) his own reasoning (*svatarkam*) to come up with (*unnetum*)? The term *unnetum* is crucial to grasping the intent of this passage. In accordance with his interpretation of the first half, Puṇyarāja¹⁷⁴ glosses *unnetum* with *pratividhātum* ('counter'), explaining that otherwise to what extent (*kiyat* ['how much?']) can a student (*pratīpatrā* ['one who gains understanding']) unacquainted with what other traditions are like (*adrṣṭaparakīyāgasvarūpeṇa* ['who has not seen the form of the traditions of others']) and follows (*anusaratā*) only his own lights (*svotprekṣām eva*) retaliate (*pratividhātum*). That is, one who depends only on his own wits to defend the positions of his tradition, without also being well acquainted with the positions of other traditions, is incapable of defending his tradition by countering the arguments of others. He continues, leading into the final kārīkā:¹⁷⁵ it may be fully in keeping that supreme ṛṣis, seeing things as they are due to the capacity they possess that arises from a dharma resulting from yogic practice, are capable of reaching accepted final conclusions; but those who seek to mount to the height of yogic power and whose mental activities are absorbed in the first stages of meditation, not yet having the

¹⁷² VP 2.489/484: प्रज्ञा विवेकं लभते भिन्नैरागमदर्शनैः । कियद्वा शक्यमुन्नेतुं स्वतर्कमनुधावता ॥

¹⁷³ VPP 2.489/484 (192/576): नानाविधैरागमसिद्धान्तैः खलु प्रज्ञा विवेकं लभते वैशारद्यमाप्नोति । ततश्च निःसन्दिग्धं स्वसिद्धान्तमेव सम्परिष्कर्तुर्भिन्नागमदर्शनैः शक्तिर्जायते ।

¹⁷⁴ VPP 2.489/484 (192/576-577): अन्यथाऽदृष्टपरकीयागमस्वरूपेण प्रतिपत्त्रा स्वोत्प्रेक्षामेव तेषु तेषु चावस्थानेष्वनुसरता कियच्छक्यमुन्नेतुं प्रतिविधातुम् ।

¹⁷⁵ VPP 2.489/484 (192/577): कदाचित्परमर्षयो योगजधर्मोत्पन्नसामर्थ्याद्यथावत् पदार्थान्पश्यन्तः सिद्धान्तमभिधातुमलमिति शोभते । ये त्वारुरुक्षवः प्राथमकाल्पिकाध्यानलीनचित्तवृत्तयः शास्त्रादेवातीतानागतव्यवहितपदार्थस्वरूपं निश्चिन्वन्ति तेषां नानागमोपसेवयैवानुप्रसीदति भगवती प्रतिभेति युक्तम् ।

capacity, determine from teaching alone things that are past, those that have yet to be, and those that are removed from direct experience by spatial division; for these, it is proper that insight favor them only through their doing service to various traditions.

As Puṇyarāja interprets this kārīkā, then, it does not simply state that to gain mature intellectual skill one must pay due attention to all traditions of learning but that one should do this in order to be prepared to defend one's own tradition with a knowledge of what others have to say.

As I hope to have shown here, this is in keeping with what Bhartṛhari says elsewhere. It also brings into proper focus that Bhartṛhari is indeed a follower of a long tradition. He did innovate and present matters in new ways, but he is always a vaiyākaraṇa and a Pāṇinīya.

ABBREVIATIONS

[Bibliographic details on works for which such information is not given here are to be found in my *Pāṇini, a Survey of Research* (latest issue, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997) and *Recent Research in Pāṇinian Studies*² (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004).]

- A Aṣṭādhyāyī (adhyāya, pāda, sūtra).
 Bh. Mahābhāṣya (volume, page, line of Kielhorn's edition revised by K. V. Abhyankar/volume, page of the Rohtak edition).
 Dīp. Mahābhāṣyadīpikā (page, line of Abhyankar and Limaye's edition/page, line of the edition, by various editors, published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute).
 DNC Dvādaśāranayacakram (Muni Jambuvijaya's edition [page]).
 LAIT George Cardona, *Linguistic Analysis and some Indian Traditions*.
 Nir. Nirukta (Sarup's edition, section, page).
 NirD Durga's commentary on the Nirukta. Rajavade, Vaijanath Kashinath, *Durgācāryakṛtāvṛttisametam Niruktam*. Two volumes, Poona: Ānandāśrama, 1921-1926 (volume, section, page).
 NirSM Skandasvāmin, Maheśvara's commentary on Nirukta. *Commentary of Skandasvāmin & Maheśvara on the Nirukta, critically edited by Dr. Lakshman Sarup with additions and corrections by Acharya V.P. Limaye*. Two volumes. New Delhi: Pāṇini, 1982 (volume, page).
 NS Nyāyasūtra. *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*, edited by Anantalal Thakur, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997 (sūtra and page).

- Pr. Mahābhāṣyapradīpa (volume, page of the Rohtak edition/volume, page, column of the Nirṇaya Sagar Press edition).
- PSR *Pāṇini, a Survey of Research.*
- PV *Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the commentary 'Vṛtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin, edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.*
- PWT I *Pāṇini, his work and its Traditions, Vol. I: Background and Introduction².*
- RRPS *Recent Research in Pāṇinian Studies².*
- RV Rgveda.
- ŚS Śivasūtra.
- Ud. Mahābhāṣyapradīpodyota (volume, page of the Rohtak edition/volume, page, column of the Nirṇaya Sagar Press edition).
- VaiS Vaiśeṣikasūtra, edited by Muni Jambuvijaya.
- VP Vākyapadīya (kāṇḍa and kārikā of Rau's edition/kāṇḍa and kārikā of K.A. Subramania Iyer's edition; if the editions do not differ, one number alone is given.).
- VPA Raghunatha Sharma's Ambākartrī on the Vākyapadīya and its Vṛtti (page references to first edition of the first and second kāṇḍas).
- VPH Helārāja's commentary on the third kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya (page, line of K.A. Subramania Iyer's edition/page of Raghunātha Sharma's edition; the volume in question is indicated by the kārikā reference.).
- VPPad. Paddhati to the Vṛtti on the first kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya (page, line of K.A. Subramania Iyer's edition).
- VPP Puṇyarāja's ṭīkā on the second kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya (K.A. Subramania Iyer's edition[page]/Raghunatha Sharma's edition [page]).
- VPPh. Phullarāja's commentary on part of the Sādhanaśamuddeśa (page, line of K.A. Subramania Iyer's edition/page of Raghunatha Sharma's edition).
- VPV_r. Vākyapadīyavṛtti (K.A. Subramania Iyer's edition [page, line for the first kāṇḍa, page for the second]/page of Raghunatha Sharma's edition [first edition]; only the former is referred to for passages not included in the latter.).
- VPr. Vājasaneyiprātiśākhya. Virendra Kumar Varma, editor, भाष्यद्वयसहितम् शुक्लयजुर्वेद-प्रातिशाख्यम् अथवा वाजसनेयि-प्रातिशाख्यम् Varanasi: Kashi Hindu Vishvavidyalaya, 1975.
- VS Vājasaneyisamhitā.

Revisiting the Notion of Śiṣṭa in Bhartṛhari

MADHAV M. DESHPANDE

In a number of my previous publications (see bibliography of this article), I have dealt with the notion of the authority of the Śiṣṭas 'elites' as conceived by Patañjali and how it changed in the works of Bhartṛhari. In this article, I would like to revisit some aspects of this notion as seen in Bhartṛhari's works and highlight certain dimensions that I had not discussed previously in detail. However, in order to provide a proper historical background to understand the departures of Bhartṛhari, I will briefly summarize the notions as they appear in the works of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali.

Pāṇini seems to have made a significant distinction between the Veda and the Vedic Ṛṣis on the one hand and the grammatical authorities and teachers on the other hand. The grammatical authorities are often referred to by their specific names, and by the general term Ācārya (cf. P.7.3.49: *ād ācāryāṇām*). Sanskrit usage is accounted for in two ways in Pāṇini's grammar. It is either accounted for in terms of providing full derivations, or by simply sanctioning an underived output form, i.e., *nipātana*. It is in connection with this latter method, that P.6.3.109 (*pr̥ṣodarādīni yathopadiṣṭam*) is often cited. The rule says that forms like *pr̥ṣodara* are approved as taught (*upadiṣṭa*).¹ The term *upadeśa* in this rule is rather ambiguous. It is not

¹Derived from a combination of *pr̥ṣad-udara*, a more regular formation might have been *pr̥ṣadudara*, and yet the usage shows a rather irregular form: *pr̥ṣodara*, and hence the procedure of *nipātana* is used in this rule to authorize it.

clear if it refers to an explicit teaching of a grammarian or another authority or simply the usage that is accepted as authoritative. It is also not completely clear as to who the agent of this *upadeśa* is. If it is a form of usage, whose usage is it? If it is a form of teaching, whose teaching is it? I would also like to note here that the term *upadeśa* as a mode of transmission of knowledge also appears elsewhere. In the Śikṣāvallī (11th Anuvāka) of the Taittiriya Upaniṣad, it is the Ācārya who teaches (*anuśāsti*) the disciples as they are about to finish their education, and at the end of this *anuśāsana*, the teacher says: *eṣa ādeśaḥ, eṣa upadeśaḥ, eṣa vedopaniṣat, etad anuśāsanam*. Here, the author of the *upadeśa* is an Ācārya. The *upadeśa* is at the same time presented as an *ādeśa*, an *anuśāsana*, and represents the secret of the Veda. Another important text that uses this term is the Nirukta of Yāska (1.20): *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvus te'varebhyo'sākṣātkṛtadharmabhyā upadeśena mantrān samprādur upadeśāya glāyanto'vare bilmagrahaṇāya imam grantham samāmnāsiṣur vedaṃ ca vedāṅgāni ca*. This is a dense passage full of different implications and Albrecht Wezler (2001) has discussed these in great detail. Without going into all of its richness, I only wish to point out that here the authors of the *upadeśa* are the Ṛṣis of the ancient golden age, who were *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ* 'those who had directly perceived the dharma.' By using *upadeśa* as a mode of transmission, they transmitted (*samprāduḥ*) the Vedic mantras to future generations, who were themselves *asākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ* 'those who had not directly perceived the dharma.' This future generation was somehow unable to handle this *upadeśa* (*upadeśāya glāyantaḥ*) and produced works like the Nighaṇṭu and other Vedāṅgas. Again, what is clear is that *upadeśa* is not the mantras themselves, but a certain mode of transmission. Does it merely refer to uttering (*diśir uccāraṇakriyaḥ, uccārya hi varṇān āha upadiṣṭā ime varṇā iti*, cf. Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 13; Vol. III, p. 174), or does it refer to an associated interpretive comment as Wezler² (2001) suggests? This question need not detain us at this point. However, it is clear that the notion of *upadeśa* is variously associated with Ṛṣis as well as with Ācāryas. Considering that grammatical authorities as referred to by Pāṇini are Ācāryas, rather than Ṛṣis, it would make it more likely that the authors of *upadeśa* referred to by Pāṇini in P.6.3.109 (*prṣodarādīni yathopadiṣṭam*) are Ācāryas, rather than Ṛṣis, if indeed the term refers to a form of teaching. We will return to this distinction between Ṛṣi and Ācārya again.

² Referring to the term *upadeśa* in the Nirukta, Wezler says: "In my view what is meant by *upadeśa* is a method of teaching students (*śiṣyopādhyāyikā vṛtti*), to borrow Durga's expression, which aims at a correct and full understanding of the wording of a *mantra*, the syntax and the semantics at least of some of the expressions used, and above all, of the meaning of the *mantra* as a whole," Wezler 2001: 233. However, Wezler (ibid.: 231) recognizes that the term *upadeśa* may have a different meaning in Pāṇini, namely the teaching of a rule as such.

In his very first Vārttika on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, Kātyāyana makes interesting distinctions of two kinds (*siddhe śabdārtha-sambandhe lokato'rthaprayukte śāstreṇa dharmaniyamo yathā laukikavaidikeṣu*, Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, pp. 6-8). The first distinction is between *loka* and *śāstra*. While the usage of language is already established in the world of users (*loka*) motivated by the need to communicate meanings, the science of grammar (*śāstra*) makes a restriction regarding religious merit associated with the usage of language. Thus, the usage sanctioned as meritorious by the *śāstra* is a small subset of the usage found in the world. Kātyāyana does not elaborate upon where the *śāstra* derives its authority from³. The second distinction made by Kātyāyana is that between *laukika* and *vaidika*. While these two domains are distinct from each other, it is clear that the *śāstra* holds authority over both of these domains.

It is in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya that we find a full-blown discussion of many of these issues. Here we shall look at the main points. First, Patañjali seems to keep up the distinction between the categories of Ṛṣi and Ācārya. The story of the Ṛṣis named Yārvāṇastarvāṇaḥ is introduced using the past perfect verb *babhūvuh* : *yārvāṇastarvāṇo nāma ṛṣayo babhūvuh pratyakṣa-dharmāṇaḥ parāparajñā veditaveditavyā adhigatayāthātathyāḥ* ... (Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p.11) , "In ancient days there were sages named Yārvāṇastarvāṇaḥ who had directly perceived the dharma, who realized both this and the yonder, had come to know what is to be known, and had understood the true nature of things as they are." These are ancient sages of the golden age of *purākalpa*⁴ 'prior age'. They remain authoritative and yet are not to be mixed up with what happens *adyatve* 'these days'. Their characterization as *pratyakṣadharmāṇaḥ* seems like a paraphrase of Yāska's *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ*.

On the other hand, Patañjali's discussion of the Śiṣṭas on P.6.3.109 (*prṣodarādīni yathopadiṣṭam*) seems to refer to an idealized and yet a

³There is a hint that the *śāstra* is analogous to the authoritative words of the Veda, cf. *śāstrapūrvake prayoge 'bhyudayas tat tulyaṃ vedaśabdena*, Vārttika 9, Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 10.

⁴On the other hand, see Wezler (2001: 218-19) on *babhūvuh* in Nirukta 1.20: "To say it in other words, the passage at issue explains the origination of the dichotomy between the *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayaḥ* and those called *asākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa* by putting it into a temporal sequence, but this does not imply, and certainly does not mean (because this could clearly contradict an easily observable fact) that the two classes of people, Brahmins, cannot and do not exist side by side at a given later period of time." In the Nirukta passage, one recognizes a sequence of generations, while in the Mahābhāṣya account of Yārvāṇastarvāṇaḥ, one notices no such immediate generational sequence. Here, the counterpart of the Ṛṣis is rather the Asuras who made mistakes in utterance and were defeated by the gods. Thus the Ṛṣis and the Asuras seem to refer to a mythical time and space.

contemporary community of social/linguistic elites.⁵ Words like *pr̥ṣodara* are taught/used by the Śiṣṭas, as far as Patañjali is concerned (*kaiḥ punar upadiṣṭāni? śiṣṭaiḥ*, Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 174). As the word *śiṣṭa* is derived from the root *śās*, Patañjali's implicit linkage between *upadeśa* and [anu]śāsana is apparent here, cf. the Taittirīya-Upaniṣad passage discussed above. However, Patañjali shies away from directly identifying the Śiṣṭas as grammarians, by saying that it would become a circular definition if the grammar were based on the usage of the Śiṣṭas and if the Śiṣṭas were themselves grammarians (*yadi tarhi śāstrapūrvikā śiṣṭiḥ śiṣṭipūrvakam ca śāstram tad itaretarāśrayam bhavati*, Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 174). With this concern, Patañjali defines the Śiṣṭas by referring to their residence (*nivāsa*) and conduct (*ācāra*). The Śiṣṭas live in the region of Āryāvarta, the region to the south of the Himālayas, north of the Vindhya, east of disappearance of Sarasvatī and west of Prayāga (*prāg ādarśāt pratyak kālakavanāt dakṣiṇena himavantam uttarena pāriyātram*, Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 174). The Śiṣṭas living in this region are the Brahmins free from greed, storing only a potful of grain and becoming experts in some branch of learning without any worldly motivation (*etasmīn āryāvarte āryanivāse ye brāhmaṇāḥ kumbhīdhānyā alolupā agrhyamāṇakāraṇāḥ kiñcid antareṇa kasyāścid vidyāyāḥ pāragās tatrabhavantah śiṣṭāḥ*, Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 174). Limaye (1974: 563), Olivelle (1999, intro.: xxxiii), and others have pointed out how Patañjali's description of the Āryāvarta and the conduct of the Śiṣṭas almost echo the wording of many Dharmasūtras. The Śiṣṭas of Patañjali, like the Śiṣṭas of Dharmasūtras, are an idealized contemporary community, the prime source of authoritative knowledge of dharma and the dharmically approved behavior, including the usage of Sanskrit. They are not the Ṛṣis of *purākalpa*, the imagined golden age.⁶ Could they possibly be authors of grammatical or other sciences? Indeed they could be. However, Patañjali, with his desire to avoid circularity, says that one can use the Aṣṭādhyāyī to identify the Śiṣṭas who are using the proper language as defined by the Aṣṭādhyāyī without studying it. Then he learns other usages from such Śiṣṭas. How do the Śiṣṭas speak proper Sanskrit without ever learning it from a grammar? Patañjali says that this must be either their intrinsic nature or grace of a divinity (*nūnam asya devānugrahaḥ svabhāvo vā*, Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 174). Such a Śiṣṭa is indeed not a grammarian, but miraculously speaks

⁵ This is like the idealization of the Sadashiv Peth area of Pune as the home of the elite form of Marathi.

⁶ Compare Āpastambadharmasūtra 1.2.5.4: *tasmād ṛṣyo 'vareṣu na jūyante niyamātikramāt*. See Wezler (2001: 220ff) for a detailed discussion. However, also note that Āśvalāyanagrhyasūtra (3.4.1-5) places gods and ṛṣis together in the context of Tarpaṇa, in contrast with Ācāryas who are placed along side the Pitr̥s. In between the two Tarpaṇas, the performer is supposed to move his *yajñopavīta* from one shoulder to the other. This indicates more than a generational difference between Ṛṣis and Ācāryas.

grammatically perfect Sanskrit without learning it from a grammar. Thus, Patañjali has created this idealized Śiṣṭa who must be looked up to by grammarians, but himself is not (or need not be) a grammarian. Yet, it is his *upadeśa* that validates the use of words like *prṣodara*. Thus, for Patañjali, the term *upadeśa* must refer to the usage of the Śiṣṭas, rather than any technical grammatical teachings composed by the Śiṣṭas. This meaning of the term *upadeśa* is clearly brought out by the Kāśikāvṛtti (on P.6.3.109: *yathopadiṣṭāni śiṣṭair uccāritāni prayuktāni tathaiṣvānugantavyāni*).

Coming down now to Bhartṛhari's views as seen from the Vākyapadīya, the Vṛtti,⁷ and the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, we see some interesting and important developments. Here I will note them briefly.

1. The *itaretarāśraya* argument brought up by Patañjali in his discussion of the notion of Śiṣṭa is completely lost in Bhartṛhari's narrative. He emphatically asserts that the Śiṣṭas are the grammarian-authors like Pāṇini who composed the Smṛtiśāstras like the Aṣṭādhyāyī, (cf. *tasmān nibadhyate śiṣṭaiḥ sādhutvaviṣayā smṛtiḥ*, Vākyapadīya 1.29). We should note that Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣyadīpikā on the Mahābhāṣya on P.6.3.109 is not available to us and hence we do not know directly how he may have commented on Patañjali's argument of *itaretarāśraya*. However, this argument shows up nowhere in the Vākyapadīya, the Vṛtti, or the available portions of the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, and his emphasis on the authoring of the grammatical smṛti by the Śiṣṭas goes in a direction opposite to that of Patañjali's argument of *itaretarāśraya*.⁸

2. The Śiṣṭa Vaiyākaraṇas, including Patañjali, are clearly identified as Ṛṣis by Bhartṛhari, (cf. *nityāḥ śabdārthasambandhās tatrāmnātā maharṣibhiḥ/ sūtrāṇām sānutantrāṇām bhāṣyāṇām ca prañetr̥bhiḥ//* VP 1.23). The term *maharṣibhiḥ* in the verse is rendered by the term Śiṣṭa in the Vṛtti and in Vṛṣabha's Paddhati.⁹ Referring to the loss of the tradition of the Mahābhāṣya, Bhartṛhari says: *ārṣe viplāvite granthe...* VP 2.479. The Mahābhāṣya, for

⁷ Here I do not wish to get into the question whether the Vākyapadīya and the Vṛtti are composed by the same or different authors. If the Vṛtti is not composed by Bhartṛhari himself, it was indeed composed by someone very close to him. I should also note that on some matters discussed here in this paper, the Vṛtti offers more alternative views than what one finds in the Vākyapadīya. One should also note that while the Vākyapadīya is an independent work of Bhartṛhari, the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā is a commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, and as a commentator, Bhartṛhari may be more constrained and restrained in giving a full expression to his own views, especially if they were to be somewhat different from those of Patañjali.

⁸ Also see Helārāja on VP III, Vṛttisamuddeśa, verse 78 (Iyer 1973: 189-90): *dvividham hi śiṣṭair anuśāsanam prārabdham sākṣād upeyanirdeśena yathā nīpātanam/upāyanirdeśānusāreṇa vā yathā vidhiḥ/*

⁹ *yaiḥ pratyakṣadharmabhis tatra tatra ...sūtrānulantrabhāṣyāṇi prañīlāni tair eva śiṣṭair vyākaraṇe 'pi nityāḥ śabdārthasambandhā ity āmnātam/* Vṛtti on VP 1.23, (Iyer 1966: 63). Vṛṣabhadeva's comment (ibid.: 51) *maharṣibhir iti śiṣṭaiḥ* follows the Vṛtti.

Bhartrhari, is an *ārṣa* text. Patañjali is a Rṣi and he is the foremost among the Śiṣṭas: *ayam ca ādiśiṣṭaḥ* (Mahābhāṣyadīpikā in Palsule 1983: 13).

3. With the identification of Śiṣṭas as Rṣis, Bhartrhari seems to move away from Patañjali's dharmaśāstric description of the Śiṣṭas, and applies Patañjali's and Yāska's characterization of Rṣis to Śiṣṭas. Now the Śiṣṭa-Rṣis have the characteristics such as *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ* and *pratyakṣadharmāṇaḥ*, Vṛtti on VP 1.23 (Iyer 1966: 63).

4. While the Śiṣṭas of Patañjali are an idealized contemporary elite community, for Bhartrhari, the Śiṣṭa-Rṣis belong to the ancient golden age of *purākalpa* and have far superior abilities as compared to us, the latter-day contemporaries of Bhartrhari: *jñānam tv asmadviśiṣṭānām ...sarvendriyam ...pratyakṣān na viśiṣyate*/ VP 3.1.46.

5. A new emphasis, not seen in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, begins to make its appearance in Bhartrhari's works, namely the centrality of what he calls *āgama*. Aklujkar (1991) and Iyer (1982) have discussed what Veda and Āgama seem to mean to Bhartrhari. Without going into broader issues connected with these notions, I would like to point out that Bhartrhari is making a deliberate effort, perhaps a new one, to argue that ultimately all knowledge rests upon the foundation of Āgama. While the Śiṣṭa-Rṣis may be *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ* or *pratyakṣadharmāṇaḥ*, even their knowledge ultimately rests on the Āgama: *ṛṣiṇām api yaj jñānam tad apy āgamapūrvakam*, VP 1.30. Also see: *syuṣ ca tāvad āgamād eva pratyakṣadharmāṇaḥ*, Dīpikā (Abhyankar-Limaye edn.), p. 38.

6. The knowledge of the proper words one receives from the Śiṣṭas is also ultimately based on Āgama, since the knowledge of the Śiṣṭas ultimately derives from the Āgama: *śiṣṭebhya āgamāt siddhāḥ sādhave dharmasāadhanam*, VP 1.27. While the verse refers to *śiṣṭebhyaḥ* and *āgamāt*, the Vṛtti uniquely foregrounds the Āgama: *tathā sādhasādhavyavasthānam apy anavacchinna-pāramparyam anabhiśaṅkanīyam yathāgamād eva siddham iti*, Vṛtti on VP I. 27 (Iyer 1966: 82). On this verse, Vṛṣabhadeva says that the Āgama is not qualified by the reference to Śiṣṭas. The words are known from the Āgama, and the Śiṣṭas simply say that these words lead to merit (*athavāgamād avicchinna ye sādhave siddhāḥ te śiṣṭebhyaḥ sākṣāt dharmasāadhanam iti siddhāḥ/ na tu śiṣṭ grahaṇenāgamo viśiṣyate*, Vṛṣabhadeva's Paddhati on VP I. 27 (Iyer 1966: 82). This almost removes the Śiṣṭas as an independent source of knowledge,¹⁰ and substitutes the Āgama in its place.

7. The emphasis upon Āgama as a new feature is recognized by Abhinavagupta. Referring to the verse *idam puṇyam idam pāpaṁ//* VP

¹⁰We do not have Bhartrhari's Dīpikā on P. 6.3.109, and hence our understanding of how Bhartrhari interpreted Patañjali's notion of śiṣṭa is necessarily incomplete. However, the available materials seem to indicate that Patañjali looked upon his Śiṣṭas as an independent source of

I.40, Abhinavagupta says that this verse is provided by Bhartṛhari to strengthen the authority of the Āgama (*āgamaprāmāṇyadārḍhyāya*,) Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarśinī, Vol. III, p.102 (cited by Abhyankar-Limaye edn. of VP, Appendix III, p. 204).¹¹

8. The term Āgama seems to have a graded meaning. The primary Āgama is the Śruti and Smṛti.¹² Then there are Āgamas that are directly based on Śruti and Smṛti (*śabdanibandhana āgama*). Others are indirectly based (*aśabdanibandhana āgama*).¹³ But there are others that are not based on Śruti or Smṛti, directly or indirectly, and these are termed as *anibandhana* and *pauruṣeya*.¹⁴

9. For Bhartṛhari, the real Āgama is *apauruṣeya*. His views are more like those of the Mīmāṃsakas, rather than like those of the Naiyāyikas. [However, Helārāja does seem to propose Īśvara as the source of Āgama.¹⁵] The *apauruṣeya āgama* overrides *pauruṣeya āgamas*.¹⁶

10. Bhartṛhari insists that the real *apauruṣeya āgama*, though diversely transmitted (cf. *eko 'py anekavartmeva samāmnātaḥ pṛthak pṛthak*, VP 1.5), is of unbroken continuity (*avicchinnaparamparā*, cf. *caitanyam iva yaś cāyam avicchedena vartate/ āgamas ...*, VP 1.41).¹⁷ The Śiṣṭa-Rṣis are merely links within this *avicchinnaparamparā* (cf. *śiṣṭācaritam avicchinnaparamparāyam*

authoritative knowledge above and beyond what was found in the Aṣṭādhyāyī (cf. *nūnam ayam anyān api jānāti*, Mbh. on P. 6.3.109). On the other hand, Bhartṛhari has placed Āgama above the Śiṣṭa. While the Śiṣṭa of Patañjali does not learn proper usage from a grammar, Vṛṣabha on VP 1.135 (Iyer 1966: 222-23) says: *yathā tam eva ā pāṇinīyam sādhuprayogaṁ niyogena vyākaraṇam adhiyānāḥ sādhuṁ prayuñjate/ te vaiyākaraṇaiḥ śiṣṭā ity anumīyante/*

¹¹ For a discussion of other possible sources for this verse, including the Mahābhārata, and other ways of interpreting it, see Houben 1999: 143ff.

¹² On *āgamaḥ khalv api* of Mbh., Dīpikā comments: *pāramparyeṇāvicchinna upadeśa āgamaḥ śrutilakṣaṇaḥ smṛtilakṣaṇaś ca/* (Abhyankar-Limaye edn., p. 8). Vṛtti on VP 1.41 (Iyer 1966: 98): *tathāivāyaṁ śrutismṛtilakṣaṇaḥ sarvaiḥ śiṣṭaiḥ pariḡṛhīta āgamaḥ/*. Also Vṛṣabha on VP 1.133 (Iyer 1966: 212): *kaḥ punar asāv āgama iti śrutismṛtirūpatvād āgamasya .../*

¹³ Vṛtti on VP 1.7 (Iyer 1966: 28-29): *tatra kāścic chabdanibandhanāḥ smṛtayaḥ/ kāścic aśabdanibandhanāḥ śiṣṭeṣu prasiddhasamācārāḥ/*. Vṛṣabhadeva comments: *yady api śabdo nāsti te tu śiṣṭās tān śabdān ācaranto dṛśyante iti prasiddhasamācārāḥ/* (ibid.: 28).

¹⁴ Vṛtti on VP 1.124 (Iyer 1966: 203): *sarvapravādeṣu āgamavākyānām prañetrparigraheṇa pauruṣeyatvam abhyupagamyate/ vedavākyāni tu caitanyavad apauruṣeyāṇi/ tāny āgamāntarāṇām prañetrṣu vicchinneṣu āgamāntarānusandhāne bijavad avatiṣṭhante/*

¹⁵ See Helārāja's commentary on VP III. Jāṭisamuddeśa, verse 46 (Iyer 1963: 51ff).

¹⁶ Dīpikā (Abhyankar-Limaye edn., p. 257): *katham ca tad avikalpyam/ apauruṣeyatvāt/ ... yat pauruṣeyaṁ tat śakyam vikalpayitum/* Also: Vṛṣabha on VP 1.124: *puruṣāṇām ca sāparādhavād aprāmāṇyaṁ teṣām/ vedas tu caitanyavad avicchedād apauruṣeya iti pramāṇāni vedavākyāni/* (Iyer 1966: 203).

¹⁷ See Houben 1997: 331ff. for a detailed discussion of "Bhartṛhari on the Eternality of the Universe and Revealed Texts", and how the VP and the Vṛtti treat diverse views on this topic.

svacaranasamācāram ..., Vṛtti on VP 1.43 (Iyer 1966: 99).¹⁸ In this insistence on *avicchinnaṣparamparā* of the Āgama, Bhartṛhari's views seem more dogmatic when compared with the frank admissions of loss of Vedic text-traditions found in the Dharmasūtras, cf. *brāhmaṇoktā vidhayaḥ teṣāṃ utsannāḥ pāthāḥ prayogād anumiyante*, Āpastambadharmasūtra 1.4. 12.10-11; *deśadharmajātīdharmakuladharmān śrutyabhāvād abravīn manuḥ*, Vasiṣṭhadharmaśāstra. 1.17.

11. The terms *nirāgama tarka* and *śuṣka-tarka* seem to refer not just to explicitly non-Vedic traditions like Buddhism and Jainism, but also to those of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika etc., cf. Vṛtti on VP 1.30 (Iyer 1966: 85): *ko hi anavasthitasādharmyavaidharmyeṣu nityam alabdhanīścayeṣu puruṣatarkeṣu viśvāsaḥ*; Vṛtti on VP 1.127 (Iyer 1966: 205): *yāvān anugamyamānas tarkaḥ svasāstraṃ na bādhati tāvān anugantavyaḥ*; Vṛtti on VP 1.42 (Iyer 1966: 99): *āgamacakṣuṣā vinā tarkānupātī kevalenānumānena kvacid āhitapratyayo dṛṣṭādrṣṭaphaleṣu karmasu āgamam utkramya pravartamāno niyataṃ mahatā pratyavāyena samyujyate*; Vṛtti on VP 1.129 (Iyer 1966: 209): *śabda evopadeṣṭā/ tatsāmārihyam evānugacchanto vaktāro yogaśabdanibandhanayaiva vivakṣayā pravartante /...śabdasaktirūpāparigrhītas tu sādharmyavaidh-armyānusārī sarvāgamopaghātahetutvād anibandhanaḥ śuṣkas tarka ity ucyate*. In this, Bhartṛhari's usage is copied verbatim by Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 2.1.11: *tasmān nirāgamāḥ puruṣotprekṣāmātranibandhanās tarkā apratiṣṭhitā bhavanti, puruṣotprekṣāyā niraṅkuṣatvāt* (pp. 366-367).

12. Why is this almost dogmatic insistence on *avicchinna vaidika āgama* as the foundation of Sanskrit grammar found in Bhartṛhari? Contrast his own description of how the tradition of Sanskrit grammar almost died out:

- a. *baiji-saubhava-haryakṣaiḥ śuṣkatarkānusāribhiḥ/ ārṣe viplāvite granthe... VP II. 479*. The attackers of Patañjali are *śuṣkatarkānu-sārīn*, a code word for non-Vedic.
- b. *yah patañjaliśiṣyebhyo bhraṣṭo vyākaraṇāgamah/ kālena dākṣiṇātyeṣu granthamātre vyavasthitaḥ// VP II. 480*. The *vyākaraṇāgama* did almost become *vicchinna*.

13. The circumstances allow us to suggest that Bhartṛhari is engaged in the project of re-establishing the Vyākaraṇa tradition. Components of this project are:

- a. Making a claim for the status of Āgama for Vyākaraṇa.
- b. Making a claim of *avicchinnaṣparamparā*, in the face of the historical fact of a break in the tradition.

¹⁸ Also Vṛtti on VP 1.29 (Iyer 1966: 85): *tasmād anādir gurupūrvakramāgatā śiṣṭānumānahetur avyabhicārā lakṣaṇaprapaṇcābhyāṃ paryāyair śabdavalī cāśabdā ca smṛtir nibadhyate/*

- c. Relocating the Vyākaraṇa squarely within a Vedic fold,¹⁹ in view of the possibly uncomfortable fact that the almost lost Mahābhāṣya was discovered by the Buddhist Candracārya, and that the Buddhists were making strong claims on Pāṇini (cf. Deshpande 1997).
- d. Supporting a 'Veda-based' tradition of Sanskrit grammar, and countering the rise of 'non-Vedic' traditions of Sanskrit grammar.

It thus seems circumstantially very plausible that the doctrinal shift in Bhartṛhari, as compared with the views found in the Mahābhāṣya, was compelled by the specific circumstances of the near loss of the tradition of Patañjali, the role of the Buddhists in its recovery, and the claims the Buddhists were beginning to make on the Pāṇinian tradition. The increasing use of Sanskrit by the Buddhists and Jains by this time may have created a new additional complicating factor that did not exist at the time of Patañjali. Thus, Bhartṛhari seems to be at pains to distinguish his grammatical tradition from other traditions, especially the non-Vedic ones. In spite of the well-known argument for Bhartṛhari's 'perspectivism', we should note that the only perspective prominently promoted in the Vākyapadīya and its Vṛtti is the *nityatva* perspective for language. Expressions like *nityāḥ śabdārthasambandhāḥ* (VP 1.23) and *anādim avyavacchinnāṃ śrutim āhur akartṛkām* (VP 1.136) are given in the Vākyapadīya without competing alternative perspectives, while the Mahābhāṣya is still discussing the *nityatva* and *kāryatva* views without committing itself firmly to either (*yady eva nityo 'ihāpi kārya ubhayathāpi lakṣaṇaṃ pravartyam*, Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 6). While the Dīpikā discusses these alternative perspectives, the Vākyapadīya and the Vṛtti are firmly on the side of the *nityatva* view of language and Veda.²⁰ This firming up may have occurred in the context of Buddhist views of language that were current. The defense of *nityatva* and *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda as seen in Bhartṛhari, as well as in the tradition

¹⁹ *tasmād akṛtakaṃ śāstraṃ smṛtiṃ ca sanibandhanām/ āśrityārabhyate śiṣṭaiḥ śabdānām anuśāsanam/* / VP 1.43. The Vṛtti on this verse squarely puts the grammatical tradition within the Vedic roots: *tasmād apauruṣeyam analiṣaṅkanīyaṃ puruṣahitopadeśāya pravṛttam āmnāyaṃ pramāṇīkṛtya pṛṣodarādivac ca sādhuśabdaprayogeṣu śiṣṭācaritam avicchinnaṃ pāramparyaṃ svacaraṇasamūcāraṃ pariṅghya virodhe ca sthītavikalpāni ulsargāpavādvanti pūrveṣāṃ ṛṣiṇām smṛtiśāstraṇi pratikālaṃ dṛṣṭaśabdasvarūpavyabhicārāṇi pramāṇīkṛtyedam ācāryaiḥ śabdānuśāsanam prakṛāntam anugamyate* (Iyer 1966: 99-100).

²⁰ It may be noted that the Vṛtti on VP 1.23 explores various alternative explanations of the notion of *nityatva*, but does not entertain the alternative of *anityatva* of words, meanings, and their relations. In fact, it emphatically asserts that if words, meanings, and their relations were *anītya*, there would be no purpose in composing the grammatical śāstras: *latra sūtrāṇām ārambhād eva śabdānām nityatvam abhimatam/ na hy anityatve śabdādīnām śāstrārambhe kiñcid api prayojanam asti* (Iyer 1966: 61). VP 1.28 shows that Bhartṛhari is willing to compromise by accepting *vyavasthānityatā*, as opposed to *kūṭasihanityatā*, but this is as far as he seems to be willing to go. One must admit at least a minimalist notion of *nityatā*, and the doctrine of *anityatva* is not admissible. This shows the limits he is willing to travel, so far and no further.

of Mīmāṃsā, is most likely occurring in the context of the Buddhist opposition as was suggested by Francis Clooney (1990). The R̥ṣification of the grammarian-sages, including Patañjali, was only a small part of this project. The primary goal of the project seems to have been to bring the grammatical tradition squarely back into the Vedic fold, by claiming Āgamic foundations for it. We know rather very little about the actual circumstances of Bhartṛhari's life. However, he himself reports the recovery of the Mahābhāṣya by Candrācārya and the efforts of Candrācārya in re-establishing its tradition. The continued active interest of the Buddhists in the propagation of the Pāṇinian tradition indicated by the presence of eminent Pāṇinian Buddhist grammarians like Jinendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti, Śaraṇadeva and Puruṣottamadeva was perhaps resented by the followers of the Vedic tradition to some extent, and Bhartṛhari's doctrinal shift may perhaps be an early response to such a rivalry. A possible indication of such a shift may be seen in VP II. 482:

*nyāyaprasthānamārgāṃs tān abhyasya svaṃ ca darśanam/
praṇīto guruṇāsmākaṃ ayam āgamasamgrahaḥ//*

The verse seems to suggest that Bhartṛhari's guru, Vasurāta, received the tradition of the Mahābhāṣya as revived by Candrācārya, but in composing his Āgamasamgraha, he also incorporated his own philosophic tradition (*svaṃ darśanam*). One could say that he brought the recovered tradition of Sanskrit grammar back within the fold of his own *darśana*. This emphasis on not crossing the boundary of one's own *śāstra* is seen elsewhere in the Vākyapadīya and the Vṛtti:

vedaśāstrāvirodhī ca tarkaś cakṣur apaśyatām/ VP 1.127

Vṛtti: *tatra yāvān anugamyamānas tarkaḥ svaśāstraṃ na bādhate tāvān anugantavyaḥ/* (Iyer 1966: 205).

Vṛṣabha: *evam avasthāpīte āgamaprāmāṇye tīrthikāntarakalpitasya ca tarkasyāprāmāṇye 'bhīpretam tarkāprāmāṇyam kathayati = tarkaś cakṣur iti/ ... tīrthāntaraprakalpitatarkaṃ vyudasya vedārthavyavasthāpakasya mīmāṃsāsthāpitasya śrutilingādeḥ prāmāṇyam udbhāvayati/* (Iyer 1966: 205).

Thus, with the given circumstantial evidence, we are in a position to read between the lines of Bhartṛhari's work and are able to detect a historical situation of rivalry and cooperation between the Buddhist tradition and the Hindu-Vedic tradition. In certain ways, the situation in Bhartṛhari is comparable with what one finds in the work of Gauḍapāda, but that is the topic for another occasion.²¹

²¹ This feeling of rivalry may be compared with the oft-quoted critique of Amarasiṃha, the author of the famous Amarakośa, that he stole the whole Mahābhāṣya: *amarasiṃho hi pāpīyān sarvaṃ bhāṣyam acūcurat*.

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Thought, Language and Consciousness: Bhartṛhari's View of Language

K.D. TRIPATHI

Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language emerges from the antecedent Vedic tradition replete with the speculations on Vāk and Brahman in different contexts. K.A. Subramania Iyer asserts that some of them certainly contain the idea that Brahman is the ultimate source of all, while others convey the idea that Vāk is the origin of everything.¹

Vākyapadīya inherits that tradition and, therefore, is not merely a text that offers a theory of meaning in order to facilitate the analysis of language as an object to enable us to understand the multiplicity of the phenomenal world. It is an *āgama* too, which offers a deeper insight into the nature of Ultimate Being in order to resolve the perennial tension of Indian metaphysics between unity and multiplicity, internal and external, subtle and gross, formless and all-forms, universal and particular, microcosm and macrocosm, and so on.²

Initial five kārīkās of Brahmakāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya form the core of Bhartṛhari's philosophy according to which the Ultimate Reality, Brahman, which is without beginning and end, is of the nature of word (*śabda-tattva*) when viewed from the angle of creation and from it are manifested all the objects and the whole cosmos. This Ultimate Reality is

¹ K.A. Subramania Iyer, 1969: 99.

² K.D. Tripathi, 1990: 208-11.

One, but it manifests itself as many because of its power. It does so, however, without losing its oneness. Its two powers, *vidyā* and *avidyā*, which are in opposition to each other, are not different from it. All multiplicity appears due to the power of *avidyā*, i.e., the power of differentiation; however, unity persists due to the power of *vidyā*.

The Ultimate, which is One, contains the seed of all multiplicity and manifests itself as the experiencer, experienced and the experience itself. In fact, the time as power, which is the first among the diverse powers emerging from *avidyā*, is essentially one; however, division is superimposed on it. All the different kinds of changes (*ṣaḍ bhāva-vikāras*), which bring about multiplicity in the Being, depend on it. Veda, the means (*upāya*) of realizing the Ultimate as well as its symbol (*anukāra*), i.e., *upeya*, is one, though handed down to us by the sages in many recensions.

These ideas, which form the core of the *āgama* of grammarians which was once lost and then regained, may be distinguished from the grammatical or linguistic content of *vyākaraṇa-śāstra* and the moral issues appearing in the text termed by Bhartṛhari as *vyākaraṇa-smṛti*. Iyer has rightly emphasized that Bhartṛhari has always the Ultimate Reality in mind even when he is speaking about *jāti* or *dravya*, *kriyā* or *sādhana*, *kāla* or *dik* and so on. He somehow connects it all with Brahman. Thus, the metaphysical basis of the *Vākyapadīya* figures as the main content of the work and runs like a thread right through his work, giving it a unity.³ It may be emphasized here that the confusion about the main topic discussed in *Vākyapadīya* was created by the observations made by Helārāja regarding the topics discussed in *Vākyapadīya*. Helārāja makes his observations in the beginning of his commentary on *Jāti-samuddeśa*, wherein he maintains that *Vākyapadīya* is devoted to dealing with eight *padārtha*s as they have been enumerated in *kārikā*s 24-26 of *Brahmakāṇḍa*.⁴ The fact remains that Bhartṛhari is enumerating there the topics primarily discussed in *vyākaraṇa-śāstra* and not in *vyākaraṇa-āgama*. In *vyākaraṇa-āgama*, i.e., *Vākyapadīya*, they find a secondary place. Primarily, it is the philosophy that has been discussed in *Vākyapadīya*.

³ K.A. Subramania Iyer, 1969: 98.

⁴ इह पदार्थाष्टकविचारपरत्वात् वाक्यपदीयस्य, प्रथमकाण्डेन प्रयोजनादिपदार्थं निर्णीतेऽनन्तरकाण्डोपपादितोपपत्तिभिः वाक्यतदर्थयोरन्वाख्येयस्थितलक्षणयोः पदार्थयोर्निर्णीतत्वात् तदौपयिकापोद्धाररूपपदविचारः प्रक्रम्यते। Helārāja, VP III. i. p. 1.

Compare this with the *Vṛtti* on VP, I.24-26: त्रिष्वप्येषु श्लोकेषु प्रस्तुतस्य परिसमाप्तिः। *api* occurring in the foregoing sentence may be taken to be 'भिनक्रम'. Thus the sentence should be read as त्रिषु एषु श्लोकेषु प्रस्तुतस्य परिसमाप्तिरपि। Thus, the meaning is: "The matter presented (here) ends too in these three verses." In fact, *kārikā* I.26 clearly states: "These are only a few issues which have been dealt with here (i.e., in VP) according to tradition so that they may be retained in memory." Hence, it may be concluded, these eight topics have been elaborately dealt with in *vyākaraṇa-śāstra*, i.e., *sūtra*, *anulantra* (*vārtika*), and *bhāṣya*.

Thus, the metaphysical nature of Vākyapadiya is evident. Viewing language as identical with consciousness on the one hand, and as the substratum of thought process on the other, corroborates the theory that the Ultimate Reality is the Word-principle.

Vāk as consciousness figures in kārikās 124-126 of Brahmakāṇḍa and the Vṛtti thereon.⁵ The Vṛtti is full of terms such as *caitanya*, *saṃvit*, *pratyavamarśa*, *anusandhāna*, and *citi-kriyā*. Vāk as *parā-prakṛti*, where all the transmutations cease to exist, is viewed as a goal to be attained. She, in her aspect of consciousness or self-consciousness, is the basis for all sciences, arts and crafts. Whatever is created can thus be analysed and communicated.⁶ All sciences are closely bound with the knowledge, which is of the nature of Word. The artist works with the word in his intellect and the intellect is further rooted in the consciousness. The eternal Word is not perceived by the ears but the manifest word becomes perceptible through its own unmanifest cause, the unmanifest One, as the air by fanning. The power that is breath (*prāṇa*) lies in the Self, strikes at different places of articulation and becomes differentiated. Thus, the unity of the process — starting from consciousness and going upto the gross words, through the *prāṇa* and *buddhi* — is evident. This unique notion of language, essentially Vedic, blossoms forth in the later philosophy of grammar and in the Tantras.

Language is the foremost human behaviour which links all human experiences and goes even deeper as being identical with our consciousness. Being the most intrinsic and subtle, language culminates into the 'awareness of awareness' (*sā hi pratyavamarśinī* —VP I.124d). However, viewing language as the substratum of thought-process on the one hand, and as being identical with the indivisible consciousness and the Absolute on the other, raises some serious questions.

The idea of inevitable and necessary in-dwelling of verbality in the cognition raises the question: whether grammarians admit determinate cognition only? If the question is answered in the affirmative, then a problem would arise: how do they speak in terms of Brahman, *parā-prakṛti* and a yoga entitled *śabda-pūrva-yoga* and *krama-saṃhāra-yoga*?

⁵ (a) वाग्रूपता चेदुक्तामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती। न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी॥
सा सर्वविद्याशिल्पानां कलानां चोपबन्धनी। तद्वशादभिनिष्पन्नं सर्वं वस्तु विभज्यते॥
सैषा संसारिणां संज्ञा बहिरन्तश्च वर्तते। तन्मात्राप्यतिक्रान्तं चैतन्यं सर्वजातिषु॥

—VP I.124-26.

(b) See also Vṛtti on the above.

⁶ प्रत्यक्चैतन्येऽन्तःसन्निवेशितस्य परसम्बोधनार्था व्यक्तितरभिष्यन्दते।

— Vṛtti, VP I. p. 3.

Nevertheless, such a great scholar as Mahāmahopādhyāya Gopīnātha Kavirāja maintains, "In the expression *na so'sti pratyayo loke* [Vāk 1.124], the word *loke* implies modal consciousness. This consciousness is discursive and relative. It must be borne in mind that the grammarian does not admit what is ordinarily known as *nirvikalpaka-vṛttijñāna*, cf. the stoic view on connection between language and thought (Janet and Seales, History of the Problems of Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 208)" [Kaviraj 1966: 15]. The question has been further examined recently by Bimal Krishna Matilal.⁷ He states that language constitutes not only a wider part of thought, but rather it is an indispensable substratum of thought. Verbalizability is immanent in our cognitive faculty. In fact, it is claimed that the cognitive faculty operates necessarily with the verbal faculty. Elaborating this idea, Matilal examines the thesis of Bhartṛhari and views it in terms of its strong and weak versions. The strong version, according to him, is:

B1. All cognitive episodes are equivalent to verbal thought.

However, he expresses his reservations that this will exclude many primitive, non-verbal experiences from the domain of awareness-episode and declare them to be non-cognitive in character. It is somewhat doubtful whether Bhartṛhari intended his thesis in this form. Hence, Matilal proposes a weaker version which will allow for certain primitive, pre-linguistic cognitive episodes, among which we can put the so-called pure sensory experiences, 'raw feels', etc. The weaker version is:

B2. Most cognitive episodes are verbal thoughts at some implicit level.⁸

Matilal interprets certain portions of the Vṛtti differently from the way Iyer has understood them. He holds the view that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta assimilated the theory of Bhartṛhari into their metaphysical doctrine of Śiva consciousness. Matilal uses the remarks of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta to expound further the thesis of language-impregnated nature of awareness, for it has some important implications for the theories of perceptual awareness. He refers to the arguments advanced by Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, and Mīmāṃsakas, according to whom there are two types of perceptual awareness, *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*; by almost common consent, the first (*nirvikalpaka*) is the sensory awareness where no concept and, hence, no language or word (*śabda*) can appear, and the second one (*savikalpaka*), where words, concepts, and universals are essentially present. Bhartṛhari and, following him, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta maintain the opposite views, viz., that even in the so-called *nirvikalpaka* non-conceptual state the word is interpenetrated as *vāg-rūpatā*. For, it is argued, without such *vāg-rūpatā* (verbal nature), which Bhartṛhari calls

⁷ B.K. Matilal 1990: 133-41.

⁸ Ibid.: 133-34.

pratyavamarśa and the Śaivite monists of Kashmir call *vimarśa*, or sometimes *parāmarśa*, an awareness which is awareness of the object it reveals, the light of awareness itself will not illuminate (*na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta.*)⁹

My purpose in citing this somewhat lengthy passage from Matilal is to point out that modern scholarship has moved in a direction different from that of Mahāmahopādhyāya Kavirāja. Matilal presents the arguments advanced by Dharmakīrti and answers the questions raised by him the way Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta have answered them.

We need not conclude from the VP I.124 cited above that either Bhartṛhari admits *savikalpaka* or discursive cognition only or that *nirvikalpaka* or non-discursive cognition must necessarily be divested of every level of *vāk*. Hence, it may be stated that *pratyavamarśa* is present in *nirvikalpaka* cognition and even beyond according to Bhartṛhari.

But how does Bhartṛhari account for his philosophical position? Apparently, he develops this idea of impregnation of thought by the word on the basis of his notion of *śabda-bhāvanā*. Whether understood in terms of 'residual traces of linguistic ability', as interpreted by Matilal, or as 'word-seed' or the 'residual traces from previous births,' as understood by Iyer, this *śabda-bhāvanā*, explains the riddle of the presence of linguistic abilities even in a new born baby or a dumb and deaf by birth, the way it has been admitted by the grammarians. It may be observed here that the notion of *śabda-bhāvanā* carries forward the idea of verbal impregnation of thought and links the level of ordinary experience with the metaphysical experience. Thus, Bhartṛhari's theory of meaning is a double-faced one that explains reality at the phenomenal level as well as at the transcendental level.

Viewing Supreme Reality as *sphoṭa* from the angle of *vācaka* (expressive word), *pratibhā* from the angle of *vācya* (expressed meaning) and *paśyantī* from the angle of both, serves the metaphysical purpose of the grammarians. The term *paśyantī*, or the Seeing One, suggests that it may see both: the phenomenal as well as transcendental aspects of reality, i.e., towards *madhyamā* and *vaikhari* on the one hand, and towards *parā* or Brahman on the other. It is logically necessary for the system, as M. Biarreau holds, to postulate the Being as pure unity and non-differentiation in order to show profound correlation of the objective and subjective aspects of reality and, at the same time, it is not contrary to the postulation that Being is Brahman or *śabda-tattva*, for that undivided Brahman holds within itself the phenomenal diversity as well as the unity and then, transcends both. Kārikās of the Vākyapadīya clearly emphasize this point in VP III. i. Dravyasamuddeśa, 7-14.

⁹ Ibid.: 135-36.

Bhartṛhari's notion of *vivarta*, which is fundamentally different from that of Śaṅkara, is an attempt to resolve the tension between the unity of the Being and its manifestation as the diversity of the phenomena. The notion of *vivarta* has been elaborated in the following *kārikā*.

"Of which one that is the seed of all, there is this state of multiplicity, that of the enjoyer, the enjoyed and enjoyment." [VP I.4. trans: Iyer: 1965]

Vṛtti of the first *kārikā* faithfully expands this notion of *vivarta* and asserts that unity as the oneness of one is never lost, yet it assumes the apparent diversity of forms – unreal, divergent and the other. This notion of *vivarta* is fundamentally different from the Sāṃkhya notion of *pariṇāma* in which reality is transformed into the other form which is real. It is different from the notion of *vivarta* as admitted by Śaṅkara in which the diversity is superimposed, hence completely illusory. In the *vivarta* admitted by Bhartṛhari, the one appears as if many (*bhedānukāreṇa*). The apparent multiplicity persists as long as there is ignorance, but disappears in *vidyā*.

Moreover, the One diversifies himself through his own power of *avidyā* and appears as experiencer, experienced and experience. In order to illustrate the idea, Vṛtti cites the analogy of the dream in which viewer divides himself as the object of the dream, the view as well as the viewer. It all happens due to the power of *avidyā* or the nescience which leads to the differentiation, i.e., the phenomenal diversity. But the phenomena do not simply veil the Being, they reveal it also, or rather the Being manifests itself through them. Vṛtti offers the logic of this manifestation as *pratyavabhāsa*.

Yet the question remains, for whom this happens? It is for the one who has already overcome *avidyā* and stays in *vidyā*. The notion of power as 'freedom' or *svātantrya* is implicit in the doctrine of *Śaktimat Brahman* of the grammarians; otherwise, postulation of two powers contradictory to each other cannot be explained satisfactorily. Kashmir Śaivism may be credited with making the implicit as explicit.

All diversity and change appear in time as well as in space. Hence, the first manifestation of the power of *avidyā* is *Kālaśakti* or the power of time. All activity appears in time and all the forms are manifested in the space. Thus, the concretization and the manifestation of the language happens in sequentiality or temporality and in forms or spatiality. The temporal words are incapable of expressing the Ultimate Reality, because, Reality in its ultimate aspect embraces all forms, or more correctly speaking, it is formless (VP, III.i. Saṃbandha-samuddeśa, 56).

There is, however, something which runs through all these unreal forms and which persists when these forms disappear. That is Brahman, the Ultimate Reality and that is the unity of all expressive words and the

expressed meanings. Vākyapadīya constantly emphasizes this aspect of the language and offers a unique logic to understand it and a spiritual practice, i.e., yoga to realize that supreme state of Being. This spiritual practice has been termed as *śabdapūrvayoga* or the yoga of transcending the verbal multiplicity or plurality through the words themselves. All such verbal multiplicity occurs in time; hence, it is an activity, temporal and sequential. Spiritual practice of grammar shows the path to submerge such a sequentiality into the plenitude of the Self, the Consciousness. Therefore, it has been termed as *kramasamhārayoga*. Since it is the yogic path based on the purity of language, it is called *vāgyoga*. The stages of such a unique yogic practice have been taught in the Vṛtti in a few kārīkās of Vākyapadīya explaining *śabdapūrvayoga* and Vāk as *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikhārī*. *Parā vāk* has been mentioned in the kārīkā itself as *parā prakṛti*.¹⁰

Thus, the phenomena are defiled existence (*aśuddhi*). Absolute has been understood in terms of plenitude, transcending the subject-object duality. It is the empirical world which has fallen into subject-object duality. The relation between the Absolute and the phenomena is that of transcendence and immanence both. Bhartṛhari views realization of the absolute unity in terms of purity or *śuddhi* (VP I.9).

Moreover, Bhartṛhari speaks in terms of grammar as the highway for attaining *mokṣa* or *apavarga* and expounds the distinct path of *śabdapūrvayoga*, or the yoga of moving from *śabda* to that which transcends the word. It may be stated here that the word *pūrvā* occurring in the term *śabdapūrvayoga*, means *atīta* (beyond) according to Nāmaliṅgānuśāsana of Amarasimha.¹¹

Thus, the identity of Vāk with consciousness does not create any obstacle in developing an idea of speech that explains the multiplicity of the phenomenal world and paves the way for the emergence of the aesthetic theory of Dhvani and Rasa as enunciated by the Kashmir Śaivas and, at the same time, offers a metaphysical theory which blossoms into the Tantric philosophy shared by Śaivas, Śāktas, and Vaiṣṇavas alike.

¹⁰ VP III. i, Dravyasamuddeśa, 15.

¹¹ (a) पूर्वोऽन्यलिङ्गः प्रागाह ।

—Nāmaliṅgānuśāsana (Amarakośa), III.3.133.

(b) प्रागतीतार्थकम् ।

—Nāmaliṅgānuśāsana (Amarakośa), III.4.16.

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Thought and Language: The Bhartṛharian Perspective

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This paper tries to place Bhartṛhari's views in the backdrop of one of the central issues of modern philosophy of language – whether thought is independent of language or language-determined. Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* can be claimed to be one of the oldest treatises meticulously dealing with this issue. I shall discuss his views on the topic from two angles —

- (i) Thought and language as components of linguistic communication,
- (ii) Thought and language as conceptual entities and their relative priority.

On the first issue Bhartṛhari conceives a two-dimensional relation between language and thought. And on the second issue, he prefers to prioritize language over thought, dismissing thereby the popular and commonsensical theory that language is just a vehicle of thought. In this context I shall also like to compare notes with some relevant modern views on these issues. Sometimes such a comparative study is necessary because the present is always enriched by the past, and the past is better assessed by its capability to face the challenges of the present.

I.

Before I explicate Bhartṛhari's views on the theme, I must clarify that no discussion on any aspect of his philosophy is complete without reference to his multi-layered method of analysis of the phenomenon, called '*śabda*' (generally translatable as language).

Broadly speaking, he explicates language from three angles – (i) *śabda* as a *tattva*, i.e., the metaphysical principle; (ii) *śabda* as an object of *loka-vyavahāra*, i.e., as it is used; and (iii) *śabda* as *śāstra-vyavahāra*, i.e., as an object of analytical or grammatical study. Here, my focus would be on *loka-vyavahāra*, though occasionally I have to refer to the notion of *śabda* as a *tattva*.

Bhartrhari conceives language, that we use in our day to day life, as communicative in nature, for he uses the term *vyavahāra*, very often to mean 'the use of words to communicate one's thought', 'verbal usage' or 'exchange of ideas'. He also projects language as an act. It is an activity in human beings. The Sanskrit term for this is '*śabdānā*', which B.K. Matilal (1990: 85) very aptly translates as 'languageing'. As an act it involves the speaker's expression of his intention through the utterance-act, and the hearer's ability to grasp what is being expressed along with the intention of the speaker. He explains the process of linguistic communication by introducing a distinction between *sphoṭa* and *nāda*. In case of expressive words (as opposed to the meaningless sounds) one has to distinguish between two elements – one is the root cause of manifestation (*nimitta*), and the other is the applied (*prayujyate*), when manifested to convey meaning (VP I.44). In other words, every linguistic communication has two aspects: (1) the element that causes manifestation, that makes the implicit potency explicit through the (sentential) utterances, and (2) the element which, being actualized, conveys the meaning to the hearer. The former is called *nāda/dhvani* and the latter *sphoṭa*. Pandit Suryanarayana Shukla (1961) interprets this verse both from the speaker's angle, as well as, the hearer's angle. Viewed from the speaker's side, *sphoṭa* is the causal ground (*nimitta*) for the audible sound, which conveys the meaning (*artha*). But from the hearer's point of view, it is just the opposite. The audible sequence of sounds is the causal ground (*nimitta*) of the *sphoṭa*, which in turn, conveys the meaning. K.A.S. Iyer (1969: 153), on the other hand, thinks that the verse should be interpreted from the hearer's angle. It should imply that the sequential stretch of sounds that is heard by the hearer is the cause of the manifestation of the indivisible *sphoṭa*, which is within him and which, when manifested, conveys the meaning. All these interpretations of this rather enigmatic verse make at least one thing clear; it intends to offer us a hint about how Bhartrhari is going to explicate the idea of the communication of meaning. It is suggested that there are spoken words conveying some unitary sense that can be communicated by the speaker and understood by the hearer because there is something commonly shared by both. So the process of linguistic communication necessarily involves three basic elements: (i) the speaker, (ii) the hearer, and (iii) the common ground for inter-subjectivity. For, in Bhartrhari's

opinion communication is not a process of directly transferring the contents of thought from the speaker to the hearer. The competence to express the thought and grasp the meaning exists as an inherent power within human being. It is a property inter-subjectively available. So the expressive word (that the speaker intends to communicate) is made explicit through a 'stretch of sounds' (I use this term following Matilal (2002: 334), because it helps us to clarify that, according to Bhartṛhari, sentences, not the words, are the primary units of communicative meaning); this is *nāda/dhvani*. This audible stretch of sounds that is presented sequentially, syllable by syllable, is the cause (*nimitta*) of the manifestation of the meaning to be communicated. The hearer too, grasps the stretch of sounds along with their multiplicity and sequentiality. But unless the hearer understands the stretch of sounds as representing a unitary and sequenceless meaning, linguistic communication is not achieved. This sequenceless meaning-unit (potentially present in both, the speaker and the hearer) is the *sphoṭa*. As Bhartṛhari clarifies, "Since *nāda* (sound pattern) arises in sequence, *sphoṭa* which has neither former nor later stage and which is sequenceless (*akrama*) is apprehended through *nāda* and appears to be having sequence as well as parts" (VP I.48).

Thus, the meaning-unit (or *sphoṭa*) is a partless, indivisible whole. In contrast, the discernible elements like grammatical and syntactical divisions are very much prominent when the meaning the speaker intends to communicate is presented through the stretch of sounds. If utterance represents the speech, and the meaning intended to be expressed is taken to be the non-verbal element present in the mind of the speaker, then it is obvious that Bhartṛhari maintains a duality between speech and thought. Both the elements are autonomous, yet not autonomous to the extent of excluding each other. But he would claim that in the ultimate sense these two elements are indistinguishable, as is evident from his explanatory note on the verse I.44, where he clarifies: "In the sequenceless nature of the *vāk* (speech) [which also means *sphoṭa*] both the powers, the power to be articulated in sound (audible form) and the power to convey meaning lie intermixed". It is clear from this statement that Bhartṛhari does not identify *sphoṭa* with the *artha* or meaning. In spite of the risk of misrepresentation I would like to interpret *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* distinction in terms of the distinction between (what Western philosophers would call) the propositional content and the speech-act. I have used the term 'propositional content' to make it clear that according to Bhartṛhari the same *sphoṭa* can be expressed in different formulations and different languages. Yet it will be misleading to say that *sphoṭa* is the bearer of meaning. It is rather the unit of linguistic potency which, when expressed, is diversified into two elements, *dhvani* and *artha*. In one of its dimension it is expressed

as sound pattern and in another, it is the meaning-bearing unit. So *sphoṭa* should not be confused with the meaning-bearing unit. Rather, Bhartṛhari believes that *sphoṭa* along with expressing the meaning expresses itself. This may be evident from the following verse. He says "Just as light/fire (*jyoti*) resides in the *araṇī* (churning) stick and being manifested becomes the cause for manifesting other objects, *śabda* resides likewise in the mind (*buddhi*, the inner faculty) and being manifested becomes separately the cause for manifesting itself as well as the meaning" (I.46). In the quoted passages we note that he uses the terms *śabda* and *sphoṭa* almost interchangeably. And both the terms seem to refer to a principle that includes both, the sequential form of words and the meaning. This principle of unity itself is the *sphoṭa*. Moreover, this verse states very clearly that the locus of *śabda/sphoṭa* is *buddhi* or the inner faculty of cognition (*śabdo'pi buddhisthaḥ śrūtinām kāraṇam pṛthak*). In other words, if speech is taken to be meaningful stretch of sounds then *sphoṭa* (which exists at the mental level) is its cause. Of course, there is no unanimity of opinion among the scholars regarding the exact significance of the term *sphoṭa*. According to John Brough (1972) and K.K. Raja (1969) *sphoṭa* is the meaning-bearing unit in its linguistic aspect. For S.D. Joshi (1967) and G. Cardona (1976) *sphoṭa* should mean sound unit of the language system, whereas K.A.S. Iyer (1969) argues that it should stand for meaning-bearing speech unit. However I would like to accept B.K. Matilal's (1990) interpretation of the term *sphoṭa* as signifying 'language principle'.¹ Justifying his view he says that *sphoṭa* is the linguistic unit, which is identical with its meaning and hence the 'language principle'. He says, "Language is not the vehicle of meaning or conveyor-belt of thought. Thought anchors language and language anchors thought. *Śabdanā*, 'languageing', is thinking; and thought 'vibrates' through language. In this way of looking at things, there cannot be any essential difference between a linguistic unit and its meaning or the thought it conveys. *Sphoṭa* refers to this non-differentiated language-principle" (p. 85). I intend to come back to discuss the deeper significance of this principle called *sphoṭa*, a little later. For the time being I would like

¹ It appears from Bhartṛhari's exposition that *sphoṭa* stands for unitary sentence meaning (*vākya-sphoṭa*). Interestingly enough he also uses the term with reference to words and phonemes (*pada-sphoṭa* and *varṇa-sphoṭa*, respectively). If we accept that Bhartṛhari conceives sentence as the ultimate point of unity and consequently, *sphoṭa* stands for sentence meaning then his monistic metaphysics would collapse. For, this would mean there could be innumerable number of unrelated *sphoṭas*. This inconsistency in his position can be solved if we take *sphoṭa* in the sense of 'one and unitary' language-principle. He has already hinted that the power of expressibility, i.e., *śabda* or *sphoṭa* is in the inner faculty (*buddhi*) that is expressed through each meaningful utterance. So in all probability he used the term *sphoṭa* or *śabda* in an extended sense when he talked of *sphoṭa* in the context of words or sentences.

to dwell a little longer on Bhartṛhari's conception of language-thought equation and explicate the issue from another angle.

We have noted that Bhartṛhari maintains a distinction between the 'language at the level of thought' and 'language at the level of speech'; between the 'meaning to be expressed' and the 'meaning actually expressed' through articulated stretch of sounds. But ultimately he seems to reject their autonomy. This may give rise to a paradoxical situation. But Bhartṛhari sees no paradox in his position. He may still hold that at a certain level there is an undeniable interdependence between language and thought. The implications of such a viewpoint will be clear if we examine Bhartṛhari's analysis of the processes of linguistic communication. Exploring the process of linguistic communication from the speaker's angle, he identifies three discernible elements in an utterance, viz., the sound pattern/form of words (*vācaka*), the meaning expressed (*vācya*) and speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*). *Vācya* is the meaning to be expressed and *vācaka* is the meaning expressed through the stretch of sounds. In a broad sense, *vācya* stands for the meaning-content (*artha*) and *vācaka* for stretch of words (VP I.50). For certain practical reasons, Bhartṛhari thinks, the distinction is to be maintained. If meaning would have been conceptually inseparable from words then the same meaning could not have been expressed in different forms of sentences; or we would not have translated the meaning of sentences from one language to another. But we must remember that the speaker's utterance is always presented sequentially, syllable by syllable. The moment one syllable is uttered it is replaced by another syllable. So how does the speaker manage to convey the meaning that has a unitary sense? Bhartṛhari's answer to the problem is interesting, yet profound. He would say that the level of utterance is just one part of the linguistic expressibility. So he introduces the notion of a three-tiered process of linguistic communicability. In this scheme the level of utterance is only the last stage of the process, which he calls the *vaikharī vāk* (elaborated speech). The level of utterance points to a deeper level of thought. It is the pre-verbal stage identified as the *madhyamā vāk*. "Mind is its only substratum" (Vṛtti under I.142). This pre-verbal stage is broadly comparable to the modern notion of an episodic but unexpressed pre-verbal thought. It is a thought with the same verbal content. In this stage the thought is already linked to an idea or object, but un-uttered. If we take thought to mean what the sentence purports to communicate then we can say that language presupposes thought and thought is operative through language. But uttered speech with discernible elements and the pre-verbal stage with the supposed distinction (though pre-verbal) between the word and the meaning refer to an ultimate stage where the distinction between *vācya* and *vācaka* is obliterated. It points to a level beyond *buddhi*.

This stage is called the *paśyanti vāk*, a purely non-verbal stage of language. This is the stage in which the potentiality for the expressiveness is inherent, but not explicit. It is non-differentiated principle and is identical with the consciousness. This is also the stage of *sphoṭa*, the *language-principle*, from which meaning as if bursts forth (for, that is the etymological significance of the root *sphuṭ* from which the word *sphoṭa* is derived) along with the phonetic and syntactical elements. Though Bhartṛhari never explicitly associates *paśyanti vāk* with the *sphoṭa*, we can infer this from his commentary on the verse I.142. It is stated: "The seeing one (*paśyanti*) is that in which sequence is merged and though it is One the *power to produce sequence* has entered into it. It is restless (*calācalā*) ... the forms of the objects of knowledge have entered into it or merged into it." *Paśyanti*, described as *restless* points to a potency that has a tendency to manifest itself in preverbal and verbal level. Understood in this sense we can be in better position to understand Bhartṛhari's statement that the potency of language is like a peahen's egg. All the colours of a full-grown peahen are potentially there in the egg. These colours are manifested when the peahen comes out of the egg. Similarly the *sphoṭa* or *śabda* is the potential stage in which the linguistic form, along with its power to mean is already there in all languageing beings (I.51). Elaborating the relationship between these three stages of the linguistic process Bhartṛhari says: "All the objects (meant) merge into the intellect (as potentialities) and intellect merges into sequenceless Word as potentiality" (Vṛtti on I.118). So there seems to be no incongruity in connecting the stage of *paśyanti* with *sphoṭa* or the principle of language.

But is it not a problematic stance adopted by Bhartṛhari? If languageing rests on unity then why does he maintain that a sort of duality exists at the initial stage of linguistic process between thought and language? It seems that Bhartṛhari assumes such a distinction as a convenient ploy, for otherwise languageing cannot be an act of communication. He says "Just as the mind of the speaker first turns to the words, in the same way, the attention of the hearers also is directed towards them" (I.53). So he believes that even if the duality between thought and language is suppressed at the ultimate level, the residual force of the differentiation is not totally abandoned. So the moment a speaker desires to say something the duality is again operative. "It is this merging and emerging of word, which is looked upon as its activity" (Vṛtti under I.51). But, a relevant question may be raised at this point – if the element of differentiation is so important for communication what is the need for Bhartṛhari to conceive of a non-differentiated language principle called *sphoṭa*? Why does he not follow the less complicated path of explaining the linguistic communication either in terms of duality, or else in terms of either thought or language alone? In this context it may be of great interest to examine some of the modern

Western theories of philosophy of language, especially those theories that deal with the communicative dimension of language. Such an undertaking is likely to help us in assessing Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language, with reference to his theory of *sphoṭa*.

It is well known that the course of Western philosophy took, what is popularly known as, 'the linguistic turn' in the first part of 20th century. Since then prolific works have been produced on the concept of language. It is neither necessary nor possible for me to scan the entire literature of Western philosophy of language. I shall concentrate only on some important communicative theories of meaning and examine how such theories deal with the problem of language-thought equation. At the outset, I must make it clear that I do not intend to dwell on the points of similarity between the Western philosophers (such as, Derrida, Chomsky or Frege) and Bhartṛhari. I would rather concentrate on the points of difference for, this may be more helpful in explaining why Bhartṛhari needs to assume an initial distinction between thought and language and finally discard this initial dualism as far as communication of meaning is concerned. So I shall be taking up these two questions conjointly while discussing the relevant theories.

In the Western philosophy of language we primarily come across two diverging views regarding the relation between thought and language in the context of the expression of meaning. On the one hand, there are philosophers like Wittgenstein (1953), Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), who prefer to confine the problem of the communication of meaning within the limits of language and its use, without treading the area of thought; on the other hand, there are intentionalists like Grice (1957) and later-Searle (1983), who view language just as a medium of thought, thereby prioritizing thought. There is also a middle line of thought represented by the Interpretationists like Davidson, who seem to offer an equal status to both, thought and language. I shall discuss these three alternative positions in brief to examine the rationality of Bhartṛhari's position.

Wittgenstein and following him many others like Austin and Searle display a sort of apathy towards the possible role of thought in the analysis of language, often fearing that this would lead to a form of psychologism. Wittgenstein argues that we need not make a conceptual reference to mental states in explaining the nature and functioning of language. So we can clearly see that Wittgenstein would have reacted negatively to Bhartṛhari's way of looking at language-thought equation. He would have shared Bhartṛhari's position regarding the functional and the communicative role of language. But he would not at any cost buy the idea that there may be a complementary relation between thought and language.

Wittgenstein, (especially in his *Philosophical Investigations*) rather suggests that one should confine the analysis of the concepts of 'language' and 'meaning' within the limits of speech or verbal utterance. He admits that we do talk of such mental concepts as 'meaning', 'belief', 'understanding', 'intention' in the context of linguistic expression, but they are nothing more than 'grammatical fictions'. He even goes to the extent of labeling such mentalistic hypothesis as a 'general disease of thinking'. Explaining his position on this issue Pitcher (1972: 275) says:

"Once we have an overall view of variety of situations in which the terms 'meaning' and 'understanding' are used, and of various criteria of their use, there is nothing more to know about what meaning and understanding are. To know their meanings, Wittgenstein would say, is to know their use."

So we note that, Wittgenstein adopts a form of linguistic behaviourism as far as analysis of meaning is concerned. He outright discards the need for presuming an independent level of mental activity for understanding how we operate with meaningful expressions.

Austin and Searle, on the other hand, without sharing Wittgenstein's penchant for linguistic behaviourism, go along with him in claiming that the functioning of language can be well understood without bringing in the concept of thought. They come out with a theory of language that in spite of admitting the importance of the *intention* of the speaker to communicate does not hook up in a way the level of speech with that of the thought. Surprisingly enough both, Austin and Searle largely draw their inspiration from the communication-intention theory of Paul Grice that not only connects language with thought but also believes that language is thought-dependent. In all fairness to Paul Grice, it must be admitted that it was he who provided a revolutionary turn to the philosophy of language by bringing to light the communicative intentional dimension of language as opposed to the purely semantic and formalistic interpretation of this concept. I shall discuss his views on thought-language equation later. For the time being I shall focus on the speech-act theories of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) who agree with Grice that language is an audience-directed activity, therefore communicative in nature; they also agree that the speaker may express his intention while communicating the literal meaning. But they prefer to explain the act of linguistic communication in terms of semantic and syntactic rules, thereby meticulously avoiding treading into the area of 'mind' and 'thought' in their analysis of the linguistic communication. According to Austin, uttering a statement is as good as indulging in multiple forms of acts. These acts include the act of expressing the propositional meaning along with the intention of the speaker (which he prefers to call as the 'force' of an utterance), and also the act of eliciting response from the audience (which he prefers to call

the act of eliciting response from the audience (which he prefers to call 'securing an uptake'). He labels the former element as the 'force' of an utterance, thereby introducing a distinction between 'meaning' and 'force'. However, in Austin's opinion the 'force' or the intention of the speaker has nothing to do with the level of thought. For him, the 'intended meaning' or 'force' is ultimately dependent on linguistic and institutionalized conventions. We can better understand Austin's way of analyzing the communication of meaning with the following example. Suppose a local man in a town says to a stranger, 'This is not a good place'. In this case the speaker is not only making a statement about the place (locutionary act/meaning), but also warning the stranger about the dangers involved (illocutionary act/force). But Austin would want the speaker to say, 'I warn *that* this is not a good place', thereby segregating 'meaning' from the 'force' with the clause 'that'. It is obvious that in case of Austin, 'force' is not exactly the 'intention' as we understand the term today. Pointing out the weakness of Austin's handling of the concept of intention, Strawson very rightly observes that in most cases the illocutionary acts, i.e., the acts of indicating the intention by the speaker succeed not by confirming to the linguistic conventions, but by recognition of the intention by the hearer (1964: 439-66).

John Searle's (1969) account of speech acts, though an improved version of Austin's theory, toes the same line of thought as far as the speaker's intention and the hearer's understanding is concerned. Very much like Austin, he too proposes to explicate the speaker's intention (force of an utterance) in terms of the rules (convention) of language. Therefore he talks of 'force-indicating devices', such as performative verbs and sentential moods to explain the speaker's intention (force). So Wittgenstein, Austin and Searle, in a sense, prefer a form of reductionism, i.e., reducing thought to language, as they interpret the intention of the speaker as well as the understanding of the hearer either in terms of linguistic behaviour or else in terms of institutionalized and conventionalized linguistic rules. Besides, in case of these philosophers the question – how the meaning is conveyed from the speaker to the hearer – receives virtually no attention. Most probably it is taken for granted that knowing the conventions and syntax of a language is enough to guarantee the transference of meaning from the speaker to the hearer. Bhartṛhari would have outright rejected this type of reductionism. He definitely believes that language is an act, but as a communicative act it has to be connected to the level of thought at some level or the other. So thought, at no cost, can be reduced to language as long as we are talking of the speaker's intention to indulge in speech-act and the hearer's desire to understand

Now, I intend to throw some light on the second viewpoint, which admits the importance and independence of thought as an element involved in linguistic communication. This theory, broadly known as Expressivism, is a popular view upheld by the philosophers of language and the philosophers of mind, as well. In this case, unlike the theories discussed above, primacy is attached to thought over language. According to this theory language is nothing more than expression of thought. So the primary function of language is to enable speakers to convey the content of their thought to the hearer. In other words, it is presumed that speaker has a thought, with certain content and he chooses words in such a way that on the basis of these words the hearer is able to recognize that the speaker has a thought with such and such content. This doctrine is supposed to have its genesis in Frege's (1977) famous theory of thought. According to him a sentence expresses a thought. He says: "I call a thought something for which the question of truth arises ... thought, in itself is immaterial, clothes itself in the material garment of a sentence and thereby becomes comprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses a thought" (p. 20). Thus language, for him, is dependent on thought. As he points out: "when one apprehends or thinks a thought one does not create it..." (p. 30). Thus it stands as a *transcendental signified*, which remains constant, in spite of varied forms of utterance. However, we must not conflate Frege's theory with Expressivism. Thought, for Frege, has deeper nuances and in all cases does not mean the 'content of thought', that the speaker intends to express. So it will be better if we concentrate on Grice's famous theory of thought-based semantics. As I have indicated earlier, Grice can be said to be the first philosopher of language who explicitly focuses on the concepts like intention and belief in the analysis of communication of meaning. He attempts to explain what it is to mean something by an utterance in terms of speaker's communicative intention, i.e., the intention to induce certain belief in the hearer. In his famous paper entitled "Meaning" (1957) he specifies, 'A meant something by x' is roughly equivalent to 'A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention' (p. 45). Such a concept of meaning implies that speaker has an intention and he wants his intention to be understood by the hearer (audience) on the basis of his utterance. Grice wants to present a thought-based semantics of natural language in terms of thought via intention. So for him it is the thought-content that imposes meaning on language. But a theorist who explicates meaning in terms of communication of intention must realize the typical nuances of the language in use. For there may be cases where what is stated by an utterance is completely different from what is intended. Grice (1969) in a later article admits the possibility of such linguistic anomalies that he prefers to call them as 'conversational

implicatures.' In such cases, there is a big gap between what is stated and what is meant. For example, in stating 'I love the sound of your voice' one may mean she cannot stand the sound of his voice, and thereby implying that he should stop singing. In case of such implied meaning what can serve as the basis of communicating to the hearer what the speaker intends to communicate? Since for Grice and other communicative-intention theorists communication is a matter of encoding or signalling a thought-content what matters is the utterance made by the speaker and his success in inducing certain belief in the hearer by recognition of the speaker's intention to communicate certain thought-content. Summing up their position Kent Bach (1994) says, "communication essentially involves an audience-directed reflexive intention, so that whether or not the utterance can plausibly be taken at face value, the hearer must rely on the presupposition that the speaker intends what he communicates to be recognized (partly on the basis of that intention)". But Bhartṛhari would like to solve the problem of conversational implicature by referring to both the speaker's and the hearer's power to be a part of the communication process. As he points out, "Meaning in language is dependent on the usage and the speaker-hearer relationship, and the capacity of each one of them to express and comprehend what is going to be expressed and what has been expressed" (II.135). But one might expect in such a communicative intention theory an account of 'what it is for an audience to understand by an utterance x', complementary to an account of 'what it is for a speaker to mean by an utterance x'. Unfortunately, in case of Grice the hearer has no other clue than the speaker's use of words. But how can the hearer understand the speaker's intention unless something common is shared, both by the speaker and the hearer? The communication-intention theorists might say that communication is a kind of 'co-ordination game' (Bach). But how such a game can be played without locating a basic coordination principle? If Grice's position is to be vindicated then it is necessary that the speaker and the hearer should *share an understanding of language*. Otherwise the meaning would remain uncommunicated. Thus, in case of Grice, the ideas of *thought content* and *shared understanding of language* by the speaker and the hearer are fundamental. But in that case he must explain what kind of thought-content is shared in communication. If it is inferable from the choice of the words used by the speaker, then he has to face two kinds of problems. He not only fails to explain how the speaker's intention is communicated, he also fails to give a solid foundation to his thesis that thought has a conceptual priority over language. For, ultimately, one has to *turn back to language to interpret thought-content*.

Now let me discuss in brief another important theory that tries to explain speech in terms of thought. Searle (1983) modifies his earlier

position (undertaken in his speech-act theory) and in his book, *Intentionality*, presents a different kind of thought-based semantics. He successfully overcomes one of the important weaknesses in Grice's theory. He discounts Grice's claim that the speaker's intention in communication is always a case of inducing a belief in the hearer. Yet he goes along with Grice in admitting that meaning of an utterance is inherited from the content of intention. Searle explicates meaningful linguistic utterance in terms of the intentional states of the speaker's beliefs, desires and intentions. The basic features of his theory are – (i) all our activities (including languageing) are governed by intentions, (ii) our assertions and beliefs are supposed to match the world, and so have a 'mind to world direction of fit,' (iii) the world represented by a contentful mental act must be conditioned by criterion of satisfaction (broadly implying truth conditions). Applying these features to his theory of meaning we may say that the speaker, for example, in saying 'it is raining' intends to say so, and has the utterance 'it is raining' having the condition of satisfaction with 'mind to world direction of fit' that 'It is raining'. In this case the meaning of utterance is determined by the content of intention with which an utterance is made provided it satisfies the relevant truth-conditions. So in case of both, Grice and Searle, it is the thought that anchors language, not vice versa. But one may very significantly ask-can such thought-contents exist independent of their linguistic expressions, if we are assuming that language is communicative? Besides, both, Grice and Searle interpret thought-content in terms of episodic thoughts, not thought in general. So we are bound to fall back on linguistic utterances to interpret such episodic intention of the speaker. In that case, can we still maintain that thought is independent of language? For language is an important source of the acquisition of new beliefs and concepts. In this context, Peter Carruthers (1996) raises a very important question, i.e., "how are we to explain our ability to entertain unlimitedly many *new* thought-contents ... except *generatively*, in terms of the construction of new linguistic means for the expression of those thoughts, by putting together old parts in new ways?" (p. 85). Therefore, we may safely claim that unless the Bhāṭṛharian position is admitted, that is, unless we presuppose that thought anchors language and language anchors thought, the theory of thought-based semantics remains inexplicable. This problem raised by Carruthers is a central problem that any philosopher of language must address to. Unfortunately, most of the Western philosophers of language seem to be obsessed with the language of assertion and truth-conditionality (in Searle's case, 'condition of satisfaction'). This does not allow them to give sufficient attention to this problem. But in case of Bhāṭṛhari this problem seems to have an easy solution. In his *Vākyapadīya* he discusses in detail multiple kinds of activities a man can perform with language, including

metaphorical, elliptical, satirical and even ornamental expressions. This, to some extent, is clear from the following explanatory note on verse I.13. He says: "On language depends may be the speaker's intended meaning, the possibility of applying words to things, the ability to combine words into sentences, the connecting of objects with actions, identification of a thing as to be accomplished, or the projection of the content of an awareness as an external object". So he must have sought an answer to the question — how does our language function in limitless ways? And his answer would be that the power to use language in limitless ways is rooted in the dispositional linguistic ability that is present within each conscious human being. And *sphoṭa* is the basic ground of this linguistic ability itself.

So far I have given a brief outline of two radically opposite theories about the relation between the language and the thought as far as linguistic communication is concerned. Now I shall make an attempt to examine the plausibility of a theory that may look apparently closer to Bhartṛhari's position. Donald Davidson (1975) conceives these two concepts as interdependent. He says, "...the parallel between the structure of thoughts and structure of sentences provides no argument for the primacy of either, and only a presumption in favour of their interdependence" (p. 10). From this basic premise he goes on to conclude that, "a creature must be a member of the speech community if it is to have a concept of belief. And given the dependence of other attitudes on belief, we must say more generally that a creature that can interpret speech can have the concept of thought". So far Davidson's position seems very akin to Bhartṛhari's initial position regarding the relation between thought and language. But the primary purpose of Davidson here is to offer a theory of interpretation based on the modified version of Tarski's theory of truth. So he makes it clear that, "We usually think that having a language consists largely in being able to speak, but in what follows speaking will play an indirect part, what is essential to my argument is the idea of an interpreter, someone who understands the utterance of another" (p. 9). This notion of an interpreter does not seem to differ very much from Bhartṛhari's notion of a hearer. But the points of similarities end once we try to know the very basis of interpretability. According to Davidson the method of interpretation "puts the interpreter in general agreement with the speaker, according to the method the speaker holds a sentence to be true under specified conditions, and these conditions obtain, in the opinion of the interpreter, just when the speaker holds sentence to be true" (p. 21). Davidson is ultimately assuming that the condition of sentences being held true is the determinant factor for referring to the thought. So Davidson describes thought as interlocking system of beliefs that can be held true. But Bhartṛhari looks at the problem of language-thought equation primarily from the

standpoint of communicability of meaning. He does not need to bring in the concept of 'belief' to work as a counterpart of **assertions being held true**, simply for the reason that truth is not the connecting link between meaning and an utterance. Rather the spoken words and its meaning refer to a state which serves as the preliminary stage of the expressiveness of meaning, for there is no verbalizability without cognisability. Interestingly enough, Davidson in the concluding part of his paper comes to the conclusion that we can only meaningfully talk of 'belief' from the role of belief in interpretation of language. Therefore, "the notion of true belief depends on the notion of a true utterance, this in turn there cannot be without a shared language." So from the notion of interpretation he comes to the notion of truth to return back again to interpretation in terms of 'shared language' (p. 21). The speaker and the hearer communicate because they are the interpreters of 'truth'; and this is made possible on the basis of a 'shared language'. Though he does not specify what he exactly means by this term, yet it is obvious that he prioritizes speech over thought. It is obvious that he does not intend to go beyond the level of speech, but carefully avoids falling into the trap of linguistic behaviourism of Wittgensteinian kind.

From our discussion on three important strands of philosophy, viz., speech-act theories, thought-based semantics and interpretationalism, it becomes clear that some of the important issues regarding communication of meaning between the speaker and the hearer remain unattended. Much is taken for granted. Though these theories accept that linguistic communication is inter-subjective in nature, the fundamental question that needs to be answered, i.e., how does the speaker convey the meaning to the hearer, seems to take a backseat. Should we say that meaning is an entity that can be transported in the manner we load the contents of one car into another car. Had it been so the following problems would not have bothered the philosophers of language:

1. The speaker has to express his thought through temporal and instantly destroyed sound utterances having sequence and multiplicity. The hearer, too, receives them in their multiplicity and sequentiality. But the 'sense' communicated is unitary in nature. How does the hearer grasp the unity and sequenceless whole, called meaning?
2. Why in certain cases does the hearer fail to get the meaning even if he had listened carefully to each word uttered by the speaker? Again, in certain cases the hearer can grasp the meaning even if the speaker has not completed his utterance. How this is possible?
3. The speaker's utterance not only conveys the literal meaning, but also the 'implied' and 'implicit' meaning (which in modern philosophical

parlance is called 'implicature' and 'impliciture', respectively). How does the hearer grasp them from the stated meaning?

These are the questions that Bhartṛhari does not want to leave unattended. Here, the notion of *sphoṭa* comes in handy. Bhartṛhari would say, because both the speaker and the hearer share the common *sphoṭa*, meaning is communicated. *Sphoṭa* is connected with inherent linguistic potency (*śabdabīja* or *śabdabhāvanā*) present within all conscious human beings. Therefore human beings have a natural linguistic competence. When the speaker intends to say something, he grasps the unit of meaning first, and then expresses it in a sequential form. The hearer, on the other hand, catches the audible and sequential forms of words first and these words evoke his linguistic potency, and this gives him the competence to understand what the speaker intends to say. If the speaker's utterance fails to arouse the linguistic potency there is a gap in communication. On the other hand, if the hearer is able to grasp the sense conveyed by the speaker then an incomplete sentence is enough for the purpose. In this case he need not listen to the whole series of words to assess the meaning. Nor does he require to mentally compute the uttered words to gather the unitary sense conveyed. To the question — how the same sentence can be used to communicate, besides the literal meaning, implied, implicit and even metaphorical meaning — Bhartṛhari's answer is remarkably clear. He says: "It is the word which is the instructor. Speakers follow the power of words and act when urged by a desire to speak based on the availability of the right word. When the hearer follows the fixed power of words to convey a meaning through reasoning based on meaning, context, indication, interconnection etc., people look upon the capacity of the words as the reasoning of the hearer" (*Vṛtti* under I.137). The ability to express meaning and apprehend the meaning is potent in the *sphoṭa*, which also refers to human linguistic potency (*śabdabhāvanā*).

The explanation of linguistic communication in terms of *sphoṭa* or *śabda* may not sound very appealing to the Western mind, but their solution to the issue has not been very satisfying either. In the context of communication of intention, Grice does talk of a 'shared understanding of the language'. But ultimately, such understanding is grounded on linguistic convention. But linguistic convention alone is not sufficient to explain the complexities associated with communication of meaning. Similarly, Davidson (1975: 21) tries to locate the basis of inter-subjectivity in 'shared language', but this phenomenon, though not implying linguistic convention, is finally set to rest on systems of beliefs and truth-conditions which indirectly means that he does not want to go beyond the language of assertion, and thereby neglects the multiplicities of dimensions of the phenomenon called

'language'. What is more worrying is that these theories of linguistic communication pay scanty attention to the unlimited creative power of thought and the generative power of language.

II

Now I shall try to shift the focus of my discussion to another dimension of thought-language equation. It is not directly connected with communicative meaning. The issue is confined to the conceptual level. We know that language and thought are two important aspects of human existence. So the question likely to puzzle philosophers is about the conceptual priority of one over the other. It is usually believed that it is a one-way relationship. Thought is conceptually prior to language since language serves as the conveyor belt of thought. Dismissing this popular stand Bhartṛhari claims that it is thought which presupposes language. Naturally, he does not have many sympathizers in Indian classical as well as modern Western philosophical traditions. Of course in contemporary academic circles the issue has generated much debate in the field of philosophy of mind and introspective psychology. Philosophers like W. Sellars (1963), Jerry Fodor (1981), and Peter Carruthers (1996) support a thesis which may give credence to Bhartṛhari's stand on the issue. However these philosophers mostly look at the problem from the standpoint of philosophy of mind and introspective psychology. But Bhartṛhari explicates the issue absolutely from a different angle. Language is his apparatus as well as the goal of his philosophical investigation. Specifying his approach he states very clearly that as a *śabdapramāṇaka* (which approximately can be translated as the analyst of language), his primary concern is language, not the nature of things. So he announces, "What the word presents is the only reality for us" (*Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*). Accordingly, he formulates a unique metaphysics, in which the highest status is accorded to *śabda* or Word-principle. *Śabda*, for him, is the ultimate reality (*śabdatattva Brahman*). Therefore, he has no problem in explicating thought as well as the objective world, in terms of the *śabdatattva*. As far as his metaphysical stance is concerned he is an unflinching monist. Unity is the key principle in his philosophy. Applying this to the level of language-in-use he conceives meaning as a unity of three distinct elements, i.e., thought, language, and the object meant. His commitment to monism would not allow him to retain the distinction between thought and language. Therefore, he believes that human consciousness is impregnated with the Word-principle. In *Vākyapadīya* he declares: "It is the speech which prompts all mankind into activity. Without this power man is nothing more than a log of wood or a piece of stone" (*Vṛtti* on I.126). To understand Bhartṛhari's position on conceptual priority of language over thought we must refer to the following verses of his treatise.

"There can be no awareness in this world without being intertwined with language. All cognitive awareness appears as if it is interpenetrated with language."
(VPI.123)

In this verse Bhartṛhari uses the word 'awareness' in a distinctively different sense. We as conscious beings are aware of the innumerable factual and mental events and objects surrounding us. The general impression is that we are aware of them because of the perceptual process. But Bhartṛhari argues that our awareness is not a matter of accumulating contents through the perceptual process, because even our simple perceptions involve cognizing through names and forms. That is the reason why he claims that there cannot be any cognitive awareness without being intertwined with words.

The next verse throws some further light on the nature of being aware of objects and events. Herein it is stated:

"If the language-impregnated nature of awareness went away from it, then a cognition would not manifest (any object), for that (language-impregnated nature) is the distinguishing nature of our awareness". (I.124)

In this verse Bhartṛhari uses two terms, *prakāśa* and *pratyavamarśa*, to explicate the process of human consciousness. However he does not offer us the detailed implications of these terms in his Vṛtti. So we have to take help of the Kashmir Śaiva philosopher Utpala for the interpretation of these terms. Utpala says that the very nature of illumination (*prakāśa*) is *vimarśa*, i.e., discrimination; otherwise illumination would be inert and passive like material objects, such as a mirror or a crystal. To express it in simpler terms the word-potentness of thought functions in two ways; it reveals the content of thought along with discriminating it from other thought-contents. Matilal (1990: 136), while analysing the import of this pair of concepts says, "illumination means removal of darkness but simple removal of darkness does not reveal the object unless one is able to distinguish the outline of the object from its immediate surroundings or environment." Therefore, Bhartṛhari and other Grammarians believe that even in case of bare awareness, these twin principles of concept formation (awareness), i.e., subsuming an object/event experienced under a name and distinguishing it from other similar experiences of objects/events, are very much operative. Without such *vāgrūpatā* (word-loadedness), which Bhartṛhari identifies with *pratyavamarśa*, i.e., 'determination by word' (which the later grammarians call as *vimarśa*), an awareness is no awareness. So he says, "What is called awareness (*saṃjñā*) is having the form of speech or word (*vāgrūpatā*). Consciousness in all beings never goes beyond it, that is, it is never different from the fact of having the form of the word." In direct contrast to the views of some of the traditional Indian theories like Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, Bhartṛhari holds that there cannot be any prelinguistic

bare awareness (*nirvikalpa jñāna*). In Indian epistemological tradition it is commonly accepted that language has a minimum role to play as far as cognition is concerned. This belief is very articulately presented in the Nyāyasūtra of Vātsyāyana, where he defines perception (*pratyakṣa*) as being characterized by non-verbalizability (*avyapadeśya*). He distinguishes between the cognition of those who have the linguistic ability and who lack it. Later commentators include the mute and the infant in the later category. As far as awareness is concerned Vātsyāyana finds no difference between the two categories. It is obvious that Bhartṛhari was very much aware of this problem. In his commentary on I.124 he says, "Speech (*vāc*) indwells or inheres in all cases of awareness just as illumination does in fire and consciousness in the mind (*antaryāmīn*). The subtle nature of *vāc* (speech) [i.e., *sūkṣmo vāgdharmah*] penetrates and permeates even such states as lack of ostensible mental activity (*asañcetitāvasthā*)." [Translated by B.K. Matilal, 1990: 135] Even the awareness of a child is word-potent. Bhartṛhari emphatically states, "All knowledge of what is to be done in this world depends upon the word. Even the child, with residual traces from previous births has such knowledge" (I.121). Though a child lacks the capability of forming definite concepts, its raw awareness is subsumable under the vague concepts like, 'this' or 'that'. He points out, "The residual trace of speech has no beginning and it exists in everyone as a seed in the mind. It is not possible that it should be the result of the effort of any person. Movements of the articulatory organs by a child are not due to instruction by others but are known through intuition. Who, indeed, can make or make known these human properties as other than residual traces of the word?" (Vṛtti on I.122) In other words, he wants to drive home the point that the **linguistic potency is innate and universal** in each conscious being. Unless a child has the latent capacity of languageing in him he cannot make an effort to reproduce language through his own effort. Thus language is not acquired through external influences, but it is the inherent constituent of our awareness, about which we gradually become conscious when the learning process starts. We only become aware of the word-potentness of thought when the words are expressed in a sequential and articulate manner to express our thought. In fact, for Bhartṛhari, the word-potentness is the very basis of distinction between the sentient (*sasamjñā*) and insentient being (*visamjñā*). But, from this it does not follow that thought is a form of 'inner speech', as is conceived by Sellars; nor does the theory say that being conscious means being constantly in the process of using words. There is definitely a distinction between verbalization and verbalizability. All our thought and awareness **need not be wordy**, but they have the **potentiality to be expressed through words**. To put it in different words 'whatever is thinkable is sayable'. At the same time Bhartṛhari is not reducing thought

into words. He is interested in justifying the conceptual dependence of human consciousness on the principle of language.

Bhartṛhari's explication of the conceptual relation between thought and language may appear unusual. It may sound sometimes like a mystical rhapsody. But given his metaphysical position no other conclusion could have been possible. However, recent studies in philosophical and introspective psychology² (refer Peter Carruthers: 1996) can be taken as ample evidence for the fact that, even after a considerable lapse of 1500 years, Bhartṛhari's philosophy can withstand the test of time.

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² For instance, Jerry Fodor explicates the linguistic potency in terms of *Mentalese*. He argues the sentences that human beings use in communication belong to an innate, universal language of thought. This he calls as *Mentalese*. This linguistic potency consists of an innate lexicon, or vocabulary, and an innate set of combinatorial rules for the production of completed sentences, held in common by all human beings.

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Does Language Map the Reality : Bhartrhari's View

MITHILESH CHATURVEDI

The speech in Bhartrhari's philosophy is one with our consciousness (VP I.118). Every object, every cognition is associated with the language. The grammarian points out than an object, even if it is existent, is equivalent to a non-existent one if it is not helped by linguistic usage. And an object like the hare's horn or the sky-city looks like existent when it is expressed by the language.¹ We are therefore faced with the question: "Does the language give expression to the reality or fictions?" In other words, "What is the relation between language and reality?"² On the Nyāya view, an authentic sentence, expressing a valid cognition, the content of which is an ontological entity can be understood to express the reality as it is given. In other words, the Nyāya system holds that language can express the reality as it is through valid cognition. On the other hand, Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti, who define valid perception as a cognition devoid of

¹ sad api vāgyavahāreṇānupagṛhītam artharūpam asatā tulyam | atyantāsac ca prasiddham
loke śaśaviṣṇādi prāptāvirbhāvatirobhāvaṃ ca gandharvanagarādi vācā samutthāpyamānaṃ
mukhyasattāyuktam iva teṣu teṣu kāryeṣu pratyavabhāsate | Vṛtti I. p. 186.

² By 'reality', I do not mean only the ultimate reality in this paper but also the objects with which we deal in our daily life. As I have tried to clarify later in this paper, for Bhartrhari the external objects are partial manifestations of the one, undifferentiated reality which differentiates itself through its powers (*śaktivibhāgena*: see fn. 24).

conceptualization,³ do not accord that status to language as they consider language itself to be a conceptualization.⁴

Though the language is indispensable to thought according to Bhartṛhari, he holds the view that the language cannot fully describe the reality, be it the transcendental ultimate reality or the objective reality. In fact, language does not deal with the things as they are but with the view of things as presented by words.⁵ All the objects are partial manifestations of the ultimate reality because they are its limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*). But even the part cannot be fully expressed by the language. Words can only express a particular aspect even of that part. A blue shirt is a single object but we have to use two different words to express it by dividing it into quality and substance. The words can convey only the general element in the object as in case of the word 'blue' which cannot convey distinctions of different shades of the blue colour and gives only a general idea of it. Sometimes the words present the opposite of the reality. Though Brahman is one, language presents it as many through various limiting adjuncts. The language may also be said to present to us non-existent things either according to the Śūnyavādins because there is no external object according to them, or according to the Vedāntins who say that the multiplicity conveyed by words is non-existent because the unity, viz., Brahman, alone is real.⁶

Why does the language function in this fashion? This is because it follows cognitions as conceived by the mind. These cognitions do not reveal complete reality to us as Nyāya holds.⁷ Our mind postulates differences in an object and accordingly all the meanings are as if created by the intention of the speaker.⁸ Of course, the seers can see the thing as it is with their extra-ordinary perception. But when it comes to expressing their vision they have to use the same language that ordinary people use. Therefore their vision cannot help in linguistic usage (VP II.139; III.3.55). Language is based on our everyday behaviour and therefore has its own limitations (VP II.297).

³ (i) tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam | NBP 1.4.

(ii) pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣeṇaiva sidhyati | pratyātmavedyaḥ sarveṣāṃ vikalpo nāmasaṁśrayaḥ || PV II.123.

⁴ vikalpayonayaḥ śābdā vikalpāḥ śābdayonayaḥ | teṣāṃ anyonyasaṁbandhe nārthān śābdāḥ spṛśantyamī || Dīnnāga, quoted in NM 1. p. 229.

⁵ sarvasyaiva śābdasya vyavahārasya yathātattvam apravṛtteḥ | Helā. a. p.160.

⁶ pradeśasyaikadeśaṁ vā parato vā nirūpaṇam | viparyayam abhāvaṁ vā vyavahāro-
'nuvartate || VP III. 3.52.

⁷ akṛtsnaviṣayaḥ śābdāḥ pratyayam āśritaḥ | artham āhānyarūpeṇa svarūpeṇa-
nirūpitam || VP III. 3.54.

⁸ buddhyavasthāvibhāgena bhedakāryaṁ pratīyate | janyanta iva śābdānāṁ arthāḥ sarve
vivakṣayā || VP III. 14.517.

How can Bhartṛhari who accords highest importance to the words speak of the incapacity of language to express the reality? The question should not arise if we keep in mind that for Bhartṛhari language is not constituted only by the articulate word forms. He accepts that an inner language or a linguistic disposition (*śabdabhāvanā*) is present in all beings. That is how Bhartṛhari accepts a linguistic trace in all cognitions even without denying nirvikalpajñāna. The linguistic disposition (*śabdabhāvanā*) is present in all such cognitions although it is not functional in nirvikalpajñāna.⁹ If the existence of this *śabdabhāvanā* were not accepted, a child would never learn the language. He makes an effort to speak the language by virtue of this linguistic disposition which is present in him.¹⁰ Moreover when Bhartṛhari says that Brahman is of the nature of the word, he does not mean ordinary linguistic units. The highest stage of *śabdabrahman* is free from the division into word and meaning. But linguistic units are only so many appearances of Brahman. Brahman is their source and the light because of which the words reveal worldly objects in one's cognition. The transcendental reality that is *śabdabrahman* is beyond these linguistic units.

The relation between the word and the meaning is eternal according to the grammarians. Whenever a word is uttered, a meaning is understood from it irrespective of whether the thing denoted exists in reality or not. Bhartṛhari says that the words give only a suppressed view of reality. The word is only an upalakṣaṇa and cannot fully express the powers of an object (VP II.434). Words like 'hare's horn', 'sky-flower', 'fire-circle' etc. are seen to convey a meaning although nothing corresponds to them in outside reality. The form of an object is perceived through such words.¹¹ Therefore language conveys a meaning, which is in the form of the cognition or the mental reality. All words including the words like 'hare's horn' or 'fire-circle' express such a mental reality (*bauddha sattā*). Thus the eternity of the word-meaning relation is established because the word is never without a meaning.¹² These mental realities are superimposed on external objects.

⁹ cf.: sarvasmin jñāne śabdānugamaḥ kevalam anuvṛttiḥ kvacit yathā nimittaśūnya-vastugrāhiṇi jñāne labdhavṛttiḥ kvacit yathā taduttama(ra) bhāviṣu | Paddhati, p. 188.

¹⁰ ādyaḥ karaṇavinyāsaḥ prāṇasyordhvaṁ samīraṇam | sthānānām abhigātaś ca na vinā śabdabhāvanām || VP I.114.

¹¹ atyantam atathābhūte nimitte śrutyupāśrayāt | dṛśyate 'lātacakrādaḥ vastvākāra-nirūpaṇā|| VP I.121.

¹² avadhīritabahirgatabhāvāḥ śabdāḥ buddhipratibhāsinam artham abhiniviśanta ityalātacakraśaśaviśāṇādīnām api śabdānām nityam arthair aviyogāt sambandhanityatā-siddhiḥ| Helā. a. p. 150 f.

Thus the relation of the language to the things and persons is that of superimposition (*adhyāsa*).¹³

Bhartr̥hari calls this mental reality *aupacārikī sattā* or the secondary reality (VP III.3.39) while the external reality has been called *mukhyā sattā* or the primary reality (VP III.3.46). Through this secondary reality, language expresses the persons and things that it refers to. All the words resort to the secondary reality for presenting contradictory things – positive and negative, past and present. It is present at all times. Words are applied to the things only after they are perceived with the mind. So this mental reality belongs to the things that have ceased to exist as also to those that are yet to come into existence. It is the basis for the application of all the words (VP III.3.49-50).

Bhartr̥hari shows how by positing this secondary reality we can solve some of our semantic problems. One such problem is the paradox of negative statements. If words convey only a thing that has external existence, how can one make a negative statement about that thing? A word that is used for an existent thing cannot be used for a non-existent one because existence and non-existence contradict each other. Helārāja gives an example here. If the word *brāhmaṇa* is used for someone who exists, it cannot be connected with the negation that is in contradiction with it and thus the word *non-Brahmin* cannot be used. If the person has no external existence, then the word *brāhmaṇa* cannot be used at all. Similarly, if the word *tree* means a real existing object, then the word by itself would mean that the tree exists. In that case, the verb *exists* would be superfluous. Moreover, we cannot say that the tree does not exist (*vr̥kṣo nāsti*). If the word denotes an existing object, the statement that it does not exist would be a contradiction. This paradox has been summed up by Dharmakīrti (PV 4.226) as follows:

A negation cannot be made about existing things and it is not possible in case of non-existing objects. Thus the meaning of the negation is totally lost in this world.

Patañjali has also raised a similar problem. From the use of the negative particle we perceive the removal (*nivṛttiḥ*) of something. Now, if the removal is natural what is the use of the negative particle?¹⁴ But if it is dependent on the use of a word, i.e., if the negative particle (*nañ*) can set aside the

¹³(i) artharūpākāraḥ pratyayātmā bāhyeṣu vastuṣu pratyastah | Vṛtti I. p. 46.

(ii) cf.: svājātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvair evābhidhīyate | tato 'rthajātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā || VP III.i.6.

¹⁴ yadā punar asya padārtho nivartate kiṁ svābhāvikī nivṛttir āhosvid vācanikī ... yadi svābhāvikī kiṁ nañ prayujyamānaḥ karoti | MB I. p. 411, l. 3-5.

thing-meant merely by its use, the kings need not maintain big armies, he says. They can remove the enemy simply by using the word 'no'.¹⁵

Bhartṛhari resolves these problems with reference to the secondary reality. Although an object in the external world has the nature of existence, this secondary reality expressed by the words is common to both existence and non-existence. According to Bhartṛhari affirmation and negation are inherent in the meaning of the word. After the word has presented an object to the mind its existence is either affirmed or denied.¹⁶ Thus the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for both the existence and the non-existence of a Brahmin. If a word denoted only positive existence then in an expression like *san brāhmaṇaḥ* (a Brahmin existing), the word *san* would be superfluous and thus inappropriate. It is used because the meaning present in the mind can be connected with both the existence and the non-existence. So, just as we say *san brāhmaṇaḥ* for affirming the existence, we can use the negative particle for denying the existence. The meaning of word is sometimes associated with the meaning of *asti* (is) and sometimes with that of *nāsti* (is not). But since the difference of meaning cannot be known because of non-difference in form, the negative particle is used to indicate the latter meaning, i.e., that of non-existence.¹⁷

Thus the negation legitimately can take effect only on assumption of a secondary reality. Unless it is present in the mind, a thing cannot be negated. However, the negation applies to the external reality only because the secondary reality is present in the mind at all times and there can never be an absence of that reality. As Nāgeśa says, the denial of an object by the negative particle means that it exists in the mind but does not exist outside.¹⁸ Through an identification of the perceptual reality with the mental construct, it is perceived outside and the negation is effective with reference to that outside reality.¹⁹

This shows the difference between the Buddhist approach and the Grammarian's position. Dharmakīrti has said that both the affirmation and negation proceed on the basis of verbal meaning without reference to any

¹⁵ nañ prayujyamāṇaḥ padārthaṁ nivartayati | ... yadyetan nañ mātmyaṁ syān na jātucid rājāno hastyasvaṁ bibhṛyur netyeva rājāno brūyuh | MB I. p. 411, 1.7-9.

¹⁶ buddher viśayatām prāpte śabdād arthe pratīyate | pravṛttir vā nivṛttir vā śrutya hyartho-
'nuśajyate || VP III. 14.279.

¹⁷ prāk samāsāt padārthānām nivṛttir dyotyate nañ | svabhāvato nivṛttānām rūpābhedād
alakṣitā || VP III.14.250.

¹⁸ buddhisato 'pyarthasya nañ bāhyasattāniśedhāt | buddhau sannapi ghaṭo bahir
nāstītyarthāt || PLM pp. 226-227.

¹⁹ tasya yeyaṁ bahīrūpatā vyāvahārikair dṛśyavikalpaikikārād adhyasitā (adhyavasitā?) tatraiva
niśedhaḥ phalati | Helā, a. p. 153.

external reality.²⁰ Thus he uses the problem of negative statements to deny the external reality. But Bhartṛhari has no such purpose. He takes up the question from the point of view of linguistic behaviour. In fact he designates the external reality as the primary reality (*mukhyā sattā, samprati sattā*). Helārāja says that the ontological question of the existence of any other reality does not bother the Grammarian in the present context. If such a reality is accepted on the basis of purposive action (*arthakriyākārīta*), the Grammarian has no objection; but it does not enter verbal usage.²¹

Elsewhere (on VP III.3.51) Helārāja specifically refers to the existence of external reality. He clarifies that while the past and future things can be talked of only as being present in the secondary reality, the present existence has reference to the secondary as well as the primary reality. In terms of the qualifiers like 'the past' and 'the future' we cannot talk of the primary reality as the thing does not exist at the time of such talking. The linguistic usage takes place for the past and future only because they are present in our understanding. So the verb 'is' (*asti*) is used to indicate the acceptance of this external reality to the exclusion of the past and future existence.²² Although the external reality existing in the present time also enters into the linguistic usage only after it is grasped by the mind and becomes an object of the secondary reality, still it alone is referred to as existing (*asti*) as it is also present outside.²³ Ultimately it is the one, eternal Brahman who is at the basis of all words. It is free from all conceptualizations. But for the purpose of linguistic usage it manifests itself variously by differentiation in its powers. All the words express this one reality, which combines in itself both the existence and non-existence.²⁴ Therefore Bhartṛhari's view about the words and their meanings cannot be termed as sceptical.

In the Jāṭisamuddeśa of the third kāṇḍa, Bhartṛhari speaks of the one undifferentiated reality to which ultimately every thing can be traced

²⁰ tasmād āśrītya śabdārtham bhāvābhāvasamāśrayam | abāhyāśrayam atreṣṭam sarvaṁ vidhiniṣedhanam || PV 4.228.

²¹ yadyarthakriyākaraṇādina kṣaṭṭhabusaprayeṇa kenacin nibandhanenānyasattā kalpyate tad vardhatām sā na tatra cintāsmākaṁ, vyavahāre tu tasyā nāstyanupraveśaḥ | Helā. a. p. 151.

²² bhūtabhaviṣyator anupākhyatvān na kācin mukhyā sattā | ... buddhyā tu parāmarśe pratyayaparivartinyarthe śabdaprayoga ityupacārasattā bhūtabhaviṣyator upapadyate | tathā ca tadvyudāsāya bāhyasattāparigrahārtham astīti viśeṣaṇam yuktam | Helā. a. p. 159 f.

²³ yadyapi vartamānāvasthasyāpi bāhyasya pratīgrāhyatvenaiva vyavahāryā sattā tathāpi saiva bahir api bhāvād astītyanena viśeṣaṇena vivakṣitavartamānakālena grhyate | Helā. a. p. 160.

²⁴ (i) tasmācchaktivibhāgena nityaḥ sadasadātmakaḥ | eko'rthaḥ śabdavācyatve bahurūpaḥ prakāśate || VP III.3.87.

(ii) sarvaparikalpātītaṁ tattvaṁ samāviṣṭaṁ sarvābhiḥ śaktibhir brahma yathāyatham vyavahāre bhāvābhāvarūpatayā tattadupādādhikacitaṁ śabdāḥ pratipādayanti | Helā. a. p. 180.

back. All the universals are abstractions from this reality which has also been called the Great Existence (*mahāsattā*) and in fact all words denote this Existence only although they do it through determinate limiting factors, i.e., as differentiated in the form of lower universals like cowness etc.²⁵ So Bhartṛhari does not feel any need for accepting *abhāva* (non-existence) as a reality on the basis of the negative statements. Both the existence and the non-existence enter the verbal usage in an identical manner (VP III.3.59). In fact the cognition of *abhāva* is based on *bhāva* (existence) of something; similarly the existence of something presupposes its previous non-existence (VP III.3.60), but if the two were absolutely contradictory, this dependence on each other cannot be explained. So neither is *abhāva* born as *bhāva* nor does *bhāva* become *abhāva*. The existence and non-existence are only appearances that are not different from one supreme reality.²⁶ Therefore the duality of *bhāva* and *abhāva* is not acceptable to Bhartṛhari.

Thus, our verbal usage takes place on the basis of an existence created by mental constructs. However, this does not undermine the importance of words. Without their intervention, we cannot get even a restricted view of reality. It is only through them that every object is analysed. Every activity that takes place depends on the words. The word is the basis resting on which the self that is *pratibhā* appears as manifold (VP I.110-122).

While explaining the relation of causality between the word and the meaning, Bhartṛhari says that word is the cause of the meaning that arises in the mind of the listener. Likewise the meaning that is present in the speaker's mind gives rise to the word which when uttered is heard by the listener. Thus the meaning is the cause of the word (VP III.3.32). The *Vṛtti* on the first *kāṇḍa* says that the meaning that arises in the mind of listener is identified with the external object through a superimposition just as the letters of script are identified with real phonemes.²⁷ Explaining the two way causality, Helārāja says that the word and the meaning are present in mind in a state of identity.²⁸ Linguistic usage consists in communicating the intention of the speaker to the listener. So the word

²⁵ (i) *saṁbandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu | jātir ityucyate tasyām sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ || VP III.1.33.*

(ii) *tasyām eva ca sarve śabdā niyatopādhivaśāj jātyabhidhāyinaḥ siddhāḥ | Helā. a. p. 41.*

²⁶ *nābhāvo jāyate bhāvo naiti bhāvo 'nupākhyatām | ekasmād ātmano 'nanyau bhāvābhāvau vikalpitau || VP III.3.61.*

²⁷ *arthasarūpapratyayābhabhāsanām vā pratyayānām bāhyeṣvartheṣu pratyastānām akṣaranimittākṣarakalpanāvad evaikaviśayatve 'bhyupagamyamāne nityam aviccinna-pāramparyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ śabdārthayoḥ saṁbandhaḥ | Vṛtti I. pp. 60-61.*

²⁸ *tathā hi buddhau śabdārthayoḥ pūrvam abhedenāvasthānam | Helā. a. p. 145.*

conveys to the listener the meaning that is present in the speaker's mind and this meaning is the inner meaning (*antaḥsthita artha*).²⁹ Thus the discussion about the secondary reality expressed by words leads to the Grammarian's thesis that the word and the meaning have a mental status and their relation is the relation of identity.³⁰ Nāgeśa has used the explanation of negative statements to refute the Naiyāyikas who refuse to accept the mental status of the meaning (*bauddhārtha*).³¹

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²⁹ pratipādyapratipādakayor hi parasparābhiprāyasaṅkrāntir vyavahāra ityantaḥsthitam artham mūlavasthāyām apyaparityaktaṁ vaktṛbuddhisamāviṣṭam śrotāryarpayati śabdaḥ | Helā. a. p. 146.

³⁰ vastuto bauddha evārthah śakyah | padam api sphoṭātmakam | tayos tādātmyam | PLM p. 36.

³¹ (i) etena bauddhārtham asvikurvanto nañarthabodhāya kaṣṭakalpanām kurvantas tārīkākāḥ parāstāḥ | PLM p. 227.

(ii) The Naiyāyikas say that in 'there is no jar' it is the knowledge of the existence of jar that is negated by the negative particle. But Nāgeśa says that it is the jar that is expressed by the word and not its knowledge. Since the knowledge of the jar is not meaning of the word 'jar', the negative particle cannot negate the knowledge.

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Time as Power of Word according to Bhartṛhari

PIERRE-SYLVAIN FILLIOZAT

In the wake of Pāṇini and Patañjali, Bhartṛhari deals with time as a linguistic concept. He has also a lot to say about time in his philosophical speculations. He has a vast philosophical culture and ideas about time that came before him appear sporadically in his exposition. Even though he mentions many different doctrines, with or without a refutation, so that it is hard to ascertain which one is his own conclusion, we can assert that he has conceived a well-structured metaphysical system of his in which time occupies a central place.

He speaks about time not only in the Kālasamuddeśa, the ninth *samuddeśa* of the Prakīrṇakāṇḍa, but also incidentally in many other *samuddeśas*, as well as in the Brahmakāṇḍa and the Vākyakāṇḍa. At the very outset of Brahmakāṇḍa, he introduces the concept of *kālaśakti*. The present article aims at determining the contours and significance of this concept, its role in Bhartṛhari's system of thought, its influence in subsequent philosophical literature.

The Brahmakāṇḍa of Vākyapadīya starts with the presentation of the Veda as the 'means to reach Brahman', or even the 'imitation' or 'representation' of Brahman (*prāptiyupāyo 'nukāraś ca*, 1.5) and in its four opening stanzas describes Brahman under the name of *śabda-tattva*. In the third stanza appears the concept of *kālaśakti*:

anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yad akṣaram |
vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ || 1 ||
ekam eva yad āmnātaṃ bhinnāśaktivyapāśrayāt |
apṛthaktve 'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthaktveneva vartate || 2 ||
avyāhatakalām yasya kālaśaktim upāśritāḥ
janmādayo vikārāḥ ṣaḍ bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ || 3 ||
prāptyupāyo 'nukāraś ca tasya vedo.... || 5 ||

- 1) "Brahman devoid of beginning and end, Essence Word, imperishable, which evolves by becoming object, from which there is creation of the world,
- 2) which, traditionally repeated as being one, since differentiated potentialities repose in it, even though there is no separateness of it from the potentialities, is manifested as if separate from them,
- 3) whose time-power of unobstructable parts is the support of the six transformations, birth, etc., matrices of division of being,
- 5) the Veda is the means of attainment and the symbol of that [*brahman*]..."

The first stanza introduces the concept of Brahman. The first half defines it as being *śabdatattva*. We take this compound as a *karmadhāraya*: 'Essence Word'. Brahman is the essence of everything and it is *śabda*, i.e., 'Word' as principle of speech. The second half delimits its relation to the world. It is the subject of a transformation into the objects. *artha* refers to an object or meaning of the word. The concept of *vivarta* is that of evolution and there is definite indication in Bhartṛhari's work that his concept of *vivarta* does not contain the idea of illusoriness which an Advaita Vedānta influence will introduce into it in later times.¹ Then *śabdatattva* is asserted to be the origin of the development of the world. At the linguistic level *prakriyā* is the process of construction of a word on the basis of grammar rules; at the philosophical level it is the process of evolution of particular phenomena and all the transformations occurring in the world, from the initial emission (*sṛṣṭi*) to the final resorption (*saṃhāra*).

The second stanza introduces the concept of *śakti*. This is the concept which explains how the one entity, which the *śabdatattva brahman* is fundamentally, can be the origin of a transformation into the multiple phenomena of the world. It appears as the inherent potentiality of Brahman to evolve. The word *śakti* has both meanings, 'power' and 'potentiality'.²

¹ There is a controversy on this point and we take the side of Madeleine Biarreau who defended the synonymy of *vivarta* and *pariṇāma* suggested by the wording of stanza 1.120. See Biarreau 1964a, p. 7 et 155.

² The use of the word *śakti* with the double values of 'power' and 'potentiality' occurs elsewhere in the Vākyapadīya. For instance, when Bhartṛhari deals with words or expressions having several meanings they are presented as words with multiple potentialities: *ekasyāpi*

The oneness of Brahman will be possible in its prospect of becoming the diverse world, only if it is an initial substance containing in itself the multiple in a potential form. If the substance of the transformation is a different entity, such as the *pradhāna*, and if Brahman is the mere agent giving impulse to the transformation of that other entity, the fundamental unity which can be predicated of Brahman is no more. Therefore, in order to conciliate the concept of a single entity and the idea of a multiplicity of transformations, Bhartṛhari conceives this *śabdatattva brahman* as the only fundamental substance, and *śakti* in the sense of potentiality and power of transforming itself or manifesting its potentialities, as the logical link between the one and the multiple.

Thus Bhartṛhari asserts the multiplicity of phenomena as derived from a non-dual entity. *śabdatattva* is 'the seat of differentiated potentialities'. That has explained the oneness of the entity. It accounts also for diversity of the transformations and the richness of the phenomenal world. Bhartṛhari conceives a first level of differentiation of Brahman, by considering a multiplicity of potentialities or powers and later uses the plural. Then he insists on the identical character of *śabdabrahman* and its potential or manifested *artha*. The manifestation of the object from the potentiality is not separate even though in its occurrence it may appear as separate. The effect is not separate from its original cause. The pot is not separate from the clay of which it is made.

Here we may introduce another important tenet of Bhartṛhari's system. Brahman contains the totality of all phenomena of the diverse world in itself. As *śabdatattva* it contains all the meanings of differentiated words. It is also consciousness. When Bhartṛhari considers the closeness of the eternal relation of word and meaning, the fact that *śabdatattva* is never separated from the objects, he states that "the purity of knowledge, when it is without [delimiting] support, is the fact that its form consists of all objects or meanings":

sarvārtharūpatā śuddhir jñānasya nirupāśrayā | (3.3.56a)

The second half of the stanza opposes this conception to the very commonly accepted opposite tenet that knowledge is pure when it is consciousness without object, i.e., when it has no form:

vivakṣāyām anuṣṭpadyate paraḥ | *vinābhisaṃdhinā śabdaḥ śaktirūpaḥ prakāśate* || 2.471. "Even if the intention of the speaker bears upon one meaning, the other meaning appears in its trail. Without intention of the speaker the word appears in its form of potentiality." We can also assert that this is the basis of the use of *śakti* to refer to the power of expression of a meaning pertaining to a word, or even in the extended sense of 'meaning', as it appears in *anekāśaktir ekasya yugapac chrīyate kva cit* | *agniḥ prakāśadāhābhyām ekatrāpi niyujyate* || 2.472. "Sometimes a multiple meaning is adopted simultaneously for one word. Fire is used in one place to give light and to burn."

tato 'pyasya parām śuddhim eke prāhur arūpikām ||

“Some say that it has a higher purity when it is without form.”

The word *eke* refers to thinkers other than Bhartṛhari and it is tempting to recognise Vedāntins here. But definitely that does not enter in Bhartṛhari's system.³ We will see below the influence of this concept in Śaiva philosophy.⁴

The second stanza has shown the importance and central role of the *śaktis* of *śabdatattva*. The third stanza introduces what may be termed the foremost of those *śaktis*, i.e., *kālaśakti*. This is a *karmadhāraya* compound signifying 'time power'. Time is itself a power of *śabdatattva*. Bhartṛhari introduces it here, certainly because he conceives it as the first power of *śabdatattva* to enter into action in the process of transformation. This process is then introduced in the old, universally accepted terms, as consisting in six transformations of being: birth, existence, change, growth, decay, destruction (Nirukta 1.2). Bhartṛhari says here only that the time power is the *upāśraya* 'location' of this process. The Vṛtti ascribed to him goes a step further. It identifies time with the concept of *svātantrya* 'independence', implying its eternity and supremacy over all *śaktis*: *kālākhyena hi svātantryeṇa sarvāḥ paratantrā janmavatyāḥ śaktayaḥ samāviṣṭāḥ kālaśaktim anupatanti |* “All powers which are dependent, because of the independent status [of *śabdatattva*] called time, which have a birth, being penetrated [by time], follow the action of the time power”. Here, we remember that the concept of independence defines the agent in the conception of the action of the Vyākaraṇa school. The action (*kriyā*) is accomplished through six factors (*kāraṇas*): agent, object, instrument, etc. The agent is characterised by its independence. The agent starts and directs the process of action by its own will. All other factors are subordinate to it. This linguistic view takes here ontological dimensions. Being is the fundamental action, the process of which consists of the six sub-actions, birth, existence, etc. The agent is *śabdatattva*. Its nature of agent is its independence. And that is called 'time'.

The identity of the author of Vṛtti is a subject of controversy and a few historians have rejected the ascription to the author of the stanzas, on account of differences of ideas and tenets between them.⁵ The present passage seems to go far beyond the letter of the stanza it claims to explain. But we have to observe that, even if the concept of time as the *svātantrya* of the supreme principle is not attested in the stanzas, it is in the line of the thought they contain here and in other developments about time. And it

³ See Biarreau 1964b: 271.

⁴ See Houben 1995: 277 sqq.

⁵ See Biarreau 1964a: 4 sqq.

could very well be a development of the thought of the same author, not incurring any contradiction, and sustaining powerfully his system.

This initial exposition has situated time at the ontological level. Ideas about time occur in all parts of *Vākyapadiya*, and a specific *samuddeśa* of 114 stanzas first pursues the philosophical analysis (stanza 1-79), then deals with the linguistic role of time. The *Kālasamuddeśa* is to be read keeping in mind the ontological conception presented in the beginning of the *Brahmakāṇḍa*. In the philosophical part there are several echoes of ideas we have already encountered in the initial stanzas. One stanza provides a remarkable etymology of the word *kāla* and sheds light on the concept with a poetical comparison:

jalayantrabhramāveśasadr̥śibhiḥ pravṛttibhiḥ |
sa kalāḥ kālayan sarvāḥ kālākhyāṃ labhate vibhuḥ || (3.9.14)

“Moving all parts (of the world) through renewed activity similar to the frenzy of revolutions of a water-wheel, this all-pervading entity gets the name of impeller.”

The word *kāla* is shown here as derived from the root *kalÁ kṣepe* (X.64/1604) and primary suffix *ac* prescribed after roots of the *ākṛtigāṇa paçādi* (3.1.134), referring to the idea of agent. If we accept the reading ‘kalayan’ in place of ‘kālayan’ it can be said to derive, with the secondary suffix *aṇ* prescribed after words of the *ākṛtigāṇa prajñādi* (5.1.38), from a primary derivative, itself derived from the *a*-ending root *kala gatau samkhyāne* (X.319/1866) not admitting the suffix *ṇi*. It provides the meaning ‘agent of the action to impell, to put in motion’. *kāla* is defined thus as the impeller of action. The word *kalā* designating here the object of this action, has for primary sense a small unit of time, a division of an instant, or a small part such as the digit of the moon. It may be here an image for all phenomenal parts of the world obtained by division of the fundamental substance, which *śabdatattva* is. Time appears thus as the impeller of the evolution of *śabdatattva*. And that reminds us of the conception of the time-power of that primary unique entity, a power which puts in action all other powers.

Bhartṛhari ascertains emphatically the oneness of time. But his analysis imposes the reality of a number of divisions. Therefore, as in the case of *śabdatattva*, he has to explain oneness and multiplicity for the same entity. For this purpose he introduces the concept of *śaktis* or specific powers of time. Time is the first power of *śabdatattva* and in its turn has powers which create division. Firstly, Bhartṛhari mentions two powers:

tam asya lokayantrasya sūtradhāraṃ pracakṣate |
pratibandhābhyanujñābhyaṃ tena viśvaṃ vibhajyate || (3.9.4)

"One calls it (i.e., time) the operator of the mechanical puppet, which the world is : by its [powers of] prohibiting and permitting [transformation] it divides everything."

These two antithetic powers explain the notion of *krama* 'succession'. They account also for the concept of cycle in the form of recurring birth, life and destruction of the world.

Time contains divisions in itself, i.e., past, present and future. This multiplicity does not hinder the oneness of time, since its three divisions are themselves powers regulating the manifestation of everything:

ekasya śaktayas tisraḥ kālasya samavasthitāḥ |
yatsaṃbandhena bhāvānām darśanādarśane satām ||
dvābhyām sa kila śaktibhyām bhāvānām varanātmakaḥ |
śaktis tu vartamānākhyā bhāvarūpaprakāśinī ||
anāgatā janmaśakteḥ śaktir apratibandhikā |
atītākhyā tu yā śaktis tayā janma virudhyate || (3.9.49-51)

"Three powers are established for the one time, by relation with which there is visibility or invisibility of existing things. By two powers [i.e., past and future] time has the nature of hindering things, but the power called 'present' sheds light on the form of things. The power of future is no obstacle for the power of birth, but birth is opposed by the power which is called past."

Bhartrhari alludes to diverse conceptions of several other schools, which support tenets not always conflicting with his basic concepts. That is the case with the following three views:

śaktyātmadevatāpakṣair bhinnam kālasya darśanam |
prathamam tad avidyāyām yad vidyāyām na vidyate || (3.9.62)

"The perception of time is diversified by the theses [of its nature as] power, self and deity. That [perception], which does not occur when there is experience [of the *śabdatattva*], occurs first in the state of ignorance."

Three theories are mentioned here : time is conceived as power, self or deity. In all these theories two ranges of consciousness are distinguished. One is the experience of the supreme principle, non-dual and beyond the phenomenal world. The other is the experience of the world, which obstructs the experience of the supreme principle, and that is called *avidyā* 'non-experience [of the supreme principle]'. Thus *avidyā* in this context refers to the implied lower worldly experience. In that conception there is no idea of illusoriness of the world experience. This stanza asserts that the experience of time occurs in the state of *avidyā* only. That is direct consequence of the nature of time which is the link of the supreme with the phenomenal world, the one with the multiple. Perception of time

implies engagement in the phenomenal world, implying in its turn the absence of experience of the supreme principle. And that is the case, whether the supreme principle is *śabdatattva* with time as his first power, the self or a deity.

The theory of time as a deity or as the self (*ātman*, *puruṣa*) can be ascertained in diverse passages of Mahābhārata and Purāṇas. An oft-quoted instance is from Bhagavadgītā:

kālo 'smi lokakṣayakṛt pravṛddhaḥ... (11.32a)

“I (Bhagavān) am Kāla who accomplishes the destruction of the world.”

We do not know any express attestation in ancient literature of the theory of time as *śakti*. And Helārāja states that it is the view of Bhartṛhari. It is indeed an echo of the introductory conception of his Brāhmacāṇḍa. Therefore we can assert with confidence that this view about time is the key to his original system of thought.

In later philosophical literature also, Bhartṛhari appears isolated in giving such a high status to time. But his position and his philosophical analysis have not been ignored. A remarkable trace of his influence appears in Śaivasiddhānta. This is a theistic school of thought, a branch of Tantric philosophy which had its apex of creative literary activity from 10th to 13th century with a group of *ācāryas* who expressed their thought in commentaries on Śaivāgamas or in independent works.

Śaiva philosophy starts from Śaṃkhya and Yoga thought and builds a system in which the twenty-five basic *tattvas* of Sāṃkhya are transcended by higher entities. At the top is the concept of *pati* who is the supreme Śiva and his supreme Śakti. They are pure spiritual entities to whom a pure matter called *śuddhamāyā* is provided. This matter is itself considered as a *śakti*. One of its aspects is diversely defined as being the highest aspect of Speech. Śaivasiddhāntins are constantly attentive at isolating the pure entities from the impure world. With this intention they have duplicated several entities. The *śuddhamāyā* is a transcendent form of the worldly *māyā* consequently called impure and a lower form of the higher *śakti*. *śuddhamāyā* and *aśuddhamāyā* are differentiated only by the criterion of purity. Their structure is similar. They contain the totality of objects, unmanifest at their primary level, and are subjected to transformation, up to the manifest state of their products.

The pure consciousness of the supreme Śiva is thus defined as *sarvadikkriyā* ‘made of knowledge and action of everything’, i.e., omniscience and omnipotence. That reminds us of the above-mentioned concept of pure knowledge, the form of which is all ‘objects’ (*sarvārtharūpatā śuddhir jñānasya*).

The impure *māyā* in its primary level is similarly considered as the entity containing all phenomena of the world contained in unmanifested form in itself, i.e. its future products in the scheme of transformation well-known in Sāṃkhya. But between the unmanifested *māyā* and *prakṛti* with its evolutes, Śaivasiddhānta places five *kañcukas* 'shields', commanding the *puruṣa*, the *prakṛti* and all the transformations of the latter. Time is one of them. It is not called directly a *śakti*. It is said to be the support of the *mahāśakti* of the supreme Śiva. It thus appears as transcending the whole matter. It is not at all substance of Vaiśeṣika or the evolute of *prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya. It is defined by its etymology as the 'impeller' of everything. It has the qualities already ascribed to it by Bhartṛhari including the *vibhūtvā* 'all-pervasion'. The difference with Bhartṛhari's conception is that time here does not appear as being directly a power of the god. It is not a *śakti*, but the location of the *śakti* of the supreme principle. It is indirectly connected to it, through a mediatory principle. It has been elaborated in accordance with the Śaiva doctrine that the supreme Śiva does not enter the realm of *māyā*, does not touch *māyā* itself which is impure. Śiva has a contact only with the supreme *śakti* or *śuddhamāyā* and entrusts the incitation to activity to pure entities like Mantra-s or Vidyēśvara-s who are in charge of agitating the impure *māyā* and its different components. Time appears thus as a *śakti* of God through delegation.

Thus the Śaiva concept is a later development of Bhartṛhari's concept. We wish to attract again the attention to the stanza of Kālasamuddeśa dealing with the three views on time. It already contains a trace of the concept of time as belonging to the realm of *māyā* in the name of *avidyā*.

prathamam tad avidyāyaṃ yad vidyāyaṃ na vidyate || (3.9.62b)

"That [perception of time], which does not occur when there is experience [of the *śabdatattva*], occurs first in the state of ignorance."

Just as Bhartṛhari separates the experience of time from the experience of the supreme *śabdatattva*, Śaivasiddhānta separates time from the realm of the supreme Śiva and places it at the head of the engagement of the soul in the world. We recognise in Śaivasiddhānta, Bhartṛhari's basic conceptions of the transcendence of time, of its nature of power impelling evolutionary action, of its role of commanding the engagement in the phenomenal world. The divergence between the linguist and the theistic thinker is in the fact that for the former Śabda remains the only principle liable to absolute supremacy, whereas the idea of God places even this concept in subordination.

A clear expression of these ideas appears in the 12th *paṭala* entitled Kālatattvaparakaraṇa of Maṇḍapārameśvarāgama with the comment of Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha, a Kāśmīrian author of 11th century:

kalayitrī mahāśaktiḥ kālam āśritya pudgalān |
prerayaty akhile viśve kāraṇājñānuvartinī || (12.2)

"Relying on time, the Great Śakti, the impeller, incites to action the souls in the whole world, obeying the order [of the Lord] who causes her to act."

kālah sarvagataḥ sūkṣmo hy ananto 'mūrtimān vibhuḥ |
akartā nirvasthāno niṣkāmaś cāpy acetanaḥ ||

"Time is all-pervasive, subtle, infinite, without body, omnipresent, non-agent, without stop, without desire, insentient."

Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha makes these comments with several quotations from Bhartṛhari's *Kālsamuddeśa* (3.9.1; 76; 57; 58; 24; 35; 16; 50; 27; 45; 3), showing his great familiarity with the thought and text of Bhartṛhari. We surmise that the redactor of the Āgama and the thinkers of this Śaiva system are equally familiar with Bhartṛhari's work. Its influence is clear. We do not know the date of composition of the *Mataṅgapārameśvarāgama*. It is not one of the basic twenty eight *tantras* of the school. It is an *upāgama*, i.e., an ancillary of the *pārameśvara* which is not known to us. It cannot be held as an early item of this literature. There has probably been a long gap between Bhartṛhari and this text which shows a well-developed form of the Śaiva thought. In the span of centuries between them, active speculation has occurred. Bhartṛhari has probably been at the start of the speculations. But his ontology of Word and Time has become a theology of Śiva and Time.

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On Bhartṛhari's Notion of 'Power' (śakti)

HIDEYO OGAWA

The Vākyapadīya begins with a description of Brahman in kārikās 1-4. Bhartṛhari immediately introduces the theme of multiplicity and unity: Brahman is enunciated in the Veda as one, in that there is no separation between it and its powers (śakti); it appears as though distinct from these powers; and it appears as distinct things by virtue of its several powers.

*ekaṃ eva yad āmnātaṃ bhinnaśaktivyapāśrayāt/
aprthaktve 'pi śaktibhyaḥ prthaktveneiva vartate// VP 1.2*

"Brahman is enunciated in the Veda as one. It appears as if distinct from powers although not distinct, by virtue of its several powers."

As shown in this kārikā, power plays a critical role in Bhartṛhari's *vivarta* theory. Besides, not only from a viewpoint of Bhartṛhari's metaphysics but also from that of his linguistic theory, we may point out that the notion of power plays an essential part in his abstraction theory (*apoddhāra*), a theory basic to his philosophy of grammar, since the theory presupposes a linguistic item's causal link with its meaning. I do not think however that the question of how Bhartṛhari conceives of a power has been made sufficiently clear. Thus I intend this paper to be a closer investigation of Bhartṛhari's notion of power.¹

¹Chakravarti (1940) once attempted to give a historical outline of the doctrine of *śakti* in Sanskrit literature, though regrettably the work was not completed. He also touched on Bhartṛhari's use of the term *śakti* but could not find that Bhartṛhari defined precisely what *śakti* is.

The term *śakti* is one of the most widely used terms in Indian philosophy but at the same time one of the most difficult ones to define. In this respect also, Bhartṛhari's arguments relating to powers in the Vākyapadīya will provide a good clue to the concept of power.

1. Definition of power

In the Sādhanaśamuddeśa of the Vākyapadīya Bhartṛhari defines a *sādhana* ('means') as follows:

yad yadā yadanugrāhi tat tadā tatra sādhanam/ VP 3.7.12cd

"When a certain thing *x* grants a favor (*anugrāhin*) to another thing *y*, the thing *x* is a *sādhana* for the thing *y*."

This definition of a *sādhana* finds a different expression by Helārāja:

yad yatropakaroti tat tatra sādhanam/ Prakāśa on VP 3.7.12

"When a certain thing *x* renders service (*upakaroti*) to a certain thing *y*; the thing *x* is a *sādhana* for the thing *y*."

The *sādhana* Bhartṛhari is speaking of in this kārīkā is what brings an action (*kriyā*) to accomplishment. Naturally, Bhartṛhari means a power by the term *sādhana* here, as is shown in his opening kārīkā of the Sādhanaśamuddeśa.²

Obviously, a power is called *sādhana* in the *kriyā-kāraka* context precisely because the given definition of *sādhana* applies to the power. As a matter of fact, Helārāja clearly understands that the given definition of *sādhana* amounts to that of a power. He states as follows:

paropakāri paratantram sarvaṃ śaktīlakṣaṇam anupatati/ Prakāśa on VP 3.7.12

² VP 3.7.1: *svāśraye samavetānām tadvad evāśrayāntare/ kriyāṇām abhiniṣpattau sāmārthyam sādhanam viduḥ*// ('It is what [Pāṇinīyas from Patañjali onwards] call *sādhana* that is a power (*sāmārthya*) for bringing to accomplishment the act which abides in the same locus as the power itself or the one which in the very same manner abides in a locus different from the one in which the power does.'')

According to Bhartṛhari, what plays a contributing role in an act is the power (*sāmārthya*), which is teated as *sādhana* in correlation to an act as what is to be brought to accomplishment (*sādhyā*). Prakāśa on VP 3.7.1: *kriyānirvṛttau dravyasya śaktiḥ sādhanam, sādhyate 'nayā kriyēti bhāṣyakāraprabhṛtayo viduḥ*/ As is suggested by Bhartṛhari's use of the word *viduḥ* 'they consider, call' (*vid*, 3rd pl. pfct.), moreover, this view is firmly rooted in the Pāṇinian tradition. Helārāja comments: *bhāṣyakāraprabhṛtayo viduḥ*. Bhartṛhari developed the view of a *sādhana* as a quality (*guṇa*) into its view as a power, simply following Patañjali who, in answering the question of what a *sādhana* is, had proposed the alternatives of a substance (*dravya*) or a quality and had given preference to a quality.

In the Prakāśa passage cited above, Helārāja glosses the term *sāmārthya* with the term *śakti*. There is no question that Bhartṛhari uses the terms *śakti* and *sāmārthya* synonymously when he speaks of a notion such as 'power', 'capacity', and the like.

"Whatever renders service to others and is something dependent fits the definition of power."³

Thus we may reasonably arrive at Bhartṛhari's definition of power. The definition is as follows: When a certain thing *x* renders service to another thing *y*, the thing *x* is a power for the thing *y*.

2. dharma and nimittabhāva

Of course, it is hard to say that we can acquire a clear understanding of power from this definition alone. In order to deepen our understanding, it is essential to consider the following kārīkās, which immediately follow the kārīkā that has given the definition of *sādhana* (VP 3.7.12). They give short but superb characterization of the power.

*svaśabdair abhidhāne tu sa dharmo nābhidhīyate/
vibhaktyādibhir evāsāv upakāraḥ pratīyate// VP 3.7.13*

"When denoted by its own word, however, that property (*sa dharmah*) is not denoted by it. The function of rendering service [to an action] is understood precisely from items such as a nominal ending."

*nimittabhāvo bhāvānām upakārārtham āśritaḥ/
natir āvarjanety evaṃ siddaḥ sādhanam iṣyate// VP 3.7.14*

"On the basis of its purpose of serving others, *nimittabhāva* belongs to entities. The *nimittabhāva* is something referred to by terms such as *nati* 'inclination', *āvarjana* 'leaning'. When actually present (*siddha*) [in the entities], it is accepted as *sādhana* [i.e., a means]."

§2.1. DHARMA

Let us first consider kārīkā 13. There are three points to be noted here. The first, which is the most important, is that Bhartṛhari refers to *sādhana*, a power, by the phrase *sa dharmah* 'that property'. This clearly shows that the power is a property (*dharma*) which calls for a locus to abide in (*dharmīn*).⁴ And this is also suggested by Bhartṛhari, who has described a

³ In his Prakāśa on VP 3.6.1 (see fn. 11) also Helārāja mentions features of a power as follows: *tathā hi paropādhirūpāḥ śaktayo digādyāḥ, pāratantryaṃ ca śaktīlakṣaṇam iti kriyāpi dravyaparatantrā śaktir iti vyapadiśyate/vaiśeṣikanaye ca dik dravyam nopapadyate, kāryānumeyatvena padārthopakāraṇīyasya śaktītvasya nyāyyatvāt/* He says that things such as *diś* 'direction' are in essence adjuncts delimiting others (*paropādhi*), that being dependent (*pāratantrya*) is a characteristic of a power, so that an action, being dependent on a substance, is a power, and that power is something to be inferred (*kāryānumeya*) and consists in rendering service to things (*padārthopakāraka*). On the characteristic of being dependent, see section 4.

⁴ Helārāja comments: *sa dharmah, kriyām prati śeṣabhāvaḥ/* Judging from the fact that, in introducing the kārīkā in question, he states *sā ca svakāryaparatantrūvasthā ...* 'and that is the state of being dependent on its own result', we may take the gloss as meaning 'the property of being subordinate to an action' (*śeṣabhāva* = *śeṣatva*). This interpretation is possible because, as shall be seen later, when a certain thing serves another, the former is said to be subordinate to the

power as abiding in a locus (*svāśraye*, *āśrayāntare*) in the first *kārikā* of the *Sādhanaśamuddheśa*. To use Bhartṛhari's terminology in VP 3.7.11 which equates Vaiśeṣika categories with powers he has in mind, a locus of the property in question is spoken of as *śaktimat* 'that which has a power'.⁵ We have to say that it is quite natural that Bhartṛhari, following Patañjali who identifies *sādhana* with a quality (*guṇa*), should consider a *sādhana* to be a property.

The second is that Bhartṛhari says that power, being a property, cannot but be denoted by an item other than that of its own. Things such as a power and a relation (*saṃbandha*) are spoken of as *asvaśabda*.⁶ This shall be explained later in connection with Bhartṛhari's characterization of power as *upakārin* or what renders service.

The third is that he remarks that one understands the function of rendering service to an action (*asāv upakāraḥ* 'that service') from an item like a nominal ending. The power has been defined as what serves something. It is natural, therefore, that when one understands something as serving a certain thing, one should understand the function of rendering service involved there.

§2.2. NIMITTABHĀVA

Turning now to *kārikā* 14, we see that Bhartṛhari uses the term *nimittabhāva* with reference to the *dharma* mentioned in the preceding *kārikā*.⁷ First of all, there is no question that Bhartṛhari means power by this term. Consider the following *kārikā*:

latter. In this sense, we cannot deny that what is called *sādhana* has such a property. However, Bhartṛhari does not mention such a property at all in the preceding *kārikās*.

⁵VP 3.7.11: *svaiḥ sāmānyaviśeṣaiś ca śaktimanto rasādayaḥ/ niyatagrahaṇā loke śaktayas tās tathāśrayaiḥ*// In the situation conveyed by the utterance *rasam rasayati* 'He takes a taste', the generic property taste-ness (*rasatva*) of the taste is a power and the taste is a power-holder (*śaktimat*); when the taste-ness is understood as being in specific locus such as the taste in question, the locus is a power while the taste-ness is a power-holder. Note that Vaiśeṣika categories are spoken of as powers under the condition that they are *asvaśabdas*, which means that even the locus of the generic property taste-ness is viewed as a certain *dharma* with respect to the taste-ness. The reason for this is obvious. The locus in question is that which is related to the taste-ness in question (*saṃsargin*) and which is understood to function as a differentiator (*bhedaka*) of the taste-ness, so that it may legitimately be taken as a *guṇa* or a quality (as contrasted with a *dravya* or a substance). See fn. 35.

⁶VP 3.7.9: *śaktayaḥ śaktimantaś ca sarve saṃsargavādinām/ bhāvās teṣu asvaśabdeṣu sādhanatvaṃ nirūpyate*// ('According to Samsargavādins, every entity is a power and has a power. When they are not denoted by their own words, they are accepted as [power-] *sādhana*s.') In the classical Vaiśeṣika system, power is not accepted as a separate category. This *kārikā* is to declare that Vaiśeṣika views can be reformulated in *śakti*-terminology, and hence can point to characteristics of a power all the more for that. Concerning a relation, VP 3.3.4 describes such an *asvaśabda* aspect of it. On this *kārikā*, see fn. 31.

⁷Iyer (1971): "It is for the sake of rendering help (to the action) that finished objects are

*diśo vyavasthā deśānām digvyavasthā na vidyate/
śaktayaḥ khalu bhāvānām upakāraprabhāvitāḥ*// VP 3.6.6

"Regions are regulated through *diś* (direction) and nothing regulates *diś*. Indeed, powers of entities are aroused for the sake of service."

The second half of this *kārikā*: *śaktayaḥ khalu bhāvānām upakāraprabhāvitāḥ* is obviously equivalent to the first half of VP 3.7.14: *nimittabhāvo bhāvānām upakārārtham āśritaḥ*. The former says that powers of entities are aroused for the sake of service, while the latter states that *nimittabhāva* belongs to entities on the basis of its purpose of serving others. We cannot see any difference between what is meant by the terms *nimittabhāva* and *śakti*. Thus it is plain that the term *nimittabhāva* is synonymous with the term *śakti*. And this is supported by Helārāja. In VP 3.7.15 (see §3.4.1) Bhartṛhari uses the demonstrative *saḥ* to refer to *nimittabhāva* which has occurred in the *kārikā* in question. In his *Prakāśa* on this *kārikā* Helārāja explicitly states: *saḥ iti hetubhāvaḥ śaktyaparaparyāyaḥ*, in which statement he paraphrases the term *nimittabhāva* with the term *hetubhāva*, remarking that it is synonymous with the term *śakti*.

Then what exactly does the term *nimittabhāva* signify? It is open to dispute what the term in question signifies. This term might admit of two interpretations: one might take it as synonymous with the term *nimittatva*, an alternant of *nimittasya bhāvaḥ*, as Raghunatha Sharma [1979] does in his *Ambākartrī* on the *kārikā* in question,⁸ or one might interpret it as meaning *bhāva* or *dharma* (property) which is *nimitta* 'cause'. Of these two interpretations, the latter is confirmed by Bhartṛhari himself.

We have to note that in VP 3.6.6 Bhartṛhari, considering *diś* to be a *nimitta* or *hetu* (*diśaḥ*, abl. sg.), a cause for regulating regions, equates it with a power.⁹ It is proper to say that what functions as *nimitta* has *nimittatva*:

looked upon as cause (*nimitta*). It is an inclination to render service (*natī*) or self-surrender. Thus what is a finished thing (*siddha*) becomes the means (*sādhana*)."¹⁰ My interpretation of this *kārikā* differs from Iyer's. Iyer takes the *pāda* ab as intending to say that a substance-*sādhana* (*bhāva*) becomes a cause (*nimitta*) for the sake of rendering service to an action, on the basis of Helārāja's comment: *sādhyaśvabhāvāyām kriyāyām upakārāya siddhasvabhāvānām bhāvānām nimittabhāvo hetubhāvaḥ*. Iyer's interpretation, however, would lead to the consequence that what serves an action is a substance-*sādhana* and not a power-*sādhana*. And further, his interpretation of *pāda* d is not syntactically justified. The term *siddha* must be construed with the term *nimittabhāva*. As is well known, there stands the relation of *sādhyaśādanabhāva* between action and *kāraka*. What does the accomplishing *has* to be something established, set (*siddha*), with respect to an action, something to be brought to accomplishment. When there is such a relation to be found between action and power, the power should be something established, set. See section 3.2 also.

⁸ Ambākartrī on VP 3.7.14: *kriyāyā upakārārtham āśrito bhāvānām nimittabhāvaḥ nimittatvam . . . /*

⁹ The terms *nimitta*, *kāraṇa*, and *hetu* are synonymous. See the *vārttika* on A 2.3.23: *nimittakāraṇahetuḥ sarvāśūṃ prāyadarśanam* and *Pradīpa* on MBh ad A 2.3.23. The occurrence

the property of being a *nimitta*. To be sure, one might say that *diś*, being a *nimitta*, has the property of being a *nimitta*. However, if you accepted *diś* as having such a property and such a property as a power, then *diś* would result in being a *śaktimat* or a power-holder.¹⁰ In principle *diś* is never a *śaktimat* but a power *per se*.¹¹ The *diś*, being a *nimitta* for regulating regions, should be spoken of as *nimittabhāva*.

All this, thus, makes it clear that a power is a *dharma*, or rather, a *nimittabhāva*, that is, a property which functions as a *nimitta*.

3. upakārin

But, in what respect can a power be said to be an *anugrāhin/upakārin*?¹²

§3.1. SAMBANDHA AS A ŚAKTI

In order to answer this question, let us consider the following *kārikā*:

*upakārāt sa yatrāsti dharmas tatrānugamyate/
śaktinām api sā śaktir guṇānām apy asau guṇaḥ*// VP 3.3.5

"Where it [i.e., the relation] obtains on the basis of service, the property is understood. The relation is a power even of powers; it is a quality even of qualities."

Bharṭṛhari first states: Whenever one thing is seen to serve another, there is a certain relation (*saḥ : sambandhaḥ*) between them; where there is a certain relation between certain things, the property of being absolutely dependent (*atyantaparatantratva*) is understood.¹³ He then goes on to

of the ending *-as* of the fifth triplet is accounted for by resorting to making a rule split (*yogavibhāga*) concerning A 2.3.25. See SK 602.

¹⁰ Prakāśa on VP 3.6.6: *deśānām svatantram rūpam ādhārādisvabhāvam avadhāryata iti tatra pūrvāparādibhāvasya svarūpād evābhāvād anyan nimittam digākhyam kalpyate dikkṛtenaivopakāreṇa/ tatra paratantrasvabhāvā kalpyamānā nāparaṃ pūrvāparādibhāvāt svabhāvam avalambitum utsahate yena tatrāvasthite svabhāve deśavat pūrvāparādibhāvārtham nimittāntaram eṣaṇīyaṃ syāt/ yādṛksvabhāvā hi sā kāryaparikalpyā tāvad eva tattvaṃ nāparam, tatra śaktinām pāratantryasyaivopapalleḥ/śaktyantarakalpane śaktimattvāpalleḥ śaktitvahānīprasāṅgāt/* Helārāja clearly states that what is called *diś* is a *nimitta* and such a *nimitta* is postulated on the basis of the service (*upakāra*) which an entity called *diś* renders because the distinction of priority or posteriority among regions cannot arise out of their own nature.

¹¹ For Bharṭṛhari, direction, *sādhana* in relation to an act, action, and time (*kāla*)—all these things are in themselves powers. VP 3.6.1: *dik sādhanam kriyā kāla iti vastvabhīdhāyinaḥ/ śaktirūpe padārthānām atyantam anavasthitāḥ*// They are powers, though not denoted by their own words. This point shall be explained in section 4.

¹² In his definition of *sādhana* Bharṭṛhari uses the word *anugrāhin* 'that which grants a favor', while in his reformulation of it Helārāja employs the word *upakaroti* '... renders service'. From the above, we see that Bharṭṛhari himself sees no difference in meaning between them and that Helārāja's reformulation of the definition in question is well-grounded.

¹³ The property (*dharma*) mentioned in this *kārikā* is the property of being absolutely dependent (*atyantaparatantratva*) referred to in the preceding *kārikā* (VP 3.3.4). See fn. 31.

characterize a relation by saying *śaktīnām api sā śaktir guṇānām apy asau guṇaḥ*. Note the *pāda* c: *śaktīnām api sā śaktiḥ*, with which he characterizes a relation as a power of powers. How is it possible that a relation is a power? Needless to say, it is because his definition of power applies in a relation that the relation is regarded as a power. According to Helārāja, a power is also to be served by a certain thing in order to be determined both to abide in a locus and to bring about a fixed result. Such a thing is a relation that the power has with respect to its locus (*āśrayāśrayibhāva*) and to its result (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*), and the relation can consequently be viewed as a power in that it helps the power to abide in a locus and to bring about a specific result.¹⁴

§3.2. VIŚEṢAṆA AS AN UPAKĀRIN

And further, consider the following *kārikā*:

*viśeṣyaṃ syād anirjñātāṃ nirjñāto'rtho viśeṣaṇam/
parārthatvena śeṣatvaṃ sarveṣāṃ upakāriṇām// VP 3.14.7*

"The following has to be the case: What has not been definitely known is a qualificand (*viśeṣya*), while what has already been definitely known is a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). All things that serve [others] are subsidiary with respect to them because of being meant for them."

In the utterance *nīlam utpalam* 'a blues lotus', we understand that the color blue which is denoted by the term *nīla* is a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), while the substance lotus which is denoted by the term *utpala* is a qualificand (*viśeṣya*). According to Bhartṛhari, a qualifier, being known as something specific (*nirjñātārtha*), serves a qualificand as what helps the latter, something that has not yet been known as specific (*anirjñāta*), to be known as something specific; consequently, the qualifier is said to be subsidiary to the qualificand (*śeṣa*) because the former is meant for the latter (*parārtha*).¹⁵

¹⁴ Prakāśa on VP 3.3.5: *na ca śaktir eva sambandhaḥ, śaktīnām apy ādhārapāratantṛye niyatakāryajanane ca sambandha eva niyamako yataḥ*/It is obvious that, by stating the second half of VP 3.3.5, Bhartṛhari intends to emphasize a feature of the relation that it is something absolutely dependent. Both the power and the quality have the characteristic of being dependent. See section 4. This does not prevent us from assuming that *śakti* becomes a *śaktimat* with respect to its relation and *guṇa* becomes non-*guṇa* with respect to its relation. For, a relation is something that renders service even to something dependent, so that it is considered to be absolutely dependent. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.5: *paratantrāṇām apy upakāratvāt sarvatranūmīyamānasvarūpo nityaparatantraḥ*/It goes without saying that the power, the quality, and the relation are all something dependent; of these three things the relation is something exceedingly dependent, so that it is called something absolutely dependent. The reason that, with regard to qualities, a relation is called a quality is that it is viewed as meant for a quality because it serves to determine the quality abiding in a specific substance. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.5: *guṇānām api ca dravyāśritatvāvasthāpakāḥ sambandha eva*. See also 3.4.2

¹⁵ Prakāśa on VP 3.14.7: *tathā hi sāmānyātmanā kriyāsambandhitāyām upakrāntaṃ viśeṣyaṃ jñātāṃ api svagatenātmabhūtena viśeṣeṇānīścitam iti lannīścayāya jñāpakatvād eva niścito 'rtho guṇādiḥ*

§3.3. THREE FACTORS ESSENTIAL FOR UPAKĀRA

The two cases mentioned above tell us that in a situation where a certain thing is called *upakārin*, three factors are involved: the thing itself which performs the function of serving, a thing, different from it, which is to be served, and the effect the latter thing obtains with the help of the former. With reference to a power, Bhartṛhari explicitly states this structure.

It must be recalled that in the opening *kārikā* of the *Sādhana-samuddeśa* Bhartṛhari stated: *kriyāṇām abhiniṣpattau sāmartyaṃ sādhanam viduḥ*. Obviously, in the *kriyā-kāraka* context, a power, bringing an action to accomplishment, has to be regarded as what serves the action in that it helps the latter to be brought to accomplishment. Helārāja calls this *kriyopakāra* 'the service rendered to an action'.¹⁶ And besides, consider the following *kārikā*:

*nirjñātaśakter dravyasya tām tām arthakriyām prati/
viśiṣṭadravyasambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate// VP 1.33*

"A substance is known to have the powers to accomplish the various things one aims at. Its power is suppressed when the substance comes into contact with a particular substance."

Here Bhartṛhari speaks of a power as being in relation to *arthakriyā*, the accomplishment of a thing aimed at, or more generally, 'causal efficiency'. Clearly he posits three factors: a power, an objective (*artha*), and its accomplishment (*kriyā*), as in the *kriyākāraka* context he posits three factors: a power, an action, and the accomplishment (*abhiniṣpatti*).¹⁷ In this connection it is to be noted in passing that what is served by a power is not always the thing that possesses it.

§3.4. FEATURES OF A POWER DERIVED FROM BEING AN UPAKĀRIN

Additional features of a power are to be pointed out. The fact that a power is what has the function of serving entails the following features of it.

pravartamāno viśeṣaṇam/ tataś ca jñāpyaṃ pradhānam viśeṣyam, jñāpakam paropakārāyopādīyamānam śeṣabhūtam apradhānam viśeṣaṇam . . . /

¹⁶ See Prakāśa on VP 3.7.148. In this *kārikā* Bhartṛhari states that in the accomplishment of an action a *kāraka* called *adhikaraṇa* 'locus' renders service to the action by holding it indirectly through an agent or an object (*kartṛkarmavyavahitām asākṣād dhārayat kriyām/ upakurvat kriyāsiddhau śāstre 'dhikaraṇam smṛtam//*).

¹⁷ In his *Vṛtti* on VP 1.33 Bhartṛhari rephrases the first half of VP 1.33 as follows: *agnyādīnām kāṣṭhādivikārotpādane dr̥ṣṭasāmartyānām*, which says that fire is seen to have a power to produce the modification of firewood. We find three factors here: a power (*sāmartya*), the modification of firewood (*kāṣṭhādivikāra*), and the production of it (*utpādana*).

§3.4.1. *vyatireka*

When a certain thing is said to perform the function of serving, there must be a thing to be served by it, as a matter of course. Consider the following *kārikā*:

*sa tebhyo vyatirikto vā teṣām ātmaiva vā tathā/
vyatirekam upāśritya sādhanatvena kalpyate// VP 3.7.15*

"Whether it [i.e., the *nimittabhāva*] be distinct from those [entities (*bhāva*)] or they themselves be it, it is assumed to be a *sādhana* or a power on the basis of the distinction [between what is served and what serves]."

According to Bhartṛhari a power obtains when there is the distinction between what serves (*upakāraka*) and what is served (*upakārya*). This of course accounts for a feature of the power that it serves others (*paropakāra*).¹⁸

§3.4.2. *parārtha, śeṣa, guṇa*

As is suggested by VP 3.14.7 which defines what a qualifier and a qualificand are, the characteristic of serving others leads to those of being meant for them (*parārtha*), of being subsidiary (*śeṣa*), and of being subordinate (*guṇa*). The following *kārikā* is by far the most explicit source of this point.

upakārī guṇaḥ śeṣaḥ parārtha iti kalpanā/ VP 3.14.336cd

"They consider that whatever serves a certain thing is meant for the thing, subsidiary with respect to it, and subordinate to it."

¹⁸In his VP 3.7.16-17 Bhartṛhari illustrates the point made in the *kārikā* in question with the Bhāṣya on A1.4.32 (I.330.23 – 331.2) which says that even an action can be regarded as an object (*karman*). The *kārikās* run as follows: *saṃdarśanam prārthanūyām vyavasāye tu anantarā/ vyavasāyas tathārambhe sādhanatvāya kalpate // purūṣasmin yā kriyā saiva parasmin sādhanam matā/ saṃdarśane tu caitanyam viśiṣṭam sādhanam viduḥ //* In his Prakāśa on them Helārāja states: *tad evaṃ vyatirekam upāśritya sādhanatvena kalpata iti kriyāyā api sādhyasādhanabhāvo vyatirekāśrayeṇo- pakāryopakārabhāvena bhāṣyokta udāhṛta iti sthītam etat / śaktivyatirikṭā kriyopakārārham āśritā sādhanam iti sāmānyenocyata iti/* According to him, Bhartṛhari means to say that even an action has the relation of what is to be accomplished and what does the accomplishing, with another action on the basis of the distinction between them as what is served and what serves. In addition, Helārāja remarks that even an action which is distinct from a power is generally spoken of as *sādhana* on the basis of its purpose of rendering service (*śaktivyatirikṭā kriyopakārārtham āśritā sādhanam iti sāmānyenocyate*). In short, even an action which is served by a power can be considered to be a power when it serves another action. We have to note that Helārāja applies here what is said in VP 3.6.6cd: *śaktayaḥ khalu bhāvānām upakāraprabhāvītāḥ* and in VP 3.7.14ab: *nimittabhāvo bhāvānām upakārārtham āśritāḥ* to accounting for an action being regarded as *sādhana* or a power.

We should not understand that what is asserted in the present *kārikā*, VP 3.7.15, is the same as what is intended in VP 3.7.38 (see 5). The former speaks of the distinction between what is served and what serves, while the latter talks about the one between a power and its locus.

As is clear from the above, thus that a power is an *upakārin* tells this: A power serves another thing in such a way that it helps the thing, something that has not yet obtained a certain effect, to obtain the effect; and besides, when rendering service to the thing, the power, viewed as related to the thing to which service is rendered, is considered to be meant for it, subsidiary with respect to it, and subordinate to it.

4. a-svaśabda

Bhartrhari characterizes a power as *asvaśabda*. A power is something that cannot be denoted by the word 'power' itself.

§4.1. ŚAKTI AND SAMBANDHA

Elsewhere in his *Vākyapadīya* Bhartrhari also mentions this aspect of a power and illustrates it by giving relation as an example. For Bhartrhari, a power and a relation are alike in that both have the property of being dependent.¹⁹ I will cite relevant *kārikās* together with the *Vṛtti* thereon. Note that the text of the *Vṛtti* is based on Ashok Aklujkar's unpublished edition.²⁰

*vastūpalakṣaṇaḥ śabda nopakārasya vācakaḥ/
na svaśaktiḥ padārthānām saṁsprastuṁ tena śakyate// VP 2.438*

"A word which refers to an entity (*vastūpalakṣaṇaḥ śabdah*) does not denote the service [a power renders]. Such a word cannot touch things' own power."²¹

¹⁹ See fn. 14.

²⁰ I wish to thank Prof. Aklujkar for sending me the *Vṛtti* text pertaining to VP 2.438-439 to answer my inquiry about its reading. I cannot reproduce his critical apparatus here for want of space.

²¹ Iyer (1977): "The word is only an adventitious mark of an object (*upalakṣaṇa*); it does not express the service which it renders, it is not capable of touching (that is, of expressing) the powers of the object." We have to note that Bhārtṛhari purposely uses here the word *vastūpalakṣaṇa*, which occurs in his *kārikā* to define *dravya* (VP 3.4.3, see fn. 35). It is reasonable to consider that what is meant by this word is the same as what is meant by the expression *vastvabhīdhāyin* in VP 3.6.1 (see fn. 11). I do not think that Iyer, taking the term *upalakṣaṇa* as an adventitious mark, touches the core of the problem raised by Bhārtṛhari.

It is noteworthy that service (*upakāra*), which implies a power, does not fall under the category of *vastu*. The term *vastu* in the expressions *vastūpalakṣaṇa* and *vastvabhīdhāyin* is synonymous with the term *sattva* which is, in turn, synonymous with the term *dravya* which is defined by Bhārtṛhari in his VP 3.4.3. Consider Vṛṣabha's comments on the *Vṛtti* passage on VP 1.13: *kevalam vastu tyadādīnām vastūpalakṣaṇānām viśayamātram/*; Paddhati thereupon: *vastu iti/ nāmapadavācya/ tyadādīnām iti sarvanāmopalakṣaṇam/sattvalakṣaṇanam iti/ sattvam dravyam tal lakṣyata ebhir iti/ vastūpalakṣaṇam yatra sarvanāma iti dravyalakṣaṇam/* (Here Vṛṣabha cites part of VP 3.4.3). Thus it follows that a word, as far as it denotes a substance (*vastu*, *sattva*, *dravya*), cannot touch the service a power renders, or, the power.

*vastumātram anāśritaśaktiviśeṣam aparigrhītasvadharmakam yena saṁvijñānapadenopalakṣyate na tad vastukṛtānām śaktinām yad upakāri rūpaṁ tat saṁvyāpāraṁ svakārye na śaknoti vaktum / na hi sa vastumātrasaṁsparsītvād bhedakāny upakāriṇi śaktirūpāni saṁspṛśati*²² Vṛtti on VP 2.438 (2.434 in Iyer's edition).

"It is not the case that a specific designation (*saṁvijñānapada*)²³ which refers to a bare entity (*vastumātra*) — that is, an entity whose specific power is not recognized (*anāśritaśaktiviśeṣa*) and whose own property is not grasped (*aparigrhītasvadharmaka*) — cannot denote the service-rendering form of powers relating to entities, as being involved in an activity toward its own result [i.e., differentiation]. [However,] it is indeed not the case that on account of touching a bare entity that [i.e., a word (*śabda*)] touches those service-renderers (*upakāriṇi*) in the form of powers (*śaktirūpa*) which are performing the activity of differentiating [their loci from others'] (*bhedaka*)."

*saṁbandhidharmā saṁyogaḥ svaśabdenābhidhīyate/
saṁbandhaḥ samavāyas tu saṁbandhitvena gamyate*// VP 2.439

"[In a certain utterance] contact (*saṁyoga*), being a relation (*saṁbandha*), is denoted as what has the property of being a relatum (*saṁbandhin*) by its own word [*saṁyoga*]. [In another utterance], however, the relation [which obtains between the contact and its holder], namely, [the relation of] inherence (*samavāya*), is also understood as a relatum [from its own word *samavāya*]."

aṅgulyoḥ saṁyoga iti saṁbandho 'pi saṁyoga[h] saṁvijñānapadena svatanthro 'bhidhīyamānaḥ puruṣādivat saṁbandhidharmābhidhīyate / saṁbandhisambandhas tu śaṣṭhyā nimittatvāya kalpate / yadi śāstrāntaradarśanam avaśyam abhyupagantavyaṁ tad āśrīyate saṁyogasamavāyaḥ śaṣṭhīviśaya iti / samavāye 'pi ca saṁyogasamयोगिनो samavāya iti sati vyapadeśe saṁbandhitvena samavāye 'bhidhīyamāne bhavita-vyaṁ saṁbandhāntareṇa / yadi tu śāstravyapadeśa evāyaṁ lokavyavahārānupātī tatra pratipādanārtham upacāreṇa saṁkhyāvyavahāraḥ kriyate/Vṛtti on VP 2.439 (2.435 in Iyer's edition). (Concerning the last sentence, I would like to suggest reading *upacāreṇa saṁkhyāvyavahāraḥ kriyate* as *upacāreṇa saṁvyavahāraḥ kriyate*, following Iyer's edition.)²⁴

²² Iyer's edition: *vastumātram anāśritaśaktiviśeṣam aparigrhītasvadharmakam yena saṁvijñānapadena nopalabhyate na tad vastukṛtānām śaktinām yad upakāri rūpaṁ tat saṁvyāpāraṁ svakārthena śaknoti vaktum / sa hi vastumātrasaṁsparsītvād bhedakāny upakāriṇi śaktirūpāni saṁspṛśati* / (Bold letters show the difference in reading between Aklujkar's edition and Iyer's.)

²³ On the term *saṁvijñānapada*, see Houben (1995: 340, fn. 564).

²⁴ Iyer's edition: *aṅgulyoḥ saṁyoga iti sambandho 'pi saṁyogaḥ saṁvijñānapadena svatanthro 'bhidhīyamānaḥ pūṣādivat saṁbandhidharmābhidhīyate / saṁbandhisambandhas tu śaṣṭhyā nimittatvāya kalpate / yadi śāstrāntaradarśanam avaśyam abhyupagantavyaṁ etad āśrīyate saṁyogasamavāyaḥ śaṣṭhīviśaya iti / samavāye 'pi ca saṁyogasamयोगिनो samavāya iti sati vyapadeśe saṁbandhitvena samavāye 'bhidhīyamāne bhavitavyaṁ saṁbandhāntareṇa / yadi tu śāstravyapadeśa evāyaṁ lokavyavahārānupātī tatra pratipādanārtham upacāreṇa saṁvyavahāraḥ kriyate*//

"As in the utterance *aṅgulyoḥ saṃyogaḥ* 'There is contact related to two fingers', when contact (*saṃyoga*) is denoted as something independent (*svatantra*) by a specific designation [like *saṃyoga*], it is understood as what has the property of being a relatum (*sambandhin*) just like the servant [in the utterance *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ* 'the king's servant'], even if it is a relation, whereas (*tu*) the relation with [the contact as understood to be] a relatum becomes a cause for the occurrence of an ending of the sixth triplet.

"If the view of another school [i.e., that of the Vaiśeṣika] is necessarily to be accepted, then it is admitted that [the relation of] inherence with the contact is the domain of the ending of the sixth triplet [that is, the ending of the sixth triplet occurs to signify the inherence]. And (*ca*), with reference to the relation of inherence in question also, if one expresses it as *saṃyogasamयोगिनोḥ samavāyaḥ* 'There is inherence related to the contact and its holder', the inherence results in being denoted as a relatum; in which case there should be another relation [to connect the inherence in question with its relata]. If, however, this very technical expression [simply] goes by everyday speech, then (*tatra*), the verbal expression (*saṃvyavahāra*) is made metaphorically (*upacāreṇa*) [that is, by means of superimposing the property of being a relatum upon the inherence],²⁵ for the purpose of conveying [that there is the relation of inherence between the contact and its holder. Consequently, another relation with respect to the inherence does not have to be resorted to]."

The gist is as follows: From the Vaiśeṣika point of view, the situation where there exists a relation between two fingers in contact with each other can be conveyed by such an utterance as *aṅgulyoḥ saṃyogaḥ* in which by A 2.3.50 *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe* a nominal ending of the sixth triplet is used to denote relation (*sambandha*); and further, with respect to the relation, denoted by the nominal ending, which exists between the contact and either of the two fingers, an utterance like *saṃyogasamयोगिनोḥ samavāyaḥ* is employed.

In Bhartṛhari's analysis, however, in the utterances *aṅgulyoḥ saṃyogaḥ* and *saṃyogasamयोगिनोḥ samavāyaḥ*, the words *saṃyoga* and *samavāya*, which Vaiśeṣikas consider to denote particular relations and which they treat as *svaśabdas* with respect to those relations, cannot touch the very nature of relation. For those words denote their meanings as relata.²⁶

²⁵ The term *upacāra* is glossed with the term *adhyāropa* 'superimposition' in Prakāśa on VP 3.3.39 (*upacāro 'dhyāropaḥ*).

²⁶ This is why Bhartṛhari in his VP 3.3.6 points out that contact and inherence conceived of as relations by Vaiśeṣikas are called 'relation' in a secondary sense (*tācchabdyā*). See Houben 1995: 176-178, 341-342 and Cardona 1999: 121-122. The kārīkā in question runs as follows: *taddharmaṇos tu tācchabdyam saṃyogasamavāyayor/ tayoṛ apy upakārārthā niyatās tadupādhyayor//* VP 3.3.6cd should be taken as giving a reason for what is asserted in the same kārīkā ab. According to Bhartṛhari, contact and inherence have the property of being dependent but

By the same token, the situation where firewood is being burnt by fire is conveyed by an utterance like *edhā dahyante 'gninā*, 'The firewood is being burnt by fire', in which the nominal ending of the third triplet in *agninā* denotes the power of functioning as agent or instrument;²⁷ and besides, with respect to the power in question, an utterance such as *agner edhadahane śaktir bhavati* 'The fire has the power to burn the firewood' can be used. In the latter utterance, according to Bhartṛhari, the word *śakti*, denoting a substance (*vastu*), cannot touch the very nature of power.²⁸

In the Vṛtti on VP 2.438 it is distinctly seen that Bhartṛhari's theory of denotation, which will be mentioned later,²⁹ prevents powers from being denoted by items that denote substances. The tenor of the Vṛtti is this: If a specific designation were to refer to bare entity without resorting to its adjuncts, it could signify a power. However, such is not the case with the specific designation. The item *śakti* cannot denote a power which is something that renders service and that differentiates its locus from others', as it is.³⁰ Needless to say, it is nominal endings and others (*vibhaktyādibhiḥ*)

not that of being *absolutely* dependent. Therefore they are in some cases regarded as something dependent; in other words, they become what is served by factors such as gender and number (see fn. 34) which are delimited by relation, that is, are related to them. In the light of this, I find it difficult to accept Houben's interpretation of this kārikā: "As regards *saṃyoga* (connection) and *samavāya* (inherence), they (are *tacchadbhāḥ*;) are called by that word (sc. 'relation'), because they have (as it were) that property (sc. dependence). Even these two have restricted functions of rendering service, with this [relation] as limiting factor." The second half of this kārikā should be translated as follows: "They [contact and inherence] also have the specific (*niyata*) [properties (*dharma*, supplied from the preceding kārikā)] which are meant for rendering service to them (*upakārārtha*) and which have the delimitation by that [i.e., relation]." On Houben's translation of the first half of it, see Cardona [1999: 121-122] also.

²⁷ See section 2 (VP 3.7.13).

²⁸ In his Prakāśa on VP 3.6.1 Helārāja elaborates on this point in connection with the powers *diś*, *sādhana*, *kriyā*, and *kāla*, by saying: *digādiśabdāḥ siddhasvabhāvadravayadharmatayā svārtham pratipādayanto yathālakṣitadigādyarthasamsparsavikalāḥ / . . . / evaṃvidham śaktirūpam siddhasvabhāvavastuvācakaiḥ śabdaiḥ sāḥśān na spṛśyate . . . /* Words such as *diś* cannot convey that those which are denoted by them consist in a power since those words denote their own meanings as things that have the property of being a substance which is in essence something established (*siddhasvabhāvadravya*, *siddhasvabhāvavastu*).

²⁹ See section 4.2 and fn. 37.

³⁰ Note that a power is called *guṇa* (see fn. 24) and hence should be a *bhedaka* 'differentiator'; anything that does the differentiating is called *guṇa*. In accordance with his definition of *guṇa*, Bhartṛhari uses the term *sayyāpāra* 'in action' in the given Vṛtti. When a certain thing has the status of being a differentiator with respect to another, it is called *guṇa*, which indicates that the status of being a *guṇa* is not fixed but relative. For example, the color blue is a differentiator with respect to its locus, say, a pot, while it is what is differentiated with respect to its generic property, say, blueness. See fn. 35 in which the definition of *dravya* and *guṇa* given by Bhartṛhari is treated.

that can denote powers, as it is endings of the sixth triplet that can denote relations.³¹

It is important, moreover, that Bhartṛhari points out that the utterance *saṃyogasam̐yoginoḥ samavāyah* is considered to be a metaphorical expression (*upacāreṇa sam̐vyavahārah*), if one has this utterance by means of superimposing the property of being a relatum upon the inherence in question which is itself a relation. For, the same may be said of the utterance *agner edhadahane śaktir bhavati*. If one can have this utterance by means of superimposing the property, that the power spoken of does not possess, upon the power, this will be properly called a metaphorical expression. As shall be seen in section 4.2, when one uses the word *śakti* with respect to a power, it denotes the power as something dependent. A power itself does not possess the property of being dependent. In order to speak of the power by the word *śakti*, therefore, one cannot but resort to the superimposition of such a property upon it.

§4.2. PARATANTRA AND SVATANTRA

Now what is the reason that a power is characterized to be an *asvaśabda*? The key to this question also lies in a power being an *upakārin*. For, as shown earlier in section §§3.4.2, whatever serves, rendering service to others, is considered to be meant for them (*parārtha*), a subsidiary to them (*śeṣa*), and hence subordinate with respect to them (*guṇa*). As soon as an *upakārin* characterized as such is substantialized, it loses its own characteristic of being what is called *guṇa*. Consider the following *kārikā*:

*paropakāratattvānām svātantryeṇābhidhāyakah/
śabdaḥ sarvapadārthānām svadharmād viprakṛṣyate// VP 3.11.7*

“If a word denotes as something independent (*svātantryeṇa*) whatever in essence serves others, the word used to denote it is alienated from its own property [of being dependent].”³²

³¹ See section 2 (VP 3.7.13) and Prakāśa on VP 3.3.4. In the Prakāśa Helārāja says: *tatra svena asādhāraṇena dharmeṇa svabhāvenopalakṣitasya vācakaṃ pratyāyakam, abhidhānam śaṣṭhīvyatiriktaṃ nāsti, idaṃtaya svarūpānavadhāraṇāt/*

³² Based upon Helārāja’s interpretation of ‘*svadharma*’ as *vācakatva*, Iyer (1971) renders this *kārikā* as follows: “The word which conveys as being independent of all things whose nature is determined by extraneous things is removed from its own function.” Prakāśa on VP 3.11.7: *śabdo hi na guṇānām eva, api tu dravyānām apy aparopādhikena rūpeṇopalakṣitānām svadharmād vācakatvād dūrībhavati/* According to Helārāja, the word is far removed not only from having its own property of denoting qualities unqualified by their adjuncts but also from having its own property of denoting substances unqualified by their adjuncts. That is, it is incapable by nature of denoting a quality or a substance which is not qualified by its adjunct. This interpretation of course makes good sense. However, unlike Helārāja who takes the word *svadharma* as meaning a word’s own property of denoting something, we may take it as signifying a denotatum’s own property, which turns out to be proper when we consider the following

According to this *kārikā*, when things such as a power whose essence lies in rendering service to others (*paropakāratattva*) and hence lies in being dependent on them are denoted as independent things (*svātantryeṇa*) by words of their own, such as *śakti*, their own property of being dependent cannot be touched by those words.³³

The point is this: When one uses the term *śakti* with reference to a certain thing, the thing has to be something that has already been known as a power. In other words, in order to refer to the thing by that term, one requires a certain property such as *śaktitva*, the property of being a power, which as its adjunct qualifies the thing and with the help of which one can know the thing as a power. This shows that when a power is denoted by its own word *śakti*, it behaves like a substance (*dravyāyamāṇa*)³⁴ because it is a *bhedyā* or something to be differentiated in order to know which the help of *bhedaka* or what differentiates it, *guṇa*, is needed, so that it can no longer be what serves; rather, it is now what is served.³⁵ In this case, the power is viewed as a principal thing (*pradhāna*) with respect to its adjunct and as something independent. This is why a power is said to be an *asvaśabda*. Of course, this is derived from Bhartṛhari's views of a substance and of a quality

kārikā in which a parallel idea concerning a relation is expressed: VP 3.3.4: *nābhidhānam svadharmaṇa sambandhasyāsti vācakam / alyantaparatantratvād rūpaṃ nāsyāpadiśyate*// ("[Except for a genitive ending,] there is no word to denote a relation in terms of its own property. Because it is absolutely dependent, its form cannot be referred to by its own word.") Here, clearly, the word *svadharma* means 'a relation's own property', that is, the property of being absolutely dependent (*alyantaparatantratva*). See also VP 3.11.5, where Bhartṛhari states: *asvalantre svalantratvaṃ paradharma yathā guṇe / abhedye bhedyabhāvo 'pi dravyadharmas tathā guṇe*// ("As the property of being independent (*svalantratva*), which belongs to another (*paradharma*), is found in a quality which is not independent, so also is the property of being to be differentiated (*bhedyabhāva*), the property of a substance, found in a quality which is not something to be differentiated"). For a quality, the properties which are not attributed to it are: *svalantratva* and *bhedyabhāva*.

³³ According to the Vṛtti on VP 2.439, when the relation called *saṃyoga* which is an *asvaśabda* is referred to by its own word, it is denoted as something independent (*svalantro-bhidhīyamānaḥ*). As far as *saṃyoga* is regarded as a relation, it must have the property of being dependent.

³⁴ Prakāśa on VP 3.7.3: *tatra śakter dravyāyamāṇāyā buddhyā svātantryeṇa nirūpaṇāc chabdenābhidhāne śaktyantarayogo 'viruddhaḥ*/ According to the speaker's intention, one may have utterances such as *śaktimādadhāti* '... confers a power upon something'. A power which behaves like a substance can have another power, so that a nominal ending of the second triplet occurs after the nominal base *śakti*.

³⁵ One has to recall that in VP 3.14.7 Bhartṛhari points out that a qualifier, *bhedaka*, is an *upakārin* with respect to its qualificand, *bhedyā*. The point that a *guṇa* becomes something served by others is explained by Helārāja as follows. Prakāśa on VP 3.11.7: *tathā ca dravyavad guṇo 'pi paśasya rūpaṃ iti svātantryeṇābhidhīyamānaḥ saṃsargisaṃkhyādikṛtopakāru evābhidhīyate*/ When a *guṇa* is substantialized, it behaves like a substance since it is something served by a factor connected with it, such as a number.

(*guṇa*).³⁶ And moreover, this is intrinsically linked to his theory of denotation that a *guṇa* is indispensable for denoting a substance which is in itself beyond denotation.³⁷

5. dharma and dharmin

Bhartṛhari said that a power is a *dharma*. As shown above, this characterization of power, while being determined by its being *asvaśabda*, determines its being something dependent (*paratantra*) with respect to its locus on the one hand and on the other hand raises the question of how it is related to its locus (*dharmin*). Whatever is spoken of as a *guṇa* does not necessarily have the relation of what abides and that in which it abides (*āśrayāśrayibhāva*) with that with which it is connected. But a power, being a *dharma*, never loses the characteristic of expecting its locus, even if it serves things other than its locus.³⁸ Consider the following *kārikās*:

³⁶ A substance and a quality have respective definitions. VP 3.4.3: *vastūpalakṣaṇam yatra sarvanāma prayujyate / dravyam ity ucyate so'rtho bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ*// ("That object, with reference to which a denominative that refers to an entity is used, is called *dravya* when it is intended to be conveyed as something differentiated.") VP 3.5.1: *samsargi bhedakam yad yat savyāpāram praliyate / guṇatvam paratantratvāt tasya śāstra udāhṛtam*// ("Whatever is related [to a certain thing] and differentiates the thing [from others] is regarded as *guṇa* when it activates the function [of differentiating], because it is something dependent. This is what has been illustrated in grammar.")

From the point of view of how a power is to be viewed in relation to its locus, Helārāja explains the reason that it is called *guṇa* as follows. Prakāśa on VP 3.7.1: *śaktir evātrādhārapāra-tantryād anyasmūc ca svāśrayasya bhedakatvād guṇaśabdenoktā*/A power is called *guṇa* because it depends on its locus and because it differentiates its own locus from the locus of another thing where it does not abide. See also Vṛtti on VP 2.438 (section 4.1).

We have to note that in VP 1.63 Bhartṛhari describes a linguistic item as *paratantra*, *guṇa*, for the reason that a linguistic item is uttered for the sake of conveying its meaning. When a power is said to be a differentiator of its locus, it serves the locus, so that it is viewed as something dependent with respect to the locus. Patañjali in his Bhāṣya on A 5.1.119 (II.367.2-10) says that the property of being something dependent (*aprādhānya*) is one of the meanings of the word *guṇa*. On the basis of this, Bhartṛhari characterizes *guṇa* as *paratantra*.

³⁷ Bhartṛhari's theory of denotation claims that a bare substance is beyond verbalization; in order to denote it one has to resort to its adjuncts. In connection with the introduction of an affix for excellence in respect of a quality, Bhartṛhari distinctly states the theory of denotation as follows. VP 3.5.2: *dravyasyūvyapadeśasya ya upādīyate guṇaḥ/bhedako vyapadeśāya tatprakarṣo-bhidhīyate*// ("A quality, which is a differentiator, is adopted to denote a substance which cannot be denoted in itself. Excellence in respect of the quality is expressed [by an affix].")

³⁸ In his Vṛtti on VP 1.65 Bhartṛhari paraphrases the clause *svātantryeṇopadiśyate* with the phrase *prādhānyeṇopādīyate* and mentions four features of a *guṇa* (quality): a quality is that which abides in something (*āśrita*), that which is a cause of differentiating something (*bhedahetu*), that which is something dependent (*paratantra*), and that which is connected with something (*samsargin*). The important point to note here is that Bhartṛhari makes a distinction between *āśrita* and *paratantra*. According to Vṛṣabha, in the situation conveyed by the utterance *śuklaḥ paṭasya* 'the color white of the piece of cloth', the color white has the property of abiding in the piece of cloth and not the property of being dependent on it because it has been substantialized.

*tattve vā vyatireke vā vyatiriktaṃ tad ucyate/
śabdapramāṇako lokah sa śāstreṇānugamyate// VP 3.7.38*

“Whether [a power] may be identical with or distinct from [its locus], [we grammarians] say that it is different. For the world, the word is the authority and the grammar follows it.”

*paramārthe tu naikatvaṃ prthaktvād bhinnalakṣaṇam/
prthaktvaikatvarūpeṇa tattvam eva prakāśate// VP 3.7.39*

“From the viewpoint of the ultimate truth, however, there is no identity whose characteristic is distinguished from that of difference. It is the ultimate reality that appears as difference and identity.”

We immediately recognize that Bhartṛhari distinguishes between two levels: semantic and metaphysical.

§5.1. VYATIRIKTA

At the semantic level, a power and its locus have to be distinguished from each other, irrespective of its ontological status. For example, in the utterance *devadatta odanaṃ pacati* ‘Devadatta is cooking rice-gruel’, the property of being an object, the power of functioning as object, abiding in the rice-gruel, is understood from the accusative ending *-am*. The observation of this fact further leads to the establishment of the distinction between a power and its locus. Consider the following kārīkā:

*dṛṣṭo hy avyatireke 'pi vyatireko 'nvaye 'sati/
vṛkṣādyaarthānvayas tasmād vibhaktvyartho 'nya iṣyate// VP 3.7.43*

“The following is seen: Even if [the meaning of the base] does not differ (*avyatireke*), [the meaning of the affix] differs; even if [the meaning of the affix] does not remain constant, the meaning of a base such as *vṛkṣa* ‘tree’ remains constant. Therefore, the meaning of the affix is accepted as distinct [from the meaning of the base].”

Suppose that there is a sequence of items: *vṛkṣah* (nom. sg.)—*vṛkṣam* (acc. sg.)—*vṛkṣeṇa* (inst. sg.) in construction with respective items denoting different actions. We observe that a base meaning remains constant while an affix meaning changes. From this one may reason that powers which are signified by nominal endings such as *-am* are distinct from their locus, a

Paddhati on VP 1.65: *āśritaiḥ iti / na rājā puruṣam āśritah/tadāśritatvaṃ svātantryeṇāpi vivakṣite guṇe 'sti [iti] śuklah paṭasyety avacchinalli paratantraiḥ iti* / We must draw attention to the fact that in his *guṇa*-definition Bhartṛhari does not mention the notion of *āśrita*. However, in the case of a power, if it serves its locus in some way or other, its *paratantratva* may be taken as *āśritatva*, the property of being located in something, because, under this assumption, that on which a power is dependent is considered to be the same as that in which it abides. Commenting on MBh ad A 2.3.1 (II.767), Kaiyaṭa remarks that Patañjali means a power by the term *guṇa*, taking into account its aspect of being what abides in a certain thing (*āśritatvāc chaktir evātra guṇaśabdena vivakṣitā*).

substance, which is signified by the nominal base *vrkṣa*. It is on the basis of this reasoning that grammatical operations provided for by rules such as A 2.3.2 *karmaṇi dvitīyā* take place. At the semantic level, thus, a power has to be said to be distinct from its locus, a substance.³⁹

§5.2. AVYATIRIKTA

VP 3.7.39, beginning with the phrase *paramārthe tu*, clearly contrasts *loku* and *paramārtha*; the semantic field or the world of everyday communication and the world beyond it.

The point made here is that *ekatva* 'identity' and *prthaktva* 'difference' are not distinguished from each other in that they are both unreal since they are mere appearances of the reality, nothing else but the conceptualized (*vikalpita*, *kalpita*) due to its powers.⁴⁰

Concerning powers also, one may conceive them as identical with their loci or as differentiated from them. For the powers of Brahman allow one to have such different, mutually contradictory, conceptualizations.⁴¹

³⁹ What is stated in VP 3.7.38 is based upon the Bhāṣya on A 2.3.50 (I.464.19-23): *prātipadikāṅthānāṃ kriyākṛtā viśeṣā upajāyante tatkr̥tās cākhyāḥ prādurbhavanti karma karaṇam apādānam sampradānam adhikaraṇam iti/tās ca punar vibhaktīnām utpattau kadācin nimittatvenopādīyante kadācin na/ kadā ca vibhaktīnām utpattau nimittatvenopādīyante, yadā vyabhicaranti prātipadikāṅtham/ yadā hi na vyabhicaranti ākhyābhūlā eva tadā tadā bhavanti karma karaṇam apādānam sampradānam adhikaraṇam iti/The gist is this: Contrast the utterances *vrkṣaṇi paśyati* and *vrkṣaḥ karma*. A specific feature manifests itself to a substance, a nominal base meaning, on account of the substance's connection with an act. When such a feature deviates from the base meaning, one has the former utterance, while, when it does not, one has the latter.*

⁴⁰ According to Bhartṛhari, whatever is susceptible to relativization is something conceptualized; for example, existence as opposed to non-existence and non-existence as opposed to existence are nothing more than mental constructs. VP 3.3.61: *nābhāvo jāyate bhāvo naiḥ bhāvo 'nupākhyatām/ekasmād ātmano 'nanyau bhāvābhāvau vikalpitau//* ("Neither does non-existence become existence nor does existence become something indefinable in itself [i.e., non-existence]. Existence and non-existence are the conceptualized and are not different from the one reality (*ātman*).")

⁴¹ A parallel idea is set forth in VP 3.6.24: *ekatvam āsām śaktīnām nānātvaṃ veti kalpane/ avastupatite jñātva satyato na parāmṛśet//* ("Concerning powers, one may conceive them as unified or as differentiated. Once one realizes that the conception in either way refers to the unreality, one cannot reflexively grasp it.") If this kārikā is taken into consideration, Phullarāja's understanding of VP 3.7.39 will turn out to be improper. Phullarāja on VP 3.7.39: *prthaktvād bhinnalakṣaṇam prthaktvavyatiriktaṃ naikatvam asti, prthaktvaikatvarūpeṇa hi tattvam eva prakāśate/ tad dhi vyavahāradaśāyām prthaktvena prakāśate/ avidyāvilaṣe tv ekatvena prakāśate iti boddhavyam//* He interprets: In the phenomenal stage, the reality appears as difference, while when nescience (*avidyā*) disappears, it appears as identity. We have to note, however, that the following is stated in the verse adduced by Bhartṛhari in his Vṛtti on VP 1.1: The soul of the universe, Brahman, which is beyond *bhedasamsarga* ('differentiation and unification'), *bhāvābhāva* ('existence and non-existence'), *kramākrama* ('sequence and non-sequence'), and *satyāṇṛta* ('truth and false'), appears as diversified (*vyatito bhedasamsargau bhāvābhāvau kramākramau/satyāṇṛte ca viśvātmā pravivekāt prakāśate//*).

This means that the powers also which are supposed to belong to Brahman can be defined neither as identical with it nor as different from it,⁴² so that they have to be considered as the conceptualized in themselves.⁴³ Importantly, Bhartṛhari's characterization of a power as what is conceptualized makes clear that he assumes not only that different powers are simply attributed to a single entity on the basis of the observation that it is the causal basis for bringing about multiple effects, but also that such characterization of a power determines its ontological status. Consider the following statement in the Vṛtti:

ekatvasyāvirodhena śabdatattve brahmaṇi samuccitā virodhinya ātmabhūtāḥ śaktayaḥ/ Vṛtti on VP 1.2

"In Brahman, the Word-principle, powers that are contradictory [to one another] and identical with it are combined, without contradicting its unity."

According to Bhartṛhari, powers are identical with Brahman (*ātmabhūta*). And, as I have already shown,⁴⁴ this identity is nothing but the negation of difference (*bhedanirāsa*), which is also meant by the term *apṛthaktva* in VP 1.2. Consider the following statement in the Vṛtti.

na khalu jātivyaktivyavahāravād anyāḥ kāścic chaktayo brahmaṇo vyatirekiṇyo vidyante/ Vṛtti on VP 1.2

⁴² Vṛtti on VP 1.4: *ekasya hi brahmaṇas tattvānyatvābhyāṃ saltvāsaltvābhyāṃ cāniruktāvirodhi-śaktiupagrāhyasyāsātyarūpapravibhāgasya . . . /* ("Indeed, the One, Brahman, receives the powers which are defined neither as identical with [it] (*tattva*) nor as different from [it] (*anyatva*) and neither as existent (*saltva*) nor as non-existent (*asaltva*), and which are not contradictory to each other (*avirodhi*). Its divisions are unreal (*asātyarūpapravibhāga*).")

⁴³ Commentators describe things of such an indeterminate nature as the conceptualized, unreal. Helārāja on VP 3.3.9: *śaktīnām vasturūpatve tattvānyatvavicāraṇā/ yujyate kalpitānām tu yuktā dvayaviyuktatā//* ("If powers were essentially real, then it would be proper to investigate whether they are identical with or different from [the real]; however, it is proper that they are destitute of both [identity with and difference from it] since they are the conceptualized.") Paddhati on Vṛtti ad VP 1.1: *śaktīnām ca svarūpatve tattvānyatvavicāraṇā/ yujyate kalpitānām tu yuktānvayavivartatā//* ("If powers were the essence [of the reality], it would be proper to investigate whether they are identical with or different from [it]; however, it is proper that they are excluded from the connection with [both identity with and difference from it] since they are the conceptualized." The source of the verse, to which Helārāja and Vṛṣabha give a slightly different reading, is not traceable.) Vṛṣabha introduces this verse by saying *kalpitasya vastunah satyabhūtena saha kā tattvānyatvānyataracintā* and refers to it in saying *vikalpitatvāc ca śaktīnām uktena nyāyena* in his Paddhati on the Vṛtti ad VP 1.4.

Vṛṣabha in Paddhati on Vṛtti ad VP 1.1 introduces the argument against the reality of powers as follows: *na tarhi śaktayaḥ sanli, tattvānyatvābhyāṃ anirvacanīyatvāt, śaśaviṣāṇaval/* ("[Thesis] Powers are really inexistent. [Reason] Because of being indefinable either as identical with [the reality] or as different from it. [Example] Like a rabbit's horn.")

⁴⁴ Ogawa 2000.

"The same thing as we say about the universal and the individual is true of this case. That is, it is indeed never the case that there are powers which are different from Brahman and that they exist separately from it."

Consequently, what naturally follows from the negation of the difference of Brahman from its powers is that they have no existence or reality separate from it (*avyatirikta*), and not that they are one with it. In the sense that the powers of Brahman have no existence independent of it as it is the only reality, they have to be said to be unreal. In this way, we may consider that in the *kārikā* in question Bhartṛhari, characterizing powers as what is conceptualized, points out that they have no reality separate from their loci.

6. dravya and śakti

Now the question arises: What led Bhartṛhari to positing powers as described above?

§ 6.1 ŚAKTIMĀTRĀSAMŪHA AND SARVABĪJA

It has been shown that a power is distinct from its locus at the semantic level and that it is not distinct from its locus at the metaphysical level. However, the two levels are not distinguished from each other in that, at either level a single entity is viewed as a conglomerate of multiple powers to bring about corresponding multiple effects. Consider the following *kārikās*:

*śaktimātrāsamūhasya viśvasyānekaḍharmaṇaḥ/
sarvadā sarvathā bhāvāt kvacit kiṃcid vivakṣyate//* VP 3.7.2

"At any time, in any manner, everything in the phenomenal world exists as a bundle of power-elements and hence has a variety of properties. Therefore, it is intended to be conveyed as a certain thing in a specific situation."⁴⁵

*ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ceyam anekadhā/
bhoktṛbhoktavyarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitiḥ//* VP 1.4

⁴⁵ The attitude toward the undivided entity taken by Bhartṛhari here is reflected in his arguments for the self-referring nature of the linguistic item (*śabda*). VP 1.56: *grāhyatvaṃ grāhakatvaṃ ca dve śakti tejaso yathā/ tathaiva sarvaśabdānām ele prthag iva sthite//* ("Just as a lamp has two powers: the power of functioning as what conveys and that of functioning as what is to be conveyed, so also do all linguistic items. [These powers] appear as if distinct from them.") VP 1.59: *bhedenāvagrhitau dvau śabdadharmāu apoddhṛtau/bhedakāryeṣu hetutvaṃ avirodhena gacchataḥ//* ("The two properties of a single linguistic item (*dvau śabdadharmāu*), understood as distinct from [the linguistic item], become without incongruity the cause of grammatical operations based on its differentiation.") We must notice that Bhartṛhari treats a linguistic item's powers, the power of being a conveyor and that of being conveyed, as its two properties (*śabdadharmā*).

"Of which one [i.e., Brahman] that is the seed of all, there is this state of multiplicity, that of the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and enjoyment."⁴⁶

Both kārīkās state that a single entity, a substance,⁴⁷ is a conglomerate of multiple powers, on account of which it brings about multiple effects, though the first kārīkā speaks of a verbal behavior while the second speaks of Bhartṛhari's own metaphysics.⁴⁸ As a variety of expressions with reference to a single entity becomes possible through its different powers in the world of everyday communication, so a variety of conceptualizations with reference to Brahman becomes possible through its powers.

§ 6.2. DRAVYA

This suggests that the multiplicity of the powers of a substance does not affect the unity of the substance, and that unless one assumes that the substance has powers, one cannot keep its unity and hence has to diversify it.⁴⁹ This idea is firmly linked with Bhartṛhari's view of a substance. Consider the following kārīkā:

⁴⁶ Vṛṣabha glosses the term *sarvaśīja* with the word *bhinnaśaktipracita* 'that which is filled with different powers'.

⁴⁷ Bhartṛhari distinguishes between two sorts of substances, according to Helārāja, a substance on the verbal level (*sāmvyavahārikam dravyam*) and the one on the level of the ultimate truth (*pāramārthikam dravyam*). The substance as defined in VP 3.4.3 is the former, whereas the latter is identified with the ultimate reality: Brahman. Prakāśa on VP 3.2.1 *dravyam ca dviividham, pāramārthikam sāmvyavahārikam ca/tatra dvilīyam bhedyabhedakaprastāvena guṇasamuddēse vakṣyate — vastūpalakṣaṇam yatra ityādinā/anena ca dravyeṇa vyāḍidarśane sarve śabdā dravyābhīdhāyino bhavanti/iha tu pāramārthikam dravyam nirūpyate*/ But they are common in that in order to express them one has to resort to their adjuncts (*upādhi*). See fn. 36 also.

⁴⁸ We may recall that Patañjali has defined *sādhana* as a collection of powers (MBh ad A 3.2.115 [II.120.11]: *guṇasamudāyaḥ sādhanam*). We have different interpretations of the statement. According to Kaiyaṭa, it means that all the powers of functioning as agent, of functioning as object, and so forth are a *sādhana*. (Pradīpa on MBh ad A 3.2.115 [III.272]: *yāvad uktaṁ sarvāḥ śaktayaḥ sādhanam iti tāvad guṇasamudāyaḥ sādhanam iti*). According to Helārāja, on the other hand, it means that those powers collectively bring a main action to accomplishment (Prakāśa on VP 3.7.2: *pradhānakriyāyā ekaikaśaktisādhya tvābhāvāt samudāyagrahaṇam*), or, it implies that a single entity has multiple powers to produce different effects (Prakāśa on VP 3.7.2: *samudāyagrahaṇam śaktinām sādhanatve tāsām bhēdād ekasya kāryabhedopapattikhyāpānārtham*). Obviously, Helārāja's second interpretation accords with the point made by Bhartṛhari in the kārīkā in question.

⁴⁹ This point is argued by Helārāja in connection with VP 3.7.2. Prakāśa on VP 3.7.2: *evam anekasvabhāvatve śaktisamudāyasya vicitre kārye yathāśakti bhēdavivakṣyāyām pratīnīyatasādhana-bhāvopapattiḥ / dravyasya tu sādhanatve tasyaikarūpatvāt kāryavaicitryam na syād ity arthaḥ*/ Such a view stems from Bhartṛhari's basic standpoint stated in the following kārīkā. VP 3.1.22: *sarvaśaktiātmabhūtatvam ekasyaiveti nirṇayaḥ/ bhāvānām ātmabhedasya kalpanā syād anarthikā//* ("The final and ultimate truth (*nirṇaya*) is that [Brahman which is] the One is identical with all *śaktis* [it has]. [Such being the case,] it would be purposeless to assume that there are entities in essence different from one another.") He first declares that Brahman is identical with all powers it has. As shown above, he means to say that the only reality, Brahman, has all powers,

*dravyam tu yad yathābhūtaṃ tad atyantam tathā bhavet/
kriyāyoge 'pi tasyāsau dravyātmā nāpahīyate// VP 3.7.166*

"On the other hand, a substance as it is should remain absolutely as it is. Even when such a substance is connected with [different] actions, its essence is not lost."

According to this *kārikā*, if a certain substance serves as agent with respect to a certain action, the substance remains an agent and cannot serve as object with respect to another action since its essence does not change. Suppose that with reference to one and the same tree we have two utterances: *vrkṣas tiṣṭhati* 'The tree stands' and *vrkṣam paśyati* 'He sees the tree'. On this assumption, we have to differentiate the tree as agent from the one as object.⁵⁰

This view of Bhartṛhari's on a substance is obviously based upon Patañjali's, according to which, when *tattva* 'essence', of a certain thing is not lost even if different qualities manifest themselves in the thing, the thing is what is to be considered as a substance.⁵¹ The essence (*ātman*, *tattva*) of the thing is nothing but its self-identity, without which it would neither be what it is, nor be different from what it is not. A substance is what possesses the self-identity even if it has different qualities.

It is this view of a substance that allows one to conceive that one and the same substance can have the different properties of functioning as agent and of functioning as object. On the contrary, however, if it were held, without resorting to such properties, that the substance itself functions as agent and as object, then it would follow that it loses the self-identity of its own. For, in this case, the substance functioning as agent cannot claim to be identical with the one functioning as object, because, by definition, the former should remain the former. This, without doubt, leads to the but the latter have no existence independent of the former. Then he states that, in this view, without positing essentially different things one may account for the multiplicity of the phenomenal world.

⁵⁰This idea also has already been expressed by Patañjali. MBh ad A 2.3.1 (I.442.20-25): *kiṃ kiṃ punaḥ sādhanam nyāyāṃ, guṇa ity āha / katham jñāyate, evaṃ hi kaścit kaṃcit prcchati — kva devadatta iti/sa tasmā ācaṣṭe — asau vrkṣa iti / katarasmīn — yas tiṣṭhātīti / sa vrkṣo 'dhikaraṇam bhūtvānyena śabdenābhisaṃbadhyamānaḥ kartā saṃpadyate / dravye punaḥ sādhanam sati yat karma karmaiva syād yat karaṇam karaṇam eva yad adhikaraṇam adhikaraṇam eva /* According to Patañjali, if a substance were a *sādhana*, an object would remain an object only; an instrument would remain an instrument only; a locus would remain a locus only.

⁵¹MBh ad A 5.1.119 (II.366.23-25): *yasya guṇāntareṣu api prādurbhavatsu tattvam na vihanyate tad dravyam / kiṃ punas tattvam / tadbhāvas tattvam / tad yathā / āmalakādīnāṃ phalānāṃ raktādayaḥ pītādayaś ca guṇāḥ prādurbhavanti āmalakam badaram ity eva bhavati/* ("That, whose essence (*tattva*) is not lost even if different qualities manifest themselves, is a substance. [Question] But what is the essence? [Answer] The essence is the property of being *that*. For example, [even if] qualities such as red and yellow manifest themselves in fruits such as the one of the *āmalaka*, one understands that it is nothing but the fruit of the *āmalaka*, that it is nothing but the fruit of the *badara*.")

undesirable consequence that one cannot have different expressions with reference to one and the same substance on the basis of its difference in causal efficiency, such as *vrkṣas tiṣṭhati* and *vrkṣam paśyati*. This is why powers that are qualities with respect to a substance are postulated.⁵²

7. śaktivyavahāra and śaktimadvyavahāra

It is plain that the introduction of the notion of a power is necessitated in order to secure self-identity for a single substance to which it is attributed and which has different forms of causal efficiency, and that, in this case, distinction between the substance and its powers is essential. However, at the metaphysical level, we have to take a further step. Consider that Bhartṛhari characterizes Brahman as an original *nimitta* of the phenomenal world (VP 1.1d: *prakriyā jagato yataḥ*) and also as the seed of all (VP 1.4a: *ekasya sarvabījasya*). Brahman becomes a *nimitta* on account of its powers. But, unless he had posited the non-distinction between Brahman and its powers, he could not have maintained the non-dualism. This is why in his VP 1.2 Bhartṛhari had to say *apṛthaktve 'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthaktveneva vartate* to have two viewpoints: *apṛthaktva* 'non-distinction' and *pṛthaktva* 'distinction'. It was imperative that he should posit the distinction of Brahman from its powers on the one hand and its non-distinction from them on the other hand, in order to establish his *vivarta* theory. Thus, at the semantic level, the reality of powers, though in the secondary sense and not in the ultimate sense, does not have to be argued, whereas, at the metaphysical level, it must be denied.⁵³

In this connection it is useful to quote from Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñānavivṛtivismarsinī* a passage which explains that knowledge (*jñāna*) is called a power of Śiva.⁵⁴

⁵² Kaiyaṭa gives a good explanation of this point in his commentary on the Bhāṣya cited in fn. 50. Pradīpa on MBh ad A 2.3.1. (II.767): *yadi dravyam sādhanam syāt tadā tasyaikarūpatvāt tannibandhanābādhitā-pratyabhijñāviśayatvān nānārthakriyākaraṇanibandhanā vyapadeśabhedo na syād drśyate cāsāv iti nānāśaktisadbhāvāvagamah siddhaḥ* / ("If a substance were a *sādhana*, then there could be no different designations based on different forms of causal efficiency (*nānārthakriyā*) since it is in essence self-identical (*ekarūpa*) and hence an object of unsublated recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) which is based upon the self-identity. But this is not a fact of experience. Therefore, it is established that one understands that multiple powers exist in a single substance."

⁵³ Paddhati on Vṛtti ad VP 1.1: *tarhi śaktayo yadi brahmaṇo vyatirikṭāḥ sa eva siddhāntavyālopaḥ, ekam eva yadāmnātam iti sarvādvaitasyāśrītatvāt / athāvyatirikṭās tata ekasmād brahmaṇo 'vyatirekān nānekātā, tataś ca nānāparikalpotṭyabhāvaḥ, śaktibhyo vānanyatvād brahmaṇa ekatvavādāvasāda ity ata āha—bhedasamsargasamatikrameṇa iti/Vṛṣabha* clearly states that one cannot explain the occurrence of multiple conceptualizations on the assumption that powers are non-distinct from Brahman.

⁵⁴ I am most grateful to Prof. Raffaele Torella for giving me valuable information about Abhinavagupta's arguments on *śakti* and sending me the draft of his paper "Studies on Utpaladeva's

anantārthakriyākārīṇi padārthe 'khaṇḍamaṇḍale upadeśyopadeśavyavahārādir na sidhyaṭīti tatsiddhaye tayā tayā vicitrāyā arthakriyayā ekaikam avacchidya sa padārtha eka eva bahudhā vyavahriyate agnir dāhakaḥ pācakaḥ prakāśakaḥ iti/tatra bahutvaparāmarśapradhānatāyām śaktivyavahāraḥ, tadekaparāmarśapradhānatve tadvadvavahāraḥ/sa cāpi na pāramārthikaḥ paramēśvareṇaiva tathā sṛṣṭatvāt/ IPVV I.287.3-9

"With reference to an entity (*padārtha*), an indivisible whole (*akhaṇḍamaṇḍala*), which has a limitless causal efficiency (*anantārthakriyākārīṇi*), practical activities such as receiving instruction and giving instruction (*upadeśyopadeśavyavahārādi*) are not established. Consequently, for the purpose of establishing such [practical activities], determining each form of causal efficiency singly, one variously speaks of such an entity which is nothing but a unitary thing; [just as] one speaks of [one and the same] fire as a burner (*dāhaka*), a cooker (*pācaka*), or an illuminator (*prakāśaka*). Such being the case, when one refers predominantly to the manifoldness of such a unitary entity, one speaks of powers (*śaktivyavahāra*), whereas, when one refers predominantly to its unitariness, one speaks of a power-holder (*tadvadvavahāra*). Moreover, that [i.e., the verbal behavior about powers and a power-holder] is of no absolute value (*na pāramārthikaḥ*) since such verbal behavior is the creation of the Supreme Lord."⁵⁵

Abhinavagupta, it is to be noted, points out that one and the same entity is differently spoken of on the basis of its different forms of causal efficiency, and that the verbal behavior about powers and their holder is the creation of the Supreme Lord (*paramēśvara*) and hence has no absolute value. Recall that Bhartṛhari introduces the dichotomy of knowledge (*vidyā*) and ignorance (*avidyā*) with reference to Brahman.⁵⁶ If, the Supreme Lord could be replaced by Brahman to which ignorance is related, what Abhinavagupta says here would hold good in Bhartṛhari's system of thought which also derives everything from two principles, the power and its holder. For, the latter asserts that insofar as Brahman appears in the domain of

Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti. Part I: anupalabdhi and apoha in a Śaiva garb," which is to appear in *Wilhelm Halbfass Commemoration Volume*, ed. K. Preisendanz and E. Franco, Vienna: Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. In this paper (fn. 80) he treats Abhinavagupta's conception of *śakti* on the basis of the passage of the Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛtivismarśinī I have quoted here.

⁵⁵ The text reads *sa cāpi na apāramārthikaḥ*. Prof. Torella suggests emending to *sa cāpi na pāramārthikaḥ*. He remarks: "When the manifoldness of aspects is borne in mind, we speak of 'power(s)'; when unity is borne in mind, we speak of 'possessor of powers'. However, none of these two approaches, goes on Abhinavagupta, can claim to be ultimately true, because both of them are equally a creation of the Supreme Lord (II. 8-9: *paramēśvareṇaiva tathā sṛṣṭatvāt*).". Cf. IPV on I.1.1 (Iyer/Pandey 1986: 54): *saṃvid iti tu ucyaṃānā vikalpvyatvena prameyatām sṛṣṭantī sṛṣṭatvāt na paramārthasamvid iti vaksyāmaḥ/*

⁵⁶ Vṛtti on VP 1.1: *vidyāvidyāpravibhāgarūpam . . . brahmeti pratijñāyate/*

ignorance, it is described as that which appears as endowed with powers (*samāviṣṭaṃ sarvābhiḥ śaktibhiḥ*) so that the causality with respect to Brahman may be accounted for.⁵⁷ Thus we have to say that, for Bhartṛhari, it is simply the result of the conceptualization to speak of Brahman as possessing multiple powers.

8. Conclusion

The following has been made clear: A power is a *dharma* which functions as a cause (*nimittabhāva*), which serves some other thing (*vyatireka*) in that it helps the latter to obtain a certain effect (*anugrāhin/upakārin*). The characteristic of being what serves gives a power its characterization as being meant for another thing (*parārtha*), a subsidiary (*śeṣa*) with respect to it, and subordinate (*guṇa*) to it, so that a power has to be treated as an *asvaśabda*. We may say that Bhartṛhari's arguments about the power is marked by his description of it through the introduction of the idea of service (*upakāra*).

Being a *dharma* requires that a power should have its locus, *dharmin*, which is a substance (*dravya*). At the semantic level, a power is viewed as distinct from a substance which possesses it, while, at the metaphysical level, the former is viewed as non-distinct from the latter.

The reason that Bhartṛhari introduced the notion of a power into his metaphysics and his theory of language is clear: The notion of the power he entertained made it possible for him to account for the observation that a single substance is the causal basis for producing multiple effects and to secure self-identity (*tattva*) for such a substance. This forms a characteristic feature of Bhartṛhari's thought to be found in his analytic procedure applied to a single indivisible entity: he looks at it from its various causal aspects and abstracts from it different causal powers to be attributed to it, regarding it as a conglomeration of powers. For Bhartṛhari, a power is something postulated in order to explain the observation mentioned above and it is a kind of working hypothesis that a substance has powers. Never is it the case that Bhartṛhari hypostatizes the power in his power-based metaphysics.

⁵⁷ Vṛtti on VP 1.1. On the other hand, Brahman which appears in the domain of knowledge is said to be beyond any conceptualizations and hence beyond any verbalizations (*sarvavikalpālīlatattvam*). See Paddhati on Vṛtti on VP 1.1: *vidyārūpam āṅgīkṛtyoktaṃ sarvavikalpālīlatattvam iti/avidyānibandhanarūpam āṅgīkṛtyoktaṃ samāviṣṭaṃ sarvābhiḥ śaktibhiḥ iti/*

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Vidyā and Avidyā in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya

VLADIMIR P. IVANOV

The words *vidyā* and *avidyā*, which are so important for Indian philosophy in general, are used in Bhartṛhari's (Bh) Vākyapadīya (VP) (in its *kārikā* (kā)-portion) not so often. Yet, there are some passages in the VP where these words suggest an intriguing variant of their interpretation especially when they meet together in one verse, constituting a pair in which the terms are interrelated in a particular way.

What is the concept of *vidyā* and *avidyā* in the VP? Could *avidyā* be interpreted purely epistemologically – as the absence of *vidyā* or true knowledge – or is it a term rather linked to the ontology of Bh's Śabdabrahma-vāda.

Madeleine Biardeau (in the introduction to her translation of chapter I of the VP) states "Bh never uses the word *avidyā* in its technical sense." Is it really so? One may argue if the word *avidyā* as a technical term of Advaita Vedānta. But does it automatically mean that Bh in his VP uses this word in the ordinary, literal sense, as 'ignorance, nescience', or does he suggest a more profound way to deal with the notion of *vidyā* and *avidyā*? Here I completely agree with Ashok Akuljkar, who believes that in the VP *vidyā* and *avidyā* have definitely the status of terms.¹ If so, what are they? How could they be determined and attributed?

¹ Ashok Akuljkar, *The Philosophy of Bhartṛhari's Trikāṇḍī*, doctoral dissertation, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University [Unpublished] 1970, p. 13.

The epistemological notion of *avidyā* is 'nescience', which is usually contrasted to true knowledge, the knowledge of reality. In Sāṅkhya and Yoga this nescience is interpreted as an absence of the true knowledge of the qualitative difference between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* (to be more precise, between *puruṣa* and *buddhi* – one of the evolutes of *prakṛti*). In Nyāya (the corresponding term in this system is *mithyājñāna*) and Vaiśeṣika *avidyā* is the absence of knowledge of *padārtha*-s, which are the real ontological and epistemological elements of the universe. In Vedānta, *avidyā* (linked with the ontological concept of *māyā*) could be interpreted as the absence of the true spiritual knowledge of the identity of *ātman* and *brahman*. In these systems, the overcoming of *avidyā* and obtaining the real knowledge leads to *kaivalya*, *apavarga* and *mokṣa*, respectively.

Let's focus on the text of the VP. The term *avidyā* is mentioned in the Trikāṇḍī twice: in the Kālasamuddeśa of Padakāṇḍa (kā 62) and in the Vākyakāṇḍa (kā 233). In both cases it goes together with the term *vidyā*.

In kā 233 we encounter an interesting observation of Bh that the process of the discrete representation of the world – that is the paramount method of all śāstra-s – in reality describes *avidyā* only. *Vidyā*, in its turn transcends any tradition and conceptualization and is obtained some how differently:

*śāstreṣu prakriyābhedaḥ avidyāivopavarnyate/
anāgamavikalpā tu svayaṃ vidyopavartate//*

VP 2.233²

The whole Vyākaraṇa-śāstra, with all its derivation procedures, the sequence of word-forms and their meanings turns out to be purely *avidyā*. So, *avidyā*, according to Bh, is directly linked with the principle of differentiation in the oneness and unity of the world that is Śabdabrahman. The sequence, which arises because of the activity of *kāla-śakti*, is an inevitable means for all linguistic procedures – first of all, the process of communication.

The point is: could we call by the word 'nescience' the śāstra that is characterized by Bh in another part of the text as *dvāram apavargasya, vāṇmalānām cikitsitam* (1.14). 'Nescience' usually has the negative connotation the signified of which is *avidyā* itself which should be dropped in order to attain *vidyā*?

It seems that for Bh the term *avidyā* rather means the differentiation proper. Thus the change or the transition of *avidyā* into *vidyā* is a natural process that presupposes the necessity of both elements: the one which is under transition and the one which is reached by this transition, that is

² Citations: *Bharṭṛhari's Vākyapadīya* von Wilhelm Rau, Wiesbaden 1977.

avidyā and *vidyā*. If the experience of the world remains on the level of diversity – this means *avidyā* – that may lead to error. Consider, for example, Bh's critique of the ordinary *pramāṇa*-s like *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* in kāṇḍa I of the VP. (Also vide an interesting notion of dry logic (*śuṣka-tarka*) by which Baiji, Saubhava and Haryakṣa ruined the tradition of Mahābhāṣya – as is stated in the kā 479 of kāṇḍa II.)

Bh also links *avidyā* to the level of linguistic abstraction. (The statement of relative significance of *appodhāra* is one of the main ideas of the VP.) That abstraction yet is very important for educational purposes, which should be normally undertaken to reach the level of *vidyā*.

This transformation of *avidyā* into *vidyā* and vice versa could be observed in the case of ordinary communication, when the unity of meaning is obtained through the multiplicity of means – phonemes, word-forms etc. Indeed, in another kā of the VP Bh describes this process in general terms as a miraculous conversion of the course into effect. He says:

*anibaddham nimitteṣu nirupākhyam phalam yathā/
tathā vidyā'pyanākhyeyā śāstropāyeva lakṣyate//*

VP 2.234

“Just as it is impossible to describe the effect as linked to its courses in a particular way, the same way indescribable *vidyā* is claimed to appear by means of the *śāstra*”.³

In another place Bh characterizes the means (*upāya*-s) as something that ‘once used could be abandoned’ and that, ‘the application of the *upāya*-s is not compulsory’:

*upādāyāpi ye heyās tām upāyān pracakṣate/
upāyānām ca niyamo nāvaśyam avatiṣṭhate//*

VP 2.38⁴

(Though in this case Bh is speaking about the relative nature of the use of different types of analysis, yet this suits our context also.) In this kā we find the indication that the process of transition from diversity to unity, which is the transition from *avidyā* to *vidyā*, could sometimes be avoided. In the context of Bh's epistemology in this case, of course, one should speak about the ‘knowledge of ṛṣi-s’ – *ārṣajñānam* – and different types of *pratibhā*-experience, the glimpses of *vidyā*, so to say, that are inherent not only to ṛṣi-s but are experienced by ordinary people also.

³In III.3.81 Bh also says about the ‘miraculous’ (*adbhuta*) nature of causality (I thank Prof. Houben for this reference).

⁴Cf. also kā II.238 in the interpretation of Chr. Lindtner. (Chr. Lindtner, “Linking up Bhartṛhari and the Bauddhas”, *Bhartṛhari: Philosopher and Grammarian, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari*, Delhi 1994: 198-199).

But generally the unity of meaning is obtained through diversity and expressed also through diversity. This diversity is determined by the linguistic practice that goes from time immemorial. As for the non-traditional knowledge; the knowledge, that transcends worldly order of things (*alaukikam*), it fails to find expression into the ordinary usage (*vyavahāra*). As Bh puts it:

*yac copaghātajam jñānam yac ca jñānam alaukikam/
na tābhyām vyavahāro'sti śabdā lokanibandhanāh//*

VP 2.297

This *vyavahāra* conceals the real nature of things – *satyam* – and thus is the *avidyā* in its operation. This condition (*upādhi*) is the very nature of the word:

asatyopādhi yat satyam tad vā śadbanibandhanam/

VP 2.127

“ Or (according to some) what is directly linked to the Word is the Reality itself, conditioned by the unreal”.

In another place Bh shows that *avidyā* is linked the power of time – *kālaśakti*. This power is believed by Bh to be the independent power of Brahman (*svātantryaśakti* – according to Helārāja). The operation of this independent power of time is the first thing that one experiences when one enters into the realm of discreteness, which is *avidyā*. And there is no such experience in the continual presence of *vidyā*. As it is stated in *Kālasamuddeśa*:

*śaktyātmadevatāpakṣair bhinnam kālasya darśanam/
prathamam tad avidyāyām yad vidyāyām na vidyate//*

VP 3.9.62

So, the position of Bh seems to differ from that of the Advaita Vedānta, which treats *avidyā* as an adventitious element attached to pure Brahman, but is rather close to the position of Kashmir Śaivism, that interprets *avidyā* as the describable power of God – *īśvara-śakti*.⁵ *Avidyā* is also called *śakti* in the *Vṛtti* to the *kā-s* of the VP, namely to the first *kā* of it, where it is stated that the diversity of “static and dynamic reality is due to the activity of *avidyā-śakti*”: *mūrttikriyāvivartau avidyāśaktipravṛttimātram*. It is also possible to say that the concept of *vidyā* and *avidyā* in the VP functionally represents the *satyadvayam* concept of Vedānta and Mahāyāna.

Indeed, the level of division, determined by the principle of *krama* in *buddhi*, (vide VP 2.19) that, in its turn, is the activity of time-power,

⁵ B.N. Pandit, *Specific Principles of Kashmir Śaivism*, Delhi 1997: 135.

represents the unity by diversity (that is, *avidyā*). Of course this is functionally the same as *saṃvṛti-satya* in Madhyamaka. At the same time, the unity of *artha* that is Śabdabrahman itself is the level of *vidyā*, which could be linked to *paramārthasatya*, as Bh's *avidyā*, (according to Nāgārjuna) is also indescribable and not dependent on *vyavahāra* – the level of ordinary activity – that in our opinion here could be also understood as the level of verbal activity:

*vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate/
paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate//*

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.10⁶

The position of Bh seems also to correspond to some early passages in the Upaniṣads, where *vidyā* and *avidyā* are described rather as two mutually complementing principles (entities), than the two principles that oppose each other. See, for example, a passage from the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad:

*dve akṣare brahmapare tvanante vidyāvidye nihite yatra gūḍhe/
kṣaram tvavidyā hyamṛtaṃ tu vidyā vidyāvidye īśate yastu so'nyaḥ//*

Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 5.1

“In the supreme, imperishable, endless Brahman, where two are hidden – *vidyā* and *avidyā*, perishable (*kṣaram* – that also could be interpreted as ‘divisible’) is *avidyā* and immortal is *vidyā*. The one who dominates over *vidyā* and *avidyā* is another (that is *ātman*).”

Consider also the well-known passage from Īśopaniṣad:

*andhaṃ tamaḥ praviśanti ye'vidyāmupāsate/
tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u vidyāyāṃ ratāḥ//
anyad evāhur vidyayānyad āhuravidyayā/....
vidyāṃ cāvidyāṃ ca yas tad vedobhayam saha/
avidyayā mṛtyuṃ tīrtvā vidyayāmṛtam aśnute//*

Īśopaniṣad 9-11

“Into blind darkness go those, who follow *avidyā*, but as if into a greater darkness those, who rejoice in the *vidyā* alone. One is attained through *vidyā* and another through *avidyā*... one who knows *vidyā* and *avidyā* together, crossing death by *avidyā*, in *vidyā* enjoys immortality.”

So, what is the relation between *vidyā* and *avidyā* according to Bh? The nature of this relation seems to be rooted in the paradoxical coexistence of two principles in the world – unity and diversity – are represented, on the one hand, by the unity of Brahman and the multiplicity of things, and

⁶ Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā de Candrakīrti, Publiée par Louis de la Vallée Poussin, St. Pétersbourg 1913.

on the other, by the unity of meaning and multiplicity of means (phonemes, word-forms etc.) which manifest it, by the glimpses of understanding – *pratibhā*, and the diversified analysis – *apoddhāra*. The process of understanding of a linguistic form thus, is the miraculous transformation of *avidyā* into *vidyā*. The whole method of Vyākaraṇaśāstra, according to Bh, turns out to be purely *avidyā*. However, it is a means (*upāya*) of attaining the integral unitary meaning-vision – *vidyā*. So, *vidyā*, and *avidyā*, as two sides of one coin form the inseparable whole of the world and linguistic transactions.

The collision of coexistence of absolute unity and the division of the phenomenal world, and thus the problems which originated from one-sided *vivarta* or *pariṇāma* approaches to the explanations of the universe, are settled (or at least avoided) in the Vākyapadīya by the recognition of the ontological status of such reality as Speech – Śabda. The very nature of this reality is the mutual superposition of multiplicity and oneness, that are presented in it by two sides of a linguistic sign – signifier and signified – *vācya-vācaka-bhāva*.

Did Bhartṛhari Give Us a Philosophy of Language

P.K. MUKHOPADHYAY

There are two major parts of this paper. In the first part I discuss which philosophy of language, if any, we can attribute to Bhartṛhari. In the second part I examine the tenability of this philosophy of language.

It needs to be examined whether we can make sense of and justify the claim that Bhartṛhari is a philosopher of language. It requires us to make clear and explicit the standard sense in which we use the expression philosophy of language. We need also to identify some major theses of Bhartṛhari's thought on which his claim to the title philosopher of language is or may be made to rest. In addition it is to be examined how the philosophy of language that can be attributed to Bhartṛhari on the basis of those theses, compares with philosophy of language in the standard sense of the expression. It will be shown in the second part that the major tenets of standard philosophy of language and the parallel theses of Bhartṛhari are unacceptable on grounds that are likely to be offered by philosophers like Naiyāyikas.

I

Many professional philosophers or philosophers of language do not seem to have closely studied Bhartṛhari as much as one could expect. As a result, implications of his thoughts for the philosophy of language in the standard and technical sense of the expression, in which it is used in the domain of

contemporary philosophy, remain yet to be worked out in detail. On the other hand Grammarians, Indologists, and Sanskritists who are never tired of calling Bhartṛhari a philosopher or *dārśanika* and his system a *darśana* do not pay much attention to what *dārśanikas* or philosophers of various persuasions and schools may have to say about those contributions of Bhartṛhari on the evidence of which he is held to be philosopher of language. These are the two definite areas to which it is desirable to draw attention of the scholars. I will argue that his claim to the title of metaphysical philosopher – a *śabdādvaitin* – is in conflict with the other claim made in favour of him that he is a philosopher of language.

I shall first state very briefly some of the contributions of Bhartṛhari that are usually considered to have turned his grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) into philosophy (*darśana*) or philosophy of language (*bhāṣādarśana*?). From this point of view some of the verses of Vākyapadiya get stressed or overstressed and in the process some other verses, which could be deemed more important from the point of view of philosophy of language in its standard contemporary sense, suffered relative neglect. I will argue that some of these other verses, if interpreted bit freely, may be seen to contain such thoughts and insights of Bhartṛhari which are in line with the contemporary thinking in the field of philosophy of language, even when the expression 'philosophy of language' is taken in the strict and technical sense in which professional philosophers use it today.

Non-professionals do not always remember that there is a definite history of the emergence, in the twentieth century, of philosophy of language as a distinct branch of philosophy and that this has determined to some extent the standard use of the expression, which thus gained certain definite sense. It is said that Europe's innocence about language was lost only in the twentieth century. In earlier time, due to prevailing innocence, Europe never had the occasion to become self-conscious about language. And philosophy of language in the technical sense did not or could not emerge till this self-consciousness dawned on the European thinkers. Certain men are born within a certain language group and are brought up using that language without any thought that it is almost a miracle how one could manage to learn a language or that it is not even clear what it means to learn a language. Like ordinary men theoreticians including philosophers so long used to believe that we experience things of the world and various social relations that distinguish men from animals, say, and express these experiences by using language. Language is so far thought to be a transparent medium through which we learn the natural and social order of things when we hear the appropriate words of some speaker. But men in Europe came to notice in the twentieth century that our very experiences

are instead shaped and determined by the language we use. Our world is, partly at least, the creation of this language. This awareness was so new (and so shocking, at least to some) that men became acutely self-conscious of language (may be their own first and then language in general). It has been said that this awareness is a central characteristic of the twentieth century.¹ This historical event, the emergence of this self-consciousness about language, or our use of it, and because of that, the emergence of systematic investigations of various aspects of natural language, used as a matter of course so long, are so integral to philosophy of language or its history that this discipline of knowledge or philosophy is generally taken to be a twentieth century phenomenon. It may not be denied that in ancient times also men thought and wrote about language but these occasional thoughts about language by individual philosophers of earlier times are not seen as constituting philosophy of language.

In India there has been widespread self-awareness about Sanskrit language, if not so much for the problematic character of it that is brought to light by some twentieth century philosophers, at least, for its centrality in the Vedic culture. Classical India found it necessary to pay greatest attention to the study of Sanskrit language and preserving its purity for otherwise the preservation of this culture and *dharma* would be endangered. When Patañjali spoke on similar lines² he was perhaps expressing certain sentiment and concern that were not just his own but of the people of India as a whole. In fact this concern was already there in the cultural milieu for a long time, from the time of the Veda. What testifies to this truth is the early emergence of so many different systems of language study, from the study of etymology to hermeneutics or theory of interpretation of (scriptural) text. But for reasons like the one stated already these earliest studies of language are unlikely to be regarded as philosophy of language. There is at least another reason too. India has indeed been credited with first developing science of language (or language study)– the Pāṇinian Linguistics has been jealously defended to be an exact science by men like Frits Staal³ – but philosophy of language in the technical sense of the term or something close to it did not emerge in India till the time when various schools of *darśana* appeared. Still another reason why earlier studies for

¹ See Brayan Magee (ed.), "Philosophy of Language: Dialogue with John Searle" in *Men of Ideas*, p. 157, Oxford University Press 1982.

² Patañjali spoke along this line in his *Mahābhāṣya* when he was answering the question about the value or use of *Vyākaraṇa*.

³ Frits Staal, "Ritual, grammar, and the origins of Science in India" in his monograph *The Science of Ritual*, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 1982. See also Navjyoti Singh, "Linguistics" etc. in D. Chattopadhyay, *History of Science and Technology in Ancient India – the Beginnings*, Calcutta: Farma KLM Pvt. Ltd. 1986.

language are not usually regarded as philosophy of language in the technical sense is there. In this sense, (contemporary) philosophy of language succeeds and supersedes another branch of philosophy which was the core of philosophy so long, namely epistemology.⁴ In the Indian schools of philosophy, theory of *śabda* remains more a part of general epistemology and is contemporaneous with the latter. Lastly when the expression philosophy of language is used without qualification it primarily refers to a contemporary branch of philosophy, which emerged in Europe in the (second half of) twentieth century or any analytical study of language in Europe or elsewhere, which shares the problems and perspectives so characteristic of the former. Most of these perspectives and problems originate in the thoughts of the German mathematician and logician Frege. It is even said that contemporary philosophy of language emanates from thoughts of Frege – as either positive elaboration of, or reaction against, them.⁵

One may think that we are being too fastidious about terminology. For it is one thing to say that expression 'philosophy of language' has certain special associations when used in the context of European philosophy and it is another thing to say that those associations constitute the very meaning of the expression or a necessary part of it. But that is precisely the point we want to emphasize. We are aware of certain sense in which the expression is used. If that is not the sense in which we are using it in the context of Indian culture or Bhartṛhari's thoughts then it may be reasonably demanded that we state the exact sense in which we are using the expression in the context in question. This demand is rarely, if at all, fulfilled by those who describe Bhartṛhari as a philosopher of language or his views as philosophy of language. Most of the time the users of this expression show no sign of awareness of the fact that this expression is already widely used 'in a certain sense. We would have made similar complaint in modern Europe if somebody used the expression *vyākaraṇa* ignoring the established sense the term has in the language and culture where it originated. A few things are quite clear. First, *vyākaraṇa* (roughly grammar) and *darśana* (roughly, but usually translated as, philosophy) are distinct disciplines of knowledge. Secondly Bhartṛhari is a *vaiyākaraṇa* (Grammarians) though his work is more conceptual than formal. His principal work, the only one we will consider here, *Vākyapadīya* is not just a technical formal grammar as perhaps the *Siddhāntakaumudī* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita or even the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini is.

⁴ See R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton University Press 1979 and M. Dummett, *Frege – Philosophy of Language*, Duckworth 1973.

⁵ S. Guttenplan (ed.), *Mind and Language*, Introduction, p. 5, Clarendon Press 1975.

It is largely a philosophy of grammar and has been so described not infrequently. But philosophy of grammar is not the same thing as philosophy or philosophy of language. Most of the time people base their view that Bhartṛhari is a philosopher of language on the grounds that he did do some truly general philosophical speculations in which language in some sense of the term prominently figures and that he also did grammar or philosophy of grammar, which implies that he studied language. But just these two do not make one a philosopher of language. In India *darśana* (philosophy) including *vyākaraṇa* or 'Grammarians's philosophy'⁶ aims at saving knowledge, which is not just the speculation on or even discursive and analytical understanding of the ultimate reality but the direct experience of the same. The feature is prominently manifest in Bhartṛhari's major work *Vākyapadiya*. "The great Indian philosopher of language, Bhartṛhari, begins his *Vākyapadiya* with a metaphysical inquiry into the nature and origin of language in relation to Brahman, but then goes on in the second and third chapters to explore technical grammatical points involved in the everyday use of language."⁷ Though otherwise a treatise on grammar and analytical study of language *Vākyapadiya* was written when systematic philosophizing in India was already under way. Bhartṛhari begins by recalling and elaborating on a clearly enunciated truth that belongs to the pre-philosophical age of the Veda and Upaniṣad. The truth is that Brahman – the absolute One or Reality – and the *Śabdatattva* or the language principle are one and the same.⁸ But as has been rightly pointed out by Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja "It is this feature that sets Indian philosophy [and hence Indian philosophy of grammar or language] apart from modern western perspectives on language"⁹ including the perspective of modern western philosophy of language. While Bhartṛhari's claim to the title of philosopher of language rests on his *metaphysical* speculation that the language principle is nothing other than the ultimate and absolute Reality itself,¹⁰ philosophy of language in the familiar modern and technical sense of it is not a metaphysics or part of metaphysical philosophy. It is a branch of analytical philosophy. But whatever may be true of Bhartṛhari's treatment of language in the second and third chapters

⁶ See Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol.5, p. 33, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1990.

⁷ Ibid., p. 34.

⁸ "It was Bhartṛhari who in *Vākyapadiya* 1.1 first systematically equated Brahman (the Absolute) with language (*śabda*), going on to argue that everything else arises as a manifestation of this one *Śabda Brahman*." *ibid.*, p. 34.

⁹ Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁰ "It was Bhartṛhari, who led Grammar into philosophy proper, by making a case for *vyākaraṇa* as a *darśana*, a view about ultimate things, eventually about liberation." *Ibid.*, p. 18.

of Vākyapadiya his *śabdādvaitavāda* is generally viewed rightly or wrongly as metaphysical or speculative.

Another related contribution of Bhartṛhari is his theory of *sphoṭa*, which is considered to be a great contribution to the philosophy of meaning. And meaning is a central theme of philosophy of language in modern sense of the term also. So at least as the major propounder of *sphoṭavāda* Bhartṛhari can be claimed to be a philosopher of language and his *sphoṭa* theory a variety of philosophy of language. But two short observations are in order. First this *sphoṭa* is not a thing of the phenomenal order even though the phenomenal language, which is analyzable, emanates, so to say, from it – as false appearance (*vivarta*) of it.¹¹ However, philosophy of language is hardly interested in the origin of language in thought and certainly it is not interested in tracing its origin back to some supersensible mystic trans spatio-temporal entity like *sphoṭa*. Secondly, his theory of *sphoṭa* does not seem to be an integral part of Bhartṛhari's total system or the proper grammatical part of it in which he investigates about the structure and function of ordinary language, which we use in our communication and other performances.¹² This is so for the very same reason for which it is held that *sphoṭavāda* attributed to Pāṇini is not an integral part of his system of grammar. For otherwise it would not have been possible for all the major philosophical schools of India to simultaneously reject *sphoṭavāda* and accept and use his grammar. To conclude, neither his *śabdādvaitavāda* nor his *sphoṭavāda* is enough ground to call Bhartṛhari a philosopher of language.

I will now identify, translate or formulate in English a few tenets of Bhartṛhari's thoughts in Vākyapadiya, which can be easily seen to be parallel to certain central theses of modern philosophy of language. On this ground one should not hesitate to call Bhartṛhari a philosopher of language. So instead of wasting time on if and in which sense Bhartṛhari is a philosopher of language or what is or should be the sense of Indian philosophy of language, I would like to list three tenets of Bhartṛhari's thought which are central to any philosophy of language that one can reasonably attribute to him. Now onward we will, unless otherwise mentioned, mean by language, even in the context of Bhartṛhari's thought, natural phenomenal language, which is articulate and is used in normal communication.

To place the tenets of Bhartṛhari in perspective let us first think what are most likely to be the views of an ordinary man about language. To an ordinary man language is the vehicle of communication. It is a common

¹¹ Or *sphoṭa* gets manifested when phenomenal language, a *vivarta* of *śabdātattva*, is brought into being.

¹² Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita in his *Śabdakaustubha* remarked that Bhartṛhari only incidentally spoke of monism and *vivarta*.

possession of all of us including ordinary men and theoreticians like philosophers or scientists. Every one of us is born in a certain language group and, manages to learn, without any formal training, at least the mother tongue. This is perhaps the reason why ordinarily one remains unmindful about how complex a system of language is. Similarly he is definitely not aware of any form of language other than the articulate one. But he may be aware that the language men ordinarily speak is somewhat different from, though most of the time not entirely unlike, the language used in writing literature or *śāstra*-s. To put it briefly ordinary man has practical acquaintance with language and very limited theoretical understanding of it. He does not ordinarily or consciously hold any view about language. But still we can extract from him as responses to appropriate questions what may be formulated as commonsense view of language or a part of it. Same holds about truth and reality. We therefore propose to attribute to an ordinary man the following views about language, thought and reality.

- O1. Language and reality – our speech and what we speak about – are different (even if not unrelated).
- O2. Language on the one hand and thought or mind on the other are different (though again not unrelated).
- O3. Words are prior to sentences.

We will not produce now the sort of arguments, which an ordinary man is likely to offer, if we insist on it, in support of these theses [such as a child learns first to utter individual and isolated words before learning to speak whole sentences. In speaking and writing we proceed word-by-word or even letter-by-letter but not sentence-by-sentence]. We will rather list the three tenets of Bhartṛhari's philosophy with the preface that they are diametrically opposite to those listed above as constituting part of the commonsense view of language, truth and reality. Bhartṛhari holds:

- B1. Language and reality are one.
- B2. Language and thought are one and the same.
- B3. Sentence is the primary (and only real) unit of language and meaning.

(Though in all these theses Bhartṛhari uses language in the sense of transcendental language or *śabdatattva*, the theses hold, as we will soon see, in the context of ordinary phenomenal language also.)

To begin with, a few short comments, which may be elaborated and where necessary a bit amended in the next part, are in order. Though the three Bhartṛhari theses enumerated above may be seen to be very close

parallel to similar three theses of the standard philosophy of language to be listed soon yet it is very difficult if not impossible to attribute to Bhartṛhari any philosophy of language in the standard sense of the expression – in the sense of analytical and non-metaphysical philosophy of language. The difficulty in question derives from the fact that Bhartṛhari uses the word language or *śabda* in different senses, at least in two senses. Sometimes it is also very clear in which of the two senses he uses the expression. For example when he writes the first of the three parts of the Vākyapadīya, rightly known as Brahmakāṇḍa, Bhartṛhari primarily has in mind the transcendental language principle – the metaphysical principle of reality. In the second and third part of his book however he is basically concerned with the natural language, the historical Sanskrit language. Coward and Kunjunni Raja have noted clearly that Bhartṛhari had in mind both the metaphysical and phenomenal dimensions of language.¹³ It may therefore be asked what the word language means in its different occurrences in our formulation of Bhartṛhari's three theses given above. Till we answer this question it remains problematic to attribute to Bhartṛhari a philosophy of language in the standard sense of the term.

We will specify later in somewhat more detail the arguments of Bhartṛhari in favour of his three theses listed above and also some more points of difference between his version of monism or non-dualism and the non-dualism of Śaṅkara. Here I would like to note that the two versions may appear to be otherwise the same but for the fact that while Śaṅkara emphasizes the point that Brahman is consciousness (*jñāna* or *caitanya* or *prakāśa*), Bhartṛhari highlights that He is language or *vāk*. But in a theory of non-dualism or monism everything including consciousness, language, and all other things are necessarily the same. For otherwise non-dualism would be violated. The verses 1/123-124 show clearly that there could not be any *jñāna* that is not shot through and through by language; at least *jñāna* could not reveal itself unless it was necessarily associated with language. And it is language which as revealing principle reveals everything so much so that but for language the whole world would remain lost in the darkness of ignorance.¹⁴ This *śabdatattva* of Bhartṛhari is the internal *paśyantī vāk* that is of the nature of *jyoti* or *prakāśa* or light. One who is inclined to the monism of the type of Śaṅkara would like to say it is *vāk* by name. For him it is not language that shares with *caitanya* the power of revealing things. *caitanya* alone has the power to reveal things and is alone of the nature of revealing principle or *prakāśa*. *vāk* or *paśyantī vāk* can at the most be a

¹³ See note 7 above.

¹⁴ This has been said by Daṇḍin in his oft-quoted couplet : *idamandhaṃ tamaḥ kṛtsnaṃ jāyeta bhūvanatrayam / yadi śabdāhvayaṃ jyotir āsaṃsāraṃ na dīpyate//*

convenient name of it. One therefore needs to deeply consider Bhartṛhari's position regarding the question whether the varieties of language (*vāk*), the manifest language (*vaikharī vāk*) etc., are so many different kinds of *vāk* or so many different stages of the same language principle. Is *paśyantī* the cause of or source of *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*? Is it the case that the language principle is first divided into inner and outer speech and the inner speech is thought? But depending perhaps on how inner it is the inner speech got divided into *madhyamā*, *paśyantī* and *parā*. Be that as it may, Bhartṛhari appears at certain stage to be equating language with thought or *jñāna* and then this with reality. Metaphysically speaking all three are the same; they only appear to be different. This in brief is Bhartṛhari's argument for the first two theses. But before we go into further detail let us first state the three central theses of contemporary philosophy of language – philosophy of language in the technical sense of the expression in which it is standard to understand it in contemporary philosophy.

PL1. Language and reality are inseparable.

PL2. Language and thought are not strictly separable.

PL3. Sentence is the primary unit of meaning.

It is to be noted that the first two theses of the PL set is somewhat weaker version of the corresponding two theses of B set. Secondly, in each of these theses of standard philosophy of language the word language means unquestionably phenomenal historical language like English. But on the evidence of the text we may say with certainty that the word language in B1 means transcendental language principle or *śabdatattva*, which is identical with Brahman or the metaphysical absolute.¹⁵ *śabda* in this sense is unmanifest, inner language and not the articulated ordinarily knowable language of daily use of *śāstras*. The situation that is brought to light when we study together B1 and PL1 can be creatively used to discover a new dimension and strength of Bhartṛhari's thought. His thought remains valid even if we abstract it from its metaphysical associations. If one thinks that such abstraction will weaken his position then one should also consider that this thought becomes more widely acceptable—acceptable to even those who do not share his particular metaphysical view of *śabdādvaita* – and also more strong. For his thesis may be defended independent of his metaphysical argument. Or to put it differently, it is itself a remarkable thing that transcendental language and phenomenal language are so similar. If however we are accused of taking too much liberty in interpreting or reconstructing Bhartṛhari's thought then we would like to say that Bhartṛhari's metaphysical speculation is only an incidental aspect of his

¹⁵ See the opening verse of Vākyapadīya.

grammar¹⁶. And we are trying to reconstruct or interpret Bhartṛhari's thought instead of merely translating literally some passages of his text.¹⁷ In the process we discover new strength and potentiality of Bhartṛhari's thought. And if we use in support of the reconstructed position of Bhartṛhari some arguments which did not originate in him then that should be normally expected. If a position is sound then later day people may always find new arguments to defend it. Whether such defence finally works or not is a different issue.

II

Language in the context of both grammar and philosophy of language is phenomenal language, which we can and do use in communication. Further this phenomenal language is accessible to our ordinary experience and is thus available to both ordinary man and theoretician. The metaphysical and transcendental language principle (*śabdatattva*) which is identical with Brahman according to *śabdādvaitavāda* of Bhartṛhari, is accessible only in extraordinary experience of a *yogī*. Such experience or *prātibhajñāna* is acquired through acquiring spiritual merits or excellences resulting from practice of *yoga* (*yogaja adṛṣṭa*). Bhartṛhari uses language in both these senses. So for him there is not one language but two. Let us reserve the expressions *śabdatattva* (Language principle) and *śabda* (phenomenal language or simply language) for them. One difference that is particularly important from our point of view is that *śabda* or language is essentially characterized by temporality and temporal sequence¹⁸ though this feature does not really belong to Language principle, which is one, transcendental and indivisible. The sequence and temporality actually belong to the sound (*dhvani*). When we associate with Language what really belongs to *dhvani* we come to have language, which alone we can and do use for communication. So whatever may be the metaphysical truth, *vyākaraṇa*, as is clear from the meaning of the word itself, is concerned with language, which is the vehicle of meaning and communication. Philosophy of language is also concerned with this language. It matters little for a philosophy of language whether a metaphysician finds language to be ultimately real or not. For another reason also no philosophy of language can be founded on Bhartṛhari's *śabdādvaita* or Language-

¹⁶ See note 12 above.

¹⁷ I am reminded of the similar point made, in another context, by Gopinath Bhattacharya. See G. Bhattacharya, *Essays in Analytical Philosophy*, p. 44, Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar 1989.

¹⁸ *Vākyapadīya*, verse 1/86. References to *Vākyapadīya* 1, its *Vṛtti* and the commentary *Ambākarī* are from *Vākyapadīya, with the commentary Ambākarī* by Raghunatha Sharma, Varanasi: Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya 1963.

Brahman. For according to this theory there is no real distinction as such between expression which means and the meaning of it. But this distinction is very central to a theory of meaning and philosophy of language. So from the point of view of philosophy of language there is no such thing as Language. At least we should not allow talks about language and Language to get mixed up together. As a grammarian Bhartṛhari cannot make do with Language (alone). But strictly speaking *śabdādvaita* (Linguistic non-dualism) admits nothing other than it. So Bhartṛhari had to devise a way to derive the expression that means and the thing that is meant (and between them they exhaust all that is there in the world of common experience and science). According to him both of these and the whole world of multiplicity is an unreal appearance (*vivarta*) rather than actual transformation (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman or Language. Bhartṛhari did not fully develop this part of his view or said much about if and what form of *adhyāsa* he admits to make such false appearance possible. There is a strong likelihood that he had a version of *adhyāsa* in his mind that was similar to one which Śaṅkara elaborated in his commentary on the Brahmasūtra. But his *śabdādvaita* seems to be quite different from *brahmādvaita* of Śaṅkara. For Śaṅkara, Brahman is the only principle of revelation. He alone reveals the inner world as well as the outer world – in fact everything including language and things meant (*vācaka śabda* and *vācya artha*). For Bhartṛhari, however, the inner and pure *Śabdatattva* or language does not reveal anything unless it gets associated with temporality and temporal sequence that belongs to the outer world, particularly to external *dhvani*.¹⁹ Thus, being devoid of analyzable sequential structure Language which is one, atemporal and indivisible cannot reveal anything; it is not what has meaning function. Only the manifest language – the false appearance of Language – is therefore the concern of the *vaiyākaraṇa* and philosopher of language. It seems that Bhartṛhari does not have any objection in principle against developing a philosophical theory of language so long as one does not claim that this language is the ultimate reality, or that there is no other *śabda*, that is to say, no inner, pure and transcendental *Śabda*.

There, however, remains one difficulty. If we take B1 and B2 to be theses relating to phenomenal language of standard philosophy of language we need to find some argument in support of them. But the supporting arguments we actually find in Bhartṛhari can hardly be interpreted in terms of phenomenal language. One argument that tends to prove the thesis B1 is that both language and reality (with small r) are identical with the only Reality, which is the Language principle. From this it also follows that they

¹⁹ Cf. Vākyapadīya, 1/86 and Bishnupada Bhattacharya's elucidation in his Bengali edition of Vākyapadīya.

themselves are identical with each other. The whole argument rests on the view about the transcendental Language principle that it is the only Reality. It is not very clear in Bhartṛhari's own writing whether he wants to proceed from the premise that Language is the only Reality to the conclusion that every other thing including language and the world of things of commonsense reality are nothing if not unreal appearance of Language. For, on what ground one may be compelled to accept the premise? To avoid circularity we need to prove independently that nothing else is real or should be able to show or offer some other evidence to prove directly that Language is the same as Reality. It was not unknown to Bhartṛhari that the thesis that Brahman or Reality is language was first propounded in many places in the Veda itself.²⁰ But Bhartṛhari seems to be the first person to clearly distinguish between transcendental Language (*Śabdatattva*), which is identical with Brahman, and (phenomenal) language, which is the false appearance of Language. Anyway the first verse of Vākyapadīya seems to suggest an independent way, i.e., not on the basis of prior proof or assumption that everything else is false appearance, of proving that Brahman or Language is real. The suggested argument runs thus: Brahman is real because it is eternal; it is neither created nor is it destructible. But temporality is an essential feature of both language and reality, i.e., the world of things of commonsense and experience. And what is temporal cannot be eternal or real. All that follows is that the last two are unreal. It does not further follow that they are identical with Brahman or Language or Reality. In fact it cannot follow, for how the unreal can be identical with the real? The point to note is that though unreal, language and the world of things are given in our ordinary experience. So they somehow are. And the only way in which their existence can be reconciled with monism is to say that so far as they are, they are not really different from Reality. As partaking in reality they are. But so far as they are different from Language or Reality they are not really there. In other words their separate existence or independent reality is only a false appearance. So far as they are appearance of Reality they are given to our experience, are phenomena or have phenomenal being. And so far as they are only false appearance they have no real existence or genuine reality. But as false appearance also they need to be the appearance of something. And the only thing they can be appearance of is ultimately what cannot itself be an appearance. So the Brahman or Language of which they are appearance cannot but be real or in fact Reality. They are not anything real when viewed as different from Brahman. It is in this sense that they are identical with Brahman or the Reality.

²⁰ See for example, Vākyapadīya 1/20.

This argument therefore shows that language and reality (*vācaka* and *vācya*) are not different from each other on the ground that both are identical with Brahman. But they are identical with Brahman in a peculiar sense that they are false appearance of Brahman. There is another argument that does not make any explicit or essential reference to their property of being false appearance. Even one who takes them to be real could offer this argument. In other words this argument is available to *śabdapariṇāmavādin*²¹ also. And some people take from this the suggestion that Bhartṛhari remained open to both *śabdapariṇāmavāda* and *śabdavivartavāda*. Be that as it may, following is the complex argument or rather two arguments, which it is quite difficult to formulate in English, as stated first in the Vṛtti on Vākyapadiya 1/1. We will first reproduce Ashok Aklujkar's translation or formulation. "All of its [Brahman] manifestations, though apparently different from one another, are to be understood as linguistic, because they share their generative source (*prakṛti*). Because we grasp things through language they must be recognized as sharing in the language principle."²² The idea seems to be this. The source of a process and the result or the product of it cannot but be related. The world of multiplicity has its source in some transcendental Unity. The multiplicity, the world of our experience including (phenomenal) language and things (*artha*) it signifies are so many changes or different manifestations (*vikāra*) of the unitary source (*prakṛti*) or the Reality or Language. For *vikāra* (the change) is the same as *prakṛti* (the source that changes) as it partakes of the latter (*prakṛtyanvayitvāt*).²³ And since this *prakṛti* is the *śabdatattva*, the world as a whole is the same as *śabda*. Bhartṛhari did not say exactly that they are the same as *śabda*. He actually said: *śabdatattvam ityabhidhīyate*; the manifestation is called *śabdatattva* or Language principle. Raghunatha Sharma in his *Ambākartrī*, however, writes: *vikārāṇām prakṛtyanvayāt śabdatvopapattēḥ*. He also gives an analogy. From a bar of gold different ornaments are made. These ornaments are nothing but that gold in a changed form. Behind the changing forms (*vikāra*) there is the same substance (*prakṛti*). So the ornaments are nothing but gold, if we ask what they are in reality or substance. It is as much correct to say that the world is the *vikāra* of *śabdatattva* and hence *śabda* as it is sound to say that ornaments are gold since they are the gold in another form (the gold bar has taken new forms). It may be pointed out that the analogy does not hold. For in

²¹ According to *śabdapariṇāmavāda* the language and the world of things, in fact everything other than Language or Brahman, is actual and real manifestation of or emanation from Brahman. As such these manifestations are as much real as the Brahman which manifest himself. To that extent *pariṇāmavāda* is a realistic system.

²² See Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 126.

²³ Vṛtti on Vākyapadiya, pp. 2-3

case of the gold and ornaments both are real. At least ornaments are as much real as the gold is. It is the same with the *Prakṛti* and *vikṛti* in Sāṃkhya *pariṇāma*vāda or Sāṃkhya theory of *real* transformation. But if we attribute non-dualism to Bhartṛhari then Language principle or Brahman is real but the world of multiplicity is not real. So the analogy breaks down. It may be (may not be also) anticipating such an argument that Bhartṛhari hints at two other arguments, *śabdopagrāhyatayā* and *śabdopagrāhitayā ca śabdatattvam*.²⁴

One major difference between the earlier argument and this second (and third) argument is that while the first argument makes essential reference to the transcendental metaphysical Language principle which is the non-dual Brahman or Reality, the present argument makes no such reference. We may make sense of this argument within standard philosophy of language. This does not imply that the argument will be found acceptable by all or majority of the philosophers of language. Part of the argument (for the argument has two parts or here there are two arguments) in Aklujkar's translation, is this "Because we grasp things through language they must be recognized as sharing in the language principle."²⁵ In Ambākartrī the conclusion of the arguments is stated thus: *śabdātmako'rtho jñānaṃ ceti*. Both *jñāna* (knowledge or thought) on the one hand and *artha* (the things known) on the other are the same as *śabda* or language. These are basically the second and first theses respectively in both B set and PL set.

It is therefore important to examine the soundness of these arguments. Let us first take the argument for the theses that language and thought are the same. The argument is that thought gets expressed in language. This must be accepted. For if thought were always unexpressed subjective state then there could hardly be any objective study of it or public debate about it. Further, all admit, as a matter of common experience, that thought finds expression in language. And the form in which thought or *jñāna* is expressed is not that '*jñāna*' or 'I have *jñāna*' but that I have knowledge of chair or table and the like. In other words *jñāna* as expressed is always *saviśayaka* or associated with some object. It is the *jñāna* of some definite object like table, chair etc. that is expressed in language. We will later see that in one sense a definite object, in this context, is an object which is associated with certain *śabda*, its name.²⁶ Anyway, thought that gets

²⁴ Incidentally, Aklujkar has translated only one of these arguments.

²⁵ See Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 126.

²⁶ This sense already discussed by Vātsyāyana was later explained by Vācaspati Miśra to be in line with Bhartṛhari's view expressed in Vākyapadīya 1/123. See Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati on Nyāyāśutra 1/1/4.

expressed in language is always the thought of some definite object: *śabdena viṣayaviśiṣṭam jñānam abhilāpyate*. When language expresses a thought it expresses the thought along with its object and also the object along with its name that is itself *śabda*. Thus in the context of linguistic expression of our knowledge of things what expresses is *śabda* and what gets expressed is also *śabda*. So *abhilāpa* or expression in language is of *śabda* and by *śabda*. Therefore *śabda* that expresses thought and thought that gets expressed in *śabda* are both *śabda*. Ambākartrī has put the argument more strongly: *na ca anyenānyasya abhilāpo y'ktaḥ*.²⁷ It is not possible for one thing to express another thing. On this ground it is concluded that that which finds expression in language (*śabda*), i.e., the knowledge or thought, is itself *śabda*. They are not different.

In Ambākartrī the parallel argument in favour of the thesis that language and reality are the same is the following. There is a general principle that nothing can grasp another thing (*anyenānyasya pratītyasambhavāt*). An instance of this principle is perceptual knowledge: a thing generates its own perception. Perception of a table is possible if there is a table. Therefore it may be said that an object causes its own perception, as we find in case of perceptual cognition: *svasyaiva svapratīti janakatāyāḥ pratyakṣe drṣṭatvāt*. Now if we apply this principle to the case of language in which things (and the linguistic description or language itself) find their description then we have to conclude that *śābdajñāna* is caused by *śabda* and it is *śabda* that could be known in *śābdajñāna* : *yadyarthaḥ śabdātmako na bhavet tadā śābde jñāne na pratīyeta*.²⁸ To say the least the argument is not clear. Following Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati Miśra it may be further clarified. The idea is this. Objects of the world are associated with their individual names. So there is no knowledge, which does not know an object and the name associated with it. Objects are revealed only in the thought that reveals their names also. As grasping name of objects, which are *śabda*, thought is always *śābda* or it is *śābdajñāna* or knowledge of *śabda*, knowledge having *śabda* as its object. And we have seen that knowledge of an object is caused by the object itself. So the object of all knowledge, every knowable thing, is *śabda* as its knowledge is *śābdajñāna*. So all things or objects are *śabda*. Without the knowledge of them objects of the world would remain in the dark, we would remain ignorant about them. But their knowledge is *śābdajñāna* in the sense described. This regular association of *artha* with *śabda* – an association without which the things would remain unknown – shows that *artha* and *śabda*, *vācya* and *vācaka* or language and things or reality are the same.

²⁷ Ambākartrī on Vākyapadiya 1/1, p. 4.

²⁸ Ambākartrī, p. 4.

The arguments for the first two theses of B set (or perhaps PL set also) which we find in Bhartṛhari and which we have so far expounded above can hardly be said to be convincing even to one who has already aligned himself with the doctrine of *śabdādvaita* or linguistic non-dualism. It is the right time to take note of the arguments for these theses, which may be found in works of contemporary philosophy of language. I will state some of these arguments very briefly. It has been found that the real foundation of contemporary philosophy of language has been laid when Frege hit upon the following discovery that marked tremendous progress of our thinking about language – a progress much beyond the achievement made in this field by European philosophers of the eighteenth century. “In the present century, largely as a result of Frege’s work, philosophical theories of language, however diverse, tend to agree in holding that some of the concepts which are necessary to describe language are also an integral part of the description of mental states and attitudes. Thus in a very important sense mind and language cannot be separated, though this is not quite to say... that language and thought are one.”²⁹ This argument is clear and easier to understand. It makes no reference to any transcendental principle nor does it appeal to any esoteric or mystic experience. Besides, the thesis supported by it – that language and thought (or mind) are not separable – is not as radical as the B thesis that they are identical. To put it otherwise, in the argument or position of the contemporary philosopher of language there is no evidence that they have allowed their metaphysical speculation and philosophical thinking about language to run into each other.³⁰

Now we may turn to the thesis that language and things are not strictly separable either. The argument that is given is a matter of great discovery of the twentieth century – a discovery that marked the dawning of self-consciousness that is claimed to be a characteristic feature of the present day world.³¹ Earlier, in fact till the first decade of the twentieth century, men used to think that language was a transparent medium which mirrors the independently existing world as it is and through which we could communicate our experience, independently obtained, uncontaminated. Wittgenstein, however, illustrated with example that language or “words, one wants to say, are part of ...experience... the possession of verbal categories like ‘love’ and ‘hate’ themselves help to shape the experiences

²⁹ See S. Guttenplan (ed.), *op. cit.*, Introduction, p. 4.

³⁰ The metaphysical and the philosophical stand sharply distinguished in such theories where the Reality is not available to speech and experience in which common things of ordinary world are available. So in Nyāya philosophy one may not demand that the philosophical and the metaphysical should preferably be kept apart.

³¹ Cf. B. Magee, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

that they name; the concepts are part of the experiences; and indeed in many cases it would be impossible to have the experience at all without a mastery of the appropriate vocabulary.” “...the world does not consist of a lot of entities to which we, as human beings then attach labels and names; but rather, the objects of experience don't exist separately from the concepts we have. In this way words enter into the very structure of our experience... . Thus language helps to create the very categories in which we experience the world.”³² Now even this argument makes no reference to any supernatural language or uncommon use of language to establish that language and the world are not strictly separate. For the philosophers of language the thesis B1 in its weaker form, i.e., the thesis PL1, is actually true and for reason that derives from our actual use of language and experience of the world. Large group of contemporary philosophers think that questions of ontology can be asked only within the framework of a certain language. We cannot ask in the abstract “What things are there in the world?”. Put in that way it hardly makes any clear sense; nor does it appear to be an answerable and hence genuine question. But once we are told what language one speaks we can determine what ontology one accepts or what things are there in his world.

We have so far examined two of the theses of each of the two sets – Set B and Set PL. It was found that those who advocate the PL version of the theses do not allow unnecessary mixing up of metaphysical doctrine with philosophy of language. And the arguments actually put forward by the advocates of the PL version of the two theses in question may be considered adequate, for the purpose of philosophy of language, for B1 and B2. We will however show in the end that neither the arguments of Bhartṛhari and his commentators nor the arguments of the contemporary philosophers of language are, strictly speaking, sound.

As for the third thesis that sentence has primacy over words, both B and PL versions, i.e., B3 and PL3 are nearly the same. As it stands, the thesis needs further clarification before we can judge its merit. The intended sense of the thesis is likely to be clearer to some extent as we proceed. Anyway, it was Bhartṛhari who in India is said to have clearly enunciated and argued elaborately in favour of this thesis though it was known in India long before. The author of *Nirukta* has told us that an earlier thinker Audumbarāyaṇa held similar view. In contemporary Western philosophy Frege is given this credit. Be that as it may, the thesis does not exactly reflect ordinary man's view in the matter, which we have formulated as O3

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 155-56. Searle puts the matter more accurately, but for our purpose here this will do.

above.³³ So we need some convincing argument to establish the thesis in question. The metaphysical argument available in the writings of Bhartṛhari is that sentence in reality is not what we identify it to be. It is not just a finite sequence of physical words but it is that non-physical unitary *vākyasphoṭa* which gets revealed when the physical sentence is uttered. By nature it is this *sphoṭa* that performs the function of meaning, whatever the meant may be. And this *sphoṭa* is neither physical nor divisible. So it is not denied that sentence as a physical entity – a finite sequence of physical words or sounds – has parts or is divisible. But the real unit of meaning is the sentence-*sphoṭa*, which is indivisible. Being indivisible it signifies what is also indivisible and there is a sort of identity or *tādātmya* between indivisible signifier (*akhaṇḍa vākya*) and the indivisible signification (*akhaṇḍa artha*). As indivisible bearer of meaning, a sentence or sentence-*sphoṭa* is not, nor does it need to be, composed out of words or whatever the sub-sentential unit of language may be. So sentence is both the structurally primary unit of language and the primary unit or bearer of meaning of the language.

As can be easily seen, this argument bears essential reference to the metaphysical theory of *sphoṭa* or linguistic non-dualism. It is likely to convince at the most those who have already aligned themselves with this form of metaphysics. But history shows that the thesis has a wider circulation. And it may be found to have greater strength and soundness when we recognize that even outside the followers of linguistic non-dualism this thesis is accepted. But then we must find different argument also – the argument, which will make no essential reference to the metaphysics of *sphoṭa* or *śabdādvaita*. One such argument is argument from relevant experience of ordinary men who are competent users of their own language. It is said that when they communicate through language they speak and hear sentences as a whole and not part-by-part or word-by-word – that is how they feel and experience. The fact that it is physically impossible to produce or receive all the words of a sentence simultaneously is beside the point. Phenomenologically speaking it is the whole sentence that we hear and utter. Later on we may become aware on reflection how and what words were uttered or heard. This argument is also available in Bhartṛhari.³⁴ The third argument that also appeals to people irrespective of their metaphysical stand is that it is only by means of a complete sentence that we succeed in performing a linguistic act like saying something or describing something. We can even extend the argument and point out that when we act on the

³³ What has been formulated as ordinary man's view in the matter here is essentially the view of such philosophical schools as Mīmāṃsā. And it has been so recognized in the tradition of Bhartṛhari.

³⁴ Cf. Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 10.

information provided by some utterance, instruction or exhortation of someone, what someone uses as a matter of necessity is a complete sentence and not words or still smaller linguistic units.³⁵ The clarity that the thesis thus gained is that the sentence has primacy in the context of descriptive use of language or use of it to induce action. But there are senses and contexts in which the word enjoys primacy over sentence.³⁶ If we are to compile a dictionary we concentrate on words and not sentence. So there is a sense in which words have their meanings independently even though we cannot be said to have mastered the sense of words if we have not understood the actual or possible sentences, which may be constructed with the words in question. But in this form the thesis is least controversial if at all. We doubt whether the thesis is meant in this sense when it is made out to be a notable contribution of Bhartṛhari or Frege. Then it is taken in the context of their respective total philosophy. In case of Bhartṛhari it is in the context of his *śabdādvaitavāda* that the thesis has been proposed. And as such it is not proved or remains controversial. We may quickly make one more point. The phenomenological argument given above is not sound. For, as the Naiyāyikas have already explained, that we hear and utter whole sentence is a matter of appearance. Because one is so habituated or familiar with his native language, the production or reception of a sentence in that language takes place so rapidly that the small time gap between the utterance or hearing of two successive words is overlooked or not noticed. From this it does not follow that the gap is not there. When we hear or utter sentences in foreign language not fully mastered, this is obvious.

As for the thesis B1 that language and world are not separable or are identical we would like to remark that it is unacceptable to realist philosophers of language. They find both the thesis and the argument offered in support of it to say the least, unconvincing. Realism is committed to accepting the independent reality of external world. And they have brought many arguments against the soundness claim of the sort of thesis in question and validity of the arguments for it. We have no scope to discuss even a few of them in detail. However one general argument, formulated cryptically, is that there should be something for language to contaminate, that is, a world must already exist independently if language is to interact or interfere with it. The uneasiness that a realist is likely to feel about the thesis B1 is well illustrated in the example of Searle who proposes a more cautious reformulation of the thesis PL1. He said, "it is essential to understand it [his position] precisely. I am not saying that language creates

³⁵ This line of argument has been used in different cultures and in different ages. Cf. M. Dummett, *op. cit.*, Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, *Śabdakhaṇḍa*; P.K. Mukhopadhyay, *Nyāya Theory of Linguistic Performance*, Jadavpur Studies in philosophy, 1992.

³⁶ See M. Dummett, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

reality. Far from it. Rather, I am saying that *what counts* as reality ... is a matter of categories that we impose on the world; and those categories are for the most part linguistic."³⁷ But the objection to the view in question, and hence to the arguments supporting it is quite old. Vātsyāyana in his commentary on *Nyāyasūtra* 1/1/4 critically considers the position that all cognition is the cognition of *śabda*. In course of his elaborate criticism of this view Vācaspati Miśra, quotes Bhartṛhari's famous kārīkā, *na so'sti pratyayo loke* (Vākyapadīya, 1/123) etc. It is said that our consciousness or awareness is shot through and through by language. But what is to be understood by *śabda* here? It is the name of the thing or the object of the knowledge. Knowledge is always knowledge of something, some object. We do not just say we have knowledge but say we have knowledge of table or chair and so on. If the thing known did not have a name then we could not express our knowledge of it (in language). Vātsyāyana formulates the position in the following way. There are as many names as there are things and we usually know things along with their names. This makes it possible for us to successfully perform actions like describing the world or our experience of it.³⁸ It is therefore clear that the *śabda* that is implicated necessarily in our awareness of objects (*pratyaya*) is the name of the object. On this evidence it is said that *śabda* and *artha*, language and the world are necessarily related.³⁹ Otherwise we could have experience of things without experiencing at the same time *śabda* or the name of the things. Vātsyāyana thinks that this view is mistaken. After showing what mistake the advocates of this position commit he finally concludes that though for *expressing* cognition of an object we need to use the name of the object yet in respect of *knowing* things it has no function.⁴⁰ We cannot say that *śabda* makes cognition to be possible, in so far as we *know* the thing. Vācaspati's critical elucidation of the point is so incisive and beautiful that it is difficult to resist the temptation to reproduce it, though in consideration of the length of the paper we resist the temptation.⁴¹ But we think that the thesis 'language and the world are the same' is certainly not proved though there is good amount of truth in the view that *what counts* as world or reality is *largely* determined by the language we use.

³⁷ Cf. B. Magee, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

³⁸ Vātsyāyana, *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, see *Nyāyadarśanam*, p. 109, Munshiram Manoharlal edition, 1985. Realists are intent on keeping these two distinct. See M. Dummett, *op. cit.*

³⁹ In his *Tattvasaṃgraha* Kamalaśīla not only quotes the verse of Bhartṛhari in question but also develops his argument to show that *śabda* and *artha* are identical. See K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye, *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*, p. 208, Poona 1965.

⁴⁰ Dummett has drawn a parallel distinction between context of *recognition* and context of *explanation* while discussing the thesis that the sentence has primacy over words. See M. Dummett, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴¹ See Vācaspati's *Tātparyāṭikā* in *Nyāyadarśanam* cited above, p. 110.

We may now note briefly our comment on B2. It has already been noted that language has no role to play in making knowledge (of things) possible. Its role is restricted to the *expression* of the knowledge or thought that we may have of a sentence or of any other thing. But we have not so far taken note of what Bhartṛhari says in his famous kārikā 1/124 *vāgrūpatā cedutkrāmet* etc. What Bhartṛhari is usually understood to mean here is that thought (knowledge) would not be thought, would not reveal things, if it were not identical with language or lacked *vāgrūpatā*. It does not seem to be very clear but it echoes the thought of Daṇḍī expressed in the oft-quoted verse 1/3 of his *Kāvyādarśa* and to which we have referred to earlier (note 14). This verse of Bhartṛhari reaffirms the point made in the previous verse which we considered in detail above. We have examined already the view that knowledge or thought (*jñāna*) is identical with language. What we need to add here by way of critical observation is that Bhartṛhari is equivocating on the word *prakāśa* and allows two points of view – the first person and the third person – to get mixed up. In its use as noun the word *prakāśa* refers to revealing principle which is thought itself. So if I have the thought of a thing that thing gets revealed to me and no need for language is felt. But when we ask what reveals to others that we have a certain thought the answer is that it is language that does it. It is not necessary that I must express my thought to others in order to have the thought at all. So far there is no need to admit that thought and language are the same. Another person could not know that I have knowledge unless I express it in language but it does not follow that I could not know without expressing the knowledge in language. If however Bhartṛhari means to say that whether or not a thought is actually expressed it must have the ability to be expressed in language and this ability is nothing but sharing some structural affinity with language then it may be taken as a very insightful remark. A complete thought finds expression in a fully formed sentence because the two have structural affinity (*samānākāra*).

We stop here with a word of caution. We have touched upon only a small portion of Bhartṛhari's thought. And within that limit we have tried to find out some definite sense in which Bhartṛhari may be said to have given us a philosophy of language. Finally we found that this philosophy of language or his account of certain central theses of it is unacceptable to realist philosophers here or elsewhere. It remains to be seen if there is any other definite theses, which may be attributed to Bhartṛhari and whether by doing so one can justify the claim that Bhartṛhari has given us a philosophy of language in certain definite and, at least nearly, standard sense.



Bhartrhari as a Philosopher of Language

R.C. PRADHAN

In this paper I would like to discuss Bhartrhari as a philosopher of language. The *sphoṭa* theory which has been the cornerstone of his philosophy of language needs a fresh look in view of the important insights it brings into our understanding of language, thought and reality. The *sphoṭa* theory is not only a theory of language and meaning but also a theory of thought and reality. It is not without reason that Bhartrhari has been acclaimed as one of the greatest metaphysicians in the Advaitic tradition. His theory of *śabdabrahman* is one of his most significant contributions to metaphysics and philosophy of language.

1. The idea of śabda.

Bhartrhari discusses the idea of *śabda*¹ as the cornerstone of his philosophy of language (*śabdatattva*). *śabda* which etymologically means Word stands for language in general both in its internal and external aspects. Language is not only a system of rules but also a system of uses or practices. Bhartrhari is more interested in the internal structure of language in view of the fact that grammar deals with the structure underlying language. He takes grammar as the study of the inner dynamics of language so far as the latter unfolds the meaning-structure or the *sphoṭa* of language in the multifarious

¹ See Bhartrhari, *Vākyapadīyam*, translated by K. Raghavan Pillai, Canto 1, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1971. (Henceforward abbreviated as VP).

human speech.² The human speech which is the *vaikharī vāk*³ or the set of utterances is a manifestation of the *śabda* or the linguistic essence.

Bhartrhari makes a distinction between the speech or the linguistic utterances and the *śabda* or the linguistic essence. *śabda* is the language in the universal sense whereas the speech is the utterance of the language in a spatio-temporal context. Speech is temporal whereas language is eternal and timeless.⁴ Thus Bhartrhari makes room for the grammatical study of the eternal essences of language which constitute the foundations of the ordinary speech in all its multifarious forms. In this sense, Bhartrhari introduces levels of language in terms of *parā vāk*, *paśyantī vāk*, *madhyamā vāk* and *vaikharī vāk* in the descending order.⁵ The *parā vāk* is the highest and the deepest essence of language whereas the *vaikharī* is the gross manifestation of it in terms of space and time. The latter is the language that we speak and use in ordinary life. It is the language that is involved in our worldly transactions. The middle level languages are the different stages which the universal essence of language passes through to get itself transformed into the ordinary language.

Bhartrhari's philosophy of language presupposes that speech is a descent from the ideal essence of language. The ordinary language with the utterances of sentences gets its contextuality from the space-time world. This is itself a departure from the ideal essence and hence has to be seen as a manifestation of the *śabda*. The utterance is the *nāda* or the sound that manifests the ideal essence. Thus Bhartrhari takes the ideal essence to be the bed-rock of all linguistic phenomena.

2. Language and time

Bhartrhari is concerned with the fact that language or the *śabda* gets manifested in time and so there is a way it descends from the essence to the manifold particulars. This descent is depicted as the descent from the timeless to the temporal order. He writes:

The Word is neither a 'previous' nor 'a subsequent', because it is the speech-sounds which are produced in sequence. But the non-sequential is revealed as sequential as if it were divided (VP I.48).

Sequentiality is ascribed to the speech-sounds and not to the *śabda* because the latter is not temporal and is not sequential. From this it follows that the *śabda* which is an ideal essence and is timeless cannot be divided into

² VP I.48-49.

³ VP I.143.

⁴ VP I.75.

⁵ VP I.143.

sequences. The sequences are embedded in the speech-sounds because sounds are created in the medium of time. Bhartrhari describes the relationship between the Word and the speech-sounds in the following way:

Just as a reflection formed elsewhere (i.e, in water) appears, due to the activities of the water, to partake of the movements of the water, similar is the relationship between the Word and the speech-sound (VP I.49).

This way of explaining the relation between the ideal essence and its manifestations in speech is apt in the sense that the Word is one while the speech-sounds are multiple. The ideal essence of language is an egg-like⁶ inner creative principle underlying the many manifestations in the linguistic utterances.

Bhartrhari introduces time to explain how language, being one, assumes different forms. The one language or *śabda* becomes many languages which are plural in form because they are conditioned by time and space. The many languages are the multifarious manifestations of the one ideal language. The many languages are the natural languages which occupy the whole space of languages in the ordinary sense of the term. This point has been emphasized for the reason that the ideal essence is the unifying principle binding all languages. This idea of oneness also applies to the various activities undertaken within any one language. Though the activities are many, they are governed by the principle of oneness, namely, the principle of structuring the activities as belonging to one system. Bhartrhari is aware of the fact that language does not function arbitrarily and that there is a unifying principle of grammar. Grammar determines the boundary of all linguistic activities.

Bhartrhari denies time's ultimate reality because *śabda* is timeless and so cannot be many and divided. It is the speech-acts that are many and are scattered in time. In this sense, *śabda*, though one and timeless, appears to be divided and sequential. It is a fact that there are many words and sentences in a language which are different from one another. But grammar brings them together and unifies them into a system of symbols. Bhartrhari is sensitive to the fact that it is the oneness of language that matters and not the manifoldness which characterizes the linguistic utterances in time.

3. The *sphoṭa*

The *sphoṭa* is the ideal essence of language or the *śabda*. It is the foundation of all linguistic phenomena. Bhartrhari develops his *sphoṭa* theory in order to give an account of how the linguistic phenomena express the *sphoṭa*, the

⁶ VP I.51.

underlying reality of all languages. The etymological meaning of *sphoṭa* is that which explodes ('sphuṭ' means to explode).⁷ In the present context, the essence of language which explodes or expresses itself is the *sphoṭa*. It is the inner reality of the sentences which constitute language.

Bhartrhari develops his *sphoṭa* theory in order to show that without the inner reality or the ideal essence of language there can be no perfect understanding of the meaning and function of language. *sphoṭa* is the ideal essence or the meaning of language. It gets itself manifested in the transactions of language. The *sphoṭa* is one ideal essence whereas its manifestations are many and varied. There is no division of time in the *sphoṭa*, whereas there is intervention of time in the manifestations of this essence. The *sphoṭa* is *abhinnakāla* (undivided by time) whereas sound is temporal.⁸ Thus *sphoṭa* is a transcendent reality beyond space and time. It is hidden inside the language and is perceived by the mind's eye.

According to Bhartrhari, *sphoṭa* is the hidden reality that is underlying languages in the sense that it is the principle which informs all linguistic activities. The linguistic activities acquire meaning because of the *sphoṭa* that is expressed in them. A sentence has a *sphoṭa* that gets translated into the linguistic act of representation of reality. Without the *sphoṭa* or the essence there can be no linguistic representation. Bhartrhari finds that language functions vis-à-vis the world only by virtue of the capacity of the sentence to represent the world. This capacity is derived from the essence or the *sphoṭa* of the sentence.

Language has a potency to reveal the world. This is derived from the *sphoṭa* which lies in the inner structure of the sentence. The sentences are, however, the outward expressions of the inner reality called the *sphoṭa*. By gradual transformation the *sphoṭa* gets revealed in the language-forms which constitute the system of symbols. Bhartrhari writes:

The power which is based on words controls this universe. This universe which has a single Intelligence as its soul is perceived as manifold through the word as the eye (VP I.118).

That is to say, the power of the words derived from *sphoṭa* reveals not only the form of language but also the form of the world of which language is a representation. In this sense, language controls the universe by the *sphoṭa* which is the manifesting power of language.

sphoṭa has two dimensions, namely, the internal dimension of constituting the essence of language and the external dimension of

⁷ See B.K. Matilal, *The Word and the World: India's Contribution to the Study of Language*, Chapter 8, New Delhi: Oxford University Press 1990.

⁸ VP I.101.

controlling the universe. So far as the external dimension is concerned, language acts on the world by the *sphoṭa* by representing the world in its own fold. The world itself is a manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. That is, the world comes out of the *śabda* which is the embodiment of the *sphoṭa*.

4. The world

For Bhartr̥hari, there is no world which is completely external to language. Language constitutes the world in the sense that the latter has the *śabda* as its source. There is nothing real that is not within language. In this sense, what we know as the world is a creation of language. Our knowledge of the world is a function of our language. Bhartr̥hari writes:

In this world no comprehension is possible except as accompanied by speech.
All knowledge shines as permeated by speech. (VP I.123).

In other words, language pervades every case of knowledge; it makes knowledge itself possible. Speech reveals the objects of knowledge as well. Even what we think and remember is all pervaded by language.⁹

For Bhartr̥hari, what we know as the world is the manifestation of the ultimate reality which is called the Brahman or the *śabdatattva*. The world has come out of this reality which is beginningless and imperishable. He writes:

That beginningless and endless One, the imperishable Brahman of which the essential nature is the Word, which manifests itself into objects and from which is the creation of the Universe (VP I.1).

The *śabdabrahman* is the source of the world in view of the fact that the world has its existence in the Word which is the essence of all reality. The Word gives rise to the world with its many-sided forms. In this way we can say that there is no reality other than language in the ultimate sense. However, it must not be understood that there is no world in which we exist and move. The world of everyday experience is real in the *vyāvahārika* sense, but it is not real in the ultimate sense. For Bhartr̥hari, the ultimate reality is *śabdabrahman*, which is the Word in the transcendental sense.

Leaving aside the transcendental metaphysics of the *śabdabrahman*, we can very well appreciate Bhartr̥hari's idealist position on this matter in view of the fact that he takes the linguistic essence as the primary reality. The objects of the world are the reflections of the linguistic symbols.¹⁰ That is, the symbols themselves make what the objects referred to are. In this sense, what the objects are is constituted by the symbols. Bhartr̥hari endorses the idealist thesis that the world is dependent on the language in which it is talked about.

⁹ VP I.124.

¹⁰ VP I.20.

Let us take his Advaitic position first. It is well-known that Advaita accepts that the ultimate reality is Brahman and that the world is real only in Brahman. Bhartṛhari accepts the thesis that there is one *śabdabrahman* which is modified into the multiple objects of the world. The world of multiplicity has come out of this one imperishable Brahman.¹¹ Here it is to be noted that the objects are due to language or the Word which is the Brahman itself.

On a more common platform, Bhartṛhari advocates the language-dependence of the world insofar as the world is revealed in the language it is talked about. This position is derivable from the idea that everything in the universe has a basis in language. Language contains the essence of the world itself by virtue of its being the source of everything. This is an uncompromising idealist position.

5. Meaning and reference

Bhartṛhari takes into account the language-world relationship in his philosophy of language. For him, language and world are intimately connected so that not only the words but also their relationship with the objects is treated as eternal.¹² The grammarians in general accept the eternity of words and their meanings. They allow for the fact that words and their objects are eternally related and so reference to the objects is fixed *a priori*. But in that case it has to be shown how words can be meaningful if the reference is fixed for ever. There is the possibility that meaning and reference will collapse in every case.

Bhartṛhari while arguing against the Naiyāyikas says that words cannot change their meaning and reference given the fact that words are eternal. In the event of change, it may be the case that the same word stands for many objects of various kinds and thus has no fixed meaning. This is not acceptable to the grammarians because it allows for disappearance of meaning. Bhartṛhari's argument is that words cannot fail in their meaning and reference because of the principle of eternity. Besides, according to Bhartṛhari, meaning is the *sphoṭa* of a word or sentence and is accordingly one and indivisible.¹³ It is eternal and imperishable. The words have their *sphoṭa* or meaning only within the sentence which is a partless whole. In that sense, there is no possibility of the words changing their meaning when the sentence-meaning is intact and is invariable. The words being dependent on the sentences, it is the sentences which fix the reference and meaning of the words. So the question of meaning change cannot be entertained.

¹¹ VP I.1-2.

¹² VP II.22.

¹³ VP II.30.

Bhartṛhari's concept of meaning (*artha*) is dependent on his notion of *sphoṭa* which defines the nature of meaning. According to this view, meaning is one indivisible whole and is itself eternal and imperishable. He writes:

The Word has no parts; how can its meaning have any parts? The ignorant person gets a different idea of its formation by splitting it into parts (VP II.13).

That is to say, like the Word, meaning being an indivisible entity, it cannot be divided, nor can it be changed from time to time.¹⁴ Meaning is one but the meaningful utterances are many. This does not contradict the indivisibility of meaning or sense of a sentence.

Bhartṛhari's theory of meaning is called the *akhaṇḍa* theory for the reason that meaning cannot be divided and that it cannot be changed from context to context. It holds that the sentence-meaning is a whole and that it precedes the meaning of the words. In fact, according to this theory, meaning of the sentence-parts is non-existent apart from the meaning of the sentences. Bhartṛhari writes:

The sentence which is (really) indivisible becomes capable of division when it is (analytically) conceived and due to this the meaning which is, in fact, indivisible, is presented to the mind as if it consisted of parts (VP II.27).

It is shown here that division of a sentence is made only from pragmatic considerations and cannot be sustained in reality. This is due to the fact that meaning of a sentence is partless and is one.

Bhartṛhari rejects the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā theories of meaning because both the theories take meaning of a sentence as the result of the combination of the meaning of the constituent words. For Nyāya and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, the meaning of a sentence follows from the meaning of its parts (*abhihitānvayavāda*), while for the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, meaning of the words follows from that of sentence as they are contextually situated in the sentence (*anvitābhidhānavāda*).¹⁵ Both hold that meaning is not an indivisible entity and is constructed from the prior meaning of the parts. The theory advocated by Bhartṛhari and other grammarians is distinct from the rest of the theories because it takes meaning as the *sphoṭa* which is a primal entity and which is invariable across the whole of language. Thus Bhartṛhari makes meaning independent of the speakers and the context of the use of language. It is not that he disregards the speakers altogether, but he takes meaning as independent of the speaker's intention. This saves meaning from the vagaries of the speaker's intentions and the contextualities of space and time.

¹⁴ VP II.30-31.

¹⁵ See B.K. Matilal, *op. cit.*, Chapter 10.

6. Meaning as akhaṇḍa and autonomous

Bhartrhari's theory of meaning holds that meaning is one and indivisible entity which is the source of meaningfulness of the utterances of the ordinary speech. The ground for holding such a view is that meaning cannot be reduced to the conditions under which meaning is known by the speakers and hearers. Meaning is generally determined by the conditions under which the speakers and the hearers cognize it. This leads to the many varieties of the verificationist¹⁶ theories of meaning which are available in the current literature on meaning. Bhartrhari resists any cognitivist and empiricist move to reduce meaning to the cognitive conditions of meaning.

Bhartrhari is a transcendentalist so far as meaning is concerned. For him, meaning is embedded in the structure of language, that is, in its ideal essences, and is therefore removed from the operational conditions of language. Language embodies meaning which is the manifest form of *sphoṭa*. The meaning of the speech-units or the utterances is dependent on the *sphoṭa* which is underlying language. Had *sphoṭa* not been there, there would have been no meaning as we understand it in the context of language-use. The meaning of the ordinary language which we use is derivative from the original meaning called the *sphoṭa*.

Bhartrhari's *sphoṭa* is comparable to the Fregean¹⁷ sense that is supposed to be the timeless entity underlying language. Frege's sense as distinguished from reference is the thought-content¹⁸ which a sentence embodies in its logical structure. The sense is distinct from the object of thought and the psychological processes involved in it and is therefore objective and independent of the mind that grasps it. Thus sense remains an independent and irreducible entity which is presupposed by the uses of language. In this sense, Frege is a transcendentalist who rejects all naturalist and empiricist reconstruction of meaning in terms of the cognitive conditions of the expression of sense in language. In no case is the Fregean sense a linguistic entity. It is pre-linguistic and it belongs to the realm of the essences or the Platonic Ideas.¹⁹ However, unlike the Fregean sense, Bhartrhari's *sphoṭa* is linguistic in character, since it is embodied in the *śabda*.

¹⁶ See M. Dummett, "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in *Mind and Language*, ed. by S. Guttenplan, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975, reprint 1977.

¹⁷ Frege, "On Sense and Reference" in *Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, trans. by P.T. Geach and Max Black, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1952.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Frege, "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry", in *Philosophical Logic*, ed. by P.F. Strawson, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1967, reprint 1973.

Bhartr̥hari goes beyond the empiricist traditions of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā in espousing the autonomy of language and meaning. For Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, language is a conventional entity and is based on the natural behaviour of mankind. For them, language is based on the social need of communication and interaction. But, for Bhartr̥hari, language is an autonomous entity that is presupposed by the social conventions and habits of human beings. Language is the primal entity that is the source of all conventions and social habits. Language pervades all activities of man including his cognitive activities. Therefore there is nothing that can be conceived which is not based on language.²⁰

7. The primacy of grammar

Bhartr̥hari looks upon grammar as the study of the inner essence of language and of the *śphoṭa* that pervades language. Grammar is taken as the guide to the reality of language. For Bhartr̥hari, language itself is the basis of the universe. Therefore it follows that the study of grammar is the foundation of all knowledge. Bhartr̥hari writes:

Words are the sole guide to the truths about the behaviour of objects; and there is no understanding of the truth about words without grammar (VP I.13).

Grammar thus tells us about how the words function in language and how they speak about the objects in the world. Grammar alone is the guide to the world in the ultimate analysis.

Grammar is given by Bhartr̥hari the status of the purifier of speech and the remover of all blemishes, because it shows how language is to be used correctly. In this sense, grammar is the most fundamental of all disciplines as it shows how language and the world are properly understood. Bhartr̥hari writes:

Just as all thing-classes depend upon word-classes, similarly, in this world, this (grammar) is the basis of all disciplines (VP I.15).

Grammar thus unfolds the very foundations of all knowledge and hence is the primary of the sciences that deal with knowledge.

Bhartr̥hari goes further to tell us that grammar leads us to the knowledge of the ultimate reality, the Brahman. It is because in grammar the ultimate source of the world is disclosed. All the paths to knowledge *converge* in the knowledge of the Brahman. Grammar being the foundation of all knowledge, including the knowledge of the Brahman, its primacy is demonstrated. Bhartr̥hari writes:

It (grammar) is the first rung on the ladder towards liberation; it is the straight royal road for those *desirous* of (reaching) that goal (VP I.16).

²⁰ VP I.123.

That is, grammar liberates us from wrong knowledge by removing our ignorance about reality. Hence it is "the gateway to liberation".²¹ Liberation consists in the knowledge of reality and this is made possible by grammar.

Bhartr̥hari is an Advaitin so far as his metaphysics is concerned. He has made grammar the primary source of reality which is non-dual and of the nature of supreme consciousness. The ultimate reality is of the nature of the *śabda* and is the source of the world and the manifest speech associated with the world. Bhartr̥hari writes:

That pure light which is the supreme essence of speech free of (any kind of) form, which appears to take several forms in this darkness (of manifestation) (VP I.18).

The ultimate reality is compared with the light that shines amid darkness; it is the essence of all speech; it is the essence of all manifest reality as such. It is grammar and grammar alone which gives us knowledge of the reality. Bhartr̥hari remarks:

Which, though one, is divided on the basis of the various explanations (of it);- that Supreme Brahman is attained having recourse to grammar (VP I.22).

This shows that grammar by revealing the ultimate essence of language and reality gives us the glimpse of the Brahman which is the ultimate source of everything.

8. Conclusion

Bhartr̥hari as a philosopher of language and grammar has far widened the scope of philosophy in that his philosophy investigates the nature not only of language and grammar, but also of reality. His philosophy of language and grammar thus is a metaphysics of reality *par excellence*. Bhartr̥hari's philosophy is a reaffirmation of the Advaitic metaphysics, and it brings grammar and metaphysics closer.

²¹ VP I.14.

Changing Approaches to Language in Indian Schools of Thought vis-à-vis Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya

KARUNASINDHU DAS

Language had a fascinating effect on Indian mind from a very early date. Human utterance, rightly designated as *vāc* (< \sqrt{vac} — to articulate) was therefore conceived of as but a component of the world of sound and its source, expanse and impact were thoroughly explored in the Vedic literature. The Devīsūkta, otherwise called Vāk-sūkta, (RV 10.125.1-8), for example, admits origin of *vāc* in the waters in deep ocean from where it is posited in the vast expanse of the universe by divine will.¹ It is called the conscious (*cikituṣī*) principle responsible for our sustenance and knowledge and the abode for all though some might not be aware of the same.² Every being, human, superhuman or so, attains power, glory and merit out of it.³ It pervades all regions, spreads through all beings and goes even beyond them. Its greatness lies in this that it blows like the wind, it creates heaven and earth and still transcends them.⁴ While the omnipresent benevolent *vāc* is found portrayed later on in a Bṛhadāraṇyaka passage⁵ as the holy cow granting favour through the four udders, viz., *svāhākāra*, *vaṣaṭkāra*, *hantakāra*

¹ *mama yonir apsu antaḥ samudre*. — RV 10.125.7.

² RV 10.125.4.

³ *juṣṭam devebhir uta mānuṣebhiḥ, yaṁ kāmaya tam tam ugram kṛṇomi, tam brahmāṇam, tam ṛṣim tam sumedhām*. — RV 10.125.5.

⁴ RV 10.125. 6-8.

⁵ *vācam dhenum upāsīta, tasyāś catvārah stanāḥ... prāṇa ṛṣabho mano vatsaḥ*. — Bṛh 5.8.1.

and *svadhākāra* towards gods, human beings and the departed souls, a verse in the RV itself went to the extent of identifying four levels of *vāc*, the first three being subtle ones, the fourth one alone of which human glottis can articulate.⁶ Verily, *vāc* at all levels is really difficult to comprehend and the wise alone do succeed there.⁷

This stratification of *vāc* took another turn in the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad where four segments of the holy chant OM, viz., a, u, m and the one beyond them are represented as four phases of Brahman in waking, sleep, deep sleep and beyond that.⁸ Interestingly, the concept of Oṅkāra-brahman developed in due course into that of *śabdabrahman* and also distinction between *śabda-brahman* and *parabrahman* was emphasised in some quarters. While this relates *vāc* to the world in causal relationship, there was another move towards describing both name and form — the verbal and material worlds — as imperfect manifestations of reality.⁹

The vast expanse of *vāc*, too, was taken notice of in right earnest so much so that a commentator on the relevant Taittirīya passage (TS 6.4.7) compared it to the ceaseless flow of sound of an ocean and analysis of the same into intelligible components was devised as a step to comprehending the whole. The empirical problem of standard and non-standard *vāc* was not left unattended to either. The R̥gveda praises the wise who apply their mind to differentiating the standard from the non-standard so that merit rests in their speech.¹⁰ They are eulogised as *vāgyogavid* against those who deserve censure for their use of non-standard form of speech (*duṣyati cāpaśabdaiḥ*) for any reasons, whatsoever.

Concept of *vāc* in Vedic tradition, therefore, encompasses both physics and metaphysics of language. That the seeds prevalent there sprouted and flourished subsequently can be duly testified in schools of vedāṅga, poetics and philosophy. It is no wonder that four out of the six vedāṅgas are addressed to various aspects of language study, viz., phonetics and phonology, metrics, morphology and semantics. Yāska's Nirukta, for example, is used to two coinages, viz. *vacana* and *śabda* for *vāc*. To him, too, it has two levels: the one which is perishable within a very few seconds of its

⁶ *catvāri vāk parimitā padāni ... guhā trīṇi nihitā neṅgayanti, turīyaṃ vāco manuṣyā vadanti.*
— RV 1.164.45.

⁷ *tāni vidur brāhmaṇā ye manīṣiṇaḥ.* — RV 1.164.45.

⁸ *jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro' kāraḥ prathamā mātrā ... svapnasthānas taijasa ukāro dvitīyā mātrā ... suṣuplasthānaḥ prājño makāras tṛtīyā mātrā ... amātraś caturtho ... evam oṅkāra ātmaiva.*
— Māṇḍūkya 9-12.

⁹ *vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ, mṛttiketyeva satyam.* — Chāndogya 6.1.4.

¹⁰ *saktum iva tilaunā punanto yatra dhīrā manasā vācam akrata ... bhadraisām lakṣmīr nihitādhi vāci.*
— RV 10.71.2.

articulation while the other is pervading and subtle at the same time and hence capable of being a means of communication among people.¹¹ The whole of the sciences of Vyākaraṇa and Nirukta is, in fact, addressed to exploring the methods and nuances of *vāc* as a vehicle of communication. Poetics including rhetoric and prosody aims also at pace, tempo, music and beauty of figurative speech while schools of philosophy would concentrate, more or less, on *vāc* as a valid testimony to verbal cognition. To Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, again, *vāc* is meant for communicating to the audience by reciting the script of a drama for which he demands utmost attention of actors.¹² Body language, make-up and the like in an enactment reveal, in fact, what a verbal expression has to say.¹³ This reminds one of the VP statements: *arthapravṛttitattvānām śabdā eva nibandhanam* (VP 1.13) and *na so'sti pratyayo loke yaś śabdānugamād ṛte* (VP 1.123). As NŚ envisages, it is *vāc* which constitutes and sustains śāstras, it excels all others in that respect and hence it may be safely called the cause of all of them.¹⁴ Horizontally speaking, Bharata classifies *bhāṣā*, the sound produced by animate beings, into four heads: *atibhāṣā*, *āryabhāṣā*, *jātibhāṣā* and *yonyantarī bhāṣā*, the first and the last are for superhuman and sub-human beings while the rest two are related to human beings.¹⁵ By *yonyantarī* is meant sound produced by insects, birds and animals. For an early reference to language of the subhuman species, one may cite the ŚB passage (ŚB 4.1.3.16) according to which sounds of animate beings have several phases presented in humming of the bees, chirping of birds, sound of an animal and human articulation. That sounds produced from inanimate objects too can not be left aside for obvious reasons is noticed in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy according to which any *śabda* is nothing but a physical property of *ākāśa*, an effect produced either out of conjunction or disjunction of two objects or so, or from a previous sound. For an elaborate classification of sounds on the above pattern one may refer to Śabdārtharatna (pp. 6-7) by Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati, a nineteenth century grammarian-philosopher of Bengal.¹⁶ It comes out as follows:

¹¹ *vyāptimalltvāt tu śabdasya, anīyastvācca, śabdena samjñākaraṇam vyavahārārtham loke.* — Nirukta 1.


¹² *vāci yatnas tu kartavyo nāṭyasyaiṣā tanuḥ smṛtā.* — NŚ 15.2.

¹³ *aṅganepathyasattvāni vākyaṛtham vyañjayanti hi.* — NŚ 15.2.

¹⁴ *vānmayāniha śāstrāṇi vānniṣṭhāni tathaiva ca, tasmād vācaḥ param nāsti, vāg hi sarvasya kāraṇam.* — NŚ 15.3.

¹⁵ *atibhāṣāryabhāṣā ca jātibhāṣā tathaiva ca, tathā yonyantarībhāṣā.* — NŚ 18.26.

¹⁶ *śabdo hi nāma pṛthivyūdhībhūla-catustaya-kriyājanyo 'vakāśādesotpanno dravyāśrito guṇaviśeṣaḥ.* — SR, p. 6.



Of course, a sound produced at its source and the one perceived at the hearer's end, in fact, are not the same. As early as the second century B.C., Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, therefore, defined *śabda* from three different perspectives: first, it is that which when uttered by a speaker communicates something,¹⁷ secondly, it is the sound from which something is usually comprehended by a hearer,¹⁸ and thirdly, it is an object of auditory perception, something posited in *ākāśa* though it is effulgently manifest by articulation, and conceived at the intellectual plane.¹⁹ Distinction between initial sound and reverberation thereof was further clarified in the *Mbh* on P. 1.1.70 as one between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*.²⁰ Then came identity of *r* in both *r* and *ṛ*, the type sound or the abstract sound image designated as *sphoṭa*.²¹

Now, use of *śabda* as a communicating vehicle (*arthaprayukte śabdaprayoge*) and concept of permanence thereof (*siddhe śabdārtha-sambandhe*) in both Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* and *Mbh* obviously lead to accepting two planes of *vāc*, viz. the physical sound in either its grotesque or subtle

¹⁷ *yenoccāritena sāsna-lāṅgūla-kakuda-khura-viṣāṇinām sampratrayo bhavati, sa śabdah.* — *Mbh*, Paspāśā.

¹⁸ *pralītapadārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ity ucyate.* — *Mbh*, Paspāśā.

¹⁹ *śrotropalabdhiḥ buddhinirgrāhyaḥ prayogenābhijvalitaḥ ākāśadeśaḥ śabdah.* — *Mbh*, Pratyāhārāhnikā, Śivasūtra 1.

²⁰ *sphoṭaḥ śabdah, dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇah.* — *Mbh* on *taparas tatkalasya* (P.1.1.70).

²¹ cf. the *Mbh* on *krpo ro laḥ* (P.8.2.18): *ubhayataḥ sphoṭamātram nirḍiśyate.*

form and the image revealed thereby as the meaning-bearing unit. This develops in due course into the *sphoṭa* theory of language in the VP verse, viz. *dvāu upādānaśabdeṣu* (VP 1.44). Contribution of individual sounds coming out in sequence to revelation of *sphoṭa* is also taken notice of in VP 1.84. Verily, a combination of impressions left by the preceding sounds and the final sound itself may well play the catalytic agent in revealing a *sphoṭa*.²²

To Bhartṛhari, the worlds of *nāma* and *rūpa*, i.e., both verbal and material proliferations, are manifestation of *vāc*.²³ The idea may be traced to the Vedic passage which propounds this world as but a form of the Vairājapuruṣa who is made up of nothing but the Vedas.²⁴ Admission of this intimate relationship between name and form has got far-reaching implications in the realm of epistemology. As Bhartṛhari formulates, an object of knowledge is perceptible always in terms of a name given thereto.²⁵ Cognition of meaning, therefore, entails the meaning-bearing as well. In other words, *śabda* offers itself too when it projects a meaning.²⁶ Verily a *śabda* never conveys a meaning without being itself a part of that meaning. Mere existence of *śabda* does not make any sense whatsoever.²⁷ Neither a speaker nor the hearer can afford to think of a communication without any reference to *śabda*.²⁸ Every cognition, verbal or non-verbal, in fact, is infused with *śabda* and it always comes to light in the form of *vāc*.²⁹

All this is in contradistinction to the proposition that *śabda* can be at best the cause of a cognition and nothing more than that. True, the conglomeration of causes rests in *vāc* (cf. *itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabdavyapāśrayā* — VP 1.121), but the same is the case with an effect as well. This leads rightly to comparison of *śabda* with *tejas* which illumines

²² *nādair āhitabījāyām antyena dhvaninā saha, āvṛttaparipākāyām buddhau śabdo'vadhāryate.* — VP 1.84.

²³ VP 1.1; also VP 1.120.

²⁴ *sa u evaiṣa ṛimayo yajurmayaḥ sāmamayo vairājaḥ puruṣaḥ. puruṣo vai lokāḥ. puruṣo yajñāḥ. tasya ... tisra āhutayaḥ tā eva ... trayo lokāḥ.*

²⁵ *arthajātayaḥ sarvāḥ śabdākṛtinibandhanāḥ.* — VP 1.15.

²⁶ *artharūpaṁ tathā śabde svarūpaṁca prakāśate.* — VP 1.50.

²⁷ *viśayatvam anāpannaiḥ śabdair nārthaḥ prakāśyate, na sattayaiva te 'rthānām agrhītāḥ prakāśakāḥ.* — VP 1.56.

²⁸ *yathā prayoktuḥ prāg buddhiḥ śabdesūeva pravartate, vyavasāyo grahītṛṇām evaṁ teṣveva jāyate.* — VP 1.53.

²⁹ *na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte, anuviddham iva jñānam sarvaṁ śabdena bhāśate.* — ibid 1.123; *vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī, na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī.* — VP 1.124.

others and is self-illuminating as well.³⁰ Concept of non-difference (*tādātmya*) between *śabda* and *artha* as it is propagated by philosopher-grammarians of the Pāṇinian school, justifies itself in this that one is posited in the other: *tasmād arthavidhāḥ sarvāḥ śabdamaṭrāsu nisṛitāḥ* —VP 1.119.

Another area of linguistic deliberations where VP offers striking note of synthesis and reconciliation is treatment of standard and non-standard forms of language. A Vedic chant did not approve of any slipshod mistakes in articulation lest it spoils the magic power inherent therein and adversely affects the prospects of the reciter. Thus a faulty recital is never acceptable as conveying the same sense as the faultless one in Vedic parlance.³¹ It is in fact an injunction in favour of the standard practice of use of proper forms in proper perspective. Non-standard forms, however, were very much in use even among the learned in social communications.³² And if Patañjali's enumeration of *varṇadoṣas* in the Mbh Paspasā be any indication, there were dialects, sociolects and idiolects with a plethora of phonetic and morphemic variations³³ in the language. So far as communication is concerned, this authority did not envisage any distinction between standard and non-standard forms,³⁴ though merit is assured in the former. The Mīmāṃsā on the other hand takes a different approach to this problem. Since human fault is made responsible for non-standard (*apabhraṃśa*) forms³⁵ it is the standard one that is accepted there as meaningful.³⁶ Kumārila even goes to the extent that truth and reality lie in standard forms only and that to speak of reality means maintaining the same in both form and content.³⁷ And the standard one is earmarked by the learned: *yam abhiyuktā upadiśanti eṣa eva sādhuḥ iti* —Śabara on J.1.3.27.

³⁰ VP 1.55.

³¹ *mantra hīnaḥ svarato varṇato vā mithyāprayukto na tam artham āha, sa vāgvajro yajamānaḥ hinasti.*

³² *yad vānas tad vā naḥ iti prayoktavye yavāṇas tarvāṇaḥ iti prayuñjate, yājñe punaḥ karmaṇi nāpabhāṣante.* — Mbh, Paspasā.

³³ *grastaṁ nirastaṁ avalambitaṁ nirhataṁ ambūkrtaṁ dhmūtaṁ alho vikampitaṁ, samdaṣṭaṁ eṇīkrtaṁ ardhakaṁ drutaṁ vikīrṇaṁ etāḥ svaradoṣabhāvanāḥ iti.* ato'nye vyañjanadoṣāḥ. Mbh, Paspasā. Also: *ekaikasya śabdasya bahavo'pabhraṃśāḥ. tad yathā gaur ity asya śabdasya gāvī, goṇī, golā, gopotalikā ity evamādayo'pabhraṃśāḥ.* — Mbh, Paspasā.

³⁴ cf. *samānāyām arthāvagalau śabdena cāpaśabdena ca.* — Mbh, Paspasā.

³⁵ *śabde prayatnaniṣpatter aparādhasya bhāgitvam* — J. 1.3.25 whereupon Śabara comments: *aparādhāt gūvādyo bhavēyuh* and Kumārila's Tantravārttika adds thereto the following: *atācānaparādhena vyajyamāneṣu sādhitā, sāparādheṣvasādhitvam.*

³⁶ *anyāyaścānekaśabdatvam* — J.1.3.26 whereupon Śabara comments: *eko 'nādiḥ, anye apabhraṃśāḥ.*

³⁷ *yadvā satyatvam evedaṁ sādhitvam abhidhīyate, ... arthasatyam yathā vācyaṁ śabdasatyam tathaiva hi, śabdānṛtaṁ ca hātavyam arthānṛtavat eva naḥ.* — Tantravārttika on J. 1.3.25.

True, some of the non-standard forms have been in vogue for long and some would like to assign some denotation thereto. But a Mīmāṃsaka would never accept this position. Kumārila admits in his *Tantravārttika* on *tadaśaktiscānurūpatvāt* (J.1.3.28), the sole authority of *vyākaraṇa*, in pinpointing a standard form. To him, testing whether a jewel is genuine or not and ascertaining a standard form depend equally on relevant expertise developed in due course.³⁸ He would even refuse to concede that a non-standard form may be secondarily significant by reminding one of the standard form which is actually significant.³⁹

Bharṭṭhari however tends to admit that non-standard forms too are meaningful though not directly as it is in the case of synonyms but through reminding one of the standard one.⁴⁰ This holds good particularly for those who know *śabda* as well as the *apaśabda* variants thereof. It is like comprehending something from the indistinct utterance of a child. The hearer remembers thereby the proper form to grasp the meaning.⁴¹

However, for those who have acquaintance not with the standard form at all but with the non-standard only it is the latter alone that communicates⁴² since no scope is left there for inferring the standard one from the other. It is not that there is any error involved in that understanding. Because no subsequent contradiction occurs to nullify the same.⁴³

It obviously follows that the demarcation line between a *śabda* and an *apaśabda* can be drawn not in terms of semantic capability or otherwise but at the instance of a prescriptive *vyākaraṇa*.⁴⁴ True, some like to ascertain a form as standard on the basis of its use by the learned. But this also subscribes to the above in this that such *vyākaraṇas* themselves bank on linguistic performance of the elite. As Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa suggests, it is nothing but assurance of merit in one case and absence thereof in the other that actually

³⁸ *yathā ratnaparikṣāyām sādhuśādhutvalakṣaṇam, tathā vyākaraṇāt siddham sādhuśabdānirūpaṇam.* — *Tantravārttika* on J. 1.3.27.

³⁹ *apabhraṃśeṣu sādhutvaṃ tulyārthatvād yaducyate, lakṣaṇābhāvamārgeṇa tasyābhāvo'pi niścītaḥ.* — *Tantravārttika* on J. 1.3.27.

⁴⁰ *te sādhuṣv anumāneva pratyayotpallihetavaḥ. na śiṣṭair anugamyante paryāyā iva sādhuṣv, ... tasmāt sākṣād avācakāḥ.* — VP 1.149-150.

⁴¹ *ambāmbeti yathā bālāḥ śikṣamāṇāḥ prabhāṣate, avyaktaṃ tadvidūṃ tena vyakte bhavati niścayaḥ. evaṃ sādhuḥ prayoktavye yo'pabhraṃśaḥ prayujate, tena sādhuvyavahāraḥ kāścid artho'bhidhīyate.* — VP 1.151-152.

⁴² *pāramparyād apabhraṃśā viguṇeṣvabhīdātṛṣu, prasiddhim āgatā yeṣu teṣāṃ sādhuḥ avācakāḥ.* — VP 1.153.

⁴³ *apabhraṃśānām āśaktatve tato bodha eva na syāt... na ca śaktibhramāt tebhyo bodhaḥ. bodhakatvasyābādhenā tadgrahasya abhramatvāt.* — VBS, 38. Also, cf. *sādhutvajñānam na śābde kāraṇam, nāpyasādhujñānam pratibandhakam.* — Uddyota on Mbh 3.2.84.

⁴⁴ *evaṃca yathā śābdo yatrārthe vyākaraṇe vyutpādītaḥ, sa tatra sādhuḥ iti paryavasīlam.* — Uddyota on Mbh 3.2.84.

distinguishes between the two.⁴⁵ Bhartṛhari noted that there are three divergent views in relationship between *śabda* and *apaśabda*. To some, standard words develop from the non-standard ones while others suggest the reverse, incapability of a speaker to pronounce correctly being the reason behind a faulty utterance.⁴⁶ A third view visualises independent existence of both and admits that either may fail to communicate if the other is intended.⁴⁷

As for articulation of individual sounds, there were several formulations in the Śikṣā and Prātiśākhya literatures. Taittirīya-prātiśākhya (2.2) speaks of upward movement and stroke of the internal wind at the junction of *uras* and *kaṇṭha* for the purpose.⁴⁸ As per Pāṇinīyaśikṣā 6-7⁴⁹ on the other hand, action of *manas* and internal fire (*kāyāgni*) precedes that of the internal wind. The VP develops it further in a different way and records as many as three views in this respect in a verse, viz. *vāyor aṇūnām jñānasya śabdatvāpattir iṣyate* (VP 1.107). Thus, it is either the wind within or the smallest particle of sound or knowledge of something in the process of externalisation that gives rise to an articulation. VP admits action of the internal wind but reminds one of the fact that this action is possible if only there is already an idea of *śabda* (*śabdabhāvanā*) at the intellectual plane of the speaker.⁵⁰

Of the subsequent literature, the Bhāgavatapurāṇa comes out with another sequence of causes of articulation with Parameśvara (the supreme God), *śakti* (His power) *nāda*, *bindu* and *varṇa* coming one after the other while Saṅgītadāmodara sets *prāṇa* (cf. *mārutaḥ prāṇasaṃjñakaḥ*, i.e. life-breath), *vahni* (the fire within the body), conjunction of these two and *nāda* in succession. In Saṅgītadarpaṇa, however, *prāṇa* is preceded by *vahni* which again is preceded by *citta* and *ātman* so that the sequence runs as follows: *ātman* → *citta* → *vahni* → *prāṇa* → *nāda*. Interestingly, *nāda* is graded here in five phases, viz. *atisūkṣma* (highly subtle), *sūkṣma* (subtle), *puṣṭa*, *apuṣṭa* and *kṛtrima*. Compared to *paśyantī nābhisaṃsthitā, hṛdisthā madhyamā jñeyā, vaikharī kaṇṭhadeśagā*, it presents a really interesting formulation, the root of which may be traced to the Kashmir Śaiva tradition in general and Abhinavagupta's writings in particular.

⁴⁵ *puṇyajanana-yogyatvaṃ sādḥutvaṃ, pāpajanana-yogyatvaṃ asādḥutvaṃ*. — Uddyota on Mbh 3.2.84.

⁴⁶ VP 1.154.

⁴⁷ *ubhayeṣāṃ avicchedād anyāśabdavivakṣayā, yo'nyāḥ prayujyate śabdo na so' rthasyābhidhāyakaḥ*. — VP 1.155.

⁴⁸ *vāyuśarīrasamīraṇāl kaṇṭhorasoḥ sandhāne*.

⁴⁹ *manaḥ kāyāgnim āhanti, sa prarayatī mārulam, mārulastūrasī caran mandraṃ janayati svaram*.

⁵⁰ *ādyāḥ karaṇavinyāsaḥ prāṇasyordhvaṃ samīraṇam, sthānānām abhigātaśca na vinā śabdabhāvanām*. — VP 1.122.

It transpires from the above that Bhartṛhari stands midway between tradition and innovations. He took into account all the horizontal and vertical stratification of *vāc* prevalent upto his time in formulating his philosophy of language. His commitment to *trayī vāc* (cf. *trayyā vācaḥ param padam* — VP 1.142) and still reference to the subtlest one as *parā vāg anapāyinī* have been duly construed and reconciled later on. Verily, contribution of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy of Kashmir Śaivism to admitting *parā* and *paśyanti* as two different strata was gracefully accommodated by his followers in the grammar school. Besides, acceptance of *sphoṭa* as the bearer of meaning beyond the physical features of *vāc* is another interesting area of language study in VP. It may be a really fascinating exercise to compare these levels of *vāc* with *deep structure* and *surface structure*, or, for that matter, *competence* and *performance* propounded in Noam Chomsky's scheme. Interestingly, an articulated *vāc* or its next subtle phase, viz. *madhyamānāda* is held responsible for revelation of *sphoṭa* and hence the revealed one can never be conceived of without any reference to the articulated form. One deep level structure on the other hand may come out with several surface structures and vice versa. As for competence and performance, the latter always falls short of the former. The problem was tackled in the VP in terms of a speaker's intention vis-a-vis his linguistic performance subsequently. To VP the *vāc* one articulates perfectly represents the mental image⁵¹ in the intending speaker's mind. That it may not corroborate the actual state of things is however a different question⁵² which grammarians do not bother about at all. Nor do they fight shy of propagating Bhartṛhari's theory of immutable *vāc* and efficacy of morphosyntactical analysis thereof at the interpretation level. This, in fact, helps VP in meeting all possible ends at different perspectives. Even a cursory glance at the age-old literature of dialectics developed over centuries in schools of Mimāṃsā, Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa and the like on many such issues would show how VP plays the pivot and may therefore be well designated in this respect as *pūrvāparau toyanidhī vagāhya sthitaḥ pṛthivyā iva mānadaṇḍaḥ*.

⁵¹ *sādhana-vyavahāraśca buddhyavasthānibandhanaḥ* (VP 3.7.3). Also cf. *nirūpate'rthe śabdaprayogād yāthānirūpaṇam śabdopapattiḥ*. —Helārāja on VP 3.7.3 and, *pūrvam artham vivakṣati, tato buddhau tam artham nirūpayati, tatas tadbodhānugūṇam śabdam prayuñkte*. — Ambākartrī on VP 3.7.3.

⁵² *vivakṣāprāpitarūpabhedādhīnaḥ... vāstave kārakavyavahāre na ghaṭanām eti*. — Helārāja on VP 3.7.90.

ABBREVIATIONS

Brh — Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad

J. — Jaimini-sūtra or Mīmāṃsā-sūtra

Mbh — Mahābhāṣya

NS — Nāṭyaśāstra

P — Pāṇini

RV — Ṛg-veda

ŚB. — Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa

Śr — Śabdārtharatna

TS — Taittirīya-saṁhitā

VP — Vākyapadīya

VBS — Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa-sāra, see Karunasindhu Das: *A Pāṇinian Approach to Philosophy of Language*.

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Vāk as Pratyavamarśa: Bhartṛhari from Abhinavan Perspective*

NAVJIVAN RASTOGI

Though the roots of the philosophy of word or speech, more popular as philosophy of language in contemporary parlance, go far deeper into the antiquity of Indian thinking, Bhartṛhari emerges as a philosopher par excellence whose contribution to the understanding of language, both at its factual as well as metaphysical levels, is immense. In word or *vāk* he finds primary essence of the ultimate reality, which permeates through all manifested phenomena. He, to borrow words from Padoux, “evolved an epistemology of speech, a philosophy of knowledge as relating to language and a metaphysics of language or sound.”¹ Central to it is Bhartṛhari’s famous assertion: “There is no cognition in the world in which the word does not figure. All knowledge is, as it were, intertwined with the word. If this eternal identity of knowledge and the word were to disappear, knowledge would cease to be knowledge; it is this identity which makes identification possible.”²

*Abhinavagupta here represents the whole tradition of monistic Śaivism of Kashmir. As such, a reference to him covers his teachers, specially Utpaladeva, also unless otherwise specified.

¹ Padoux, 1990.

² न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते । अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥

वाग्रूपता चेदुत्क्रामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती । न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥

Vāk 1, 115-116 (tr. Iyer’s).

We refer to Iyer’s edition throughout unless otherwise indicated. For translation, see Iyer 1965.

The nature of this word consists in *pratyavamarśa* which is considered necessary to the very structure of our linguistic experience and thought and constitutes the rock foundation of our day to day transactions. Bhartṛhari (BH) develops a sort of transcendentalism grounded in the Word-Absolute (Śabdatattva or Śabda-brahman).³ Iyer points out some obscurity with regard to the precise connotation of the term *pratyavamarśa* as understood and explained in the Grammar school and suggests exploring the same with the help from the Kashmir Śaiva monistic sources⁴ which shall, henceforward, be referred to as Kashmir Śaivism (KS).⁵

Contextually our reference point happens to be Vāk 1.115 (123), 116 (124),⁶ 118(126)⁷ and also a *kārikā*⁸ forming part of the Vṛtti on Vāk 1.118 (126) and treated by tradition, at least KS tradition, as forming part of the primary corpus of the Vākyapadiya. These are some of those rare verses or philosophical statements that have cast their spell on the whole spectrum of Indian thought and literature and have been profusely quoted. Even within the Grammatical tradition these *kārikās* have met with different treatment. Whatever the tradition, these *kārikās* – either jointly or singly, either in full or in part – have always generated serious intellectual excitement, whether by way of inspiration or by way of denunciation. However, the honour accorded to BH in the KS circles is somewhat extraordinary (barring one exception of which we will talk later) for a person from another tradition. He is always cited – when he is not being invoked directly – just next to the *āgamas* or as an *āgama* itself and invariably with an epithet exclusively reserved for him, i.e. *tatrabhavān* (“esteemed”). It is therefore not surprising when one sees foundational structure of Utpala’s and Abhinavagupta’s thought as emerging from the philosophical premises of BH.

These *kārikās*, including Vāk 1.116 (124) in particular, which form a cluster, are seminal to our understanding of the notion of *pratyavamarśa* in BH. The roadmap we propose to pursue here is first to arrive at the notion

³ अभेदपूर्वको भेदः – BH as quoted by Murti, 1963: 369.

⁴ Iyer 1969.

⁵ In fact, this connectivity between BH and KS was first noticed by Gopinath Kaviraj, and later by G N Shastri. Taking cue from Iyer, quite a few recent studies have come up with several insights on the subject notably by Bishnupada Bhattacharya, Padoux, Matilal, Coward, Torella — to name a few. This paper seeks to continue the effort further.

⁶ For first two *kārikās* see note 2 above.

⁷ सैषा संसारिणां संज्ञा बहिरन्तश्च वर्तते । तन्मात्रामव्यतिक्रान्तं चैतन्यं सर्वजातिषु ॥

⁸ अर्थक्रियासु वाक् सर्वान् समीहयति देहिनः । तदुत्क्रान्तौ विसंज्ञोऽयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुड्यवत् ॥

The *kārikā* is numbered 1.127 in the Poona edition of the Vākyapadiya ed. by Abhyankar and Limaye.

of *pratyavamarśa* that crystallizes in these *kārikās* and its ensuing implications. We then try to see how this notion and its logical corollaries are subjected to the microscopic analysis from the opposite end of the Buddhist logicians and Indian realists operating within the pre-set limits of these *kārikās* around the notion of *pratyavamarśa*. As a third step, how the ground is partly retrieved by the Śaiva Siddhāntins in developing their notion of *pratyavamarśa* pushes us to the final leg of our enquiry. Here our effort would be to understand how BH's basic approach of affirming identity of word and thought via *pratyavamarśa* is brought to near perfection with highly incisive analysis by the KS metaphysicians who share a good deal the āgamic and ritualistic background with the Siddhāntin.⁹

The word *pratyavamarśa* is ordinarily used in the sense of 'referring', 'reflecting', 'deliberating', or 'understanding' and the like. For instance '*saṃsargarūpameva pratyavamarśati*' occurring in the Vṛtti¹⁰ means "understands the connected form." Vṛṣabha though does not gloss the word, his explanation of his own usage *pratyavamarśati* by *pratipadyate* more or less carries the same sense, i.e., 'grasps/understands.'¹¹ *pratyavamarśa* is derived from *mṛś* 'to touch, handle.'¹² It is interesting that the Vṛtti uses the expression *saṃsprśanniva*¹³ (as if touching) which, going by the explanation of Vṛṣabha¹⁴ converges on *pratyavamarśa*. 'Touch' here means rendering the form of the word as an object of grasping which is not possible in the absence of the word. BH is analysing the process behind the picking up of a specific word in a particular sense and the listener understanding it

⁹ The term *pratyavamarśa* or its cognate *parāmarśa* and *vimarśa* are widely used in Indian philosophy with varying connotations. For Example, "In Nyāya, *parāmarśa* (लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम्) is the mental act through which one goes from the premise to the conclusion. This term, sometimes translated as 'subsumptive reflection', describes a logical process of inferential judgment implying a reflective act of synthesis bringing together two elements." (Padoux, 1990: 228; note 10). Padoux' views are taken from S. Kuppaswami, 1951: 188. It is however beyond our present scope to embark upon hermeneutical study of *pratyavamarśa*, with cognate words such as *parāmarśa*, *āmarśa* etc. in Indian philosophy which, otherwise, offers a very exciting area of research.

¹⁰ प्रविभक्तस्यापि चानुसंधानमन्तरेण अर्थक्रियाविषया प्रतिभा नोत्पद्यत इति पुनः संसर्गरूपमेव प्रत्यवमृशति। Vṛtti on Vāk 1.26, p. 75: 'But since an intuition leading to purposeful activity cannot take place without the reunification of what has been divided, one again *understands* the connected form" (tr. Iyer, 1965: 35).

¹¹ यदाह संसर्गरूपमेव इति ।प्रतिपत्तौ च योऽसमर्थः तमभिन्नं शब्दार्थमवगन्तुं स क्रमं प्रत्यवमृशति । यथाभिन्नपदार्थग्रहणासमर्थः प्रकृत्यादिविभागेनार्थं प्रतिपद्यते तथा वाक्यार्थमपि कश्चित् पदार्थानुगमेन । Paddhati, p. 76.

¹² मृश आमर्शने । आमर्शनं स्पर्शः । Dhātupāṭha.

¹³ यथैव प्रयोक्ता शब्दविशेषविषयं प्रयत्नमभिपद्यमानः प्रतिशब्दं परितः परिच्छिन्नान् शब्दात्मनः संस्पृशन्नैव मनः प्रणिधत्ते । Vṛtti on Vāk 1.53, p. 113.

¹⁴ संस्पृशन्नैव इति । ...संस्पृशो हि विषयभावगमनम् । यदा तु परितः परिच्छिन्नान् इति बुद्धेर्विभक्तान् संस्पृशन्नैव इत्यर्थः तथा वाक्यार्थं उपमीयते । यतो न तत्र शब्दः कुतः परिच्छेदः संस्पृशो वेति । Paddhati, ibid.

in that intended sense. When a user wants to utter a word he has to know its form clearly and for this his mind concentrates on it by isolating it from the existing mass of other words. He tries to touch all of them, though he cannot. Similarly the listener too grasps the form of word because of his habitual concentration on the understanding of meaning. Vṛṣabha underscores the fact that the word-form is not grasped as something separate because it is constitutive of the listener's cognitive judgment¹⁵ (*pratyavamarśapratyaya*). We come across one more usage of *pratyavamarśa* in the sense of determinate or definitive comprehension. In Vāk 1.86 BH tells us that though our knowledge is undifferentiated and devoid of forms it appears having forms because of its conditioning by the things it comes to know, like when one says 'five trees', 'twenty cows'. Vṛṣabha joins to say that it is because five or twenty items, though different in forms, are delimited by one single comprehension. In the comprehension relating to each of the objects to be known singly, we would have five judgments. Because our intellect does not have collective perception, there is no scope for taking them as forest etc. either. Vṛṣabha attributes it to the lack of *pracita* ("accumulative") *pratyavamarśa*.¹⁶

The kārikās 1.111, 1.113 and 1.114, specially the Vṛtti on them, seek to provide the requisite background and offer a pre-explanation for the core issues raised in the following kārikās. The main thrust of kārikā 1.111 lies in its demonstrating that difference between objects is perceived only when it is communicated through words. The other point that is emphasized by the kārikā is that a thing cognized by us becomes part of the worldly usage only when it is expressed by words. The cognition, as propounded by the Vṛtti¹⁷ and expounded by the Paddhati,¹⁸ involves three stages: "(1) to see a thing and to remember it as intertwined with its word (*smṛtinirūpaṇā*), (2) to cognize the identity between word and meaning (*abhijalpanirūpaṇā*), (3) to see it as connected with some action (*ākāranirūpaṇā*)."¹⁹

In order to highlight the close relationship that subsists between word and meaning figuring in a cognition the Vṛtti evolved a highly dense vocabulary conveying distinctive nature of each of the several aspects involved.²⁰ Thus the three aspects, which successively explain each other, relating to the word are: *samsarga* (connection/union), *anuvedha*

¹⁵ यतः प्रत्यवमर्शप्रत्ययोऽयं तत्र निमित्तीकरणम् । स त्वर्थक्रियाभ्यासात् व्याक्षिप्तः परिच्छिन्दन्निव प्रत्यवमृशति । Paddhati, p. 113.

¹⁶ ततश्च प्रचितवस्तुप्रत्यवमर्शाभावः । अथैकबुद्धिस्तानेकतया गृह्णाति, वनादिविभागाप्रतिपत्तिः । Paddhati on Vāk 1.86, p. 152.

¹⁷ सविज्ञानपदनिबन्धनो हि सर्वोऽर्थः स्मृतिनिरूपणयाऽभिजल्पनिरूपणयाऽऽकारनिरूपणया च निरूप्यमाणो व्यवहारपदमवतरति । Vṛtti on 1.111, p. 182.

¹⁸ सर्व एते शब्दानुविद्धा व्यवहाराङ्गं न स्वलक्षणरूपेण इति । एतावान् हि सर्वोऽर्थः सदैव निरूपितो व्यवहाराङ्गमिति । Paddhati, ibid.

¹⁹ Iyer 1965: 107, note.

²⁰ भेदानर्थः शब्दशक्तिसंस्पृष्टया शब्दानुविद्धया शब्दात्मिकया बुद्ध्या प्रकाशयत उपगृह्यते स्वीक्रियते । Vṛtti on 1.111, p. 183.

(penetration/intertwining/impregnation) and *ātmātā* (identification) and those relating to the meaning, similarly, are: *prakāśana* (illumination), *upagraha* (determination) and *svīkāra* (integration/acceptance). Thus the Vṛtti concludes that the meaning is illuminated, determined and integrated with the cognition which is intimately connected with the power of the word, intertwined with the word and has the form of the word. Thus concludes Vṛṣabha: The cognition is of the form of word and word is of the form of meaning.²¹ As a major pivot of linguistic absolutism the next kārikā, i.e., 1.113, proclaims that all knowledge of purposeful activity takes its root in the word. Even the newborn infant, with no access to the linguistic usage, has such a knowledge due to residual tendencies from the former birth.²² The Vṛtti adds that the word performs two important functions. In the first place, it renders even the existent appear as non-existent if it were not covered by the linguistic usage and even the absolutely non-existent (that is, fictitious) appear as actually existent, endowed with the primary existence as it were, if they are conveyed by the linguistic usage. By implication BH brings in his notion of the secondary existence, *upacāra-sattā*, which he considers the real domain of language as against the primary existence, *mukhya-sattā*, enjoyed by the things in our daily activities.²³ This explains why we have no difficulty in using the expression and grasping its meaning such as 'barren woman's son' or 'hare's horn'. In the second place, the Vṛtti explains the reason behind this innate capacity of language which enables one to cognize even the vague words in the course of pursuing respective purposeful activities. It is due to the latent tendencies one carries from the previous births, where the definitive cognition 'enters' or 'penetrates' the very being of the word whose recurrent usage generates a linguistic trace. Attention needs to be drawn to the very significant use of the term *āveśa*, 'penetration', implying an extremely fine linguistic infusion of the cognition.²⁴ The whole thrust, as summed up by Vṛṣabha, is that in our worldly life we exclusively deal with the forms of the object as presented or constructed by the word, factual existence or non-existence of a thing being simply inconsequential.

²¹ यत उपगृहीतार्थाकारशब्दरूपा सा बुद्धिः । Paddhati on Vāk 1.111, p. 183.

²² इतिकर्तव्यता लोके सर्वा शब्दव्यपाश्रया । यां पूर्वाहितसंस्कारो बालोऽपि प्रतिपद्यते । Vāk 1.113.

²³ सदपि वाग्व्यवहारेणानुपगृहीतमर्थरूपमसता तुल्यम् । अत्यन्तासच्च . . . वाचा समुत्थाप्यमानं मुख्यसत्तायुक्तमिव तेषु तेषु कार्येषु प्रत्यवभासेत । Vṛtti on the above, p. 186.

²⁴ समाविष्टवाचां च स्वजातिषु बालानामपि पूर्वशब्दावेशभावनासंस्काराधानात् । Vṛtti on 1.113, pp. 186-187; cf. समावेशः सूक्ष्मवाग्नूपाशुषङ्गः । पूर्वशब्दावेश इति ॥ शब्दपरिच्छेदी प्रत्ययः अनुप्रविष्ट इव शब्दम् । Paddhati, ibid.

Slightly digressing from the main theme it may be hypothesized that this notion of linguistic *samāveśa* could have been one of the potent sources of later KS soteriological notion of *samāveśa*.

Kārika 1.114 and the Vṛtti thereon technically designated this beginningless²⁵ residual linguistic trace as *śabdabhāvanā* which is found in every living individual as a mental seed and does not require any human effort to produce it. It serves to awaken the intuitive grasp of the word-meaning and to provoke the spontaneous response in the wake of such an intuitive understanding. Thus speaker and listener both have intuitive grasp.²⁶

One is fairly equipped now to appreciate *śabdānuvedha* doctrine so powerfully enunciated in kārikā 1.115.²⁷ Here BH rules out possibility of cognition, at empirical level,²⁸ without penetration by, or intertwining with, the word. Apparently both the lines would seem to be tautologous, but reading with Vṛṣabha they actually indicate two distinct cognitive situations,²⁹ namely the indeterminate and the determinate. In the former, for the absence of any expressive word as circumscribing the meaning, the verbal element only inheres (*anugama* glossed as *anuvṛtti*), whereas the later, i.e., determinate cognition, which has reached the level of practical verbal use, is pierced by the word, i.e., virtually becomes one with the word. These are the two stages of the 'word-association' (*śabdānuṣaṅga*). Vṛṣabha derives his formulation from the Vṛtti.³⁰ As BH posits the invariable presence of word in every cognition, he is supposed to explain verbality of the indeterminate percept because there is hardly any scope for the presence of word. According to BH the contracted word-potentiality (*śabdabhāvanā*) is very much there, but because everything stands merged back into it no verbal usage can take place in regard to the object figuring in the indeterminate knowledge. For instance, when some one, in a hurry to reach one's destination, walks quickly without noticing grass, clods of earth etc. on the route it cannot be said that there has been no knowledge because no usage has taken place. That such a cognition has undoubtedly taken

²⁵ The grammarian calls it *vyavasthānityatā*, *pravṛttinītyatā* or *vyavahāranītyatā*:

नित्यत्वे कृतकत्वे वा तेषामादिर्न विद्यते । प्राणिनामिव सा चैषा व्यवस्थानित्यतोच्यते ॥ Vāk 1.28;

सा चैयमनादिरविच्छिन्ना प्रवृत्तिनित्यता । Vṛtti on the above, p. 84; तथा शब्दव्यवहारशून्यो न लोकोऽस्ति । सर्वथा च व्यवहारस्य अविच्छेदात्तदध्यवसायानुवृत्तेर्व्यवहारनित्यतेत्याह । Paddhati, ibid.

BH and Vṛṣabha derive this view from the Mahābhāṣya, see M.BH on Vā. 1 in Paspāśāhnikā.

²⁶ अनादिश्चैषा शब्दभावना प्रतिपुरुषमवस्थितज्ञानबीजपरिग्रहा । Vṛtti on 1.114, I, p. 187; cf. प्रतिभोद्घाटनमात्रमेव शब्दाः कुर्वन्ति । . . उपदेष्ट्यापि प्रतिभोद्घटनेन तामेवानुगच्छति । Paddhati, p.187.

²⁷ Note 2 above.

²⁸ At the metaphysical level there is no scope for piercing or penetration by the word (*śabdānuvedha*), because at that stage it is only the Word-Absolute that subsists, rest of the creation having merged back into it. Mark the word *loke* in the kārikā.

²⁹ सर्वस्मिन् ज्ञाने शब्दानुगमः, केवलमनुवृत्तिः क्वचिद् यथा निमित्तशून्यवस्तुग्राहिणि ज्ञाने, लब्धवृत्तिः क्वचिद् यथा तदुत्तम(?) भाविषु । तमेवानुषङ्गमाह । Paddhati, p. 188.

³⁰ यथास्य संहतरूपा शब्दभावना तथा ज्ञेयेष्वर्थेषु उत्पन्नेनाप्यविकल्पेन ज्ञानेन कार्यं न क्रियते । Vṛtti, ibid.

place is proved at the time of recurrence of this knowledge when the latent word-seed is aroused and (the denotative) powers of word, which are restricted to their specific meanings, become manifested. It is only then that the object is formulated in a form of its own and embraced by the knowledge which is intertwined with the word. Vṛṣabha says the formulation of a clear objective form (*ākriyamāṇaḥ*) is the direct outcome of word-piercing (*śabdānuviddhena*) which is as good as saying that object is accepted or affirmed by the knowledge (*upagṛhyamāṇaḥ*).³¹ Following the powers of the word,³² when the object 'comes within the range of clear cognition' (*jñānānugataḥ*, tr. Iyer), only then the object, whose clear image is now cast on the cognition, is accorded a designation and is stated to be cognized.³³ What is to be noted here is that the word *jñāna* (cognition or knowledge), as per Vṛṣabha stands for *pratyavamarśa*.³⁴ According to a section of the grammarians, even sleep is marked by the flow of such cognitions

³¹ Vṛṣabha interprets *śabdānuviddhena* as *śabdoparaklena*, meaning thereby that penetration by the word is total in the sense that the cognition takes on the colour of the word suppressing its own. That is why the knowledge toes the dictates of the power of the word (*śabdaśaktyanupātīnā*: Paddhati, p. 189).

³² '*śabdaśakti*' is used twice (in *śabdānām śaktiṣu* and *śaktyanupātīnā*). In the first place it means 'fitness or capacity to yield meaning' (*arthanirūpaṇayogyatā*) and in the second it means 'propounding or conveying the meaning' (*arthapratipādana*). The idea is: In the first instance, the power of word, when manifested, becomes instrument through which knowledge describes (*nirūpayati*) the object in its universal mode. This description accordingly takes the form 'this'. Whereas in the second instance, once this power has been exercised it, confined as it is to the particular word, grasps the object in more concrete terms capable of usage at the practical plane by describing it as 'This is cow', 'This is horse': ज्ञानविशिष्टः शब्दभावनाशक्त्यः इदन्तया अर्थानामुपग्रहे भानस्य निमित्तं भवन्ति । ...अर्थनिरूपणयोग्यता शब्दस्य शक्तिरित्युक्ता । ...शब्दस्य शक्तिरर्थप्रतिपादनम्, तदुपदर्शनेऽर्थरूपप्रतिपत्तेः, गौरयमश्वोऽयमिति । Paddhati, ibid.

³³ शब्दानां प्रत्यर्थनियतासु शक्तिषु शब्दानुविद्धेन शक्त्यनुपातिना ज्ञानेनाक्रियमाण उपगृह्यमाणो वस्त्वात्मा ज्ञानानुगतो व्यक्तरूपप्रत्यवभासो जायत इत्यभिधीयते । Vṛtti on Vāk 1.115, p. 189.

Matilal (1990: 4-5) does not find Iyer's translation of this portion very clear and interprets in somewhat different manner pronouncing this sentence of the Vṛtti as 'most baffling'. He divides it into five parts:

"(a) For example, when one walks quickly and touches grass and pebbles, a (tactile) awareness arises. (b) But even though such an awareness arises (*saty api jñāne*) that is indeed a unique or a vague (*kācid eva*) state of cognition in which (*yasyām*) an object's nature (*vastvātmā*) is said to be cognized (*jñāyate ity abhidhīyate*) provided the object is tinged with awareness (*jñānānugata*) and its explicit form shines forth (*vyaktarūpapratyavabhāsa*). (c) This state (of cognition) contains the ready or about-to-sprout (*abhimukhibhūta*) seed of the residual traces of Language (*śabdabhāvanābīja*). (d) There are two types of words, articulate words that are speakable and the non-articulate that are unspeakable (*ākhyeyarūpāṇām anākhyeyarūpāṇām ca śabdānām*). (e) And there arises denotative power of the words regulated by each denotatum (*pratyarthanīyatāsu śaktiṣu*) while the object is picked out (*upagṛhyamāṇa*) and given a form (*ākriyamāṇa*) by that cognition which is impregnated with words (*śabdānuviddhena*) and empowered with that denotative power (common to the words) (*śaktyanupātīnā*)."

³⁴ ज्ञानानुगतः इति । प्रत्यवमर्शज्ञानेन । व्यक्तरूप इति । व्यक्तरूपः प्रत्यवभासोऽस्मिन् । इदं तदिति व्यपदेशयत्वात् । Paddhati, p. 189.

which one experiences in the waking state—the only difference is that the seeds of linguistic residual traces have a very subtle functioning in that state.³⁵ Thus the consciousness always remains mixed up with the word and constitutes both the cause and effect of the manifested word.³⁶

Helārāja adds another dimension to our understanding of the *kārikā*, employing it to explain the notion of superimposition (*adhyāsa*). He notes that there is superimposition of the word upon the meaning not only in case of the hearer but also in case of the speaker. The knowledge too is conveyed by *adhyāsa*. Thus when one utters the word *ghaṭa*, there is fusion of all the three things – the word, the meaning and the speaker's intention—in our understanding.³⁷ Helārāja refers to the Mahābhāṣya where the question *gaurityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ* is asked to isolate the own form of the word from this complex knowledge. Even the cognition of the new-born baby (cf. Vāk. 1.113) is found mixed up with the word because of its innate proneness for convention.³⁸ Thus whether there obtains relation of fitness or causality, it boils down to superimposition in either case. Hence superimposition alone is primary.³⁹

The later commentators suggest that the idea of inalienable relation between word and meaning was first formulated by Pāṇini and there has been continuing discussion over the issue.⁴⁰ Pāṇini's famous aphorism *svāmī rūpam śabdasya aśabdasaṃjñā* (Pā 1.1.68) and several *vārttikas* of Kātyāyana aided by the Mahābhāṣya squarely propound that it is through conveying the own form first, that the word conveys its meaning, except those words that are designated as *saṃjñā* (technical names). It is outside the scope of the present paper to dwell on this debate, yet it may be of interest to refer to some pertinent observations. Helārāja suggests that the worldly usage is of the nature of reflective mutuality between the cognitions of the speaker and the listener. For instance when one utters 'bring the cow,' speaker's intention 'I am deputing you to bring the cow' is also conveyed over and

³⁵ Vṛtti, p. 189.

³⁶ तदेतत् संज्ञानं शब्दप्रकृतिविकारभावेन आविर्भावतिरोभावावजस्रं प्रत्यनुभवति । Vṛtti, p. 190.

³⁷ तथा च ज्ञानमप्यध्यासेनैव शब्दः प्रतिपादयति वक्त्रवगतमिति तत्रापि परमार्थदृशाध्यास एव संबन्धः । लोलीभूतानि शब्दार्थज्ञानानि घट इत्येवमवगम्यन्ते । यथोक्तं 'न सोऽस्ति प्रत्यय . . .' इत्यादि । Prakīrṇa on Vāk, III. 3.1, p. 126.

³⁸ अत एव 'गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः' इति प्रश्नः । तदर्हजातस्याप्ययमेव शब्दसंभेदः । Ibid.

³⁹ तदहर्जातस्याप्ययमेव शब्दसंभेदः । सङ्केतसहत्वात् । एवं च कृत्वा तात्पर्यदृशाध्यास एव योग्यतायां कार्यकारणभावे च फलतः संबन्धोऽवतिष्ठति इति स एव मुख्यः । ज्ञानस्यैव च परस्परसङ्क्रान्तिर्व्यवहार इति शब्देन स्वरूपाध्यस्तं ज्ञानमपि . . . शब्दपूर्वकमेव प्रतिपद्यते । Ibid.

It may be hypothetically suggested that Helārāja represented the new generation grammarian who under the impact of Kashmir Śaivism introduced and nurtured the doctrine of superimposition. However, this is an issue for investigation by the future scholarship.

⁴⁰ For instance, see Uddyota on M.Bṛ, I, p. 549 on Pā 1.1.68; Śabdakaustubha, p. 4; Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣā, Pt.1, p. 520, p. 653; Padavākyaaratnākara, pp. 211-12.

above the word-meaning. Similarly the hearer understands 'I am being asked to bring the cow, so I should bring it,' again over and above the word-meaning. But both these sentence-meanings are communicated through words alone. In this context he refers to the Vārttika *na vā śabdapūrvako hyarthe saṁpratyayaḥ*⁴¹ While explaining this Vārttika Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa cites this kārikā and says that in our cognition the word figures as the attribute, while the meaning figures as the substantive. Likewise while commenting upon the Vārttika *mantrādyarthamiti cecchāstrasāmarth-yādarthagateḥ siddham*, Bhāṣyakāra raises a doubt: If *mantra* is at par with *śabdasaṁjñā*, *mantra* will not convey its own form and as such it will be difficult to get at the meaning of *mantra*. Elaborating his explanation in order to dispel this fear Bhāṣyakāra says that he sees no difficulty in understanding the meaning of the *mantra* which is available due to its concomitance with the ritual activities prescribed by the scripture as accompanying the *mantra*.⁴² During the course of his commentary on it Kaiyaṭa invokes the word-penetration doctrine of BH,⁴³ extending the scope of the kārikā by pointing out to its translinguistic religious dimension.

In his celebrated article on *pratibhā*, Gopinath Kavirāj (1984: 14-15) interprets *pratyaya* (cognition) in the sense of knowledge as a mode which is never free from verbal associations (*śabdānugama*) for the simple reason that it has its genesis in the word. He is describing knowledge as a mode only to exclude eternal knowledge, which is the Supreme Word. Hence a thing which is knowable is also nameable. Both are bound by an eternal relation (*anādiyogyatā*). To him *loke* (worldly usage) implies modal consciousness. This consciousness is discursive and relative.⁴⁴ Thinking is the same as object. Naming and thinking are identical. Thinking constitutes the internal whereas object constitutes the external aspect.

Iyer (1969: 100) sees a lot of value in the kārikā. To him this kārikā offers *raison d'être* for BH's linguistic monism. The form this reasoning assumes is "all the manifestations of Brahman (every thing that we know of in the cosmos⁴⁵) are intertwined with the word and so it is concluded that their root cause, Brahman, must be of the nature of word." The kārika also

⁴¹ Vide Prakīrṇa, p. 126.

⁴² शास्त्रस्य सामर्थ्यादर्धस्य गतिर्भविष्यति । . . . मन्त्रादिसहचरितो योऽर्थस्य गतिर्भविष्यति, साहचर्यात् । M.BH., I, p. 550 (NS edition).

⁴³ साहचर्यं च शब्दानुविद्धस्यैव अर्थस्य अवगमकम् । Pradīpa. Uddyota clarifies: शब्दानुविद्धस्यैवेति । 'न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमाद्' इति हर्षकैरिति भावः । Ibid.

⁴⁴ Kaviraj insists that Grammarians do not admit what is ordinarily known as *nirvikalpa vṛttijñāna*. Though they do admit indeterminate consciousness but not as indeterminate psychosis which distinguishes them from Vedāntins.

⁴⁵ *loke* is understood to mean both 'worldly transactions' as well as 'cosmos.'

provides two arguments in support of its main premise as to why this cosmos should be of the nature of word. The argument may be worded as under:

- (i) One cannot know an object through a word without knowing the word itself first.
- (ii) One's verbal cognition of a jar takes the form of an identity. This leads one to conclude that the object is not really different from the word.

The next *kārika*, i.e., 1.116, sees transfiguration of 'word-intertwining' into *pratyavamarśa*. This is what makes this *kārikā* extremely important. BH lays down four premises – (i) identity with word (*vāgrūpatā*, 'being of the nature of word') is the eternal essence of knowledge, (ii) the nature of word consists in its capacity to reflect, to be aware of or to identify (*pratyavamarśinī*), (iii) illumination (*prakāśa*) and cognition (*avabodha*) are one, and (iv) the illumination-episode itself derives from word's capacity to identify. The obvious corollary has also been stated: In the absence of word as its essence, knowledge would lose its very signification.

'Identity with word' (*vāgrūpatā*) is understood by Vṛṣabha as 'presence/inherence of the form of the word' (*śabdākārānugama*).⁴⁶ The Vṛtti in the opening sentence itself distinguishes *prakāśa* from consciousness and identifies it with knowledge. *prakāśa* has two dimensions. One, it manifests itself,⁴⁷ as pointed out by Vṛṣabha, and two, it illumines others,⁴⁸ as noted by the Vṛtti, although in a negative formulation. In order to explain what he understands by *pratyavamarśinī* in his delineation of *vāgrūpatā*, BH offers two sets of illustrations, one concerning the indeterminate experience and other the determinate. The first set relates to the instances of deep sleep,⁴⁹ indeterminate perception and remembrance respectively and the second to the determinate comprehension of a sentence-meaning from a set of words. Even in deep sleep the association with the word (now described as *vāgdharma*, 'word-property') persists in a subtle form, that is, *śabda-bhāvanā* remains unmanifest (*alabdhavṛtti* – Vṛṣabha). In the indeterminate cognition or first ever cognition of a thing, for that matter, the external object is apprehended very vaguely because the special characteristics of an external object are not apprehended. As such the first cognition presents ('illumines' – Vṛṣabha) the object as a mere thing by referring to it in non-specific generalized terms as 'this' or 'that'. At this stage, in the words of Vṛṣabha, *śabda-bhāvanā* though present remains

⁴⁶ Cf. Paddhati, p. 190.

⁴⁷ प्रकाशस्य स्वप्रकाशताख्यो व्यापारः । Ibid.

⁴⁸ प्रकाशः पररूपमनङ्गीकुर्वन् . . . न व्यवतिष्ठते । Vṛtti on the above, p. 191.

⁴⁹ याप्यसञ्चेतितावस्था । Ibid; Iyer takes it to refer to sleep (1965: 111). An unconscious state may be either deep sleep or stillness (*staimitya*). For Matilal (1990) it covers 'such states as lack of ostensible mental activity.'

unmanifest, since it is practically non-functional. In remembrance the situation almost remains the same. When the seeds of such a cognition are rekindled, the previous indistinct cognition figures as a bare outline taking the form 'this is a verse or a piece of song which I heard earlier'. Here Vṛṣabha's remark is very pertinent. He says that what is revived is only a sensation and not its indistinct objective counterpart.⁵⁰ BH seems to bring it to our notice that knowledge always relates to an episode, which necessarily has an objective reference irrespective of the fact whether it is capable of being perceived distinctly or vaguely. The other point he insists is that even situations of faint or vague cognitions such as these are never free from word-association, howsoever subtle, otherwise knowledge would fail to discharge its essential function, i.e. to reveal the nature or form of the other,⁵¹ that is, the referent, which is grasped or received exactly the way it is expressed or conveyed by the word. Had it not been for identity with the word, Vṛṣabha goes to the extent of saying, the very usage such as 'reveals' or 'illuminates' as being the activity of *prakāśa* will be impossible.⁵² The concept of *pratyavamarśa* comes for a detailed treatment at this point⁵³ when BH proceeds to illustrate determinate cognition. The point at issue is the analysis of the process that is involved in one's comprehending the meaning of a statement or sentence from the group of words spoken to him.⁵⁴ At first one hears a series of words (forming a sentence). This leads to the cognition of meanings of words which are exclusive, non-cooperative and mutually uninvolved (*ātmāntarānātmanām*) as mere things (*vastumātrājñāne pratyavabhāsamāne*).⁵⁵ What follows next,⁵⁶ according to

⁵⁰ न विषयरूपस्य स्फुटस्य तदा स्फुरन्ति किन्तु संवेदनमात्रस्येति । Paddhati, p. 191.

⁵¹ वाग्रूपतायां चासत्यामुत्पन्नोऽपि प्रकाशः पररूपमनङ्गीकुर्वन् प्रकाशनक्रियासाधनरूपतायां न व्यवतिष्ठते । Vṛtti, p. 191.

⁵² विषयस्य विशिष्टं व्यपदेशयानुरूपं, वाग्रूपतायामसत्यां च (ज्ञा? नेन) न परिच्छिद्यते । वाग्रूपतानुषक्तस्य तद्रूपोपग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् । ततश्च प्रकाशयतीति व्यवहारो न स्यात् । क्रियानिबन्धनभावो न स्यात् । Paddhati, p. 191.

⁵³ A word of caution seems called for. The text of Paddhati on the *kārikās* in question, specially the present one, is unintelligible and corrupt at times despite Iyer's best possible critical edition available under the circumstances. There seems to be ambiguity and difference of approach, aided by dearth of supportive material, between BH and Vṛ and also other exponents alluded to, which makes the clearcut formulation difficult.

⁵⁴ वाक्यार्थविषयस्य पदार्थप्रत्ययवमर्शस्य प्रत्ययवाग्रूपानुषङ्गं दर्शयति । Paddhati, p. 191.

⁵⁵ भिन्नरूपाणां चानुपकारिणामात्मान्तरानात्मनामितरेतरस्य वस्तुमात्रज्ञाने प्रत्यवभासमाने । Vṛtti on Vāk 1.116, p. 191.

⁵⁶ Presentation of next steps depends on how we understand the text and whose analysis – BH's or Vṛ's – we follow. It is clear, despite the text not being ideal and unambiguous, that BH and Vṛ had different approach altogether as to the precise order involved in the various stages marking the post-indeterminate comprehension of the sentence-meaning from the words that form the sentence. The word *uttarakālam* in the Vṛtti seems to hold the key of both, confusion as well as resolution. BH seems to connect *uttarakālam* with the whole lot that follows, that is, *anusandhāna*, *pratyavamarśa* and *ekārthakāritva* in that order. In the following sentence, which repeats the whole process he re-endorses the stated order (*sā hyanusandadhānā*

the Vṛtti, is (i) mutual delimitation of word-meanings as understood from words (*anusandhāna*: unification),⁵⁷ (ii) definite identification of meanings sensed from words by giving a shape as such and such (*pratyavamarśa*: judgment),⁵⁸ (iii) their cooperation to accomplish one purpose, namely, production of a single unified meaning (*ekārthakāritvam*) and finally, (iv) realization of the indivisible unity of the individual sentence-meanings with the powers of the words (*avibhāgena śaktisamsargayogopagrahaḥ*). All this is rooted in the word (*vāk*) which constitutes its essence.

According to Vṛ there is transposition between the first two steps. Thus "the stages in the process, as understood by Vṛ, are: (i) the understanding of the word-meanings from the words, (ii) the identification of the meanings in a cognition intertwined with the word, (iii) the unification of these meanings by their mutual delimitation."⁵⁹ However,

pratyavamarśantī ca sarvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭe'pyarthakriyākāriṇī. By this logic, although unstated in words (such as *pūrvakālam*), BH takes *bhinnarūpāṇām.....pratyavabhāsamāne* as marking the prior phase (i.e., preceding the determinate).

On the other hand Vṛṣabha is at pains to assert his difference from his master. Between *anusandhāna* and *pratyavamarśa*, he reverses the order treating *pratyavamarśa* as 'preceding' (*pūrvakālabhāvinī ceyam avasthā*) and *anusandhāna* as 'following' or 'subsequent one' (*yadullarakālamiti/abhinnapadārtha-paricchedād ullarakālam/anusandhānam iti*). Vṛ seems so obsessed with his departure from his master that he leaves no occasion to underline this difference. During the course of his commentary on the present kārikā, he does so four times:

- (a) ततः तत्पूर्वकमनुसन्धानं भवति ।
- (b) प्रत्यवमर्शादिभेदमात्रानुसन्धानसंसर्गमात्रं न जहाति इति ।
- (c) ततो भेदेन प्रत्यवमृश्यानुसंधत इति ।
- (d) कथं प्रत्यवमर्शः कथं तत्पूर्वकमनुसन्धानमित्याह . . . ।

Besides, Vṛ also underscores the divergent approaches as to whether these constituted a unitary state of cognition or the cognition stratified into several stages. Again we are confronted with the Paddhati's far from happy condition. Vṛ's text reads as under:

ततोऽप्रतिस्नानवाक्याप्रत्ययादेकामितिकर्तव्यतां जनः । अन्ये त्वेकपरतां समीहन्ते । अन्ये त्वेतत्पदत्रयम् उत्तरोत्तरव्याख्यया व्याचक्षते ।

The first alternative is not intelligible. The second view seems to take it as one composite cognition. The third view takes the three terms as successive clarifications, implying an integrated cognition consisting of three stages marked by successively greater clarity. Vṛ is silent on his or his master's preference. However from the construction of the Vṛtti where *ullarakālam* (i.e., afterwards) covers all the three stages (also mark *hyanusandadhānā pratyavamarśantī ca* where the present participles formed with kṛt affixes *śatṛ* and *śānac* in the sense of 'the agent of the present time' underline continuity) one is led to deduce that BH takes it as an integrated state of cognition consisting of three stages in a figurative sense because the progressively increasing clarity does not mean real division. In Vṛ's case it has to be an ordered/stratified cognition because he clearly identifies *pratyavamarśa* as 'prior' and *anusandhāna* (coordination, unification) as 'posterior' states.

⁵⁷ पदेभ्योऽवगतानामर्थानां परस्परवच्छेदेन अवधारणमनुसंधानम् देवदत्तकर्तृकं गोकर्मकम्, देवदत्तः कर्तृत्वादि । Paddhati, p. 191.

⁵⁸ पदेभ्योऽनुभूतानामर्थानामाकारनिरूपणा । Ibid.

⁵⁹ Iyer 1965: 112, note 2.

VṚ is in total agreement with the Vṛtti in holding that the whole process of understanding sentence-meaning from the word-meanings is based on the fact that all knowledge has word as its nature.⁶⁰

The detailed treatment of the kārikā has been necessitated by the reason that the kārikā itself is devised to be BH's exegesis of *pratyavamarśa*. The tone of the kārikā set the whole agenda for the Vṛtti. It is why, even when in the earlier portion relating to the various instances of indeterminate perception no mention of *pratyavamarśa* is made by the Vṛtti or in the latter portion when a distinction of the sort is sought to be made out between various stages in broader terms, entire cognitive activity seems to consist of *pratyavamarśa* by virtue of its being of the nature of the word.

The divergence of approach seen between BH and VṚ is indicative of the ambiguity that prevailed in the rank and file of the grammarians as to the precise definition of terms like *pratyavamarśa*, *anusandhāna* etc. which prompted Iyer to underline this obscurity. However, the Vṛtti and the Paddhati have seriously taken up this challenge. VṚ's treatment offers a few insights into the nature of *pratyavamarśa*. His first comment is, as we understand, that *pratyavamarśa* is *nirūpaṇa*⁶¹ in its literal sense, i.e. giving a form or shape such as 'this' or 'that,' which is akin to *ākriyamāṇa* occurring in the Vṛtti on the previous kārikā. This is corroborated by his exegesis a little while later, where he says "*pratyavamarśa* consists in giving a shape to the meanings grasped from the words."⁶² The second comment he makes relates to the ontological chronology of *pratyavamarśa* vis-à-vis *anusandhāna* (coordination/unification). He is of considered view that it must take place before *anusandhāna*.⁶³ A little later, he uses another term for *pratyavamarśa*, evidenced by the context, that is *vāgruṇānuviddhapratyaya* (cognition intertwined with/penetrated by, word) which again is presented in terms of *nirūpaṇa* expressed as 'this' or 'that' and also refers to its ontic positioning.⁶⁴ VṚ's third comment relates to the reasoning behind this stand. It relates to the distinctive feature of the two notions. He relates *pratyavamarśa* with the consciousness of duality (*bheda*) and *anusandhāna* with that of unity (*samsarga*).⁶⁵ According to him unification takes place

⁶⁰ वाक्यार्थविषयस्य पदार्थप्रत्यवमर्शस्य प्रत्ययवाग्रूपानुषङ्गं दर्शयति । Paddhati, p. 191.

⁶¹ प्रत्यवमर्शिनी इति । या निरूप्यते तया । यतः शब्दानुगममन्तरेण न प्रत्यवमर्शः । Paddhati, p. 190. There seems to be some ambiguity with regard to the phrase या निरूप्यते तया. Perhaps यया निरूप्यते सा would be better.

⁶² प्रत्यवमर्श इति । पदेभ्योऽनुभूतानामर्थानामाकारनिरूपणा । Ibid., p. 191.

⁶³ पूर्वकालभाविनी चेयमवस्था । ततो ह्यनुसन्धानमिति अनुसन्धानकालमाह । Ibid.

⁶⁴ पदेभ्योऽवसितानर्थान् यदेदं तदिति वाग्रूपानुविद्धेन प्रत्ययेन निरूपयति ततः तत्पूर्वकम् अनुसन्धानं भवति । Ibid., p. 192.

There is some doubt as to the interpretation of यदेदं तदिति. Is it यदा इदं तद् इति or is it यदा इदम् (इति) तद् इति? Iyer seems to prefer second interpretation. We have followed him.

⁶⁵ प्रत्यवमर्शादिभेदमात्रानुसंधानसंसर्गमात्रां न जहातीति । ततो भेदेन प्रत्यवमर्शश्च अनुसंधते । Paddhati, p. 192.

only after differentiation. Once again he poses a question that if purposeful activity is indivisible what is the point in sequencing between *pratyavamarśa* and *anusandhāna* on the basis of differentiation and unification respectively.⁶⁶ He explains diversification, dualizing, as 'abstraction due to the power of the word' and *saṁsarga* as 'connection', 'unification'.⁶⁷ Thus *pratyavamarśa*, as understood in the light of VR, has two dimensions. As *vāgrūpatā* it has broader perspective and subsumes all stages⁶⁸ and as the unified cognition characterized by difference-consciousness it has concept-specific dimension.⁶⁹

The next *kārikā* 1.118 (126) (or should we say the two *kārikās*, including the one cited in the Vṛtti) makes a radical departure from *kārikā* 1.116 (124) which distinguished consciousness from knowledge. Now this *kārikā* makes strong assertion of oneness of consciousness⁷⁰ with 'being of the nature of word.' This being so, the fact of 'having the nature of *vāk*' constitutes the differentium between⁷¹ the sentient and the insentient. VR utilizes this opportunity to exegete 'persistence of identity with *vāk*' (*vāgrūpatānugamaḥ*) in terms of *pratyavamarśa*. There are no new elements in the definition except a little more emphasis that *pratyavamarśa* is nothing but the intrinsic association with the word-being which is responsible for the identification or delimitation of the individual meanings.⁷² This is what, VR says, provides the basis for designating one as sentient and other as

⁶⁶ ननु तस्याभिन्नत्वात् कथं प्रत्यवमर्शः कथं तत्पूर्वकमनुसंधानमित्याह भेदशक्त्यपोद्धारकल्पनया । Paddhati, p. 192.

⁶⁷ भेदः शक्त्यपोद्धारः । संसर्गोऽप्यनुसंहतिरूपता । ibid.

⁶⁸ सा ह्यनुसंधाना प्रत्यवमृशन्ती च सर्वविशेषणविशिष्टेऽप्यर्थक्रियाकारिणि प्रत्यये शक्त्यपोद्धारकल्पनया भेदसंसर्गमात्रं न विजहाति । Vṛtti, p. 192.

⁶⁹ We may just make a passing reference to the following *kārika*, or the intervening *kārikā* (i.e. 1.117 (125) between 1.116 (124) and 1.118 (126) as it does not make part of the famous cluster we are dealing with. The *kārikā* reads:

सा सर्वविद्याशिल्पानां कलानां चोपनिबन्धनी । तद्वशादभिनिष्पन्नं सर्वं वस्तु विभज्यते ॥

[It is this which is the basis of all the sciences, crafts and arts. Whatever is created due to this can be analysed and communicated. – Iyer's translation 1965: 112.] Vṛtti makes some points. One, all creative human and sub-human activity is traced to word as its essence. *vāgrūpatā* is here equated with intellect (*vidyādayaśca vāgrūpāyām buddhau nibaddhāḥ*). Two, word-essence as source of the intellectual activity and creative arts is transconventional which is evident from the element of will that is generated in the wake of the prompter's urging and the prompted's readiness to execute in situations such as making of a jar: घटादीनां चाभिनिष्पादने प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकानामुपदेशसमीहादि सर्वं वाग्रूपतानुसारेण प्रकल्पते । Vṛtti, p. 192. Three (as explained by VR.), all creative activity is externalization of the internal whether one holds the internal as already subsisting or instantly created: अभिनिष्पन्नम् इति । वाग्रूपतावशादन्तस्तन्निष्पन्नं वस्तु पश्चाद् विभज्यते बहोरूपेण क्रियते । यद्वा निष्पन्नमपि वस्तु । Paddhati on 1.117, p. 192. That is, all creation – as in the case of word – is expression, that is, communication.

⁷⁰ तन्मात्रामव्यतिक्रान्तं चैतन्यं सर्वजातिषु ॥ Vāk. 1.118 (126) cd.

⁷¹ योऽयं चैतन्ये वाग्रूपतानुगमस्तेन लोके ससंज्ञो विसंज्ञ इति व्यपदेशः क्रियते । Vṛtti, p. 193.

⁷² यो विशिष्टाकारपरिच्छेदकेन वाग्रूपानुषङ्गेण प्रत्यवमर्शेण प्रत्ययो व्यवहारः । तेन अतः । ससंज्ञः तदभावात् विसंज्ञः । Paddhati, p. 193.

insentient, as alive or as dead. In fact, Vṛ points out that *pratyavamarśa* causes cognition which is another name for worldly discourse. *vyavahāra*, really speaking, is interaction between two or more, which is based on communication which in turn stems from our precise formulation of word-meanings. Thus, BH goes to the extent of seeing the word as pervading even our internal space of psychic experiences as well as outer space of day to day purposeful activities.⁷³ Another point of importance to which BH's Vṛtti draws attention happens to be that the mark of consciousness lies in the sentient being's capacity to know (*sambodha*).⁷⁴ An insentient being is incapable of knowing. All the living or sentient beings fall under two categories – the stationary (*sthāvara*) who are able to know themselves alone and the human beings (this includes all living species capable of moving—*jaṅgama*)⁷⁵ who are endowed with the capacity to know both, themselves as well as others. The latter capacity means both, as Iyer would have it, knowing others as well as making others know.

Since the word and consciousness are regarded as homologous concepts, the Vṛtti allows some insight into the nature of consciousness. It appears that in BH's school consciousness is considered to be a dynamic principle, hence consciousness is always referred to as 'activity of consciousness' (*citikriyā*) or 'activity in the nature of consciousness' to be more precise. But there is no unanimity with regard to the nature and extent of closeness between the word and the consciousness.⁷⁶ One view regards them quite close, maintaining that the activity of consciousness is intimately linked with the powers of the word. But, points out Vṛ, this closeness is not close enough to culminate into identity. Hence, on this view, consciousness lacks the word as its defining essence.⁷⁷ The contrarian view, on the other hand, reduces the activity of consciousness to the Word-Principle, which according to Vṛ is the Supreme Word itself. The latter view is the upholder of non-dualism and, it appears that this was BH's natural preference.⁷⁸ Perhaps this consciousness-word equation was overcoded by

⁷³ वायूपानुषङ्ग एव पदार्थानां समीहनं चेष्टनं भवति इति वाचैव युक्ताः प्राणिनः चेष्टन्ते । Paddhati, p. 193.

⁷⁴ नहि सा चैतन्येनाविष्टा जातिरस्ति यस्यां स्वपरसंबोधो यो वाचा नानुगम्यते । Vṛtti, p. 193.

⁷⁵ स्वसंबोधानुगम एव स्थावरेषु, उभयानुगमो जङ्गमेषु मनुष्यादिषु इति । Paddhati, p. 193.

⁷⁶ तस्माच्चित्तिक्रियारूपम् अलब्धवाक्शक्तिपरिग्रहं न विद्यते । वाक्तत्वरूपमेव चित्तिक्रियारूपमित्यन्ये । Vṛtti, p. 193.

⁷⁷ अलब्ध इति । वायूपानुषङ्गोपलम्भराहित्यम् । तदेव भेदः चैतन्यवाचोः । Paddhati, p. 193.

It is interesting to note that Vṛ reads (चित्ति ?) क्रियानुरूपम् for चित्तिक्रियारूपम् in the Vṛtti and glosses the same as चैतन्यक्रियानुरूपम्. This reading supports the duality-doctrine as *anurūpa* means 'similar' or 'like'. We may also add that this view, in all probability, is precursor of the Śaiva Dualist's theory of speech.

⁷⁸ अन्ये त्वभेदमेव मन्यन्ते इत्याह वाक्तत्वं इति । परं शब्दं ब्रूमः । Paddhati, pp. 193-194.

the later grammarians such as Helārāja to identify *parāmarśa* (i.e., *pratyavamarśa*) with the Parā Vāk endowed with agential functionality.⁷⁹

BH's foundational concept of word as *pratyavamarśa* has elicited square refutation from the other end of Indian philosophy namely the Buddhist logicians. Incidentally for Buddhists too it is a premium notion but with altogether different formulation leading to the opposite conclusion. For Buddhist, reality consists of unique particulars, point instants, which have no synthesis and no word-element, whereas our day-to-day empirical world is a constructed reality inhabited by the stream of particulars, logically synthesized. These unique particulars are directly perceived by pure sensation, that is, indeterminate perception, as bare mental reflex (*pratibhāsa*). The mentally constructed reality is apprehended by *adhyavasāya*, i.e., judgement, which is synthetic and is capable of coalescing with the word or designation. Thus, it is through indeterminate perception that we apprehend reality whereas our determinate knowledge lands us into a kind of illusion.

Now it is the infusion of word or designation, *abhilāpa* in the Buddhist parlance, that converts pure sensation into the determinately constructed knowledge. Perception (or the indeterminate knowledge) is defined by Dharmakīrti as knowledge bereft of construction (*kalpanā*),⁸⁰ and *kalpanā*⁸¹ is defined as "distinct cognition of a mental reflex which is capable of coalescing with a verbal designation."⁸² This coalescing of mental reflex with the corresponding words (*abhilāpasamsarga*) is what is generally understood by word-meaning convention (*vācyavācakabhāva*). According to Dharmakīrti's formulation, as interpreted by Dharmottara, not only those mental reflexes that are accompanied by their designating words but also those that are capable of being so accompanied are all included in *kalpanā*. This will include the mental construction of even a newly born baby.⁸³ We may ask how we ascertain that this is mental fabrication? Because it is not produced by the object (point instant) actually apprehended, says the Buddhist. At this point the notion of *pratyavamarśa*, 'synthetic judgement', is brought in: An infant stops crying and sucks his mother's breast only when a synthesis is generated that this breast is the one which he fed upon previously.⁸⁴ Dharmottara, as per Durveka's explanation, emphasizes that

⁷⁹ परामर्शस्य परवागात्मनः कर्तृभूम्युपाख्यस्य | Prakīrṇa, p. 125.

⁸⁰ तत्र प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढमन्तम् । Nyāya-bindu, 1.4.

⁸¹ अभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यप्रतिभासा प्रतीतिः कल्पना । Ibid., 1.5.

⁸² Stcherbatsky, 1962: 19.

⁸³ Cf. ibid., p. 20.

⁸⁴ कुतः पुनरेतद्विकल्पोऽर्थान्नोत्पद्यत इति? अर्थसंनिधिनिरपेक्षत्वात् । बालोऽपि हि यावद् दृश्यमानं स्तनं स एवायम् इति पूर्वदृष्टत्वेन न प्रत्यवमृशति तावन्नोपरतरुदितो मुखमर्पयति स्तने । Nyāyabinduṭīkā, pp. 50-51.

baby's determinate judgement and, for that matter, all judgements involve some kind of rudimentary synthesis, because a cognition which unifies the two experiences, former with the latter, will never have its object present since the former experience is no longer there.⁸⁵

Śāntarakṣita incorporates BH's *anuviddhamiva* kārikā as part of verse 1216 and says that the verbal intertwining of knowledge rather vindicates the Buddhist stand of envisaging mental construction (*kalpanā*) in infant's perception and also in the moments of acute anxiety and flight of imagination.⁸⁶ Drawing inspiration from Śāntarakṣita, Vidyākaraśānti turns BH's argument against BH himself. Objects our author, if all thoughts are characterized by the word as their essence, no form of knowledge will be able to directly apprehend the object, as there will always be an element of construction involved in it.⁸⁷ Commenting upon Dharmakīrti's famous kārikā,⁸⁸ which Abhinava is also very fond of referring to, Manorathanandin defines *parāmarśa* in terms of constructed synthesis between object (meaning) and its designation where the designation relates to memory of the past experience and the object to the perceptual experience. And then he raises a doubt as to how this verbal synthesis is at all possible in the sense-perception which by definition apprehends the bare, unmixed, real moment.⁸⁹

One of the biggest challenges for the Buddhist is to account for his dealing with the external world because the reality is the constant flow of unique particulars. We do not know the external objects, rather we deal with the constructed images. To quote Stcherbatsky, "our images are not constructed by the external world, but the external world is constructed according to our images." It is here that the notion of *ekapratyavamarśa* becomes the Buddhist's biggest weapon to account for the seeming unity of series of moments belonging to a particular object as different from others. By this we understand a kind of unitary synthetic judgement which causes a unitary perception of an object despite the real discreteness.⁹⁰ This is produced by an aggregate of the mutually cooperative causal factors,

⁸⁵ पूर्वदृष्टत्वं पूर्वदर्शनविषयत्वम् । तेन यो मया पूर्व क्षुब्धप्रतिघातहेतुत्वेन प्रतिपन्नः स एवाऽयमिति प्रत्यवमर्शस्य रूपमाचष्टे । न प्रत्यवमृशति न प्रत्यभिजानाति । . . . Dharmottara-Pradipa, p. 51; also cf. Stcherbatsky, 1962: 19-24.

⁸⁶ चिन्तोत्प्रेक्षादिकाले च विस्पष्टं या प्रवेद्यते । अनुविद्धेव सा शब्दैरपह्नोतु न शक्यते ॥ T'S, verse 1216; Kamalaśīla comments: चिन्तेत्यादिना भूयः प्रत्यक्षतः कल्पनासिद्धिमाह । Pañjikā, p. 450.

⁸⁷ अन्यार्थं कृतमन्यार्थं भवतीति न्यायात् परविप्रतिपत्तिरपि निराकृता द्रष्टव्या । तथाहि वैयाकरणैरुक्तम् —

'न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते । अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन जायते ॥' इति ।

सर्वप्रत्ययानां शब्दानुगतत्वरूपत्वे कस्यचिदपि ज्ञानस्य अर्थसाक्षात्करणायोगात् । Tarkasopāna of Vidyākaraśānti, p. 279.

⁸⁸ संकेतस्मरणोपायं दृष्टसंकल्पनात्मकम् । पूर्वापरपरामर्शशून्ये तच्चाक्षुषे कथम् ॥ Pra. Vā 2.174.

⁸⁹ तच्च पूर्वस्य संकेतकालदृष्टवाचकशब्दस्यापरस्य दृश्यमानार्थस्य परामर्शो वाच्यवाचकतायोजनम्, तेन शून्या शब्दामिश्रवस्तुस्वरूपग्राहिणि चाक्षुषे ज्ञाने कथं सम्भाव्यते । Vṛtti on the above, p. 153.

⁹⁰ Cf. एकप्रत्यवमर्शस्य हेतुत्वाद् धीरभेदिनी । एकधीहेतुभावेन व्यक्तीनामप्यभिन्नता ॥ Pra. Vā 3.109.

for instance, the combination of sense of sight, colour, light, mental attention etc. give rise to colour perception, but not the sense of hearing.⁹¹ Although all point instants are mutually exclusive yet some of them have reciprocal congeniality which others do not have. These cooperative factors combine in which the law of contradistinction (*apohana*) plays an important part in giving rise to a unitary synthetic judgement which is responsible for designating an object as 'this' or 'that' and this becomes our entry point into the empirical world of purposive activities.⁹²

This prompts the Buddhist to assail BH's basic presupposition. Śāntarakṣita, in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, devotes a full-length section to the critique of Śābdabrahman.⁹³ Citing *na so'sti pratyayo loka* (Vāk. 1.115) twice, his commentator Kamalaśīla attacks BH on two counts. One, on the count of word-impregnation constituting the essence of the cognition and two, on the count of the identity of the object with the word as a logical outcome of the word-impregnation of awareness.⁹⁴ Countering this Kamalaśīla argues that the analytical reason (*svabhāvahetu*) in the form of word-penetration is not at all supported by perception as posited by BH.

The Buddhist argument runs thus. BH has attacked the Buddhist theory of transitoriness on the ground that it is against the verdict of experience. To this the Buddhist answers that transitoriness is undoubtedly apprehended in the indeterminate perception, but because it is not definitively ascertained by the determinate cognition it leads BH to take it to be non-existent. BH overlooks the fact since these are two cognitions having existence of transitoriness as well as non-existence thereof as their separate objects; there is no inner contradiction *per se*. Yet BH denies transitoriness on the misconceived ground that the constructed judgement of the determinate perception fails to support it. But BH's position is no better. He cannot say that the word is apprehended by the indeterminate perception but not endorsed by its determinate successor, because of his known opposition to the doctrine of radical separation between the sources of our knowledge (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*). Hence if word is affirmed by even one perception, all experiences will turn out to be determinate because of the inevitable coalescence with the verbal element. But such a scenario will not be palatable to BH himself, because he does subscribe to the

⁹¹ एकप्रत्यवमर्श एकाकाराध्यवसायो.... यथा चक्षुरूपा लोकमनस्कारादय एव भेदाऽविशेषेऽपि रूपविज्ञानं जनयन्ति, न श्रोत्रशब्दादयः । Vṛtti on Pra. Vā 3.73, p. 282.

⁹² एकप्रत्यवमर्शाख्ये ज्ञाने भेदाविशेषेऽपि केचिदेव भावा एकाकाराध्यवसायहेतवः नेतरे । Ibid., pp 294-95.

⁹³ Vide TS 128-135.

⁹⁴ सर्व एव प्रत्ययोऽर्थेषूपजायमानः शब्दोल्लेखानुगत एवोपजायते । यथोक्तम् —

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते । अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन वर्तते ॥

ज्ञानाकारनिबन्धना च वस्तूनां स्वभावप्रज्ञप्तिः । अतः सिद्धमेषां शब्दाकारानुस्यूतत्वम् तत्सिद्धौ च तन्मयत्वमपि सिद्धमेव, तन्मात्रभावित्वात्तन्मयत्वस्येति । ते वाच्या Pañjikā, p. 86.

existence of some kind of indeterminate apprehension, and will thus be patently against the verdict of our experience. Hence BH ought to desist from propagating the unity of cognition with the word.⁹⁵ Śāntarakṣita carries his onslaught to its logical conclusion. He once again castigates the Word-Absolutist's contention that although Brahman is always indivisible and undifferentiated, the differentiation is brought in by the nuisance created by nescience (*avidyā*). This also falls for the same reason invalidating word-penetration doctrine. According to BH, says the Buddhist, the consciousness-character of the ultimate reality is evidenced by the perception called *svasamvedana* (self-sensation). But, on the ground, it is not sustained by *svasamvedana*. Let us take the case of a person who is looking at an object, say *nīla* (blue), with his eyes while his mind is distracted elsewhere. In this eventuality although he does not notice, does not grasp any name, it does not mean that he has no experience at all of the 'blue'; he does have an experience, but it is wordless. This clearly disproves what is sought to be established by BH's *kārikā* 'na so 'sti' and also, as a consequence, perception fails to demonstrate the ultimate reality being of the nature of the word.⁹⁶

On the other side of the spectrum are realists – the adherents of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya both. BH was denounced in these circles too. The theory of the grammarian that all thoughts were necessarily and unexceptedly associated with words was not acceptable to Kumārila so far as it related to the indeterminate perception. Kumārila says that the indeterminate perception is like the apprehension of the child and the dumb. There is no word-element in it. It implies "that we cannot be conscious of an indeterminate perception in terms of thought."⁹⁷

D.N. Shastri refers to the views of Jayanta and Vyomaśiva who held that in the indeterminate perception there is no word-element and therefore it is vague and indefinite.⁹⁸ Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, while explaining *avyapadeśya* (ineffable) in Gotama's definition of perception, declares that BH's thesis 'na so 'sti....bhāṣate' suffers from the defect called *asambhava* (impossible) because the object which is sought to be defined (*lakṣya*) that is, the indeterminate cognition, does not exist in reality.⁹⁹ This has

⁹⁵ न चैवं भवतां पक्षे शब्दस्य ग्रहणाग्रहणे युक्ते, सर्वज्ञानां सविकल्पकताभ्युपगमात् ।अथ किंचिदविकल्पमपि ज्ञानमभ्युपगम्यते ! न तर्हि वक्तव्यम् – "न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादुते" इति । शब्दाकारानुस्यूतत्वादिति च हेतुर्न सिद्ध्येत्, ततश्च प्रमाणाभावाच्छब्दात्मकत्वव्यवस्थापनं न निश्चीयेत । Pañjikā p. 89.

⁹⁶ स्यादेतत् – स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षत एव तत्सिद्धम्, ज्ञानात्मरूपत्वात्, तथा हि ज्योतिस्तदेव शब्दात्मकत्वाच्चैतन्यरूपत्वाच्चेति? तदेतत् स्वसंवेदनविरुद्धम् । तथा हि – अन्यत्र गतमानसोऽपि चक्षुषा रूपमीक्षमाणोऽनादिष्टाभिलाषमेव नीलादिप्रत्ययमनुभवति ।एतेन यदुक्तम् "न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके" इत्यादि, तदपि प्रत्युक्तं भवति । Ibid., p. 92; cf. Vāk, Poona edition, pp. 208-209.

⁹⁷ D.N. Shastri, 1964: 439; also see NVT, pp. 126-127.

⁹⁸ D.N. Shastri, 1964: 439, note 65.

⁹⁹ न च शब्दानुसन्धानरहितः कश्चित् प्रत्ययो दृश्यते । अनुल्लिखितशब्दकेष्वपि प्रत्ययेषु अन्ततः सामान्यशब्दसमुन्मेषसम्भवात् तदुल्लेखव्यतिरेकेण प्रकाशात्मिकायाः प्रतीतेरनुत्पादात् । तथाऽऽह भर्तृहरिः –

slight affinity with Dignāga's viewpoint and also with that of Kumārila. Both of them vehemently insist that there is no word-element in the indeterminate cognition. In Vācaspati Misra (although he preceded Udayana) this theory takes a slightly more developed form. His view is that in the indeterminate perception individual as well as universal are both apprehended except that their relationship as substance and attribute is not noticed.¹⁰⁰ Thus it will be seen that while Kumārila opposes BH, Vācaspati supports the latter and for the same reason criticizes Kumārila and invokes BH in approval.¹⁰¹

The Śaiva Siddhāntins are very vocal critics of BH though they assimilate many insights of BH into their theory of speech. However our immediate concern is their notion of *parāmarśa*. Realists as they are, they approximate Kumārila ideologically unlike BH and KS. It may be interesting to know that wherever Rāmakaṇṭha, in his *Vṛtti* on the *Mataṅgapārameśvara*, seizes an occasion to discuss his notion of *parāmarśa*,¹⁰² he invariably quotes Kumārila's famous statement in this regard.¹⁰³ Like Kumārila he also holds that knowledge of the first moment,¹⁰⁴ i.e., indeterminate apprehension,

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते । अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन गम्यते ॥
तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षस्य लक्ष्यस्यासद्भावात् कस्येदं लक्षणमुपक्रान्तमिति असम्भवदोषमाशङ्क्याह सूत्रकारः अन्यव्यपदेश्यमिति । Nyāyamañjarī, part 1, pp. 75-76.

¹⁰⁰ अविद्यमानं व्यपदेश्यं यस्मिन्स्तदव्यपदेश्यं जात्यादिस्वरूपावगाहि न तु जात्यादीनां मिथो विशेषणविशेष्यभाववावगाहि । NVT, Vol. 1, p. 125.

¹⁰¹ तथा च नाविकल्पं शब्दरहितमस्तीति तात्पर्यार्थः । तथा चाहुः —

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते । अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन गम्यते ॥
बालमूकादीनामपि विज्ञानं शब्दानुव्याधवदेव अनादिशब्दभावनावगाहि । Ibid., p. 127.

Matilal seems to support Vācaspati's interpretation from a different perspective and notices an indirect convergence between the views of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the one hand and those of BH and KS on the other. Says he (1986: 29):

"All *pramāṇa* theorists agree, first and foremost but with varying degrees of emphasis, that what exists, or is really there, can be known (and is known). The domain of the knowables seems to converge, or coincide, with only a few exceptions, with the domain of 'existents'. Some (e.g., Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) would even go further to say that what is knowable is also *eo ipso* 'effable', i.e., expressible or nameable in language, for whatever satisfies the conditions for being known satisfies also the conditions for being expressed or named. Other *pramāṇa* theorists, however, part company with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and are reluctant to make knowability a sufficient condition for 'effability'. There are others, for example Bhartṛhari and possibly also the proponents of Kashmir Śaivism, who would lend an indirect support to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position by propounding a theory of an intimate connection between language and 'structured' knowledge."

¹⁰² Vide Ma. Pā. (Vidyāpāda), with *Vṛtti* 6.35: 174-175; 10.6-13^{ab}: 312-313; 17.2: 382.

¹⁰³ अस्ति ह्यलोचनज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम् । बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ॥

ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यया । बुद्ध्यावसीयते सोऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन संमतः ॥ Ma. Pā., *Vṛtti*, loc. cit.

¹⁰⁴ The 'first moment' has a broader connotation as it includes all apprehensions where the determinate ideation is not felt as for instance in the states of sheer joy or acute anxiety. Cf.

आशिरो लक्षणे काये सेयं सविचित्रतेः सदा ॥ आह्लादे वाऽप्यथोद्वेगे । Ma. Pā. 6.34^{cd} - 6.35^{ab}

is totally free from verbal association of any kind whatsoever and is comparable with the apprehension which an infant or a dumb person has. The cognition that we have is twofold – non-judgemental and judgemental, coming in succession. Rāmakaṇṭha employs four sets of terms interchangeably to designate these states – e.g., *ālocanapratyaya* and *parāmarśapratyaya*, *grahaṇa* and *parāmarśa*, *anadyavasāya* and *adhyavasāya*, as well as *anubhava* and *parāmarśa*. At the indeterminate level the object is apprehended as a bare object, without any attributes (*nirviśeṣa*) and becomes meaningful only when the judgement relating to the object is reflectively appraised by the modality of ego (*ahaṅkāravṛtṭyā ātmaparāmarśaḥ*).¹⁰⁵ It may be mentioned, for the sake of clarity, that this is not the reflectiveness of the individual self, but of the inner sense (*antaḥkaraṇa*), which takes the form ‘I am fair’, ‘This is cow’ etc. Employing the method borrowed from the Buddhist logician, he contends that *ātman* is said to be realized through perception.¹⁰⁶ In fact, *parāmarśa* when philosophically appropriated, constitutes the self’s knowledge-power, which is capable of illuminating own self as well as others. But as Siddhāntin is a dualist, power and its prius indeed happen to be different. Hence the indeterminate cognition, i.e., non-judgemental reflexivity (*parāmarśa*), always shines as cognizer or as ‘the nature of the individual soul’ but not as the ‘individual soul’¹⁰⁷ whereas *adhyavasāya* by virtue of being a product of intellect¹⁰⁸ cannot partake of the nature of subject, otherwise it will reduce the eternal into the ephemeral.

The problem of *parāmarśa* has been handled at a much higher plane by the Śaiva dualists. According to them there are three ultimate reals – Pati, Paśu and Pāśa (‘Lord’, ‘individual souls’ and ‘noose’). These constitute the three primary categories. Pati is called Paramaśiva from whom ensue thirty-six dependent categories beginning with Śiva or *bindu* (often designated as *para-bindu* in order to separate it from *bindu*, also called *akṣara-bindu*).¹⁰⁹ It is also called Mahāmāyā, the insentient material cause of pure creation and happens to be different from Paramaśiva, the primary category.

The Śiddhānta Śaivism traces determinacy in thought to the words, but at the same time the determinate knowledge cannot be explained in terms of *buddhi*, because determinacy is found in levels beyond *māyā* (a dependent category which happens to be the material cause of the impure

¹⁰⁵ न ह्यहंकारवृत्त्या आत्मपरामर्शं विना कश्चिदपि विषयपरामर्श उपपद्यते । Ma. Pā Vṛtti, p. 312.

¹⁰⁶ ततश्च घटोऽयमितिवद् अनुभवपृष्ठभाविना निश्चयप्रत्ययेन विषयीकृतत्वाद् आत्मापि प्रत्यक्षेण निश्चित एव । एवं स्वपरमात्मप्रकाशकतया ज्ञानशक्तिरूपेण परामर्शाच्च आत्मा प्रत्यक्ष उक्तः । Ibid., p. 175.

¹⁰⁷ तत्र योऽनध्यवसायात्मकः स सर्वदा ग्राह(क)रूपेणैव भासमान आत्मस्वभाव एवेत्युक्तम् । Ibid., p. 382.

¹⁰⁸ आलोचनज्ञानादनन्तरं परामर्शबुद्ध्युत्पादे मनोव्यापारः कार्यसिद्धः । Ibid., p. 313.

¹⁰⁹ K.C. Pandey, 1986: 88-90.

creation) also. It, therefore, holds that there is the subtle sound (*śabda*) which evolves out of *bindu* (or *parabindu*) agitated by the Lord. This subtle sound is called *vidyā* or *nāda*. Thus, *nāda* is the undifferentiated cause of the subtle inner speech. According to Rāmakaṇṭha when an object is grasped in an indeterminate apprehension by a cognitive source it is *buddhi* that differentiates the indeterminate objects of the determinate judgement and relates them as the designator and the designated. This verbal activity is always addressed to an object which has been sensorily apprehended; otherwise it will cause the determinate apprehension of all the objects for ever.¹¹⁰ In his commentary on the Sārdhatriśatikālottarāgama, Rāmakaṇṭha talks of three levels of the word – gross, subtle and ultimate (*sthūla*, *sūkṣma* and *para*). The gross is what we hear, the subtle is what prompts the gross. Out of these two the subtle is of the nature of *parāmarśa*. All words and meanings exist here in an undifferentiated state of unity just as the different colours exist in the liquid of a peahen's yolk.¹¹¹ Although the word in this state is not an object of hearing, it is from this storehouse that *nāda* manifests a particular word and its corresponding meaning to be differentiated by the intellectual operation. It is reflective and judgemental, though undifferentiated. In contrast, the ultimate (i.e., *para*) word is free from all reflection and beyond the realm of thought. It happens to be the source of the subtle word (*cintāmayā*, i.e., *parāmarśa*) and is called *nāda*. Rāmakaṇṭha equates it with *paśyantī* of BH.

What the Śaiva Śiddhāntin wants to ultimately drive at is that whereas the individual subject or self happens to be the thought-free consciousness, a thought is never without a judgement.¹¹² This judgement in the undifferentiated form consists in the subtle murmur and defines the signification (*vācakatā*) of the word. The external objects represent the meaning part and are called 'denotata' (*vācya*).¹¹³ Its characteristic feature, i.e., inner murmur (*antaḥsaṃjalpa*) is explained in terms of 'inner judgemental knowledge' (*āntaravimarśātmaka-jñāna*) which consists in the intellect's role of analyzing and designating an object appearing in a sensory perception. Thus *nāda* as the undifferentiated subtle signifier covers all the meanings as its objects, bringing all – existent as well as non-existent –

¹¹⁰ बुद्धिर्हि तावद् बाह्ये चक्षुरादिना विषयीकृत एवार्थेऽध्यवसायिनी दृष्टा नाविषयीकृते अतिप्रसङ्गात् । ततश्चान्तरे बुद्धिः केनापि विषयीकृत एवार्थे परामर्श करोति । अन्यथा सर्वदा सर्वार्थपरामर्शप्रसङ्गात् ... अतः संजल्पात्मेति । Vṛtti on Nādakārikā 11, in Aṣṭaprakaraṇa, K.C. Pandey, 1986: 242. Also see p. 94, 221.

¹¹¹ यत्तु तस्यापि प्रवर्तकमित्यभिप्रायवशात् ... परामर्शात्मिकम् अविभक्तं तद्वाच्यतदर्थमविभागशक्तिविशेषात्मकत्वान्मायूपाण्डसविन्दु-व्यपदेश्यानेकमात्ररूपत्वतः ... अश्रोत्रग्राह्यं तत्परामर्शज्ञानरूपमेवानुभवतः सिद्धमित्यर्थः । Vṛtti on Sārdha., 1.8, p. 15.

¹¹² आत्मस्वरूपविदस्तु शैवाः तां सूक्ष्माख्यां बिन्दुकार्यभूतां शब्दवृत्तिमेव मन्यन्ते न तु पुरुषसमवायिनीम् । Quoted from Ratnatrayaparikṣā of Śrīkaṇṭha by K.C. Pandey, 1986: 222, note 2.

¹¹³ रूपरसगन्धशब्दाद्यर्था येनावमृश्यतां नीताः । सोऽन्तःसंजल्पात्मा नादः सिद्धो न विषयभावेन ॥ Nādakārikā 11.

¹¹⁴ विषयीकुर्वन् सर्वान् शब्दानर्थानेष वाचको नान्यः । दृष्टं सदप्यसत् तद् यस्मादेतेन सदा परामृष्टम् ॥ Ibid., 12.

within its ambit.¹¹⁴ It is from this point of view that Aghoraśiva upholds the inalienable relationship between thought and word, so glorified in the grammarian school.¹¹⁵

The Siddhānta Śaiva dualism has appropriated BH's famous kārikās under reference in different contexts rendering them as part of its formulations but these may be skipped for the present for want of immediate relevance. None the less their evaluation in terms of the tantric soteriology definitely merits a reference, all the more so for the reason that the KS monists too have made similar appropriation specially in the Spanda cluster of kārikās. Śrīkaṇṭha considers knowledge of the fettered individuals as intertwined with the word and instead of quoting, incorporates Vāk. 1.115 wholesale as kārikā 84^{cd} – 85^{ab} in his Ratnatraya-parīkṣā.¹¹⁶ As a logical continuation, echoing the theme of BH's famous kārikā, he holds that Mahāmāya (the principle of *pāśa*, which is also the cause of determinacy), if not properly understood, always obscures the knowledge of *paśu* through intertwining with the word.¹¹⁷ Properly understood, it becomes pure word-power (*vāk-śakti*)¹¹⁸ and becomes instrumental, as *mantra*, to the success of individual self's pursuit of power and liberation.¹¹⁹

In Kashmir Śaivism, which in the immediate context stands for the monistic strand of philosophical speculation, we discern a paradigm shift from conceiving reality as consisting of *śabda* (subsuming *artha*) to reality as constituted by *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*. This shift, though a direct outcome of BH's impact on KS, also marks the subtle line of departure from BH's notion of philosophy itself. For BH the philosophy of language exhausts all philosophy, whereas for KS philosophy as such covers all aspects of thought—howsoever seemingly diverse and polarized – severally carrying equal weightage by themselves and yet syncretized into a unified vision emanating from and logically sustained by a complete hermeneutics of the Word and Meaning in terms of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* which may be concisely summed

¹¹⁵ तदुक्तम् - “न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते । अनुविद्धमिह ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन जायते ।” इति । Vṛtti on Nāḍakārikā, p. 242.

¹¹⁶ न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययोऽणूनां यः शब्दानुगमादृते ॥ अनुविद्धमिह ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन जायते । Ratnatrayaparīkṣā of Śrīkaṇṭha in Aṣṭaprakaraṇa, 84^{cd} – 85^{ab}.

¹¹⁷ सा भोगसाधनोपायप्रत्ययोदयहेतुना ॥ शब्दानुवेधेन सदा मोहयेदविचेति । Ibid., 169^{cd} – 170^{ab}.

¹¹⁸ शान्त्यतीता पञ्चमी शिवशक्तिरपि शुद्धवाक्स्वरूपा नादाख्यं यत् तत्त्वमित्युक्तम् ... तन्मध्ये पुरुषः सूक्ष्मदेहाभिव्यक्तो दृक्क्रियामात्रो ... न वाक्छक्तेरपि व्यतिरिक्तमात्मानं मन्यते । यदाहुः -

वाग्रूपा चेदुक्तामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती । न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥ इति । Vṛtti on Sārdha. 10.18-19, pp. 93-94.

¹¹⁹ शक्तिश्चात्र नादशक्तिरेव विवक्षिता । तत्रैव मन्त्राणां वस्तुतो विनिविष्टत्वात् । ... सकलपशुगतात् प्रागुक्ताद् बोध्यपरामर्शलक्षणात् कुर्यादेतत्सिद्धमित्यर्थः । तदिदमुक्तम् - “न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते । अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन जायते ॥” इति । ... तस्य यथा पुरुषभोगमोक्षकार्याभ्यामन्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रगमोऽत्र सिद्धः, तथात्रापीत्युक्तमित्यविरोधः । तदिदमाहुः - “वाग्रूपता चेदुक्तामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती । न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत साभिप्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥” इति । Vṛtti on Sārdh., on 1.6^{cd} – 7^{ab}, pp. 14-15.

up as a discovery of reality by its self-referring, self-affirming consciousness. Metaphysically this amounts to 'a recognition of reference, i.e., the meaning in experience'.¹²⁰ This also brings another paradigm of the Abhinavan thought into bold relief. This is the paradigm of recognition inspired by BH via his theory of the levels of speech and apprehension and conveyance of meaning. In view of the stringent Buddhist denial of the validity of recognition, Utpaladeva (UTP) and Abhinavagupta (AG) reconstruct a complete metaphysics of recognition making it essential to the very structure of thought, speech, and reality. In this context Iyer's English rendering of *pratyavamarśa* as 'recognition-cum-identification' assumes added significance buttressed by Lawrence's forceful reasoning in support. On our part we do not propose to translate these terms because *pratyabhijñā*, *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*, all these and also other cognate terms are intended to convey the distinctive connotations at several levels of usage yet so integrated to one another that it would be only fair if we use them as such.

The system of UTP and AG has put up two entirely different – one may even say, contradictory – valuations on BH. From a derogatory epithet of a 'poor grammarian' (*vaiyākaraṇasādhūnām*)¹²¹ in Somānanda to the honorific little of *tatrabhāvān* in the whole tradition is indeed a journey from negative to the positive revaluation of his contribution. Somānanda treats BH primarily as a grammarian who has no *locus standi* for dabbling into the matters philosophical.¹²² But on a relook we notice that in his critique Somānanda only aims at limiting the scope of BH as an enunciator of the ultimate nature of things by equating the Supreme Word (Parāvāk/Śabdabrahman)¹²³ with Śiva's power of knowledge¹²⁴ and thus underscoring the need for going beyond and as such himself identifying it with the power of will instead, paving the way for the infusion of *parā*. However, right in the immediate next generation of Somānanda, UTP acknowledges BH's constructive debt, as interpreted by AG, that his formulation of *vimarśa* is in the main drawn from BH. In the AG's exegesis of BH's reference *kārikās*, building upon the central theses developed by his grand teacher UTP, he proceeds with four general formulations:

- (i) Objective reality (*artha*) is constituted by *prakāśa* (light of awareness) implying its ideal character.
- (ii) *vimarśa* is the essence of *prakāśa*, offering *raison de'être* of conceiving reality in terms of *prakāśa*, i.e., pure light of consciousness.

¹²⁰ Lawrence, 1992 : 135, note 13.

¹²¹ Śivadr̥ṣṭi (ŚD), 2.1.

¹²² वैयाकरणतां त्यक्त्वा विज्ञानान्वेषणेन किम् । ŚD. 2.72 ab.

¹²³ इत्याहुस्ते परं ब्रह्म यदनादि तथाक्षयम् । तदक्षरं शब्दरूपं सा पश्यन्ती परा हि वाक् ॥ Ibid., 2.2.

¹²⁴ अथास्माकं ज्ञानशक्तिर्या सदाशिवरूपता । वैयाकरणसाधूनां पश्यन्ती सा परा स्थितिः ॥ Ibid., 2.1.

- (iii) *vimarśa* is posited as the agential functionality or creativity (*karṭṛtā*) emanating from and resting within the subjective consciousness which defines consciousness and distinguishes it from un-(or non-) consciousness and sentiency from insentiency at the empirical level.
- (iv) This agential freedom is the word or speech (*vāk*) which has two dimensions – (a) sacred (*māntrī*) and (b) linguistic (*śabdana*) and is marked by fullness expressed as or in terms of ‘self-affirmation’ or ‘self-repose’ (*aham-pratyavamarśa* or *ahamviśrānti*).

In all these formulations, as one instantly finds out, *vimarśa* emerges as AG’s ‘hermeneutical key’ (to use Mark Dyczkowski’s phrase). AG grounds in these formulations his ambition of building a meta-philosophy which covers metaphysics, logic, religion, ritual, tantric praxis, yoga, devotion, literary criticism, aesthetics and various art forms integrating them by an underlying unity of thought, purpose, approach and yet nourishing their individual and analytic existence to the highest level of excellence. This all-encompassing vision he spells in terms of recognition leading to his philosophy of the transcendental recognition where one’s own identity is ‘discovered’, ‘re-cognized’ by every instance of acting, becoming, thinking, where one emanates from and returns to oneself in whatever one knows, does or speaks.

This vision, to a great extent, AG inherits from BH. The ideas of word as the creative principle, unity of thought and speech, world of experience constituted by the powers of the word as the ultimate principle, speech as the basis and constitutive of the empirical world of purposeful activities, *vimarśa* and *anusandhāna* (unification) not only participating in apprehending and communicating but also in ordering and coordinating our universe of discourse (*vyavasthā*), language in its transcendental aspect transfiguring into religious language par excellence, soteriology of language leading to self-realization and language being the root of our literary, cultural and aesthetic pursuits, all have been taken from BH. Even the major tools and metaphors of crystal, of liquid in a peahen’s yolk, *vāgyoga*, notion of superimposition of the word on meaning (*adhyāsa*), illustration of rapid reading, rapid movement, stillness, all these are drawn by UTP and AG from BH. Here AG’s contribution is threefold. First, he continues the basic thrust of BH by meeting criticism from Buddhist logicians specially Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara vis-à-vis their notions of *śabdana* as *abhilāpa* and *apoha* in particular, by defending BH against the attack from the realists and also against the dualistic linguistic formulation of Siddhānta Śaivism; second, he clarifies vague and doubtful areas as for instance the relationship between word and meaning articulated in the word-penetration doctrine (and the use of expressions such as ‘as if’ – *iva* – as in

anuviddhamiva), treating meaning as *vivarta* of word (without being sure as to what it stands for: whether transformation or appearance), freedom of the ultimate principle being coloured by nescience, meaning and the process of *pratyavamarśa*, the ontological status of meaning, and the existence of the transcendental level of language as *parā* – these are, inter alia several areas that demanded a precise formulation. Third, he develops hints and insights which were in incipient stage in BH or were only suggested therein. Here we have a creation of a full-bodied religious language, depicting reality as constituted by the sacred language (*mantraśārīra* or *śabdārāśi*) and its essence as *mantra* or *śabdana*, building up a thoroughly structured aesthetics, integrating speech with resonance within the framework of the basic aesthetical formulations, evolving the notion of enjoyer (*bhoktā*) into that of the aesthete at the level of both metaphysics as well as art-experience rooted in BH's formulation of the grammatical notion of subject as *bhoktā* and modulating some of foundational linguistic insights, viz., pronouncing the coeval status of word and meaning and yet synthesizing them into an identity (*śabdārtha-sāmarasya*) instead of treating meaning as *vivarta* and then reducing it to the primal word, understanding thought as having word as its nature (*śabdānātmaka*) and not thought as if pierced by or shot with the word, taking word as the attribute and meaning as the substantive instead of taking word simply as the substantive, going in fact to the extent of making either of them give up their designation as attribute or substantive within the process of *adhyāsa*,¹²⁵ visualizing the word and meaning in harmony instead of the Word-Principle alone as the supreme reality and finally construing the notion of *pratyavamarśa* as *aham-pratyavamarśa* (self-referring affirmation).

AG adopts several strategies to work it out. First of all, as a symbolic gesture, Parama Śiva in masculine gender, is brought in replacing Śabdabrahman, in neuter, and is viewed as the Agent par excellence. Deriving from and corresponding to the notions of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* AG develops two process strategies in the form of *ābhāsana* (manifesting, illuminating) and *vimarśana* (ideating, reflecting). AG then exploits the *vimarśana*-strategy by adopting its several transformations. In the realm of language *vimarśana* emerges as *śabdana*, in analysing art-experience *vimarśana* is transformed into *camatkaraṇa* and *pratibhāna* both as the

¹²⁵ In the empirical realm of linguistic usage this is sought to be achieved by Abhinavan modulation of BH's *śabdavivartavāda* into *śabdādhyāsavāda* in the course of AG's elaboration of the notions of *prakāśa* as *avabhāsana* and *vimarśa* as *adhyāsa*: तदयं वाचकस्वरूपाध्यास एव वाच्यत्वं, तदध्यासश्च वाचकत्वमुत्थापयति, इति व्यवहार्यं वस्तु नामरूपलक्षणमनेवरूपतया न कदाचिदास्ते इति, एकान्त एषः । IPVV II, p. 267. In the light of the above, Matilal's observation that UTP and AG supported what is called *śabdādhyāsavāda* as opposed to BH's *śabdavivartavāda* (1990: 6) needs clarification. Though both are adherents of *śabdādvaitavāda*, their *inter se* comparison may be depicted in terms of *śabdādvaita* and *śabdārtha-sāmarasya*. This issue we propose to examine in a future paper.

underlying process and the end-result, in aesthetics and metaphysics *vimarśana* figures as *kalana* to explain the creativity of the artist and by implication that of the supreme artist, i.e., Śiva – the actor, the dancer par excellence, in ritualistic and cosmogonic contexts *vimarśana* serves as *visarjana*, in epistemological analysis it continues to remain as *vimarśana*, and in ritualistic, religious as well as soteriological contexts is reckoned as *mantraṇa*. At a more concrete level AG works by interpreting āgamas, because the word *vimarśa* seldom occurs in the āgamic literature, and at still more immediate level AG and his colleagues exegete BH's kārīkās, synthesizing them with the insights of their own system in the texts of the system they comment upon. The textual portions where these interpretations appear may be categorized into four groups. It may be noted that *visarjana* and *kalana*, the two modalities of *vimarśa*, have not been considered under these four textual categorizations: Pratyabhijñā-cluster of kārīkās, viz., ŚD 2.10, IPK 1.1.4 and from 1.5.10 to 1.5.20; Āgama-cluster of kārīkās, represented by IPK 4.1.8 to 4.1.10; Spanda-cluster of kārīkās, represented by Spandakārīkā 28, 29, 47, 48 and Śivasūtravṛtti 1.4, 3.19; and others represented by Abhinavabhāratī on Nāṭyaśāstra 20.26.

For the present we propose to concentrate on the examination of the first four kārīkās of the Pratyabhijñā-cluster.

Our first encounter with BH's kārīkās begins with Somānanda. As part of his presentation of the prima facie standpoint of the Grammarians he quotes Vāk 1.115 (123)^{ab} without any comment.¹²⁶ His illustrious commentator UTP reiterates BH's famous formulation that in all empirical cognitions their expressive verbal element is invariably present.¹²⁷ Alluding to a part of the next kārīkā *sā hi pratyavamarśinī*, [i.e., Vāk 1.116 (124)^d] he underscores the *vimarśa* character of *vāk* making it imperative to the very notion of the Grammarian's Absolute, designated as *paśyantī*, interpreting, by implication, the term *prakāśa* as the light of the Brahman, occurring in the second half of BH's kārīkā,¹²⁸ which he does not directly quote. Later, Somānanda does connect *vāk* with *vimarśa*¹²⁹ but, as Torella notes, only as a part of the objection that he unfortunately chooses to pass over,¹³⁰ out of his self-inflicted compulsion to denigrate the grammarian. Somānanda remembers *aunmukhya*, 'subtle inclination/readiness' marking the first ever

¹²⁶ न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते।... इत्यादिवाक्यरचनैस्तैरेवं प्रतिपादितम् ॥ ŚD, 2.10^{ab} -11^{cd}.

¹²⁷ तथा न स घटादिप्रत्ययो लोकव्यवहारेऽस्ति, यो वाचकशब्दानुगमवर्जितः। वाग्रूपतां विना न ब्रह्मतत्त्वप्रकाशोऽपि प्रकाशेत 'सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी' इति। तथैवभूते पश्यन्तीरूपे शब्दाख्ये ब्रह्मणि...। ŚD Vṛ, ibid., p.44.

¹²⁸ न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत...।

¹²⁹ विमर्शानुभवैरेषा यथा वाक् प्रथमं श्रिता। ŚD 2.19^{ab}.

¹³⁰ Torella 2002: Introduction, p. xxvi.

moment of will,¹³¹ which UTP describes as inward looking consciousness that was to emerge later as *vimarśa*. UTP identifies it with the inward looking free consciousness.¹³² Somānanda seems to have been inspired by the idea of 'little swelling' (resembling crestless wave) propounded by his senior contemporary Pradyumna Bhaṭṭa with whom Somānanda, otherwise, has fundamental differences.

However, Somānanda's equation of efflorescence of consciousness with will's first moment proved to be the most forceful proof in conclusively establishing the consciousness character of reality. UTP exploited it as a transcendental argument employing *vimarśa* to prove *prakāśa*, to put it in the traditional parlance of the system.¹³³ Against this background, we believe that UTP's and AG's exegesis of Bh's *kārikā* begins with IPK 1.5.10¹³⁴ and not 1.5.11 as suggested by the use of *viduḥ*,¹³⁵ attention to which has already been drawn earlier. UTP conceptualizes will in terms of *vimarśa* mostly in a language that is reminiscent of Somānanda's not only contentual but even linguistic formulation. The creative will is the subject's own reflective awareness with regard to the creation of an object shining within.¹³⁶ Will is never without an objective reference; otherwise it will lead to chaos and confusion. This objective reference has to be internal and has to be so affirmed, since an object will materialize only after due operation of causal process.

Thus this *kārikā* conclusively establishes the entire manifested reality being of the nature of pure awareness,¹³⁷ which implies internality of the object as continuing even in the manifested state, since essential character never loses its essence.¹³⁸ AG in his *Vivṛtivismarśinī* offers several additional insights. According to him, not only the object, but in fact the whole productive process relating to the potential object shines internally in the first volitional pulsation.¹³⁹ The argument also establishes the basic idealistic undertone of the system.¹⁴⁰ Through his analysis of will AG emphasizes the

¹³¹ भवत्युन्मुखिता चित्ता सेच्छायाः प्रथमा तुटिः । ŚD 1.8^{cd}.

¹³² नैरपेक्ष्येणान्तर्मुखित्वात् चित्ता चैतन्यमेव, तदा सा तुटिः सूक्ष्मकालपरिच्छिन्न इच्छाप्रथमभागः । ŚD Vṛ., p. 10.

¹³³ तेन अवश्यंभाविनो विमर्शात् तत्प्रकाशोऽनुमीयते । IPVV II, p. 167.

¹³⁴ स्वामिनश्चात्मसंस्थस्य भावजातस्य भासनम् । अस्त्येव न विना तस्मादिच्छामर्शः प्रवर्तते ॥

¹³⁵ विमर्शं विदुरन्यथा । IPK 1.5.11.

¹³⁶ प्रतिभासमानार्थैकविषयो निर्मातृतामयो विमर्श इच्छारूपो . . . । IPK Vṛ., p. 22.

¹³⁷ तस्मात् स्थितम् अन्तःस्थितं भावजातं तेन विना तद्विषयस्य परामर्शयोगात् इति । IPV I, pp. 240-41.

¹³⁸ यदि अन्तःस्थित एव चिदात्मनोऽर्थराशिः, तत्कथमसौ न भासते । कः खलु आह साहसिको न भासते इति । एतदाह सूत्रेण । IPVV II, p. 166.

¹³⁹ सर्वाविभागेन 'स्थिति' भाविन उपयोगिरूपस्य । Ibid., II, p. 171.

¹⁴⁰ तदत्र निर्णये विज्ञाननयदूषणप्रस्तावे यदाभासवैचित्र्यकारणत्वेन शङ्कितम् तदपि उपपन्नमेव । Ibid.

equivalence in the internality of object either at the plane of creative will (*sisṛkṣābhūmi*) or at the plane of residual trace (*saṃskārābhūmi*), i.e., de-creation.¹⁴¹ AG's major formulation lies in visualizing the *kārikā* as a precursor to IPK 1.5.19 where UTP examines the indeterminate character of thought and its referent both, integrating it with ŚD 1.8-13 and thereby grounding it in the foundational argument that the volitional element, constituting as it does the self-affirming awareness that is *anusandhāna* (a mode of *vimarśa* highlighting its volitional character) accounts for the immediacy or instantaneity in perception.¹⁴² It also points out to the volitional manifestation in generalized form as constituting *paśyantī* level of speech.

The IPK 1.5.11¹⁴³ is as seminal to our understanding Kashmir Śaivism as Vāk 1.116¹⁴⁴ is to the understanding of BH. What is strikingly remarkable in this context is that AG in his IPVV openly acknowledges BH's impact on his formulations.¹⁴⁵ AG pinpoints the centrality of BH's *vāgrūpatā* *kārikā* and connects UTP's *kārikā* under reference with BH's.¹⁴⁶ AG splits BH's *kārikā* into two parts and devotes 1.5.11 to the exegesis of *pratyavamarśinī*-element and 1.5.13 to the *vagrūpatā*-element. He then, in answer to a self-raised query – 'what did it propound?' – comes out with the central theme of BH's *kārikā*:¹⁴⁷ That which differentiates light, i.e., awareness, from the non-consciousness or insentience, consists in subjective stir and is identical with agentiality, is what we call I-consciousness, i.e., resting on self by definition, due to its absolute non-dependence. The main thrust of *kārikā*, then, lies in interpreting *pratyavamarśa* as I-reflectivity or I-consciousness which serves as the defining component of *prakāśa*, i.e., reality. AG does not rest at that. Which phrase in the *kārikā*, he again asks, does he find expressing this idea? From the word *prakāśeta*, is his reply.¹⁴⁸ At this point AG indulges into a dense and protracted hermeneutics of the term *prakāśeta* employing Mīmāṃsā methodology and comes to the conclusion that it is the verbal element (*ākhyātāṃśa*) in suffix *ta* (in *prakāśeta*) which speaks of the primacy of the agential function:

¹⁴¹ सर्वमिदं सिसृक्षाभूमौ संस्कारभूमौ च आत्मनि अहमिति प्रकाशमानमवस्थितमेव । IPVV II, p. 169.

¹⁴² अनुसंधानशब्दं विवृणोति 'तादृगिच्छायाजनेन' इति . . . विमर्शविशेष एव हि . . . ननु दर्शनस्य आत्मभूता इच्छा विमर्शविशेषरूपा इत्येतदेव न सिद्धम्, दर्शनानन्तरं हि इच्छा । एतत् परिहरति 'न च' इति । एवं हि सति मन्थरक्रियातस्त्वरिततायाः को विशेषः । Ibid., pp. 233-234.

¹⁴³ स्वभावमवभासस्य विमर्शं विदुरन्यथा । प्रकाशोऽर्थोक्तोऽपि स्फटिकादिजडोपमः ॥

¹⁴⁴ Quoted under note 2 above.

¹⁴⁵ एतत् संवादयति 'तथा च' इति भर्तृहरिरित्यवोचत् इति संबन्धः । IPVV II, p. 182.

¹⁴⁶ केन वाक्येन । आह "वाग्रूपता" इत्यादिना "प्रत्यवमर्शिनी" इत्यन्तेन । Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ किमवोचत् । आह - प्रकाशस्य जडवैलक्षण्यं संरम्भः कर्तृतारूपो यः स एव आत्मविश्रान्तिलक्षणो निरपेक्षत्वेन विमर्शोऽहमिति कथ्यते । Ibid.


¹⁴⁸ ननु केन शब्देन असौ संरम्भः कारिकायामुक्तः । आह 'प्रकाशेत' । (He refers to "प्रकाशेत" in न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी). Ibid.

The, optative element (in 'ta' suffix in *prakāśeta*) conveys the idea of *sambhāvanādhikya* (e.g., 'high-ness' in 'high potentiality': that is, not potentiality but its abundance) alone, whereas verbal element speaks of the rest on/in the primacy of the agential activity (*karoti* in *prakāśam karoti* which is the meaning of *prakāśate*). Then, without optative element how is this potentiality going to be expressed? If you say that potentiality (of *prakāśeta*) is conveyed by verbal element and hence it does not express 'primacy of agential element' (agential activity, i.e., *karoti*), it is not going to stick. Because what is that with which potentiality is intended to be connected? If it relates to mere absence of a thing (i.e., absence of *prakāśa* vide *na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta*), then just as non-white cannot be made white, light too cannot be turned into non-light (*aparakāśa*), because it is essentially of the nature of light. Hence potentiality is to be ruled out as the meaning of *liṅ*. Thus externalization (of the internal, that is, the becoming itself being made outward – *bāhyīkṛtameva bhavanam*) alone remains that could be associated with the optative element. For white does not become white, blue does not become blue, a jar does not become jar, it is only the active or creative element which has entered into their being that alone shines (as the respective objects). This is how the injunction turns out to be accomplished positively, though conveyed negatively: this *prakāśa*, 'awareness', alone shines or illuminates, i.e. it is the agent of the activity called shining or illumination. Thus verbal element, i.e., *liṅ* in *prakāśeta*, that is both the optative element and the verbality (*liṅamśa* and *ākhyātāmśa*) stand for *vimarśa* whose essence is freedom, self-subsistence, and which constitutes the essential, inalienable (*aheya*) body of consciousness.. This is what has been called *vāgrūpālā* which is tantamount to *śabdāyitrūpālā* in *śabdāna* (that is, having the nature of one who verbalizes in respect of the activity called verbalization) or metaphorically, which constitutes the eternal law of convention.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ लिङ्गत्र संभावनाधिक्यमात्रमाह, आख्यातरूपता तु कर्तृव्यापारप्राधान्यविश्रान्तिसतत्त्वेति आशयः। ननु लिङ्गं विना संभावना कथंकारमुच्यते। तत् संभावनाभिधायी अयमाख्यातप्रयोगो न कर्तृतांशप्राधान्यं निगमयति। मैवम्, यदि वस्त्वभावमात्रं संभावनाविषयत्वेन विवक्षितं, न शुक्लोऽयं शुक्लः स्यादिति न्यायेन प्रकाशः प्रकाशो न भवेदिति प्रकाशभावात् बाह्यीकृतमेव भवनं लिङ्गं संबध्येत, न श्वेतः श्वेतेत्, न नीलं नीलेत्, घटो न घटीभवेदिति तु तत्त्वरूपानुप्रविष्ट एव संरम्भार्थो निर्भाति, इति व्यतिरेकद्वारेण च इत्थं विधिः संपद्यते प्रकाशते च अयं प्रकाश इति। तदयं लिङ्गन्ताश्च एव स्वातन्त्र्यात्मा विमर्शः प्रकाशस्य अहेयं वपुर्बोधस्य या वायूपता शब्दनशब्दयितृरूपता शाश्वती संकेतादिवत्। IPVV II, pp. 182-183.

Though Ag's profound exegesis continues much longer but as the text hereafter is extremely corrupt and full of omissions, further translation has not been attempted. Those interested may refer to the original text, *ibid*, p. 183. It will be interesting to note that Gajendragadkar (1934: 4) translates *śābdī bhāvanā* as verbal creative energy. Applying Laugākṣi Bhāskara's following prescription: "तत्र पुरुषप्रवृत्त्यनुकूलो भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेषः शाब्दीभावना। सा च लिङ्गशेनोच्यते। लिङ्गश्रवणेऽयं मां प्रवर्तयति मत्प्रवृत्त्यनुकूलव्यापारवानयमिति नियमेन प्रतीतेः। यद्यस्माच्छब्दान्नियमतः प्रतीयेत तत् तस्य वाच्यम्। . . . तत्र साध्याकांक्षायां वक्ष्यमाणशत्रयोपेता आर्था भावना साध्यत्वेनावेति, एकप्रत्ययगम्यत्वेन समानाभिधानश्रुतेः।" (Gajendragadkar, 1934: 4). Ag would like us to look to the verbal formation *prakāśeta* for a while. Here we find that the word *prakāśeta* conveys, (i) *prakāśa*, the actual illumination-episode, by means of the root (*pra*+) *kāś*, (ii) *ārthībhāvanā* ('actual creative energy,' Gajendragadkar, 1934: 6) which is here construed to be the supereminence of agential activity by means of verbality (in suffix *ta* in *prakāśe-ta*) and (iii) *śābdī-bhāvanā*, i.e., *sambhāvanādhikya*, by means of optativeness (*liṅtva*); so all the three are understood from one suffix (*ta*) itself having been conveyed by a single common statement (*prakāśeta*) wherein optativeness (in *liṅtva* = *ādhikyamātra*) acts as the denoter and verbality (i.e., primacy of agential activity) as the denoted.

AG's detailed reasoning as above presents before us a conceptual model on the lines of *bhāvanā* exegesis of Mimāṃsā that may be tentatively tabulated as under:



This line of distinction between consciousness and non-consciousness constitutes the main subject matter of IPK 1.5.12.¹⁵⁰ Thus all the three *kārikās* are interknitted by a single theme of adding the Kashmir Śaiva perspective to the *kārikā* of BH.

In his exegesis of IPK 1.5.11, AG offers some critical insights. UTP openly acknowledges the debt of BH in holding *vimarśa* to be the very nature of *prakāśa*. It simply means if *prakāśa* is light, '*vimarśa* is what makes the object distinguishable and distinct.'¹⁵¹ For a perspectival insight we quote below a passage from Matilal which would be found very germane to the context:

If *prakāśa* is the flood of light, *vimarśa* is what makes the object distinguishable and distinct.... . The so-called pre-linguistic grasp of the object cannot have any firm grip unless the object is sufficiently distinguished, and if it is sufficiently distinguished, *vimarśa* has already set in, and *śabdabhāvanā* is implicit. A pure *prakāśa* without *vimarśa* is impossible in this theory.... . Perception without conception is blind and conception without perception is mute.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ तेन जडात्स हि विलक्षणः ।

¹⁵¹ Matilal, 1990: 7.

¹⁵² Ibid.

In describing reflective awareness as the very essence of reality AG distances himself from the Advaita Vedāntins whose view of the ultimate reality has no scope for reflective activity or ideation, hence their Brahman is supposed to be 'without *vimarśa*' (*nirvimarśa*). There is implied criticism of the Sāṃkhya proponents who consider knowledge as reflectional (*pratisaṅkrānti*) but devoid of consciousness. His main target is Buddhists, Dharmakīrti in particular, whose Nyāyabindu (1.5 and 2.33) is at the back of his mind. Contradicting him, AG denies that *parāmarśa* has anything to do with the association of words, but constitutes the intrinsic nature of knowledge, *jñāna*.¹⁵³

In order to state his position AG evaluates the metaphor of crystal, which his master UTP borrows from BH.¹⁵⁴ The analogy serves BH in two ways – one, to show that we can know the external world through language alone; two "the crystal analogy illumines its passivity. Language splits up and multiplies what is one, unites what is discrete, but reflects what is in front of it."¹⁵⁵ However, AG takes recourse to the crystal/mirror analogy to arrive at a different conclusion. In describing *pratyavamarśa* as the essence of knowledge he not only visualizes thought as being dependent upon the word alone, but also on the subject, making word as synonymous with its (subject's) reflectivity and thereby eliminates passivity of language which is now enlivened by the agential participation. In order to drive his point home AG talks of two types of essences – (i) primary and (ii) secondary. According to UTP, light's secondary nature consists in its purity or translucence (*nairmalya* or *svacchatā*) but has nothing to do with non-insentience (*ajādyā*). The primary essence consists in reflection or in being reflectively aware. This is what the term *pratyavamarśa* stands for. Similarly there are three stages of light and their respective lighting sources:

- (i) Simple illumination – as in the case of a lamp, sun or fire. One characteristic of light is that it reveals itself as well as others.
- (ii) Reflection – as in the case of a mirror or crystal. The first characteristic of light is retained here. Besides, these assume or have the capacity to assume the form of the reflected. This latter trait is not found in the former category.
- (iii) Judgement – as in the case of knowledge or cognition. Whereas it shares the former two traits in common with mirror etc, it differs from mirror etc in the sense that it receives reflection

¹⁵³ आर्यधर्मकीर्तरेवंप्रायाः पृथक्प्रयुक्तीरपरिगणयतः इति उक्तं प्राक् । . . . तथा हि न अत्र समयायत्तयोजना उक्ता यतो विकल्पता आपतेत्, अपितु विमर्शरूपता बोधस्य नैसर्गिकी . . . इत्याशयेन आह सूत्रम् । IPVV II, p. 174.

¹⁵⁴ स्फटिकादि यथा द्रव्यं भिन्नरूपैरुपाश्रयैः । स्वशक्तियोगात् संबन्धं ताद्रूप्येणोपगच्छति । Vāk III. 3.40.

¹⁵⁵ Radhika Herzberger, 1986: 52.

and at the same time knows that it is receiving reflection. Now this capacity of being aware, of consciously apperceiving, responding and reacting is what is known as *pratyavamarśa*.

It is this *pratyavamarśa* which constitutes the primary essence or the principal nature of knowledge. Since such a conscious apperception is not possible without being grounded in the conscious subject, it is identified with the subjective reflectivity transfiguring consciousness into I-consciousness, distinguishing the sentient from the insentient which is incapable of conscious apperception.¹⁵⁶ We may go back to AG's analysis of BH's kārikā. It will be evident as to why he insists so much on the verbal element in the suffix part. In an analogous and yet slightly different etymological formulation he notes that the stem part in *prakāśate* or *prakāśeta*, that is, the root (*pra*) + *kāś*, is common to all lighting sources in its passivity, whereas the suffix part underlines the agential activity and freedom¹⁵⁷ which is the extraordinary mark of the consciousness of light or *prakāśa*. That is why in the later kārikās we find AG often compares the Buddhists with the followers of Sāṃkhya in this particular aspect. On this line of thought we now understand that AG differs from the Buddhists not only in his evaluation of the notion of *vimarśa*, but in that of *prakāśa* also. Because in the Buddhist formulation of knowledge, it does not go beyond correspondence or conformity of the knowledge with the object (*sārūpya* or *parasārūpya*) and hence stops at the second or intermediary level, whereas the Abhinavan formulation goes beyond and embraces subject (i.e., agent).

Now, once having succeeded in infusing agential participation, AG adds at least two more dimensions to the notion of *pratyavamarśa* emerging from its conceptualization in terms of primacy (*mukhyatā*). The first (in fact he opens his commentary here with the solemn declaration of his intent and then repeats the same in the beginning of 1.5.13 also) happens to be that *pratyavamarśa* is constitutive of the religious language and that it has a soteriological dimension to it. *pratyavamarśa* is transconventional religiosity innate within us nourished by the fact that those who really know also know that the entire knowledge in its deepest aspect consists in *mantra* which may be understood to consist in transcendental apperception of the ultimate reality as belonging to and enshrined within our innermost self.¹⁵⁸ Thus

¹⁵⁶ प्रकाशस्य असंस्पृष्टस्य तत एव अकादिप्रकाशविलक्षणस्य परसारूप्यं प्रतिबिम्बायमानपरतादात्म्यक्षमत्वमस्ति स्वभावान्तरं यतस्तेन वपुषा घटादेर्बोधो विशिष्यते, तथापि न तत् मुख्यं जडेऽपि मणिमुकुरप्रभृतौ तस्य संभवात्, विमर्शस्तु जडे न संभवति इति अनन्यविषयत्वात् स मुख्य आत्मेति उक्तम् । IPVV II, p. 177.

¹⁵⁷ अत्र नैर्मल्याद् प्रकाशनरूपात् प्रकृतिमात्रविश्रान्तादतिरिक्तः कर्तृतालक्षणः स्वातन्त्र्यस्वभावो यः प्रत्ययस्य अर्थः । Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ अवभासयति अर्थानिति अवभासः प्रकाशः, तस्य विमर्शमहमिति अकृत्रिममसाङ्केतिकं स्वातन्त्र्यरूपमात्मविश्रान्तिलक्षणं स्वभावं जानन्ति ते तत्त्वविदो ये मन्त्रशरीरं बोधतत्त्वं श्रीमातृकाश्रीमालिन्यादितत्त्वं मन्यन्ते । युक्तं चैतत् । Ibid., p. 174.

the tantric formulations of religious and spiritually symbolic languages as *mātrkā* and *mālinī* etc. are resorted to only to deepen our awareness.

The second dimension that AG, following UTP, adds to it is aesthetical.¹⁵⁹ In this context AG integrates the notion of joy with *pratyavamarśa*. Joy is the feeling of fulfillment – an experience of perfection; wherever there is even slightest joy it is due to self-reflective awareness (*svātmāparāmarśa*). Thus higher the level of self-fulfillment, deeper the joy. Carrying it to its logical end, *vimarśa* is transformed into the notion of *camatkāra* (aesthetic relish). The most compact and dense reflection over one's own being, where the subjective part subjugates and overwhelms the objective part is *camatkāra*¹⁶⁰ which consists in relishing primarily the subjective aspect. The notion of connoisseur is modelled exactly in the same terms.¹⁶¹ This formulation of AG comes from an entirely original appreciation and re-interpretation of BH's understanding of the experience as *bhoga* which has its roots in the agent (*kartā*) being treated as *bhoktā* in the Grammarian school from the very beginning.

The following *kārikā*, i.e. IPK 1.5.12,¹⁶² as we had occasion to note, acts as a bridge between IPK 1.5.11 and 1.5.13 and has been inspired by Vāk 1.118(126) and Vṛtti thereon. At both the places (in IPVV on IPK 1.1.4 and IPV on IPK 1.5.14), the way it is cited¹⁶³ the citation appears to have formed part of the Vākyapadīya *kārikās* and not of the Vṛtti. However it is a textual problem and may be left at that. UTP in this *kārikā* offers two interpretations of Vasugupta's Śīvasūtra placing attribute and substantive in apposition (cf. *caitanya* 1.1). According to him this deliberate positioning of the two by Vasugupta is intended to convey the supremacy of the attribute, i.e., consciousness, over the conscious agent. By incorporating Vasugupta in the IP *kārikās* and Kallaṭa in the IPV and IPVV, AG wants to demonstrate that the whole tradition supports this formulation.

By grammatically analyzing the derivation of the word *caitanya*, AG unfolds UTP's new equation between consciousness *qua* activity and consciousness *qua* agency.¹⁶⁴ This formulation seems to have been prompted

¹⁵⁹ यस्तु आनन्दांशस्तत्र स्वात्मपरामर्शरूपतैव प्रयोजिका । Ibid., p. 178.

¹⁶⁰ तस्मादनुपचरितस्य संवेदनरूपतान्तरातीयकत्वेन अवस्थितस्य स्वतन्त्रस्यैव रसनैकघनतया परामर्शः परमानन्दो निर्वृतिश्चमत्कार उच्यते । Ibid., p. 179.

¹⁶¹ तत एव हृदयेन परामर्शलक्षणेन प्राधान्यात् व्यपदेश्या व्यवस्थितस्यापि प्रकाशभागस्य वेद्यविश्रान्तस्य अनादरणात् सहृदयता उच्यते । Ibid., pp. 178-179.

¹⁶² आत्मात एव चैतन्यं चित्क्रियाचितिकर्तृता । तात्पर्येणोदितस्तेन जडात्स हि विलक्षणः ॥

¹⁶³ सैषा संसारिणां संज्ञा बहिरन्तश्च वर्तते । तदुत्क्रान्तौ विसंज्ञोऽयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुड्यवत् ॥

¹⁶⁴ तथाहि संबन्धिविश्रान्तस्य प्रतीतेः द्रव्यरूपस्य च संबन्धिनः प्रकृत्या उक्तत्वात् चित्क्रियारूपं धर्मं संबद्धमवगमयता ध्याना निष्कृष्टांशः प्रत्यायितो भवति । IPV I, p. 247.

by the Vṛtti where it lays down identity between the Word-Principle and the activity of consciousness. However the main difference lies in their formulation of *citi*: '(principle of) consciousness.' In BH *caitanya* is understood to constitute the activity of consciousness (*citikriyā*).¹⁶⁵ But AG goes beyond. He reduces all activity (*citikriyā*) to the agency (*citau karṭṛā*) and that constitutes the consciousness as a potential source of distinction between the sentient and the insentient. AG seems to be saying that even when *caitanya* is spoken of as activity it must be deemed to be none other than the agency ever present in consciousness. In the IPV, AG embarks upon a new theorization where *caitanya* is interpreted as both the activity as well as the agency.¹⁶⁶ On this interpretation BH's formulation in the Vṛtti as the activity of consciousness may be supported, but AG also notes that it has no support from the tradition. It may be noted that though the term *vimarśa* does not figure in the present kārīkā, AG in the IPV and IPVV both, reduces *caitanya* into *vimarśa* and projects the latter as the single most distinctive attribute of the self.¹⁶⁷

AG arrogates these lines from BH to support our notion of life at a more practical level in his IPVV on IPK 1.1.4.¹⁶⁸ The powers (or the faculties, one may say) of knowledge and action constitute the very life of the sentient beings and the being of the insentient depends entirely on the sentient. The three terms occurring in BH, viz. *antaḥsamjña*, *bahiḥsamjña* and *visamjña*, it appears, form the central theme of the discussion.¹⁶⁹ It is through the sense of speech and the language spoken that we get access to one's sentiency in the absence of which one is supposed to be dead or senseless, because it is speech that urges and engages us in our pragmatic pursuits that constitute our practical life.¹⁷⁰ These faculties of knowledge and action are the practical or the more concrete manifestations of our consciousness. Thus AG enlarges the ambit of BH's kārīkā, because the life of the sentient is not self-confined, it touches and enlivens the life of even the insentient objects with which we deal and interact making life an ordered whole. Thus AG, like BH, visualizes continuity between the two levels and a clear appreciation of this fact, AG demonstrates, helps one realize one's inner divinity.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁵ वाक्त्वरूपमेव चित्क्रियारूपमित्यन्ये । Vṛtti on Vāk 1.118, p. 193.

¹⁶⁶ यदि वा चित्क्रिया आत्मा उदितः चित्तिकर्तृता च इति पृथगेव । एवं तु न क्वचित् पठितम् । IPV I, p. 249.

¹⁶⁷ तदेव परत्वेन प्रधानतया अभिसंधाय आत्मा चेतन इति वक्तव्ये धर्मान्तराधरीकरणाय विमर्शधर्मोद्धरीकरणाय च आत्मा चैतन्यम् इत्युक्तम् । Ibid., pp. 248-249.

¹⁶⁸ तथा हि जडभूतानां प्रतिष्ठा जीवदाश्रया । ज्ञानं क्रिया च भूतानां जीवतां जीवनं मतम् ॥

¹⁶⁹ अत्र अर्थे तत्रभवद्भर्तृहरिपठितमागमं लिखति । तदुक्तान्तौ इति । IPVV I, p. 100.

¹⁷⁰ बहिरपितु यत् विशेषवृत्तिरूपं वचनादानादि.... तेन वागादिद्वारेण तादात्म्यापन्नमान्तरमपि जीवनं प्रत्यक्षत्वेनैव अभिमन्यते । Ibid.

¹⁷¹ तदयं प्रमाता ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तियोगादीश्वरः । IPV I, pp. 67-68.

As we said earlier, UTP's *kārikā* 1.5.13¹⁷² is purported to be an exegesis of the *vāgrūpatā* element of Vāk 1.116.¹⁷³ Going by AG, both in the IPV and IPVV, this *kārikā* is addressed to UTP's two main concerns: One, this subjective agency (which was the central theme of the preceding *kārikā*), having *parāmarśa* as its nature, essentially consists in *mantra* and *śabdana*; two, this agency stands for the sovereignty, to use Padoux' term, of the Supreme Self (*aiśvarya*).¹⁷⁴ The other concern lies in offering additional support to the theme of previous *kārikā* that *pratyavamarśa*'s structural essentiality distinguishes the sentient from the insentient.¹⁷⁵ The additional ground, furnished by this *kārikā*, consists in enlarging the scope of consciousness-activity by equating *vimarśa* with supreme speech and freedom in its primary sense.

As part of his exegetical strategies AG offers two formulations of *pratyavamarśa* in the IPV. The first formulation is in terms of *camatkāra* which qualifies the consciousness-activity (*citikriyā*)¹⁷⁶ and the other in terms of *śabdana* which encompasses the consciousness-agency (*citikartṛtā*). The second formulation ipso facto incorporates the first, hence ultimately there remains only one formulation. This is the reason that in the IPVV, this exegetical distinction has not been maintained.

It is the latter exposition of *pratyavamarśa*¹⁷⁷ by AG in his IPV that has attracted world-wide attention.¹⁷⁸ *pratyavamarśa* is an inner verbalization not dependent upon any convention, a state of uninterrupted self-relishing, and happens to be the source and foundation of all such thoughts as find expression in phrases like 'this is blue', 'I am Caitra' which draw their essence from the use of conventional words. The implicit reference to the ground *pratyavamarśa* and the superstructural one, or the primary and secondary *pratyavamarśas*, leads AG's commentator Bhāskara to think of two types of thoughts, namely (i) those in the nature of pure reflectiveness

¹⁷² चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा परावाक् स्वरसोदिता । स्वातन्त्र्यमेतन्मुखं तदैश्वर्यं परमात्मनः ॥

¹⁷³ Here we will refer the reader to R. Torella, 2003: 80-104, which in the main focusses on IPK 1.5.13 and 1.5.19. We will concentrate only on those aspects which have not been touched there or need some special focus.

¹⁷⁴ परामर्शमयी विमर्शनलक्षणैव या कर्तृता सैव मान्त्री शब्दनरूपा । . . . परमात्मनश्च एषैव कर्तृता ऐश्वर्यम् . . . एतदुभयमाह कारिकाया । IPVV II, p. 187.

¹⁷⁵ (a) तस्मात् युक्तमुक्तम् . . . तेन जडात् स हि विलक्षणः । IPV I, p. 255.

(b) ततो युक्तमवोचाम . . . तेन जडात्स हि विलक्षणः । IPVV II, p. 198.

¹⁷⁶ चेतयति इत्यत्र या चितिः चितिक्रिया, तस्याः प्रत्यवमर्शः स्वात्मचमत्कारलक्षण आत्मा स्वभावः । IPV I, p. 250.

¹⁷⁷ प्रत्यवमर्शश्च आन्तराभिलाषात्मकशब्दनस्वभावः, तच्च शब्दनं सङ्केतनिरपेक्षमेव अविच्छिन्नचमत्कारात्मकम् अन्तर्मुखशिरोनिर्देशप्राख्यम् अकारादिमायीयसङ्केतिकशब्दजीवितभूतनीलमिदं चैत्रोऽहमित्यादिप्रत्यवमर्शान्तराभित्तिभूतत्वात् । Ibid., pp. 252-253.

¹⁷⁸ See Padoux 1990: 174-177; Iyer 1969: 107-108.

(*citirūpapratyavamarśa*) and (ii) those in the nature of determinate or mentally constructed reflectiveness (*vikalparūpapratyavamarśa*).

By reducing *pratyavamarśa* to *śabdāna* the way is paved for identifying *pratyavamarśa* with *parā vāk*.¹⁷⁹ It is *parā* because it is full, complete and it is *vāk* because it expresses everything and this speaking is in the nature of *vimarśana*: it formulates, as explained by Bhāskara,¹⁸⁰ “through conscious identification-cum-recognition.”¹⁸¹

AG, elsewhere, explains the logic behind terming *vimarśa* as *vāk* in an extremely complex formulation. He says, in order to appreciate *vimarśa* as *vimarśa* it is necessary that it is called *vāk*, because *vimarśa* is nothing but verbalizing for the simple reason that it is grounded in experience.¹⁸² This method of articulation, not through utterance but through the inner reflective process, is what brings us back to the māntric nature of speech and its phonematic progression. In the *kārikā*, the use of the word *parā* does not indicate any reference to the quadripartition of speech, at least so far as the IPV is concerned. There, *parā*, being full because of the non-dependence on any external element, expresses itself as ‘I’, whereas other non-ultimate states, whose fullness varies, find expression as ‘this’. But in the IPVV, AG considers this aspect in detail *vis-a-vis* BH’s tripartition theory. We are not concerned with this issue at the moment. It is however interesting to know that by the time of Abhinava, the new generation of grammarians started subscribing to the fourth level of speech as against the three levels accepted by BH. This is what one gathers from the very conscious reference to the ‘old grammarians’ (*jaradvaiyākaraṇāḥ*) made by AG himself.¹⁸³

In IPK 1.5.14, UTP does not add anything new in regard to BH’s theorization of *vāk*, but in the concluding *kārikā* of the Pratyabhijñā-cluster (of *kārikās*), he does close his exegesis by referring to Vāk 1.115 and 1.116 in the IPVV, and by quoting them in full in the IPV. According to AG, UTP is invoking scriptural and āgamic support for his formulation. In enlisting āgamic sanction AG places BH in the sacred company of the Mālinīvijayottara-tantra and the Sarvavīratāntra.

Uncovering āgamic roots, UTP invents a few more equations of *pratyavamarśa* with the ‘dynamic vibration’ (*sphurattā*) and the ‘absolute becoming’ (*mahāsattā*). AG derives them grammatically in terms of the

¹⁷⁹ पूर्णत्वात् परा, वक्ति विश्वमभिलपति प्रत्यवमर्शेन इति च वाक् । IPV I, p. 253.

¹⁸⁰ प्रत्यवमर्शवृत्त्या न तु उच्चारवृत्त्या । Bhāskari, IPV I, p. 253.

¹⁸¹ Iyer 1969: 107.

¹⁸² विमर्शस्य च संवेदनालंबित्वात् शब्दनरूपतास्वीकारेण विमर्शरूपताभिधानाय वाक्यदमुपात्तम् । IPVV I, p. 105.

¹⁸³ ननु पश्यन्त्येव परं तत्त्वमिति जरद्वैयाकरणा मन्यन्ते । Ibid., II, p. 191.

subjective agency where even becoming becomes an expression of the Supreme Self's agential function in terms of being. Another exegetic addition is viewing these equations in terms of *śakti*. Thus *sphurattā* is linked to *spandaśakti* when referred to in the Spandakārikā and *vimarśaśakti* when related with the Śivadr̥ṣṭi. As *mantra* it is *parāvākśakti* and as *pratyavamarśa* it is *citiśakti*. *spanda* is so interpreted as to account for the notion of unification or holding together (*pratisandhāna*) which is made to play an extremely significant role in the Abhinavan analysis of indeterminate cognition. By an exegesis of the word *sāratayā* (lit., by virtue of being the essence) AG reverts to IPK 1.1.4 and grounds the insentient in the conscious and the conscious in the pure awareness (*prakāśa*) and the consciousness or thought in the I-consciousness (*aham-vimarśa*). Thus *mantra*, representing as it does 'I-consciousness', is presented as the heart, which according to AG, is not metaphorical but very much real.¹⁸⁴

We have to stop here. Though there are many issues that remain to be attended to and also many insights that may be gathered from a perusal of the remaining kārikās of this cluster as well as those of other clusters, it is time to leave the issues here to be taken up at some other point of time in future. Thus we may conclude that it is to the credit of AG and his mentor UTP that the holistic and processive implications of BH's theory of word-impregnation are fully brought into bold relief by visualizing language as a dynamic creative principle firmly rooted in the agential wholeness from which the entire stretch of subjective and objective reality and its phenomenal and transphenomenal manifestations are logically abstracted to be recognized as self-identical emergent referents in I-experience. In sum, *vāk* qua *pratyavamarśa* emerges as becoming (*bhavattā/sphurattā*), as experiencing (*saṁvedana*), as verbalizing/expressing (*śabdana*) and as relishing (*bhoga/āsvādana*) marked by a homologous inner reciprocity in the exegesis of AG.

¹⁸⁴ न अत्र उपचरितं हृदयत्वम्, अपितु मुख्यमेव इति भावः । IPVV II, 206.

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IPK *Īśvarapratyabhijñānākārikā*, see Torella 2002.

IPK Vṛ *Vṛtti of Utpaldeva on IPK*, see Torella 2002.

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M.BH *Vyākaraṇa–Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali with Bhāṣyapradīpa (Pradīpa) of Kaiyaṭa and Bhāṣyapradīpoddhyota (Uddyota) of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa*, ed. Bhārgava Śāstri Bhīkājī Jośī, Nirnaya Sagar edition. Reprint: Delhi, 1987.

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From an Adversary to the Main Ally: The Place of Bhartṛhari in the Kashmirian Śaiva Advaita

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Generally speaking, we know very little of what happened in the atelier of Indian philosophers, also owing to the total lack of personal notes left by them, not to speak of 'working' journals. For example, we know nothing of the inner developments which made Śaṅkaranandana abandon Śaivism and embrace Buddhism,¹ or of the possible intellectual wanderings of a Maṇḍana Mīśra between Pūrvā and Uttarā Mīmāṃsā. Apparently less dramatic but at least equally puzzling was the change of attitude of the Pratyabhijñā school towards Bhartṛhari, which took place very quickly in the span of only one generation and opposition between Somānanda and Utpaladeva, the recognized founder of the Pratyabhijñā and its systematizer, respectively, also closely bound to each other by a direct *guru-śiṣya* relationship.²

The significance of looking into such a change of attitude, which in a broader sense is also a paradigm change proper, goes far beyond the mere fact of clarifying a little mystery in the doctrinal history of one of the most important philosophical schools of traditional India to investigate the problematic aspects of distancing oneself from one's own guru, and, lastly,

¹ On this very interesting author, see Krasser 2001.

² Somānanda's criticism of Bhartṛhari has received the attention of several eminent scholars: Gaurinath Sastri 1959: 59-61, 68-73; Seyfort Ruegg 1959: 113-114; Gnoli 1959: 55-63; Filliozat 1994: 471-474; Dwivedi 1993.

to show how the choice of the opponents and allies may be the outcome of a definite plan rather than a fact of mere liking or disliking some world view. Moreover, and this is what has the more direct relevance for the present conference, such enquiry can shed an additional light not so much on some points of Bhartṛhari's doctrine but on the way it was received by other schools, and, more in general, on his lasting and pervading influence in Indian philosophical thought, also outside the range of grammatical speculation.

What first strikes us is the fact that Somānanda after giving an outline of the main tenets of his Śiva-based philosophy in the forty-nine verses of the first chapter of the Śivadṛṣṭi,³ immediately embarks himself on a very aggressive and detailed criticism of a few crucial points of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, without naming him directly but referring to 'vaiyākaraṇas' in general.

But let us first summarize the contents:

The Grammarians who think themselves so clever – says Somānanda quoting passages from the Vākyapadiya and the vṛtti – claim that the supreme Brahman is to be identified with Paśyantī Vāc, but the latter at the most is identifiable with the power of Knowledge that corresponds to the plane of Sadāśiva – definitely not to the highest plane. In fact, as the word itself says, Paśyantī 'sees' something. But what is the nature of its objects? If we say that they are externalized images that it itself has produced, we must ask ourselves whether they are real or unreal. In the first case the distinctive feature of this philosophy is lacking, namely seeing the manifestation as illusory (*vivarta*); the unreality of what it sees would have repercussions on it, rendering it *asatya*, which is inadmissible. If the cause of this perceiving unreal things is nescience, it is the latter that must be established as being real or not: if it is real, then Paśyantī is contaminated by it; if it is not real, it is not understood how there can be relation between a real thing and an unreal one. The same is also true of its creation. Moreover, this nescience can be seen neither as an attribute of Paśyantī (for the above mentioned reasons); nor of something else, since nothing real exists apart from it; nor is it to be considered as independent, because then it would be impossible to suppress it. Neither can *avidyā* be imputed only to the middle level, because in any case it is Paśyantī that is the cause of it. If Paśyantī is to be identified with the *sphoṭa*, we must ask ourselves how words, unreal as they are, can manifest it. Even the belief that pronouncing a correct word leads to heaven results in attributing to the only reality that can be its subject characteristics which are contrary to its nature, such as the desire for particular fruitions, etc. It is not possible to posit as the highest reality that which, because of its very nature, always remains – however you put it – an instrument of action (*vāc*). Not even identifying the *śabdatattva* without beginning and end with Parā Vāc makes sense, since this means identifying the object (sound) with the instrument (voice). If, then, Paśyantī is said to be only a proper noun and hence to escape all the criticism concerning the fact of seeing, etc., and that it is only the feminine ending that counts – which is intended

³The first chapter has been translated into English by Raniero Gnoli (1957). The same author has also translated (into Italian) the second chapter (1959).

to express its being the power of Knowledge –, the reply is that, if it has nothing to do with seeing, it is insentient and therefore cannot be the power of Knowledge either.

Then, the attributes that a verse⁴ assigns to Paśyantī are criticised one by one. And so on in this vein, until his final outburst: But why on earth have you left the sphere of grammar and taken it into your head to deal with a field which is not yours, like philosophy? (Torella 2002: xix-xx)

We can single out in Somānanda's criticism three main targets:

- 1) the identification *parabrahman-śabdarūpa-paśyanti-parāvāc*;
- 2) the claim of *vyākaraṇa* to go beyond the narrow domain of grammar proper and constitute a world view;
- 3) as a world view, its preaching the unreality of manifested universe, just as within the field of linguistic speculation it upholds the basic unreality of sounds with respect to the *śphoṭa* they are supposed to reveal.

It seems apparent that we are in front of two competing world views. So does Utpaladeva understand the debate to come, when in the short *bhūmikā* to the second chapter he contrasts *īśvarādvayavāda* and *śabda-parabrahmādvayavāda*, and takes the following arguments against *śabdādvaitavāda* as aimed to confute the latter.⁵ Two crucial points are represented by the concepts of *avidyā* and *vivarta*, which he also discusses later on, in Chapter VI, when dealing with various schools of *vedāntavādins*. However, whereas Somānanda will treat them in a few verses, he devotes a full chapter to *śabdādvaitavāda*. Since we may not think that a highly sophisticated doctrine like that may have represented a direct challenge to *īśvarādvayavāda* in the Kashmir of his times in terms of 'popularity', we are left with the hypothesis that Somānanda attacks it precisely because, apart from few points, this is theoretically too close to the new Śaiva *darśana* that he has set out to build. This could explain the total lack of fair play in his attitude to Bhartṛhari, which recalls the fiery fightings between insiders rather than the cold dismissal of a rank outsider. By 'total lack of fair play' I refer both to the unnecessary sarcastic remarks and the punctilious pointing out of seeming contradictions in terminology, which show a Somānanda deliberately unwilling to catch the gist of Bhartṛhari's conception and expound it by doing justice to its boldness and originality.

⁴ *avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā/svarūpajyotir evāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāg anapāyini*//.
This verse, frequently quoted, is included (with reserve) by Rau — along with the entire passage to which it belongs — in the *kārikā* text (I.167); Iyer, instead, takes it as a quotation given in the *Vṛtti*.

⁵ *īśvarādvayavāda eva yuktiyukto na tu śabdaparabrahmādvayavāda iti vaktum vaiyākaraṇopetaśabdādvaitaṃ tāvan nirākartum upakramamāṇa āha* (Śivadr̥ṣṭi-vṛtti p. 36, ll. 4-5).
The *īśvarādvayavāda* guarantees the *satyatā* of the universe (ibid., p. 88, l.7-p. 89, l.29).

Somānanda does not show any interest, not even a critical one, to Bhartṛhari as epistemologist and grammarian, but only to his metaphysics of *śabdabrahman*. In fact most of Somānanda's attention is caught by the famous first verse of the *Brahmakāṇḍa* and the almost equally famous verse, quoted in the *vṛtti*, where the nature of Paśyantī is described (see above, note 4). Then, while concluding the main part of his criticism with a very basic observation ("why on earth have you grammarians left grammar aside to seek instead 'knowledge', which is not your business?"), he adds that this would-be knowledge is also expressed in another work of them, called *Samikṣā*.⁶ Utpaladeva clarifies that Somānanda is referring here to a verse (again of a metaphysical content) from another work by Bhartṛhari, the *Śabdadhātusamikṣā*, or rather *Ṣaḍdhātu*^o, as a passage from Utpaladeva's *vṛtti* seems to presuppose,⁷ and also reads the *Spandapradīpikā*.⁸ However, as a seeming exception, Somānanda at the very beginning of the chapter (II.10ab) does quote an 'epistemological' verse, the well-known *na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte* (*Vākyapadīya* I.131). But in the course of his rather wild attack he apparently forgets it. Or, more probably, I believe, what he had in mind in quoting that verse was rather its being used as an *anvaya* argument to prove the *śabda* nature of the ultimate cause of manifested world (so again a metaphysical content).

Knowing the central role that Bhartṛhari would play in the *Pratyabhijñā* philosophy from Utpaladeva onwards, we are legitimately curious to see how the latter may put up with his so much disparaging master. Disappointingly, Utpaladeva remains more or less impassive in commenting on him, and we have to read his *vṛtti* very attentively to detect just some very slight traces of disagreement here and there. The most reasonable explanation could have been that the *vṛtti* is an early work, and Utpaladeva, after originally sharing his master's views on Bhartṛhari, changed his mind subsequently. But this is not how things stand, since the *vṛtti* is obviously posterior to the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*kārikā, which he quotes and refers to frequently. The impression is that Utpaladeva consciously plays with a certain ambiguity. He never declares openly his disagreement with his master Somānanda on the judgement about Bhartṛhari as a whole, but, for example, it seems to be not by chance that when Somānanda's ruthless attacks are just reaching their apex, he cites in the *vṛtti* the name of their 'victim' by

⁶ II.72-73ab. *vaiyākaraṇatām tyaktvā vijñānānveṣaṇena kim / bhavalām aprastutena na kevalam ihoditam // vijñānābhāsanam yāvat samikṣāyām udāhṛtam* /. Then, the KSTS edition becomes rather confused: obviously, the *śloka* beginning with *dikkālādī*^o (p. 84, ll. 4-5), included in the *vṛtti*, in fact belongs to the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*.

⁷ *dhātuṣaṭkopagamād bhedavāde deśakālayago 'vaśyaṃbhāvīti* (*Śivadr̥ṣṭi-vṛtti* p. 86, l.4).

⁸ p. 10. The form *Dhātusamikṣā*, which occurs on p. 4, is likely to be only the abbreviation of the latter. On this work, see Gaurinath Sastri 1959: 61; Iyer 1968: 9-10.

putting before it quite unexpectedly the epithet ‘*vidvad-*’ (p. 84, l.3). Another point of the *vṛtti* deserves our attention. In verse II.19⁹ Somānanda gives voice to an opponent who objects to *vāc* being considered (by Somānanda) a mere *karmendriya*, not too different from an organ of locomotion, like the foot. In the process of reaching a reflective awareness of something (the opponent says) *vāc* stands first, taking the form of knowledge itself. Somānanda totally overlooks this quite reasonable objection, and impatiently returns to what concerns him more at the moment: the examination and demolition of Paśyantī. Utpaladeva, for his part, takes the argument very seriously and develops it thoroughly, but in such a way that it is clear that he is no more dealing with an opponent’s view but with one of his own favourite doctrines: the centrality of the word for the arising of the knowledge and understanding process, which he owes precisely to Bhartṛhari. Then, to take up again the thread of Somānanda’s discourse he concludes abruptly: *āstām anyad etat* (p. 49, l.13). In fact, a bit too overtly he had put his own words into the opponent’s mouth. Instead, in what I have listed above as point 2, Utpaladeva appears to be in real agreement with his master. The Grammarians should refrain from pushing too far their pretensions to embrace the totality of being. The aim of grammar, Utpaladeva says, is to teach correct words, being able, as such, to cause the comprehension of meaning, whereas *samyagjñāna* must be pursued by the śāstras having liberation as their aim.¹⁰ So *vyākaraṇa*, even in the prestigious and culturally very complex form that it has received particularly from Bhartṛhari’s contribution, cannot claim a full autonomy, but is expected to be, or become, a part of a wider religio-philosophical context. This is precisely what Utpaladeva intends to do, when he integrates Bhartṛhari’s teaching into the new Śaiva theology.

But, as we said earlier, when Utpaladeva writes his commentary on the Śivadṛṣṭi, he has already made his choices and composed his masterwork, the Īśvarapratyabhijñānakārikā. In it, the presence of Bhartṛhari, particularly Bhartṛhari, the epistemologist, is overwhelming. What is the reason that has made Utpaladeva appropriate Bhartṛhari’s teaching against his guru Somānanda? The reason, to my mind, is to be sought in the structure itself and the motivations of the Īśvarapratyabhijñānakārikā. If we look into the two seminal works of the Pratyabhijñā, we realize that they belong to two different orders both in contents and addressees. More rooted in the Śaiva scriptures, on one hand, and more ‘self-centred’ on the other – and consequently more willing to dispose of any antagonist doctrine – is the

⁹ *vimarśānubhavenaiśā yathā vāk prathamam śrītā/ lakṣyate bodharūpeṇa na tathā caraṇādikam//*

¹⁰ *arthapratītihetusādhūśabdānuśāsanavyāpāram eva vaiyākaraṇatvaṁ tyaktvā mokṣaprayojanaiḥ śāstraiḥ yat samyagjñānam anusaraṇīyaṁ tadānuveśaṇena bhavatām karaṇīyatvenāprastutena na kiṃcīt* (Śivadṛṣṭi-vṛtti p. 83, l.3 - p. 84, l.1).

Śivadr̥ṣṭi. More analytical and 'strategical' is the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā, which, instead of dispersing its philosophical energies against an undifferentiated multiplicity of opponents, very lucidly selects just one, the most prestigious philosophical (and also religious) tradition of the Kashmir of that time, outside the Śaiva tradition (to which instead the other great tradition of Kashmir, the Vaiṣṇava Pāñcarātra is more or less closely related). For various reasons (the principle one probably being the will to present the new Pratyabhijñā theologians as the champions of the entire Śaiva tradition against the main common antagonist; see Torella 2002: XXI–XXIII), these privileged opponents are the Buddhists, especially those belonging to the so-called logico-epistemological school (Torella 1992). Buddhist doctrines are criticized also by Somānanda, who did know of Dharmakīrti too – two verses of his Pramāṇavārttika are easily recognizable in the Śivadr̥ṣṭi (I.45cd-46ab¹¹ and VI.39¹²) – but there the Buddhists are opponents just like many others, without being extended the special status they have in the work of Utpaladeva, for whom they, admired and attacked in an equally strong way, are so to speak the most intimate enemies.¹³ The criticism of their positions is to Utpaladeva of substantial help in building and refining of Pratyabhijñā philosophy: the two processes run in fact parallel.

Two radically different world views are at stake here: the depersonalized universe of the Buddhists, made of discrete and discontinuous realities tentatively connected in the ultimately unreal net of *vyavahāra* – unreal insofar as it is the product of a 'secondary' conceptual thought – and the absolutely unitary universe of the Śaivas, identified with and penetrated by a supreme Person, Śiva, who runs through it like a golden thread unifying all the seeming multiplicity and dynamically transforming the apparently other into himself and himself into the other. Closely connected with Utpaladeva's choice of establishing the Buddhists as the main opponents is his adoption of Bhartṛhari as the main ally. At this point some questions may be asked: why Bhartṛhari? and, again: can he really be 'used' against the Buddhists? what has been historically their attitude to him? A straightforward answer is not possible, but, indirectly, precisely their problematic reaction to him represents the fulfilment of primary

¹¹ *dr̥ṣyante 'tra tadicchāto bhāvā bhūtyādīyogataḥ// tatra mītyhāsvarūpaṃ cet sthāpyāgre satyatedr̥ṣām/*. Cf. Pramāṇavārttika III. 282 *kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ / abhūtān api paśyanti purato 'vasthitān iva*. Utpaladeva's comments make even more evident that Dharmakīrti is the source (p. 33, l. 7 *kāmaśokabhayādīyogāc ca te te bhāvāḥ puraḥ sphuranāto dr̥ṣyante*).

¹² *bhedavān ili lakṣyatve dr̥ṣṭānto 'sti na tādṛśaḥ/ grāhyagrāhakaśaṃvittir bhedavān iva lakṣyate//*. Cf. Pramāṇavārttika III. 354 *avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmaviparyāsitadarśanaiḥ/grāhyagrāhakaśaṃvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate//*.

¹³ I owe this expression to my colleague and friend Arindam Chakrabarti.

requirement for being a very strong adversary, that is, the fact of not being a total outsider but of sharing much of the same problematics and presuppositions. In fact, Utpaladeva could have confronted the Buddhists simply by opposing the teachings of their Scriptures, which he did not only in a very secondary way, by adding an Āgama-adhikāra as a third chapter, but after the fully dialectical Jñāna- and Kriyā-adhikāra. Then, we should not forget that the Buddhist pilgrim I-tsing is even told that Bhartṛhari was a Buddhist (Takakusu 1896: 178-180). I cannot enter here into a detailed scrutiny of the Buddhist reaction to Bhartṛhari,¹⁴ which starts in a rather enigmatic way, with Dignāga reproducing more than thirty verses from the Saṃbandhasamuddeśa, which thus comes to form the main body of his Traikālyaparīkṣā, a work apparently dealing with an entirely different subject from the verses quoted (Frauwallner 1959: 113-116; Houben 1995: 273-274; interestingly, later Buddhist authors like Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin, and also non-Buddhists, like Jayaratha, do not show any doubt about Dignāga's authorship of them, see Frauwallner 1959: 114, n. 49). For Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, particularly the latter, Bhartṛhari plays the role of inspirer and opponent at the same time, leaving unmistakable traces in the elaboration of the theory of *apoha*, both in its more strictly linguistic version and in the broader one, investing the whole of conceptual thought. The most thorough, and explicit, treatment of Bhartṛhari's doctrines can be found in the Tattvasaṃgraha¹⁵ (in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's work we have to read it mainly between the lines), but the limits of space make me shift from the very elaborate pages of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (cf. Giunta 2003) to the commentary of Jñānaśrībhadrā on the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, extant only in a Tibetan translation (Unebe 2000), which, if certainly much less philosophically significant, has nonetheless the merit of presenting the main lines of the Buddhist attitude to Bhartṛhari in a quite clear and straightforward way. An additional reason for focusing on Jñānaśrībhadrā is his belonging to Kashmir and living just few decades later than Abhinavagupta. In explaining the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, perhaps the one which among the Buddhist scriptures shows the most radical criticism of the cognitive power of language and its closely associated conceptual thought,¹⁶

¹⁴ For a general survey see Lindtner 1993, which however contains not a few problematic points (see also Nakamura 1972).

¹⁵ See particularly, the whole of the Śabdabrahmaparīkṣā, Śabdārthaparīkṣā vv. 866-1211, Pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā vv. 1212-1360, Anumānaparīkṣā vv. 1361-1485, Śrutiparīkṣā passim.

¹⁶ This important sūtra (unfortunately, imperfectly edited and even more imperfectly translated into English) dwells on this subject at several points under the form of questions of Mahāmati to the Bhagavad. They belong to three main orders: the relationship between conceptual thought and language, the relationship between word and meaning, and whether language can guarantee the 'reality' of the things it designates. The first two questions receive more or less the same answer (p. 86: *bhagavān āha | na hi mahāmate vāg vikalpād anyā nānanyā*;

Jñānaśrībhadrā quotes as many as forty-six verses from the Vākyapadīya. Interestingly, most of them, the ones of a linguistic-epistemological import, are quoted with approval, and are used, sometimes mixed with Dharmakīrti's verses, as a support of the equation upheld by the Buddhist sūtra between language and conceptualization:¹⁷ they are not strictly speaking the same thing but, indeed, one is the source of the other. Different is the case with Bhartṛhari's 'metaphysical' verses dealing with *śabdabrahman* etc., which are instead quickly dismissed.¹⁸ In treasuring the linguistic/epistemological teachings of Bhartṛhari, Jñānaśrībhadrā moves along the same lines as Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, but in a much more simplistic way. In fact, unlike Jñānaśrībhadrā, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita were well aware that Bhartṛhari did not limit the pervasion of language to the conceptual thought but considered it an intrinsic feature of any kind of cognition, including the perceptual one, and they strongly objected to this.

We can now revert to Utpaladeva's philosophical atelier. In order to undermine the discontinuous universe of the Buddhists he decides to avail himself precisely of the latter doctrine, the language-imbued nature of

p. 155: *bodhisattvo mahāsattvo rutam arthād anyan nānyad iti samanupaśyati arthaṃ ca rutāt*). Also the motivations are basically the same: if they were not different, there could not be a cause/effect relationship between them; if, on the other hand, they were different, the meaning could not be manifested (p. 87: *yadi punar mahāmate vāg vikalpād anyā syād avikalpahetukī syāt | athānanyā syād arthābhivṛyaktiṃ* [Unebe's emendation, also confirmed by the following passage] *vāg na kuryāt sā kurute*; p. 154 *°jalpo vikalpavāsanāhetuko rutam ity ucyate [...] yadi ca punar mahāmate artho rutād anyāḥ syād arutārthābhivṛyaktihetukaḥ syāt sa cārtho rutenānupraviśyate prādīpeneva dhanam*). Jñānaśrībhadrā adds in his vṛtti that the words never touch external objects, and meanings are not directly connected with them but only shaped by *vikalpa*: the fact that Jñānaśrībhadrā conceives of the circularity of *vikalpa*-language-meaning is underlined by his quoting here the famous verses ascribed to Dignāga *vikalpayonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabdāyonayaḥ* (Unebe 2000: 333-334). Words can tell us nothing about the reality of things (p. 104: *abhilāpasadbhāvād bhagavan santi sarvabhāvāḥ | bhagavān āha | asatām api mahāmate bhāvānām abhilāpaḥ kriyate*...). Yet, language and conceptualization are not to be simply dismissed, they can (or have to) be used by the Bodhisattvas as a means to the supreme goal (p. 155: *evam eva mahāmate vāgvikalparutapradīpena bodhisattvā mahāsattvā vāgvikalparahilāḥ [°tām?] svapratyātmāyagatim anupraviśanti*).

¹⁷ The citation of Bhartṛhari's verses is, however, not always appropriate; cf. that of VP I.47 whose *buddhisthaḥ śabdaḥ* is wrongly identified with the *vikalpa* of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, whereas in fact it refers to *sphoṭa*.

¹⁸ But at least one Buddhist philosopher, Dignāga, did not conceal his potential appreciation also of Bhartṛhari's metaphysical ideas, provided that they be read in a Vijñānavāda perspective and by introducing, accordingly, some change in terminology; cf. the case of term *brahma*, found in a verse (most probably coming from Bhartṛhari's *Ṣaḍ/Śabda-dhātusamīkṣā*) incorporated into the *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, whose Tibetan translation *nam shes* presupposes in the Sanskrit original its substitution with '*vijñānam*' or '*cittam*' (Frauwallner 1959: 113, n. 47; Lindtner 1993: 201).

knowledge, which is meant to demolish its main foundation stone, the unsurpassable gulf between the moment of sensation and that of conceptual elaboration, representing, as it were, the very archetype of the Buddhist segmented reality. That is how some of the most famous, and crucial, verses of the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā originate.¹⁹ As far as the metaphysical background is concerned, there is nothing essentially new in this doctrine, the scriptural *sarvaśaktivilātā* 'effervescence of all powers (in any reality)' of the Śivadṛṣṭi (I.11b) implicitly already contained it. What Utpaladeva needed was a shared, if controversial, strong 'philosophical' argument. The omnipervadence of language is an epistemological version of the omnipervadence of Śiva, and at the same time calls for the integration into the spiritually dynamic Śaiva universe. Moreover, this allowed Utpaladeva to connect himself with the speculations on *vāc* and the phonemes found in the Kula and Trika tantras. The supreme Consciousness is the supreme Word, Paśyantī becomes a power of the supreme Lord. In this way, the formerly despised Bhartṛhari is raised to the core itself of the Pratyabhijñā. The whole of Bhartṛhari's doctrine? I should say not. Just what matched Utpaladeva's well-gauged requirements. Other very significant aspects of Bhartṛhari's thought are instead rejected, like the theory of *sphoṭa*.²⁰ Apparently, Utpaladeva did not propose his own answer to the crucial question 'what is the meaning-bearer?', looking for an alternative to the *sphoṭa*.²¹ It will be his *prāśiṣya* Abhinavagupta to do so: his solution (see Torella 2004) seems well in line with Utpaladeva's thought.

¹⁹ I.V.11: *svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśam vidur anyathā/prakāśo 'rthoparakto 'pi sphaṭikādijaḍopamaḥ*// "The essential nature of light is reflective awareness: otherwise light, though 'coloured' by objects, would be similar to an insentient reality, such as the crystal and so on." (translated by Torella 2002: 118). I.V. 13: *citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parāvāk svarasodilā/svātantryam elan mukhyaṁ tad aiśvaryaṁ paramātmanah*// "Consciousness has as its essential nature reflective awareness; it is the supreme Word that arises freely. It is freedom in the absolute sense, the sovereignty of the supreme Self" (translated by Torella 2002: 120). I.V.19: *sākṣātkāraṣaṇe 'py asti vimarśaḥ katham anyathā/ dhāvanādy upapadyeta pratisaṁdhānavarjitam*// "Even at the moment of direct perception there is a reflective awareness. How otherwise could one account for such actions as running and so on, if they were thought of as being devoid of determinate awareness?" (translated by Torella 2002: 125).

²⁰ Utpaladeva deals with the *sphoṭa* doctrine in the Śivadṛṣṭi-vṛtti but only as an opponent's theory, while commenting on Somānanda, who strongly criticized it at II.58-61ab; see also Śivadṛṣṭi-vṛtti p. 87 (on II.77).

²¹ The doubt, which is bound to remain such, is whether he treated this subject in the Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti or *ṭikā*, now almost completely lost.

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Dhvani in Bhartṛhari and Abhinavagupta's Philosophical Works

ANNA RADICCHI

I

Attempting to present Bhartṛhari's thought as regards *dhvani* involves assuming a clear methodological position. This is the case above all because for the last seventy years a debate has been going on as to whether the ancient *vṛtti* on Kāṇḍa I and part of Kāṇḍa II of the *Vākyapadiya* should be attributed to Bhartṛhari. Various stages in this debate have recently been reviewed.¹ It is in any case interesting to note that even at the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari in 1992, scholars continued to defend their respective positions and could not agree on the authorship of the *vṛtti*.² In the light of this still-open question, I believe it methodologically correct to keep what we read in the *kārikās* separate from what we read in the *vṛtti*,³ as undoubtedly divergences and differences in thought are found between the former and the latter; on the other hand, Bhartṛhari's authorship of the *kārikās*, except in particular cases, as well as of the *Dīpikā*, has generally never been questioned. This is contrary to the traditional method, also adopted in the work of K.A. Subramania Iyer, the scholar who, perhaps more than any other, made a substantial contribution to understanding Bhartṛhari.

¹ See especially Houben 1997.

² Cf. in Proceedings 1993 the polemical article by A. Aklujkar, 'Once again on the authorship of the *Trikāṇḍi-Vṛtti*'.

³ See also Houben 1998: 101, note 1.

In his 1966 edition of Kāṇḍa I, K.A. Subramania Iyer had set himself a limited objective that is, "to give the text of the Kārikās of Kāṇḍa I, as known to the Vṛtti, the earliest commentary on the Vākyapadīya which we have and believed to be by Bhartṛhari himself."⁴ Likewise, in the edition of Kāṇḍa III, which intends to be primarily a critical edition of Helārāja's commentary, "the Kārikās have also been critically edited with a view to giving the text on which Helārāja has commented."⁵ Keeping this viewpoint of Iyer's in mind, as well as the fact that neither the vṛtti nor the Prakīrṇakaprakāśa are word for word commentaries systematically repeating the text of the kārikās, Iyer's translations are nevertheless still very useful, as are all his studies, among which particular mention should be made here of 'Bhartṛhari on Dhvani', an attempt, consistent with Iyer's methodology, "to understand the relevant Kārikās of the Vākyapadīya, taken together with the available ancient commentaries, especially the Vṛtti and Helārāja's Prakāśa."⁶ The methodology used here is different, but Iyer's adhering to the texts and their terminology offers a model worthy of being followed.

A major difficulty facing those studying the kārikās of the Vākyapadīya is the lack of a satisfactory critical edition. W. Rau clearly explained this in the Einleitung to his 1977 edition, which I follow here, also as regards numbering. Neither the numbering nor the order nor the text of the kārikās have been definitely established. However, there is now a body of critical literature signaling the points to be carefully considered.⁷

I shall attempt to trace the outlines of Bhartṛhari's discourse on *dhvani*, following above all the kārikās in Vākyapadīya I.47-109 and those of Kālasamuddeśa, Kāṇḍa III, particularly the sequence III.9.63-67. References to *dhvani* in the Dīpikā are found in the part that has come down to us in the only Berlin manuscript, under āhnikas I and II edited and translated in Fascicules IV (1987) and V (1988) of the BORI critical edition. They are to be collated and compared with the kārikās to obtain the most complete picture possible of Bhartṛhari's ideas regarding *dhvani*, ideas that probably evolved with the passing of time: an initial period documented by what one reads in the Dīpikā commenting on the Mahābhāṣya, and a successive period when Bhartṛhari expressed his own ideas in the Vākyapadīya, still constantly confronting them with those of preceding and contemporary authors.⁸

⁴ Introduction: x.

⁵ Kāṇḍa III, Part 1, Introduction: x.

⁶ K.A. Subramania Iyer 1965: 62.

⁷ Cf. A. Aklujkar 1971 and 1978; also, summing up, J. Bronkhorst 1998: 123-124.

⁸ Cf. also in Proceedings 1993, Houben: 164 ff. and G.B. Palsule: 220. Again Houben 1998: 101, note 2.

Translations of *kārikās* and of passages from the *Dīpikā*, which I wrote a few years back⁹ but still, I believe, to be considered valid, have been revised and repropose for this paper.

A recent article by J. Bronkhorst¹⁰ suggesting that 'the notions of *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta* forms of sound come from Sāṃkhya' and surveying various opinions on *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta dhvani* leaves a fundamental question ultimately unresolved: does the *vaikṛta dhvani* come into being after the *prākṛta dhvani*? In my opinion, following the meaning of the *kārikās* in the *Vākyapadīya* and comparing them with passages from the *Dīpikā*, we already obtain a sufficiently clear interpretive basis.

The *kārikās* begin¹¹ by speaking of the word existing in the mind (*śabda buddhisthaḥ*), which is the cause of what is heard on each occasion (*śruti*), just as the churning sticks are the cause of the other fires that are lit time after time (47). Then the term *dhvani* appears, the first occurrence in the *Vākyapadīya*: the *dhvani*, that is the sound produced by the speech organs, helps the *śabda* to leave the mind where it is first conceived and provided with meaning (48). This *śabda* has no before, no after, no sequence (49 b, c). Here it is useful to compare the passage in the *Dīpikā*¹² that mentions a word-essence without sequence sunk deep inside the mind (*akṛmaḥ śabdātmā buddhistho vigāhate*), from which proceeds *arthapratipatti*, understanding of the meaning; what is pronounced and has a sequence is an inferior *śabda*. In the comment under *yenocārītena* of the *Mahābhāṣya* (Kielhorn. Vol. I, p. 1), the opinion is introduced as belonging to 'some' (*kecid*), but certainly this word, closed within itself and bound to its own form (*svarūpanibandhana*), which cannot denote anything else just as a word connected with an object cannot denote others, is the same thing as the energy called *śabda* (*kratuḥ śabdasaṃjñakaḥ*), which contains all the potentialities of an egg, of which the *Vākyapadīya* speaks immediately after sequence 47-50, presently being considered, and this is surely an idea Bhartṛhari presents as his own. It is this inner *śabda* that then expands, taking on parts and sequence (52 c, d).

49 a, c, d continues: as sound (*nāda*) is produced in sequence, the word comes out in a sequence and appears as having parts. And here the *Vākyapadīya* refers to the *pratibimba*, reflection, for the first time in the context of *dhvani*: it is like the reflection in moving water of something outside the water, and this reflection seems to take on the movements of

⁹ Forthcoming article, 'Dhvani in Bhartṛhari and Dhvanyāloka I.13 with Locana'

¹⁰ J. Bronkhorst 1999.

¹¹ Texts from Wilhelm Rau's 1977 edition.

¹² *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* of Bhartṛhari, BORI, fasc. IV: 3.

the water; the relation between sound and the word is the same (*sa dharmah sphoṭanādayoh*) (50). Later, in I.102-103, the text of the Vākyapadīya returns to reflection. It says that reflecting surfaces, oil, water and the like, act as revealers, *prakāśaka*, and the object reflected is what is revealed, *prakāśya*. The latter takes on the differences of the surfaces revealing it. Thus objects of the size of mountains fit inside a diamond or the mirror that reflects them. They are not actually inside, as their dimensions make that impossible, but the perception one has of them is conditioned by the revealer.

In the Dīpikā, the illustration, by way of *pratibimba*, of the relation between *śabda* and *nāda*, the revealer of the *śabda*, as is read in āhnika I under *kiṃ punarnityaḥ śabda āhosvit kāryaḥ* of the Mahābhāṣya (Kielh. Vol. I, p. 6), is expanded and enriched with images: "... or [like] the reflections in mirrors and the like which are seen to be long, round, big and otherwise. In the same way are the words, too, differentiated by the difference of sound. Just as the one moon is perceived as many in water due to different waves, and the shadow [of an object] differs on account of different lamps, and there is difference of reflection as a result of different mirrors."¹³ Thus, concludes the passage from the Dīpikā, these words, which can only be manifested as individual words (*vyaktiśabdāḥ*), are eternal; they must be manifested by sound (*nāda*), which is their limit, and must conform to the increase and decrease in sound.

In this passage from the Dīpikā, the terms *śabda* (*nitya śabda* or *vyaktiśabda*) and *nāda* are used. Kārikās I.47-50 use *śabda* and *sphoṭa* as synonyms and *nāda* and *dhvani* as synonyms. Actually the vṛtti under 48¹⁴ makes a distinction between the subtle (*sūkṣma*) *dhvani*, which accumulates due to the activity of the speech organs, and *nāda*, gross sound similar to a mass of clouds (*abhrasamghāta*). However, this distinction is not clearly stated anywhere in the kārikās; the image of gathering clouds is found again in I.114, in the sequence giving the opinions of phoneticians.¹⁵

Kāṇḍa I of the Vākyapadīya again mentions the *dhvani* starting from kārikā 76, where it is related to the *sphoṭa* synonymous with the eternal *śabda*, and attention is centred on *kāla*, time. Differences in duration are attributed, on the basis of distinctions in perception, to the *sphoṭa*, which has no time distinctions but follows the varying duration of sound, tuned, we might say, to the wavelength of sound (76). The time attributed to the

¹³ Translation by J. Bronkhorst. Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari, BORI, fasc. IV: 69, text 17.

¹⁴ K.A. Subramania Iyer's edition 1966: 106.

¹⁵ The interpretation given here of kārikās 47-50 differs from that of A. Aklujkar 1972: 194-195, who maintains that kārikās and vṛtti are by the same author and complicatedly tries to link them by reading in the kārikās an anticipation of the vṛtti.

spṛṣṭa/śabda is that of the *prākṛta dhvani* which, in the opinion of those who believe in the eternity of the *śabda* (*nityatve*), possesses short, long or prolated (*hrasva, dīrgha, pluta*) vowels (77). That is, the distinctive features of the short, long or prolated vowels and also of nasal or non-nasal (*anunāsika, ananunāsika*), having the *udātta* pitch, the *anudātta* or the *svarita*, perceived in the *prākṛta dhvani*, are attributed to the *spṛṣṭa* which, eternal and immutable, has no distinctions. The time attributed to the *spṛṣṭa* is also that of the *vaikṛta dhvanis*, the secondary *dhvanis*, which produce *vṛttibheda*, a difference in the duration of hearing (quick, medium, slow speed) after the *spṛṣṭa* has already been manifested (79).

In the sequence of the *kārikās*, from 76 to 79, it seems that 78 has slipped in; W. Rau says of it that it 'stört den Zusammenhang zwischen 77 und 79'. In effect, in the *vṛtti* under 77¹⁶ a *kārikā* is quoted from the *Samgraha*, in order to confer authority on the distinction between *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta dhvani* which, it is well to remember, had not yet been stated in the *Mahābhāṣya*.

Here it is interesting to compare the passage from the *Dīpikā* under the first *Śivasūtra* where Bhartṛhari returns to the two types of *dhvani*, the *prākṛta* and the *vaikṛta*.¹⁷ There Bhartṛhari says that the *abhivyañjakas*, i.e., the revealers, of this eternal *śabda* are the *prākṛta* as well as the *vaikṛta dhvanis*. *prākṛta dhvani* is that which is produced by contact of the speech organs and that which immediately follows: both are *prākṛta*. Through these two, distinctions can be perceived (*tābhyāṃ viśeṣopalabdheḥ*). The *dhvani* that derives from the *prākṛta* is the *vaikṛta*, because no distinction is perceived through that (*tato viśeṣābhāvāt*), it serves only for perception.

The notes by G.B. Palsule to the edition and translation of the text,¹⁸ which reproduce the manuscript, as well as the readings of the two preceding editions, seem to point towards the correct interpretation. Bhartṛhari, Palsule correctly observes, regards as *prākṛta* not only the sound produced by the activity of the speech organs, but also a subsequent one produced (on the *vīcītarāṅga* maxim) by this sound. The *vaikṛta* adds nothing further to perception, it is not distinctive, but it permits us to continue perceiving sound for a longer or shorter time according to the speed of speech.

The difficulties pointed out by K.A. Subramania Iyer disappear: 'Though the distinction here between the primary sounds and the secondary sounds is essentially the same as what is mentioned in the *Vākyapadīya*, yet it is somewhat obscure because, here, two kinds of primary sounds are

¹⁶ K.A. Subramania Iyer's edition 1966: 142.

¹⁷ *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* of Bhartṛhari, BORI, fasc. V 3.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 106.

mentioned, of which the second is produced by the first, in which case the distinction between the second kind of primary sound and the secondary sound is not clear, because both are produced by sound'.¹⁹ I think, like Palsule, that *viśeṣopalabdhi* or its absence respectively spells the difference between the second kind of primary sound and the secondary sound.

In the *Kālasamuddeśa* of Kāṇḍa III of the *Vākyapadiya*, some *kārikās* (III.9.63-67) dwell on the coexistence of the undivided interior *śabda* with its exterior manifestation, in which it appears divided and subject to the laws of time. III.9.66 clearly affirms that difference in duration existing between a quarter of *mātrā* and the entire collection of ten *maṇḍalas* of the *Ṛgveda* does not affect the essence of the *śabda*.

This essence of the *śabda* is reality. However, *kārikā* 64 reasons, the water flowing out of the instrument used to measure time is just as real: its quantity increases if one repeats a long vowel and is even greater if one repeats a prolated one in comparison to the quantity of water coming out if the repetition is of a short vowel. If the duration of short, long or prolated vowels is only a mental construction (*kalpanāmātrahetukaḥ*) and does not actually affect the supreme reality of the *śabda*, how does it fit with phenomena of contingent reality, like that of the water coming out of the *nālīkā*, which imply real differences? The following *kārikā* (65) replies that the increase in duration lies in the sounds causing that manifestation. The short, long and prolated vowels are there in the (*prākṛta*) *dhvanis*. And one does not perceive the *śabda* without these revealing *dhvanis*: *na hi vyañjakadhvanivivekena śabdātattvagrahaṇam*, clarifies Helārāja's comment.²⁰ Then come the *vaikṛta dhvanis*, not expressly named in 67, but indicated as *śabdas*, here in the sense of sounds, that in the manner of things issuing in continuous succession (*anuniṣpādikalpena*) remain, so to say, in the midst and become the means whereby listeners perceive. *anuniṣpādikalpena* is explained by Helārāja as *anuraṇanarūpāḥ*, that is, in the form of resonance, the resonance following the manifestation of *sphoṭa* on the part of the *prākṛta dhvanis*, which has a shorter or longer duration according to whether the speed of speech is quick, medium or slow. These differences determined by the laws of time valid in human dealings (*vyavahāra*) are also real.

After enunciating the basic theory of the *śabda/sphoṭa* manifested by *dhvani* (I.47-50), and after explaining in detail how in the transition from the plane of the absolute and undivided to the plane of the contingent reality the time of the *prākṛta* and the *vaikṛta dhvanis* is projected on the *śabda/sphoṭa* (I.76-79), the *Vākyapadiya*'s investigation then turns principally

¹⁹ K.A. Subramania Iyer 1965: 54.

²⁰ K.A. Subramania Iyer's edition 1973: 66-67.

(I.80-100) to the type of knowledge of which this 'manifestation' of the *sphoṭa/śabda* is part.

After kārikā 100, the subject of *dhvani* is not exhausted; in the text the occurrences of the term *dhvani* and related terminology are registered up to I.109 in W. Rau's Wortindex. Kārikās 101-109 again propose, from a different perspective, ideas already expressed or compare the ideas of 'others', while topics emerge which were the subject of debate in Bhartṛhari's time.

The term with which sequence I.80-100 opens, *indriya*, establishes the field of investigation: *indriya* is the sense organ, and thus what is dealt with is perception. Three points of view as regards *saṃskāra*, the perfecting of the sense organs and of their objects, are presented. They are opinions of *abhivṛyaktivādins* (80), of those maintaining that *śabda/sphoṭa* is known by manifestation (*vyakti*) through *dhvani*, and certainly Bhartṛhari placed himself among the *abhivṛyaktivādins*. Do both the senses and their objects undergo a *saṃskāra* or only one of the two, be it the sense or the object? Concentration and ointments aid the sense of sight, while odours are strengthened by acting on the object (81). According to the theory that rays of light emitted by the eye reach the object (*prāpyakāritva*), the *saṃskāra* in the phenomenon of visual perception regards both the eyes and the object illuminated by rays of light of the same type as that possessed by the eyes. Bhartṛhari here gives his personal opinion and explicitly says that the latter is the process in the case of *dhvani* (82).

Three points of view regarding *saṃskāras* also clearly emerge in the Dīpikā;²¹ there, instead of the term *dhvani*, *nāda* is found, and instead of *saṃskāra*, the more generic *anugraha*, favour, is used.

The Dīpikā says that sound (*nāda*) favours the ear, that is the organ. Favoured by it, the ear becomes fit to perceive the word (*śabda*). It is like ointment for the eyes. This is the opinion of some. Others, however, believe that sound favours only the object, i.e., the word, like sprinkling water on the ground helps it to give off an odour, and not the smell organ. Finally, others maintain that the help given by sound concerns both the sense organ and the object. As in the case of one who has his senses under control: this concentration helps both the luminous rays of the eye itself as well as the jar that becomes visible.

Opinions also differed on the type of association between *śabda/sphoṭa* and *dhvani* in the perception process. According to some, they were perceived together (as crystal takes on the colour of a nearby object, suggests the *vṛtti*); others believed the *dhvani* was not perceivable in itself (like the

²¹ Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari, BORI, fasc. IV 17.

sense organs that cause the perception of objects without being perceived themselves, again comments the *vṛtti*); still others believed the *dhvani* was independent of the *sphoṭa* (83). The well-known demonstration of this third opinion was noise coming from faraway, with no words distinguishable.

Thus the ways and means of perception were debated. However, Bhartṛhari does not question that perception is what is being dealt with here, a perception *sui generis*, just like the vision of a faraway object or one in the dark and initially mistaken for something else (92). The process is analogous to that of memorising a text or a verse: before the text is perfectly committed to memory, there are numerous repetitions in which it is not yet fixed in one's mind (84). In the same way, the word manifested by sound (*dhvani**prakāśite śabde*) assumes its own clear form only after cognitions which are yet unclear but which lead to the final clear one (85). It is only with the last sound (*antyena dhvaninā*) that the word is fixed as clear knowledge, where the seed planted by the sounds that preceded attains maturity (86).²²

Between the two examples, that of the gradual learning of a text and that of a visual perception in difficult conditions, some considerations regarding the nature and limits of the human mind seem to be firm points in Bhartṛhari's thinking. In the process of understanding the word, distinct sounds which do not actually exist (*antarāle*: literally 'in the middle') are picked up. This is the listener's inability (to understand something not divided into phonemes and words): these divisions are means of comprehension (87). There is this constant and therefore congenital defect that affects the word and human knowledge: both reproduce differences. The word takes on sequences, following the sequence of sound, and knowledge becomes dependent on various objects of knowledge (88).

The above-cited *kārikā* 92, presenting the example of perception in difficult conditions, is preceded by 91, which seems to depict the analogous situation of confusion preceding the understanding of words. I explain it in this way: the sounds that must reveal the *śabda* and that differ from each other (due to the distinct articulatory effort, *prayatna*, the *vṛtti* explains) emerge in phonemes, words and sentences, that is, in parts identifiable as similar. The sounds are decisively different, but their powers become confused and resemble each other. The transformation of milk into yoghurt or of the seed into the sprout takes place based on equally constant natural laws (94). The Vaiśeṣika conception of the cognition of numbers, in which smaller figures help to calculate larger ones, has also just been referred to (90). It is certain that when an utterance is revealed by the sounds which are the cause of its manifestation, its first cognition presents itself in a form

²² The sequence of *kārikās* 84-86 is cited by Maṇḍana Miśra in *Sphoṭasiddhi* under 18 as the definitive response to the *Mīmāṃsakas* on the theory of the *sphoṭa*.

in which parts are distinguishable (93), and this is the normal rule for the perception of the word.

Then, when meaning is comprehended in its entirety, it is a flash of understanding that grasps the meaning of the sentence no longer breaking it up into phonemes and words. The intuition or the *pratibhā* is a gift that must be accepted as it is with no need for explanation. The *Vākyapadīya* deals with *pratibhā* only in Kāṇḍa II, and does not consider the *pratibhā* in the context of *dhvani* and its revelation of the *śabda/sphoṭa*.

Kārikās 99-100 draw the conclusions regarding the epistemological discussion which has been conducted from 80 onwards. I.99 states: only objects having a body are bound to a place. Even if we can theoretically construct differences in place, while speaking of *dhvani* and *śabda*, this does not matter: that is, differences in place cannot be considered for *dhvani* and *śabda*, which are not subject to the laws of objects having a body.

One is reminded of the concreteness with which Vātsyāyana, who must have been a contemporary of, or slightly previous to, Bhartṛhari,²³ commented on Nyāyasūtras II.1.53-54,²⁴ explaining that the relationship between the word and its object cannot be apprehended by perception nor proved by inference. In the latter case, the object would have to be contiguous with the word, or the word contiguous with the object, or the two mutually contiguous. But if there were contact between the object and the word, which is articulated in the mouth, the mouth would be filled, burnt or cut by the utterance of the words 'food', 'fire', 'sword'. Nor on the other hand can the *sthānas* and *karaṇas*, the points and organs of articulation which are in fact in the mouth, be near the object. Locations are important indeed²⁵ in the context of the philosophy and logic of Bhartṛhari's time.²⁶

Kārikā 100 gives Bhartṛhari's definitive opinion: what links *sphoṭa* and *nāda* is a relationship of *vyāṅgya* to *vyāñjaka*, of the thing to be manifested to its manifester. It is not physical contact but a particular fitness, like the constant eternal relationship existing between the objects of perception, *grāhya*, and the organs of perception, *grahaṇa*. Through the ages, this kārikā has been considered to contain a fundamental doctrine.

Yet the need to account for a certain concrete transfer of the *śabda* from the depths of the being was evidently present in the logic of

²³ 450-500 A.D. according to K.H. Potter 1977: 4.

²⁴ Ganganath Jha and Dhundhiraja Shastri 1925: 321-323.

²⁵ This is stressed in contrast to J. Bronkhorst 1991: 18.

²⁶ On this M. Biardeau 1964 is still unsurpassed.

Bhartrhari's thought. We certainly owe the long sequence of *kārikās* present in W. Rau's edition from I.110 to 121 to this; they contain different opinions of phoneticians and *bhāṣyakāras*, who focus principally on the concrete path followed by air or atoms or whatever to bring the word forth from its interior recesses through the organs of speech.

If we follow the various strands of what seems to be Bhartrhari's thought regarding *dhvani* as expressed in the *kārikās* of the *Vākyapadiya* and in the scattered references contained in the *Dīpikā*, disentangling it from those 'opinions of others' which he constantly confronts, in brief the following features emerge. The *dhvanis* are articulated sounds, a medium reflecting the word, that is, the divine, immutable, interior *śabda*. However, the reflecting surface implies deformations, and the *prākṛta dhvanis* that reveal the *śabda* display immediate variety and distinctions. The *dhvanis* that develop from the *prākṛtas* — the *vaikṛtas* — continue to resound for a time whose length depends on the speed or slowness of speech. The *dhvanis* are heard by direct perception, *pratyakṣa*, in which the organ of hearing, the ear, is employed. It is nonetheless a *pratyakṣa sui generis*, which imparts knowledge of the meaning of the word, and this knowledge is released after perception of the sound and is no longer entrusted to perception: it is a flash of understanding that follows perception, in which the differences the statement, whether short or long, has encountered in following the sound are annulled. The meaning is grasped with the last *dhvani*: it is the *sphoṭa*, the bursting open, the arriving at the *śabda*: the *śabda* in the *kārikās* is synonymous with *sphoṭa*. At that point, the *dhvani* has completed its task and the differences, which grammatical analysis then reconstructs, have disappeared. The meaning is a single entity, no longer divided into *varṇa*, *pada* and *vākya*.

The *pratibhā* is not named in the context of *dhvani*,²⁷ neither is *dhvani* named in the last part of Kāṇḍa I, where *śabda* takes on an ambivalent meaning: *śabdas* are human words by which things are called starting with children, who carry within themselves the experience of past lives, but the knowledge, in the form of words, that illuminates the world is also called eternal (*vāgrūpatā śāśvatī*, 132). If it disappeared, the light would no longer shine: *sā hi pratyāvamāśini*, because it is this light 'which makes identification possible' according to Iyer's translation, in place of which I find no preferable one.²⁸ Grammar is the supreme field of the *Vāc*, which is

²⁷ The term *pratibhā* occurs only once in the first Kāṇḍa, in the compound word *pratibhātman* in 122c.

²⁸ On this *kārikā*, see Navjivan Rastogi's illuminating paper in this volume. The *kārikā*, along with I.131 and 134 (I.115 and 118 in Iyer's numbering) and also together with the *kārikā*

threefold: *vaikharī*, *madhyamā* and *paśyantī* (I.159). The *kārikās* say nothing further regarding this threefold *Vāc* they mention.

This schematic review would immediately invite comparison with fundamental aspects of Abhinavagupta's thought, but I shall confine myself to answering one specific question: what did Bhartṛhari's *dhvani* become in Abhinavagupta?

I shall not take into consideration Abhinavagupta's commentary on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*. To study the meaning *dhvani* assumed in Abhinavagupta's rhetoric, I believe, one should begin from the *Locana* on I.13.²⁹ Neither shall I follow the supreme *rasa* suggestion, *rasadhvani*, as it develops in the numerous situations presented on the stage, regarding which much can be learned from the *Abhinavabhāratī*, Abhinavagupta's commentary on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Finally, rereading Abhinavagupta's commentary on the *Ghaṭakarpura* would permit us to observe the analysis of a poetic text in the light of *dhvani*. Here I shall confine myself to Abhinavagupta's philosophical works,³⁰ which not only deal with philosophy in a strict sense, but also with religion, yoga, and mysticism: in short, they represent Abhinavagupta's thought. It is not necessary to state that the rhetor, the aesthete, the philosopher, the mystic are inseparable and one and the same person. Delimitation serves only to restrict the field of investigation.

II

The oldest date that Abhinavagupta himself assigns to one of his works is that at the end of the *Kramastotra*, which is 990-991 A.D.³¹ His adherence to the Krama school of Śaivism is thus documented as the earliest chronologically. Along with other Śaiva lineages, the Krama will then flow into that digest of Śaivism, the *Tantrāloka*, which is the product of Abhinavagupta's full maturity: its stated intent is to constitute the fundamental text of non-dual Śaivism, based on the authority of the teachers with whom Abhinavagupta had studied and the scriptures of those various preceptorial lines.

in the *vṛtti* under I.134 (118 in Iyer), considered part of the *kārikās* of the *Vākyapadiya* in Kashmirian tradition, is read from the viewpoint of the monistic Śaivism of Kashmir.

²⁹ See A. Radicchi, forthcoming.

³⁰ The second part of this article presents and comments on a selection of occurrences from these philosophical works.

³¹ L. Silburn 1975: 148: Dans la soixante-sixième année, le neuvième jour de la quinzaine sombre de *mārgaśīrṣa*. i.e., 4066 = 990-991 A.D., according to the astronomical calculation for which I will let K.C. Pandey 1963: 9 take responsibility.

It is in the context of Krama that we find some of the most interesting occurrences of the term *dhvani* in Abhinavagupta's works. The term occurs in āhnika IV of the Tantrāloka (181b), after 122b-181a have dealt with the fundamental theme of Krama, the arising of the wheels of consciousness (*saṃviccakraḍaya*), which is the cycle of 12 *kalās*, through which is revealed the consciousness (*saṃvid*) having the names of the goddess Kālī, that is Śṛṣṭikālī, Raktakālī, etc. However, the supreme *saṃvid* is one only, *ekaiva* (179), above every succession (*krama*); it is *kālakarṣiṇī* (176), 'the one who attracts time'.

It is when entering into the explanation of how the presence of this supreme consciousness is felt that the text uses the term *dhvani*. Scriptures had spoken of a great heart, *hṛdaya* (182a), of vibration, *spanda* (183b), etc. *dhvani* is the beating of this universal heart, it arises perennially, spontaneously: it is the great heart of the pulsating universe. Its mantric form is *saṃh*, 186a-189a explain immediately afterwards. One may say that in this passage the leit-motiv of the whole Kramastotra, which in 11 of its 30 stanzas had repeated the word heart, *hṛd* or *hṛdaya*, finds complete clarification.³²

Two other occurrences of the term *dhvani* that should be placed side by side with this are found in the preceding āhnika of the Tantrāloka, in III.241b and 244a. In this context as well the supreme goddess *kālasya karṣiṇī ekaiva*, is named first (234); this, the *śakti*, paired with the *śaktimaṭ*, makes multiplicity appear (*vibhāgam avabhāsayet*, 235). It is regarding this multiplicity that three *vapus*, three forms of the goddess Vāc, are spoken of: *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*. Bhartṛhari had spoken of these and we know that this threefoldness had been criticized by Somānanda, who had raised the number to four: *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*. And the aspects of Vāc become five in Krama: *parā*, *sūkṣmā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*.

Abhinavagupta's presentation goes beyond the schemes of tripartition and quadripartition and also ignores the fivefold distinction according to Krama. He further divides each of the three forms of Vāc into three levels, *sthūlā*, *sūkṣmā* and *parā*, thus making nine levels.

The highest level for each of the three (*param tritayam*, 248) is in Śiva who is supreme consciousness. The inferior, *sthūla*, level for each of the three reaches down into human life. The *sthūlā paśyantī* is revealed in the best music having the right combination of musical notes (*svarasandarbhāsubhagā*, 237), which is *nādarūpiṇī*, i.e., pure vocality. This

³² Strangely enough, P.E. Muller-Ortega 1989, finds no space in his detailed monograph *The Triadic Heart of Śiva* to consider these beginnings, in the Kramastotra, of the history of the meaning of the term 'heart' in Abhinavagupta's Kaula Tantricism.

music, pure *nāda*, permits immediate self-identification with divine consciousness if there is *hṛdaya*, responsiveness. *sthūlā madhyamā* is revealed among men by means of another type of music that is expressed by the sound of drums. This sound/beat of drums which is mixed, both clear and unclear (*sphuṭāspṛuṭa*, 242a), is called *dhvani* (241b). The beat of the rhythm (*tāla*) is clear, but the drums also accompany song in its numerous manifestations on the stage, and their music thus contains notes, pure vocality, and it is this that gives pleasure. 244a says that, as everyone knows, it is in this music in which *dhvani* is not evident, (*avyaktadhvanau tasmin vādane*) that men take pleasure, as if to say it is not the beat of the *tāla* that is perceived but the melody. For the *sthūlā vaikharī*, music is no longer made reference to: it contains only distinct *varṇas*, the units from which words and sentences used for human exchange are put together.

Here some clarification is necessary.

It is an axiom of Indian music that the best musical instrument is the human body; the musical instruments constructed by man can only reproduce the human voice as faithfully as possible. *svara* means 'voice' and also 'musical note'. Therefore the dignity of instruments constructed by man is established according to the degree to which they are capable of reproducing the human voice. Abhinavagupta must have had this scale of dignity in mind in his passage. Where he speaks of fortunate combinations of notes at the *sthūla* level of the *paśyantī*, he is surely thinking of instruments like the *vīṇā* and the flute. The Vijñānabhairava had also explicitly named stringed instruments (*tantryādi*, 41) for that type of yoga which is practised without suffering and which renders one divine. The sound of drums is second in rank, and this instrument acquires dignity the closer it resembles the sound of the human voice.

Upaniṣadic tradition has handed down the distinction between different levels of the yoga ascent, associated with the sounds of various musical instruments the yogin hears within himself. The number ten, a constant in these lists,³³ is also given by the Haṃsa Upaniṣad, an upaniṣad which is surely not very old, but already accepted in the first upaniṣadic collections.³⁴

The series of the ten types of sound given by the Haṃsa Upaniṣad³⁵ is heterogeneous: after the first two, which seem onomatopoeic in the form

³³ See also Jayaratha under Tantrāloka V.99-100ab.

³⁴ See in Sechzig Upanishads des Veda, translated by P. Deussen, p. 541, the 'Allgemeine Anerkennung' as the criterium for the 'Aufnahmewürdigkeit' in the collection of the Upaniṣads. See *ibid.*, also "Die Upanishads des Atharvaveda", *einleitung*: 531-543.

³⁵ Upaniṣadāṁ Samuccayaḥ, Ānandāśrama edition 1926: 633 ff.

in which they are expressed (*ciṇṭi*, *ciṇṭinī*);³⁶ there is a third level which is *ghaṇṭānādaḥ*, 'the sound of bell'; then a fourth, *śaṅkhanādaḥ*, 'the sound of conch'; a fifth, *tantrīnādaḥ*, 'the sound of stringed instruments'; a sixth, *tālanādaḥ*, 'the sound of cymbals'; a seventh, *veṇunādaḥ*, 'the sound of flute'; the eighth, *mṛdaṅganādaḥ*, 'the sound of drum'; the ninth, *bherīnādaḥ*, 'the sound of kettle-drum' and the tenth, *meghanādaḥ*, 'the sound of thunder'.

Stringed instruments and flutes are located at high levels, overwhelmed by drums and bells, which must have been widely used in the ritual, and against a background of sounds of nature, conferring a certain freshness to this upaṇiṣadic text. The individuality of the yogin is finally dissolved in the sound of the clouds.

Another passage frequently referred to³⁷ is found in the Nāḍabindu Upaniṣad, not in the briefer, more coherent text that with its mention of the seven worlds is chronologically in line with other upaṇiṣadic texts which are surely not ancient, but in the longer, even later, text containing various material. The passage introduced³⁸ by the technical terms of the *āsana* (*siddha*) and the *mudrā* (*vaiṣṇavī*) deals with the yogin who practises *nādayoga* and hears the interior *nāda* in different ways at the various levels of his experience. At the beginning, various loud sounds are heard; then, proceeding, sounds gradually become more subtle. And here an initial stage is differentiated in which the sounds of the ocean, of clouds, of the kettle-drum and *jharjḥara* drum arise; a middle part in which sounds are like the *mardala* drum, the conch, the bell, the *kāhala* drum;³⁹ the end, with sounds of tinkling bells, flute, *viṇā*, bees. These are the more and more subtle sounds the yogin hears.

The interesting thing is that Nāḍabindu Upaniṣad 33-35 returns, with only slight variations, in a sort of short treatise found at the close of the Haṭhayogapradīpikā,⁴⁰ with limits clearly defined at the beginning by *proktaṃ gorakṣanāthena nāḍopāśanamucyate* (65), "now we move on to consider the devotional practice of the *nāda*(yoga) as taught by Gorakṣanātha," and at

³⁶ *Ciṇṭinī* is certainly onomatopoeic in the śloka, cited by Jayaratha under Tantrāloka III.95ab, which speaks of the *trikoṇa*, the triangle, the graphic form of the letter *e* in the context of the emission of vowels on the part of Śiva, but also indicating the female organ, 'in the midst of which *ciṇṭinī* proceeds' (*tanmadhye ciṇṭinīkramam*), surely a sound expressing enjoyment, since the site of procreation consists of supreme happiness, as Jayaratha subsequently comments.

³⁷ See, e.g., A. Padoux 1992: 97, note 31, which collects various references without further historical investigation.

³⁸ 108 Upaniṣad, Bareli 1963 edition: vv. 31 ff.

³⁹ The Haṭhayogapradīpikā, mentioned below, helps to re-establish the correct spelling of *jharjḥara* and *śaṅkha* in V.34.

⁴⁰ Adyar Library edition 1972: 161 ff.

the end by *iti nādānusandhānam* (102). This short treatise has the declared intent of reconciling Haṭhayoga and Rājayoga, considering the latter as a continuation of the former, which it replaces after the yogin has succeeded in his ascent in piercing the knot of Rudra (*rudragranthi*) and the ascending breath has reached the seat of Īśvara (= *śarvapīṭha*) in the space between the eyes (76). In the stage (*niṣpattyavasthā*) when the *prāṇa*, going further, reaches the *brahmarandhra*, the yogin hears a sound like a flute in which the *vīṇā* also resounds (*niṣpattau vaiṇavaḥ śabdaḥ kvaṇadvīṇākvaṇo bhavet*, 76). The contemplation on the space between the eyebrows leads to the attainment of the *unmanī avasthā* in a short time (80). This is Rājayoga as Śrīgurunātha knows it (81). It is at this point, that the Haṭhayogapradīpikā quotes Nādabindu Upaniṣad 33-35 with its version of the various levels of *nāda*: initial, middle and final. In the verses that follow in the final part of both the Haṭhayogapradīpikā and the Nādabindu Upaniṣad, we find material which had already become normative for the yoga processes of *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *śamādhi*.

Surely the final part of the Haṭhayogapradīpikā has preserved centuries and centuries of religious history, including Abhinavagupta's age as well. Shashibhushan Dasgupta, one of the most sensitive interpreters of these religious movements, broadly defines the tenth to the twelfth century A.D. as the period of the spreading of the Nāth sect throughout nearly the whole length and breadth of India.⁴¹ This period should be lowered towards the Upaniṣads and raised much beyond Abhinavagupta. The Haṭhayogapradīpikā has also preserved an ancient evaluation of the relative dignity of musical instruments, in which the *vīṇā* and flute stand out.

Among the texts that can shed light on the *nāda* of *sthūlā paśyanti* in Tantrāloka III.237, and on *dhvani* of the *sthūlā madhyamā* in Tantrāloka III. 241, both usually roughly translated as 'sound,' there are the treatises on musical theory. The Bṛhaddeśī, unfortunately handed down to us in a mutilated state, in any case occupies an important place, as it precedes by only about three centuries Abhinavagupta,⁴² who respectfully mentions Maṭaṅga.⁴³ In the Bṛhaddeśī *dhvani* becomes important due to its *deśī* nature (*dhvanerdeśitvam*), and in fact *dhvani* is immediately defined at the beginning of the text which has come down to us. There it is stated that *dhvani* is perceived according to directions (*deśa*) and is linked to locations (*sthāna*) in the human body. After I.4 there is a gap, but it is clearly stated later that

⁴¹ Sh. Dasgupta, 1962: 368-369. Cf. also the conclusions in G.W. Briggs 1938: 250.

⁴² It is useful to compare the second *prakaraṇa* and beginning of the third of adhyāya I in the Saṅgītaratnākara, a text later than Abhinavagupta.

⁴³ For intriguing parallel readings in the texts of the Bṛhaddeśī and the Abhinavabhāratī, see N. Ramanathan 2001.

dhvani is of two types, *vyakta* and *avyakta*. As *vyakta* it is manifested par excellence with *varṇas*: *varṇas*, says the text corrected by Prem Lata Sharma (I.9), because they describe the whole world (*varṇayanti jagat sarvam*), through words and sentences in which texts are written and which serve for communication. However, *dhvani* is also *avyakta* when it encounters no limitations, and then it is the eternal sound spreading by means of waves which envelop the cosmos. *dhvani*, I.12 says a bit emphatically, is the ultimate origin, the cause of everything; the whole mobile and immobile world is encompassed by *dhvani*.

The text of the Bṛhaddeśi deals with *nāda* immediately afterwards and says (I.18) that without *nāda* there is no song, musical note or dance. Thus *nāda* makes the entire artistic performance possible on the stage. And this *nāda* is divine because in it the body of the three supreme gods, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva, takes on substance, and *nādarūpā* is called the Parā Śakti (I.19). The Tantricism of the text is evident, as is the attention dedicated immediately afterwards to man's inner nature where *nāda* is found; the latter arises from the station of Brahmā, the so-called *brahmagranthi* or, using the term more familiar to Abhinavagupta, from the *kanda*. From there the sound wave of *nāda* comes forth, combining breath (*prāṇa*) and vital energy (*vahni*), and it is a wave that grows within the individual and rises in the direction of the mouth. The stations are enumerated (22-23): *guhā* (the cave), *hṛdaya* (the heart), *kaṇṭha* (the throat), *tālu* (the palate, but, here rather cerebrum), *mukha* (the mouth). And five epithets for the *nāda* that rises are also given: first is *sūkṣma* when it dwells in the *guhā*, becomes *atisūkṣma* in the heart, is *vyakta* in the throat, *avyakta* in the cerebrum and finally *kr̥trima* in the mouth.

Classical Indian music has three registers: low (*mandra*), middle (*madhya*) and high (*tāra*), corresponding to three *sthānas*, locations, in the body. The first and last positions, *guhā* and *mukha*, are excluded. Music does not reach the mouth; it reaches the *avyakta* of the *tālu*. I believe it is for this reason that Abhinavagupta says that sublime music is the *avyakta* one, without the harshness of the *varṇas* articulated in the mouth.

dhvani and *nāda*, both have identical stations inside man. Where does the difference lie? *dhvani* is physical sound, eternal and divine as it comes from god; it exhausts all its intrinsic possibilities in rising up to the mouth, where it is artificially articulated by man. *nāda*, which is the substance of the god's bodies, is within man the divine spark that is made to rise from the depths of one's being and is demiurgical like creativity; indeed, it is linked to the creativity of the supreme god and is identified with the *nāda* of Śiva.

In the Parātrīśikāvivaraṇa, a work certainly written before the Tantrāloka, which quotes it, there is a passage (KSTS edition: 69-73) which, commenting on the text under *ṣṇu devi*, 'hear o goddess', considers at length the articulated word which is heard. The terms are *śabda*, *varṇa*, *dhvani*. The passage presents things from the beginning, from the supreme goddess who hears everything, and it is she that establishes the connection (*saṅkalanam ... karoti*, p. 71), that is, blends in a meaningful whole the sounds which are part of that vibrant mass of syllables (*-svaspaṇḍa-mayavarṇarāśi-*, p. 69), which is the endowment of each individual. It is the *svātantrya* of the goddess that regulates man's language; without this divine intervention, one does not understand, even if he may hear some words that are confused in a buzzing sound. In this confusion, it is a *kalakaladhvani*, that is, a sound with indistinct articulation, which enters the ear, not clear syllables. If one wants to communicate, the production of words (*śabda*) made up of distinctly articulated syllables (*varṇas*) takes over (p. 70). On the lowest level, that of the *vaikharī*, the *dhvanis*, that is, the articulated sounds, are heard by all. On the level of the *madhyamā* – the example supported by authoritative texts is the *upāṁśu japa*, recitation of the *upāṁśu* type – it is only the self who hears, no one else, as recitation is internal. If the articulation of sounds becomes more distinct, then even one sitting nearby can hear: *japa*, recitation, becomes *śaśabda*, audible.

It is useful to compare this passage with Rāmakaṇṭha's 25 stanzas, the Nādakārikās, a Śaiva dualistic text⁴⁴ which can be dated approximately in the XI century, thus not far from Abhinavagupta. There the element of sound necessary for the expression of words (*vācakatā*) is called *nāda* and is inanimate (*acit*), having a material cause for its production (*upādānakāraṇa*) that the *āgamas* have called with various names, and an evolution of its own. On the other hand is the spirit, *cit*, immobile and indivisible, not subject to transformation. The power of the word (*vākśakti*) is distributed among all the *puruṣas* (24) and there are innumerable *nādas*, as many as the people that speak, the multitude of the *paśus*, the souls chained to life, women, children, shepherds, etc. (15).⁴⁵ The *nāda* is in itself *vācaka*, that is capable of expressing words without divine intervention and in the first stage of its evolution is the interior word (*antaḥsaṃjalpātmā*, 11) that gives a name to objects, and it is thus that they exist (12). It is *sūkṣma*, subtle, as it is internal, but it is already word due to the fact of being understood upon expression, it is actually already discourse divided into the syntax of *vākya* and *pada* in which human reasoning is articulated (14).

⁴⁴ To place the subject in the perspective of the general treatment of Siddhānta Śaiva dualism, cf. K.C. Pandey, *Bhāskarī*, 1954: 66-110.

⁴⁵ In defining *deśi* in I.14, the Bṛhaddeśi adds 'kings', to show that this music is sung by everyone: women, children, shepherds, kings.

This is the beginning of human communication, which takes place when *nāda*, from within, where this state of expression (*vācakatājātam*, 24) has formed, is projected outwards with coarse words (*sthūlaiḥ śabdaiḥ*, 25). In stanza 25 the subtle *dhvani*s made up of *nāda* – *sūkṣmā nādātmakā... dhvanayoḥ* – are named; they are the interior articulation of *nāda* in which the discourse transmitting meaning takes form.

There are other pages in the *Parātrīśikāvivaraṇa* that are illuminated by comparison with the *Nādakārikās*, for example, those dealing with *Parābhaṭṭārikā*, 'the venerable supreme verbum' in the fine translation by J. Singh (177 ff.), which abides as the highest Lord in everyone. And further on (text: 65) there is mention of the *mantratvam*, of that which is the *mantra*, which in the sacred texts is generally made up above all of indistinct *dhvani* (*avyaktadhvani*) and *ardhacandra*, for example, is taught as the true essence of mantric pervasion. Here reference is certainly made to an interior *dhvani* in the *madhyamā* stage, not articulated to be heard by others.

The *Tantrāloka* confronts, in the first āhnikas, the theme of primary importance of the means (*upāyas*) serving for the realization of consciousness. And *dhvani* is explicitly mentioned in one of the gradual stages of the *āṇava*-type of the yogin's journey, a journey fit for the creature (*aṇu*) with all his limitations. *Tantrāloka* V.155 enumerates *uccāra*, *karaṇa*, *dhyāna*, *varṇa*; then the two lines immediately after, which give the order to follow in trying all the types of yoga, from the simplest to the loftiest, on the part of a yogin who strains to obtain his objective, list in succession *dhyāna*, *uccāra*, *karaṇa*, *dhvani*, then *sthānakalpana*. In this second list, *dhvani* takes the place of the term *varṇa* in the preceding line, *dhvani* and *varṇa* are thus synonymous, and *dhvaniyoga* is equivalent to *varṇayoga*. *dhvani* and *varṇa* are certainly synonymous where (V.134-135) *dhvani*s are spoken of as constituting words like *ghaṭa*, with which objects from the external world are conventionally indicated; these *dhvani*s as well are capable of arousing the image of the object in the mind.

At the beginning of āhnika V, Abhinavagupta defines the terminology he adopts and says (V.17-18) that the *prāṇa* consists of *uccāraṇa* with its five functions, i.e. vital breaths, from *prāṇa* to *vyāna*. The undifferentiated aspect of *prāṇa*, at the basis of these five vital breaths, is called *prāṇanā*, synonymous with life itself (cf. also VI.13-14). In both types of yoga, *uccārayoga* and *varṇa/dhvani yoga*, *prāṇa* plays its part, but in *uccārayoga* its five functions enter into play, while *varṇa/dhvani yoga* is based on the *prāṇa* as *prāṇanā*, the life force itself.

Before beginning to deal with *varṇa/dhvani yoga* from V.131b, ff., after having considered *uccārayoga*, Abhinavagupta says that *varṇa* in *varṇa/*

dhvani yoga is to be understood as the sound (*dhvani*) that persists, vibrating as if indistinct. And, he adds immediately afterwards, it expresses itself in its fundamental form (*mukhyaṃ vapus*, the fundamental locus of its manifestation, as Jayaratha annotates) of the *bījas* of emanation and reabsorption. The *varṇas* in *varṇa/dhvani yoga*, in a silent or perceptible recitation, make various types of consciousness arise in the yogin (134a), and the yogin gradually arrives at immersion in full consciousness (*cidātmatā*, 133a). The above-quoted passage (134b) which speaks of *dhvanis* of which the conventional names of objects are composed, capable of arousing the vision of the objects themselves in the mind, continues with the quotation of śloka 130 from the Vijnāna Bhairava, dealing with *uccāraṇayoga*, and the subject-word for yoga is actually Bhairava. The constant practice of repeating the name of Bhairava leads directly to identification with Śiva himself.

Before being differentiated in this or that *varṇa*, before expressing itself in the *bījas* and *bījapiṇḍas* which, still independent of conventions, make consciousness vibrate (140), the whole set of *varṇas* (*varṇajālam*, 152) is united in a single *varṇa* (cf. also VI.217) imbued with *nāda*, which indeed gathers together the undifferentiated set of all the *varṇas*. This is called *anāhata* because it never comes to an end. The Tantrāloka again speaks more extensively, in another context (XI.67, ff.), of the increate, infinite phonematic consciousness (*varṇasamvid*) and of the infinite treasure of non-māyic *varṇas* (*amāyīyo yo varṇagrāmaḥ*, 71), from which the māyic *varṇas* (*māyīyā varṇāḥ*, 72) originate.

Thus we have on the one hand the *varṇas* of communication, the units listed in the *varṇasamāmnāya*, fifty according to Śaivism. *dhvanis* in the sense of articulated sounds are synonymous with *varṇas* understood in this sense. On the other hand, there is the unique *varṇa*, *anāhata*, corresponding to the *dhvani* that continues to vibrate more or less distinctly in the life force that rises (*uccāra*) from deep within the yogin.

The *varṇas*, like the *padas* and *mantras* (cf. VI.216 ff.), follow the path (*adhvan*) of time because they are connected with *prāṇa*, which is calculated in terms of time: 21,600 respiratory acts a day according to VI.23-24 and *passim*. It is the *mantra* 'haṃsaḥ' that each individual automatically repeats while exhaling and inhaling 21,600 times a day.⁴⁶ Kālī, the supreme *śakti* of the god, has within herself the sequence and non-sequence of *kāla*, time, and projects it outwards, becoming *prāṇa* (VI.7-8). It is this that was stated in the sacred texts: the first evolution of consciousness is in the *prāṇa* (VI.12).

⁴⁶ See also Kṣemarāja under Śiva Sūtras III.27 and Jaideva Singh in his 1979 edition, 'Introduction': XXXIX ff., cf. also the Vijnānabhairava, 1979 (Reprint: 2001) edition: 141 ff. with verses 155 (repeated)–156. A. Padoux 1987: 144–152 presents an extensive survey of texts on this *ajapājapa*; an authoritative text containing old material is also the Haṃsa Upaniṣad.

The path entirely founded on *prāṇa* is twofold: according to action (*kriyā*) and according to the bodies (*mūrti*), cf. VI.21-22.⁴⁷ The former is the path through time of *varṇas*, etc. The latter is the path through space and arises from the multiplicity of bodies; it is the path through the thirty-six *tattvas* and their worlds, all traversed in āhnika VIII, beginning from the *tattva* earth. It is understood that the term 'path' is valid only in the language of one who has not overcome the duality (VI.30). What remains firm and unique is the reality of the *prāṇa*. The movement of the *prāṇa* as a conscious effort starts from the heart (VI.51b), traverses the *cakras*, reaches the head and goes beyond the human body. When in the review of the *tattvas* and their worlds in the VIII āhnika one arrives, having surpassed Sadāśiva, in the region of the *suṣumnā*, one finds the goddess Suṣumnā hypostatized on the lap of the Lord, who has the *piṅgalā* and the *idā* on his left and right respectively. These are three *nāḍīs*, the three channels of the body, the *suṣumnā* being the central one. Thus one becomes perfectly aware that it is the interior yoga experience that is translated into cosmology. The *nāda* arises from the lower base of the *suṣumnā*, traverses the whole *suṣumnā*, degree by degree, and it conquers the cosmos because it then comes out of the body and loses itself in the hole of Brahma (*brahmavila*). This *nāda*, the text continues (VIII.393),⁴⁸ is the eternal distinct resonance (*avyakto dhvanir akṣaraḥ*) that resounds in all beings and is presided by the *śakti* of Śiva. Then the stations continue: the *urdhvakuṇḍalī* with the *vyāpini*, Śiva Anāśrita with its *Śakti* and, beyond Śiva, the supreme power called *samanā*;

In the context of the *rahasya vidhi*, the secret Kula ritual dealt with in Tantrāloka XXIX, one can pick out a passage (146b-162a) in which the term *dhvani* appears three times. The first occurrence is at the beginning of the decisive phase of the yoga experience when the *prāṇa* (the rising breath) and the *apāna* (the descending breath) have been made to flow together from the two right (*idā*) and left (*piṅgalā*) channels into the central channel, the *suṣumnā* within the spinal column, and then the ascent of the *udāna*, the vertical breath, begins. At that point the *dhvani* arises, the sound made up of consciousness and awareness (*saṃvitparimarśātmā dhvaniḥ*, 148) which must constitute the very strength of the *mantras* (*tadeveha mantravīryaṃ syāt*, *ibid.*). The yogin must stay concentrated on his own *mantra* and repeat the *japa* prescribed by the ritual.

⁴⁷ Cf. Īśvarapratyabhijñārikā of Utpaladeva, II.1.5: *mūrtivaicitṛyato deśakramamābhāsayatyasau/ kriyāvaicitṛyanirbhāsāt kālakramamāpīśvaraḥ //*

⁴⁸ Verse 393 is found in nearly identical form in Svacchandatantra X.1235-1236, and Abhinavagupta traces the whole X paṭala of the Svacchandatantra in āhnika VIII.

Then the yoga is strengthened by means of sexual coupling, and the culminating moment of this is when the rays of the sun and moon blend into fire. And here Abhinavagupta's expressions break away from mystic symbolism because the sacred couple must enjoy fully and this enjoyment is expressed by the concrete terms in XXIX.155, in which kisses, play and laughter are present and there is a free realization of the self (*vimarśamayāḥ*, 155) which expands in sound waves named in a series of eight stages: *avyakta*, *dhvani*, *rāva*, *sphoṭa*, *śruti*, *nāda*, *nādānta*, *avyucchinānāhata*. In this list we find the second occurrence of *dhvani* in the passage. And again it is repeated: this must constitute the strength of the *mantras* (*tanmantravīryam syāt*, 156). Strophe 158 clearly states that the *avyakta* springs from the heart, follows the path to the throat and reaches the lips. It is the path of sound that from unexpressed (*avyakta*), through the phases of perceptible sound (*dhvani*) and then of resonance in the three stations of the body, heart, throat, palate or cerebrum (*rāva*), finally blossoms (*sphoṭa*) into audible expression (*śruti*) and projects itself, pure vocality (*nāda*), beyond the body (*nādānta*) to reach the inarticulate continuum (*avyucchinānāhata*) of the divine. It is the yoga path towards Bhairava who is Nādashairava.⁴⁹ Man becomes god, Bhairava himself. This path towards Bhairava is set out in detail with the names of the eight Bhairavas which are hypostatized in the cosmogony of VIII.368 ff., echoing the texts of the sacred tradition (Svacchandatantra, etc.); these eight are also the stages of yoga ascent, 'pervasion', from the (*ardha*) *candra* to the *unmanā* (161), that is, according to the enumeration in VI.161, ff.: (after *bindu*) *ardhacandra*, *nirodhikā*, *nādā*, *nādānta*, *śakti*, *vyāpinī*, *sāmyā* (then *unmanā*).

The supreme eightfold Nādashairava is called (160) *jyotirdhvanisamīrakṛtaḥ*: made of light, of sound, of *samira* (= *śakti* according to Jayaratha; the fusion, I believe, of light and sound). Here is the third occurrence of *dhvani* in the passage. These three occurrences of the term *dhvani* are very useful in measuring the distance between Abhinavagupta and Bhartṛhari. A period of enormous enrichment in the theory and practice of yoga divides the two philosophers. The *dhvani* in the first occurrence is that of *dhvaniyoga*: the sound that rises up in the *suṣumnā* and is the very strength of the *mantras*. The *dhvani* in the second occurrence, made stronger by the sexual practices of the Kula ritual, is inserted in a series in which it no longer represents the stage of sound that is articulated and can be heard. This is called *śruti* in the series. The *dhvani*, given immediately after the *avyakta*, is perceptible sound, may be only

⁴⁹ The translation by Raniero Gnoli 1980: 698, like the recent one in J.R. Dupuche 2003: 286, fails to recognise in this series the sense of the ascent of sound passing through the yogin's whole body, finally emerging and rejoining Bhairava. The *rāva* stations of the body are the *sthānas* explicitly mentioned in Tantrāloka V.98: *hṛd*, *kaṇṭha*, *tālu*.

inwardly perceptible. The space the *śabda* traversed in Bhartṛhari, coming from the depths of being to reach the mouth where the revelatory *dhvani*s were articulated, has been explored. Abhinavagupta's yogin, who succeeds in arriving at the end of the supreme mantric pervasion, has first overcome the stations of the heart, throat, the palate/cerebrum; he is a *jītarāvo mahāyogī*, whose aim is that the *rāvinī*, the voice that resounds, will finally dissolve from sound into non-sound (V.99-100).

In the third occurrence, *dhvani* is part of one of those groups of three that the Trika loves to investigate; it is the component sound that constitutes, along with the other two, the essence of Bhairava, a sound no different from those sound waves that in musical treatises are said to envelope the cosmos, *dhvani*, 'the origin of everything', as the Bṛhaddeśī emphatically states. Clearly different from the monolithic Śabdabrahman of the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari.

Utpaladeva's Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā does not speak of *dhvani*, apart from a brief mention, almost in passing, in II.3.5. About manifestations, *ābhāsas*, this kārikā says that they are manifold and that each one has its function, *te padaṃ dhvaneḥ*: they are the field of *dhvani*. As the vṛtti explains, each manifestation is given a name (*śabda*), for the purpose of communication, by people who have particular aims in mind. Philosophy is satisfied with the clear affirmation that there is a quantity of *ābhāsas*, to each of which a word corresponds. Variety and multiplicity of words depend on *dhvani*s, the sounds resulting from the articulatory processes, and there is no point in invading the territory of phoneticians and grammarians, with whom there were after all, as we know, basic discrepancies. Neither Utpaladeva's vṛtti on the kārikā nor Abhinavagupta's commentaries on the same kārikā name the *dhvani*: they use the term *śabda*.

It is believed that Abhinavagupta's commentaries on the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā represent the last stage of his philosophical production. It is on a passage in the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī that we base our concluding remarks in this review of occurrences of the term *dhvani* in Abhinavagupta's philosophical works. The passage is found under kārikās IV.8-10 by Utpaladeva, in the Tattvasaṃgrahādhikāra that gives the essential of the *pratyabhijñāvāda*. The kārikās are introduced by the statement that the text now proceeds with the description of reality as far as it is knowable for the limited being (*paśu*).

Abhinavagupta comments:⁵⁰ Who is responsible for the arising of the *vikalpanaśakti*, of the power to construct with the mind? It is the power of

⁵⁰ Bhāskari, Vol. II: 296-298, compared with the KSTS edition, Vol. II: 264-265.

the Lord in which all words are contained, as he comprehends everything. It is the power of the goddesses of the *cakras*, Brāhmī etc., whose purpose is to block the state of the supreme Lord characterized by repose within himself, a power that is varied due to the variety of the units of the *kavarga*, etc. Due to this power, the constructions of the limited being, which follow uninterruptedly because the individual does not stop at only one point, constructions like *mitramidam*, *śatrurayam*, put together with the variety of units of speech – yes, due to this power, by means of mental constructions, we have the individual creation of the limited being which has the same nature as the Lord.

And, the text continues, they may also be imaginary creations, like 'the elephant with five mouths and four trunks runs through the sky'; this as well is a group of *ābhāsas* that are still creations of the Lord, and thus, in short, all individual creation that is creation of ideas (*pratyaya*) lives in the Lord's creation.

dhvani does not appear at all in this passage; *śabda* appears, *śabda* in which antinomies interpenetrate and are dissolved: freedom and enslavement, beauty and darkness, joy and suffering. It is not Bhartṛhari's pure, divine *śabda*; it is Abhinavagupta's *śabda*, which is divine and human at the same time.

dhvani hardly survives in Abhinavagupta in the basic meaning of 'articulated sound', which has now become 'perceptible sound', instead. *dhvani* is part of the practice of yoga, and it is one of the components of the threefold essence of the supreme god. It is to be kept distinct from *nāda*: *nāda* is entirely the body of the god, *nāda* is pure vocality, it is sublime music. Yogins also use *nāda* in their practice and identify with it when they identify themselves with Bhairava. In the great cosmic/psychophysical design of the threefold Vāc, *nāda* is found in *paśyantī* at the *sthūla* level, *dhvani* is in *madhyamā* at the *sthūla* level. *dhvani* is a means, *parāpara*; *nāda* is the absolute, simply *para*.

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Bhartṛhari and the Jainas*

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§1.1

The well-known discussion format of Indian philosophical texts of *pūrvapakṣa* (preliminary view that is to be rejected) and *siddhānta* (accepted view, established conclusion) is of little help to a student of the works of Bhartṛhari. Sooner or later he will get stuck with the question “now finally, what is Bhartṛhari’s own view, where is the *siddhānta*”? Bhartṛhari’s attitude, both in the Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā (MBhD) and in the Vākyapadīya (VP), may be described not only as ‘encyclopedic’, in the sense that he seems to be eager to discuss all important views on a certain subject, but also as ‘perspectivistic’, in the sense that he apparently acknowledges that different views can represent possible and in their own context valid perspectives.¹ In accordance with his view on the relation between the different *pramāṇas* or sources of valid knowledge where *tarka* or argumentation cannot have

* An earlier and less elaborate version of this paper appeared under the title “Bhartṛhari’s familiarity with Jainism” (Houben 1994). Acknowledgements given there are still valid. Here I would like to thank again the scholars and staff of the Adyar Library and Research Centre (Chennai), the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library (Chennai), the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Pune) and the University of Poona (Department of Sanskrit and Prakrit Languages and Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit). I am happy to acknowledge support received from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) on several occasions when I was working on earlier versions of this article.

¹ Cf. Houben 1995a: 15-18, 1995b, 1997a, 1998b; Iyer 1969: 75-82 speaks of Bhartṛhari’s ‘spirit of accommodation.’

unconditional primacy, he presents his discussions without in any way suggesting that mere argumentation would be able to decide the superiority of his own position or of any position. Rather, discussions between himself as grammarian and thinkers of different philosophical persuasions are confrontations between sets of presuppositions (*āgama*), supporting perceptions (*pratyakṣa*), and arguments (*tarka*).²

Bhartṛhari refers to the different views in a very concise way, and for modern students of his works the precise identity of those who held the views often remains unclear. Of those (apart from grammarians, and authors of Śikṣā-texts and the Nirukta) whose views Bhartṛhari frequently takes up for discussion, K.A. Subramania Iyer has mentioned Vaiśeṣikas,³ Mīmāṃsakas,⁴ Sāṃkhyas⁵ and Buddhists⁶ (Iyer 1969: 72). Iyer has not mentioned the Jains, and one may wonder whether they remained outside the scope of Bhartṛhari's encyclopedic approach. This, however, is not the case. Bhartṛhari is very well aware of Jaina authors and refers to them explicitly in at least one place in the Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā. Other passages in the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā and Vākyapadīya are remarkably well compatible with Jaina ideas. These passages were no doubt intended as references to their views, although their name is not explicitly mentioned.

As is well known, the early Jains wrote their scriptures in Ardhamāgadhī, and they attributed to this language a high status. Still, at a certain point in their tradition they started to write also in Sanskrit. One of the earliest Jaina works in Sanskrit is the Tattvārthasūtra or Tattvārthādhigamasūtra (TS), which may have been written not long before Bhartṛhari.⁷ In the Jaina tradition the TS was to acquire an important position as a basic text accepted and commented upon by both the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras. We may assume that Bhartṛhari, as a Sanskrit grammarian, was more familiar with this Jaina work in Sanskrit than with the earlier works in Ardhamāgadhī.

² In Houben 1995b this is demonstrated on the basis of the argument in the second Kāṇḍa.

³ Cf. also Houben 1992 and Houben 1995a: 48-53.

⁴ Cf. Bronkhorst 1989; Houben 1997b: 278.

⁵ Cf. Houben 1995a: 58-63.

⁶ Cf. Herzberger 1986; Houben 1995a: 53-58.

⁷ Neither in the case of the author of the TS nor in the case of Bhartṛhari is it possible to give a definite date. According to Rob Zydenbos, Umāsvāti's commentary on the TS was probably written in the fifth century, while the Sūtra-text must have originated still earlier (Zydenbos 1983: 12). See also Bronkhorst 1985. As for Bhartṛhari, "If reliable information about Bhartṛhari's life is not available, his date is not definitely known either" (Iyer 1969: 2). Still, it is by now generally accepted that Bhartṛhari must have preceded Dīnnāga (cf. Iyengar 1951 and Jambuvijaya 1954: 230). Frauwallner has proposed to place Bhartṛhari in ca. 450-510 A.D. and Dīnnāga in 480-540 A.D. (Frauwallner 1959: 83ff, 1961:125); cf. also Sadhu Ram 1952, and Scharfe 1977:170.

§1.2

If Bhartrhari was familiar with Jaina works and if his thought shows at some points affinity with Jaina thought, we may expect that Bhartrhari's work attracted also the attention of the Jainas and was studied by them. A work which devotes considerable attention to Bhartrhari is Mallavādin's *Dvādaśāranayacakra* (DNC). In the model of the 'wheel with twelve spokes' that underlies Mallavādin's work, each basic philosophical position has a place and limited validity of its own, but is refuted by the subsequent position (*ara* or 'spoke') in the wheel. A central position, viz., the nave of the wheel, is occupied by the philosophy of *syādvāda* of Jainism. Mallavādin's work is at least 'encyclopedic', and may be regarded as 'perspectivistic' to the extent that other viewpoints (*nayas*) are not refuted in an absolute sense but are given a place in relation to the Jaina scriptures accepted by the author.⁸ The Jaina philosophy of *syādvāda* may be central, but it would also be aimless if there were no spokes and felly. The numerous and sometimes extensive references of Mallavādin and his commentator Simhasūri to the ideas of Bhartrhari and his teacher still await a close study. From a preliminary overview it becomes clear that Mallavādin and Simhasūri cite the grammarians and especially Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya* not only in the explicit critical discussion of the views of Bhartrhari and his teacher Vasurāta in the eighth chapter (the eighth *ara* or 'spoke'), but also at numerous other places, for instance in discussions of theories of causation (*satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda*) in the first *ara*, and of views of the Buddhist logician Dinnāga on perception (first *ara*) and on linguistic meaning (second and eighth *ara*).

§1.3

In the present paper, without aiming at completeness, I will discuss a few indications of Bhartrhari's familiarity with Jainism in the *Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā* and *Vākyapadīya*, including two places in VP Kāṇḍa 2 which seem to refer to a technicality in Jainendra-Vyākaraṇa (JV). This suggests that Bhartrhari was not only familiar with the Jaina doctrines, but also with their literature in the field of grammar. The early reception of Bhartrhari's work among the Jainas is addressed on the basis of references in the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* and Simhasūri's commentary. In the concluding section I will mention some implications of Bhartrhari's familiarity with Jainism, and his reception on

⁸ Halbfass (1988: 267) mentions especially Siddhasena Divākara and Mallavādin as authors in whose works "the enumeration of historically factual viewpoints merges with the construction of systematically possible standpoints in philosophy"; thanks to them and later authors "Jainism is credited with a special and unique manner of coordinating, systematizing and completing the other world-views, of showing their attachment to partial truths and mere aspects, and of salvaging them from their self-imposed isolation and one-sidedness."

the part of the Jaina thinkers Mallavādin and Simhasūri, for our understanding of Bhartṛhari's perspectivism and his philosophy of language.

§2.1

The Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā refers to the Jainas by the name of 'followers of the Arhat' in MBhD 1:19.11. Bhartṛhari starts to discuss the following phrase in the Mahābhāṣya: *siddhā dyauḥ siddhā pṛthivī siddham ākāśam* (MBh 1:6.18-19). His first remark on this phrase is: *ārhatānām mīmāṃsakānām ca naivāsti vināśa⁹ eṣām*. "For the followers of the Arhat and the Mīmāṃsakas there is no destruction of these (namely heaven, earth and the intermediate space)."

§2.2

The TS chapters 3 and 4 discuss the Jaina views on the three *loka*-regions, lower, middle and heavenly. The different living beings and their lifetimes in these regions are described in detail, but nothing is said about a complete destruction of the *loka* itself. Chapter 5 discusses the substances recognized by the Jainas, namely *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *puḍgala*, (together constituting *aḥi*) and as the fifth *jīva*, the soul. These substances are considered to be permanent (TS 5.1-3). The specific Jaina view on what is real and their view on permanence is discussed in TS 5.29-30.¹⁰ From the different statements referred to above it can be inferred that the author of the TS, although he did not do so explicitly and did not use the terms used in MBh 1:6.18-19, rejected a complete destruction of heaven, earth, and intermediate space. In this respect he did not deviate from the earlier, canonical texts.¹¹

§§2.2.1 Here, we should also mention MBhD 1:16.28-29, which forms part of an enumeration of different views on what a permanent *śabda* would mean: *kecid evaṃ manyante/ya evaite prākṛtāḥ śabdāḥ, ta evaite nityāḥ/prākṛtau bhavāḥ prākṛtāḥ*. This may be translated as follows: "Some think like this: Those words only, which are *prākṛta* 'original' are eternal. (The word) *prākṛtāḥ* (is derived in the sense of) *prākṛtau bhavāḥ* 'being in the origin' (pl. nom. masc.)." Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen 1986: 86-87, who add in a note (315): "The opinion referred to may be that of Jaina grammarians who

⁹ Delete the visarga at the end of *vināśaḥ* in the MBhD (cf. ms. reproduced in *Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā*, p. 8, section a, line 4, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 1980).

¹⁰ TS 5.29: *utpāda-vyaya-dhauvya-yuktaṃ sat*; 5.30: *tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam*: "That which is associated with (the three features) origination, destruction and permanence is *sat* 'real'. That which does not deviate from its essence is permanent."

¹¹ Cf. Dixit 1971: 33 (in a section devoted to the Bhagavatī-sūtra): "In the field of cosmography some of the most basic Jaina positions are that *loka* (world) has got a particular shape, that *loka* is surrounded by *aloka* (non-world), that *loka* and *aloka* are two beginningless and endless entities."

wanted to upgrade the status of Ardhmagadhi, their canonical language, as against Sanskrit."¹² Unfortunately, the reference in the MBhD is too short for a precise understanding of the view. It is nowhere said what the *prākṛtaḥ śabdāḥ* are, nor what the *prakṛti* is from or in which they arise.¹³

§§2.2.2 Later Sanskrit and Prakrit grammarians used to derive the word *prākṛta* as a designation of the Prakrit-words/languages mostly in the following way. The *prākṛta-śabdāḥ* or Prakrit words would be located at or derive from their basis or origin. The origin, or *prakṛti*, of each Prakrit word would be a Sanskrit word. Sanskrit would thus be the eternal basis of all the Prakrit-words and -languages, which developed from it.¹⁴ This derivation would provide answers to the questions what the *prākṛtāḥ śabdāḥ* in the MBhD are, and what the *prakṛti* is, but not very satisfying ones. For, this way the view would be identical with the view which the MBhD mentions next, the view that there was an original, pure language (*daivī vāk*), which became spoiled by incompetent speakers in the course of time. A more important drawback of this interpretation is that the *prakṛti*, namely the Sanskrit words, is considered to be permanent (*nitya*), but not the *prākṛta-śabdāḥ* belonging to or derived from this basis, whereas it was said in the MBhD that the *prākṛta-śabdāḥ* are 'permanent' (*nitya*).

¹² Also Kahrs, commenting on the same passage, thinks that "The view that only *prākṛta* words are eternal could possibly be that of a Jain grammarian" (Kahrs 1992: 241). For some criticism on the conclusions reached by Kahrs in his article on the term *tadbhava*, and related expressions, see below, note 14.

¹³ VP 1.77-79 discuss the difference between *prākṛta dhvani* 'fundamental sound' and *vaikṛta dhvani* 'derivative sound'. In the Vṛtti and in Vṛṣabha's Paddhati it becomes clear that both are 'sound' as opposed to the meaningful *śabda* or *sphoṭa*. Vṛṣabha explains the idea of *prākṛta dhvani* as follows: *dhvanisphoṭayoḥ prthaktvenānupalambhāt taṁ sphoṭaṁ tasya dhvaneḥ prakṛtiṁ iva manyante/tatra bhavaḥ prākṛtaḥ*, "Because *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* are not perceived separately, people think the *sphoṭa* to be the basis of that (*prākṛta*) *dhvani*. *Prākṛta* (should be derived as) *tatra bhavaḥ* 'arising in that' (namely in the *prakṛti*, 'basis')." (Iyer 1966:142, line 16-17). In this view, the *prākṛta dhvani* (which one may also call *prākṛta śabda*, *śabda* in the sense of 'sound' or 'phoneme') is not permanent (although its temporal distinctions are superimposed on the permanent *śabda* or *sphoṭa*). The reference in the MBhD to permanent *prākṛtāḥ śabdāḥ*, therefore, cannot be a reference to this view of *prākṛta dhvani*.

¹⁴ For example, Hemacandra (12th century A.D.), 1.1: *prakṛtiḥ saṁskṛtam; tatra bhavaṁ tata āgataṁ vā prākṛtam*. For more quotations see Acharya 1968: 39; Pischel 1981: 1. In an important article on this subject, Kahrs has tried to find out what the term *tadbhava* (usually referring to Prakrit words derived from Sanskrit words, as opposed to those similar to them, *tatsama*, and regional or *deśī* words) must have originally meant in the context of Indian thought about language (Kahrs 1992). He rightly points out that the term *-bhava* at the end of this compound and at the end of *saṁskṛta-bhava*, and also *bhava* in the expression *tatra bhavaṁ* and *prakṛtau bhavaṁ* explaining *prākṛtam*, should be understood in the light of P 4.3.53, where it means 'located in' and not 'derived from'. (Hemacandra's alternative *tata āgataṁ vā*, on the other hand, refers to P 4.3.74.) However, it should be observed that if *tad-* and *tatra* refer to *prakṛti*,

§§2.2.3 From the 11th-century Jaina scholar Namisādhu, who wrote a commentary on Rudraṭa's Kāvyaḷaṅkāra, we know of quite a different explication of the word *prākṛta* as a designation of languages. According to him,¹⁵ "*prakṛti* is the natural use of speech made by all beings of the world which is not refined by grammar etc.; that which is located at this [*prakṛti*], or this [*prakṛti*] itself, is *prākṛta*." After giving a different possible etymology for *prākṛta*, according to which it would be that which is created first (*prākṛta*), Namisādhu goes on to explain how Prakrit and Sanskrit are in his view related: "*prākṛta* is the speech easily intelligible to children, women etc., and the basis of all other speeches. It is of a homogeneous character like rain falling from the clouds. That same speech, being differentiated according to differences in place and on account of refinement, obtains the subsequent divisions into *saṃskṛta* and other speeches. For this reason, the author [Rudraṭa] first mentions [in śloka 2.12 of the Kāvyaḷaṅkāra] *Prākṛta* and then *Saṃskṛta* and other speeches. It is called *Saṃskṛta* on account of being refined by Pāṇini and others, in the rules of their grammar."¹⁶

'origin', the notion of 'origination' or 'derivation' enters again in these expressions. Kahrs also argues that these words (and the word *prākṛta*) should not be understood in the modern framework of historical changes in language, but in the framework of a timeless linguistic universe. It is true that we do not find ancient Indian attempts to postulate and describe systematic changes from one organic structure of language to a next stage or to a new language. Nevertheless, Kahrs goes too far in attempting to deny any awareness of linguistic change in time to the Indians. There are also some problems with Kahrs' conclusion that it was generally presupposed that a *prākṛta* word was "located in it, that is, in the constant linguistic continuum of the *prakṛti* which is Sanskrit" (Kahrs 1992: 245). If at all there was an awareness of a timeless 'linguistic continuum' it is not to be expected that all Sanskrit and Prakrit grammarians would implicitly agree that this included both Sanskrit and Prakrit forms on an equal level, although this is what I understand from Kahrs' formulation. Attention may be drawn to VP 1.182 and the Vṛtti (cf. section 2.2.5 below; also Kahrs 1992: 242-243) which contrast two viewpoints, one according to which a previously pure and divine speech becomes corrupted in the course of time, and an opposite view according to which a group of conventional (Prakrit) words are original, and the regulated (Sanskrit) forms are established later. Both views take the time factor into account (cf. *kālena*, VP I:234.1; and *paścāt*, VP I:234.4), and in both there is a sharp contrast between two groups of linguistic forms (correct – corrupted, original – regulated). Awareness of linguistic change in time is also reflected in Namisādhu's explanation of *prākṛta* as *prāk kṛta* (see below, section 2.2.3).

¹⁵ Namisādhu on Rudraṭa's Kāvyaḷaṅkāra 2.12: *prākṛteti sakalajagajjantūnām vyākaraṇādibhir anāhitasamskāraḥ sahajo vacanavyāpāraḥ prakṛtiḥ, tatra bhavaṃ saiva vā prākṛtam*. (ed. R.D. Sukla 1966: 31; cf. Acharya 1968: 40).

¹⁶ Namisādhu on Rudraṭa's Kāvyaḷaṅkāra 2.12: *prākṛtaṃ bālamahilādisubodham sakalabhāṣānibandhanabhūtaṃ vacanam ucyate meghanirmuktajalam ivaikarūpam/tad eva ca deśaviśeṣāt saṃskāraḥ ca samāsāditaviśeṣaṃ sat saṃskṛtādyullaravibhedān āpnoti/ata eva śāstrakṛtā prākṛtaṃ ādau nirḍiṣṭaṃ tad anu saṃskṛtādiṇi/pāṇinyādivyākaraṇodilāśabdalaḥṣaṇena saṃskaraṇāt saṃskṛtaṃ ucyate* (ed. R.D. Sukla 1966: 31-32; cf. Acharya 1968: 40). Kāvyaḷaṅkāra 2.12 enumerates different 'speeches' as follows: *prākṛta-saṃskṛta-māgadha-piśācabhāṣās ca sūrasenī ca/ṣaṣṭho 'ira bhūribhedo deśaviśeṣād apabhraṃśaḥ//*

§§2.2.4 With this interpretation we would get a sensible alternative view on the permanence of *śabda*, suitable to the context of Bhartṛhari's enumeration. The *prākṛtāḥ śabdāḥ* are what we would call Prakrit words; their *prakṛti* 'origin' is the natural speech of common people. The *prākṛtāḥ śabdāḥ* are in this view not derived but original, and may be considered permanent, not in an absolute, metaphysical sense, but in the sense that they are naturally spoken by common people. Finally, the non-eternal counterparts of these *prākṛtāḥ śabdāḥ* are the refined, *saṃskṛta* words regulated by grammatical rules, and other derived speech varieties. The view which thus comes to the fore is sufficiently distinct from the next view about the *daivī vāk* to deserve separate mentioning.¹⁷

§§2.2.5 That we are probably on the right track in our attempt to reconstruct a more complete view on the basis of the few hints given in the MBhD becomes clear from another text which must have been somewhat later but still fairly close in time to the MBhD, namely the ancient Vṛtti on the VP. The Vṛtti on VP 1.182 (Iyer 1966: 234), explaining a view which according to the *kārikā* should be opposite to the '*daivī vāk*'-view, says the following:¹⁸

But those who propound the impermanent, who do not accept that correct words lead to *dharma* 'merit', (and who) consider the established fixity of correct forms to be similar to the conventions among wrestlers, say that the collection of correct [namely, Prakrit] words is *prākṛta* in the sense of 'arising from the *prakṛti*'. But later on a changed form [namely, Sanskrit] has been established, which was arrived at through accentuation and phonological and morphological modification¹⁹ by persons with impaired understanding.

The view as explained here in the Vṛtti squares nicely both with the view explained by Namisādhū and the concise reference in the MBhD. The interpretation of *prākṛta* as that which originates from *saṃskṛta* would make little sense in either the view explained here in the Vṛtti, or in the discussed reference in the MBhD.

¹⁷ Neither the view that Prakrit has Sanskrit as its origin, nor the opposite view can do full justice to the linguistic situation in ancient India (cf. Pischel, 1981, §§ 1-9, 16). By the time Namisādhū wrote this commentary, the Prakrits were purely literary languages. Pischel wanted to reserve the term Prakrit for the standardized, literary language, and the term Apabhraṃśa for the old spoken varieties (Pischel 1981, §5). For the ancient Sanskrit grammarians, however, anything non-Sanskrit would be Apabhraṃśa (cf. Deshpande 1993: 3-4).

¹⁸ *anityavādināḥ tu ye sādḥūnām dharmahetutvaṃ na pratīpadyante, mallasamayādisaḍṛṣīm sādḥuvyavasthām manyante, te prakṛtau bhavaṃ prakṛtaṃ sādḥūnām śabdānām samūhaṃ ācakṣate / vikāras tu paścād vyavasthāpitāḥ, yaḥ sambhinnabhuddhibhiḥ puruṣaiḥ svarasaṃskārādibhir nirmāyate iti.* (VP I:234. 2-5)

¹⁹ For the expression *svara-saṃskārau* cf. ŚYPr 1.1; Yāska's Nirukta, 1.12, 14, 15; 2.1; and Cardona 1997: 563: "Yāska uses *svarasamskārau* with reference to accents (*svara*) and the derivational formation of words from bases and so on."

§2.2.6 Neither in the MBhD nor in the VP-Vṛtti, is it clearly stated who the adherents to this view were. In the case of Namisādhū we know that he was a Jaina. In the MBhD, where the *prākṛtāḥ śabdāḥ* are said to be permanent, the reference may also be to the Jainas. The Vṛtti on VP 1.182, however, professes to explain the view of the *anītyadarśins* mentioned in the verse. Would not the word *anītyadarśins* rather suggest a reference to the Buddhists who propound the impermanence of everything, than to the Jainas, according to whom real entities have both permanent and impermanent aspects (cf. above, note 5)? The Buddhists would in general agree with the Jainas in rejecting Sanskrit as the *prakṛti* or 'basis': they attributed the role of 'basic language' (*mūlabhāṣā*) to Māgadhi, the language in which the Buddha would have preached.²⁰ I am not aware that the Buddhists ever used the name *prākṛta* for this 'basic language' Māgadhi. This makes it unlikely that the passage in the Vṛtti ("the collection of correct [namely, Prakrit] words is *prākṛta* in the sense of 'arising from the *prakṛti*'") refers to the Buddhists directly. Therefore, we may assume that *anītyadarśin* refers specifically to the view on language, and hence to all those who do not accept *śabda* as *nītya*. The *anītyadarśins* could then include both the Buddhists and the Jainas,²¹ and the reference to the Jaina view on Prakrit by the author of the Vṛtti would be fully justified. It is not likely that *anītyadarśin* was intended as a reference to the Buddhists by the *kārikā* author, because then we would have to assume that the reference in the Vṛtti to the anti-Sanskritic Jaina view in which the *prākṛta* collection of 'correct words' is opposed to the changed form (*vikāra*) which is regulated 'by persons with impaired understanding', is a bit out of place in the explanation of *kārikā* 1.182.

§3.1

Another indication of Bhartṛhari's familiarity with Jainism or at least of his remarkable affinity with their ideas is found in the first Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya. Kārikā 110 of this Kāṇḍa reads as follows:

*vāyor aṇūnām jñānasya śabdatvāpattir iṣyate/
kaiś cid darśanabhedo hi pravādeṣu anavasthitaḥ //*

This may be translated as:

²⁰ Cf. J. Muir, 1874: 53.

²¹ The Brahmanical Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas also reject a permanent *śabda* (cf. Joshi, 1967: 70-72), but they would not consider the Prakrit words correct and the Sanskrit words derived from them. Nor would they "consider the established fixity of correct forms to be similar to the conventions among wrestlers," as was stated in the Vṛtti on VP 1.182. The convention (*saṃketa*) which plays a role in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika is originally probably the convention of the *ṛṣi*s, but in a later period it is the convention of God — cf. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 6.1.2 referring to *ṛṣi*, unconvincingly interpreted as God by the commentator Candrānandra, and Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparya-Ṭīkā ad 2.1.55, Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 7.2.20 with the commentary Upaskāra.

It has been accepted by different (thinkers) that (respectively) wind, atoms, cognition, become language; indeed, the difference in viewpoints among the doctrines remains unsettled.

Of the different views referred to here, the view that atoms become language has been taken by different scholars as a reference to the traditional Jaina view on speech and language.²²

§3.2

In the Vṛtti on this kārīkā, these views are further explained in a number of verses (*ślokas*).²³ The two *ślokas* explaining the view that atoms become language are as follows:

aṇavaḥ sarvaśaktitvād bhedasamsargavṛttayaḥ /
chāyātapatamaḥśabdabhāvena pariṇāmināḥ //
svaśaktau vyajyamānāyām prayatnena samīritāḥ /
abhrāṇīva pracīyante śabdākhyāḥ paramāṇavaḥ //

The first of these two verses may be translated without many problems as:

Atoms, because they have all capacities, are transformed when they separate and combine into shadow, heat, darkness, and sound.

This is very much reminiscent of TS 5.23-25, which explain the Jaina view on matter or *pudgala*. According to these sūtras,²⁴

The *pudgalas* are characterized by touch, taste, smell and colour. They are also characterized by sound, binding, subtleness, grossness, configuration, splitting, darkness, shadow, hot radiation and non-hot radiation.

pudgala is of the form of an atom and of the form of an aggregate.

§3.3

Unlike the Vaiśeṣikas, the Jains do not accept different sorts of atoms for earth, water, fire and air. Instead, the atoms are uniform and are at the basis of all different material things on account of different configurations between them. Here, the second verse in the Vṛtti explaining the atom-view seems to present a problem. In this verse it is said that *śabdākhyāḥ*

²² Pt. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śukla 1937, *avataraṇīkā* to 110 (VP 1.113); Gaurinath Śāstri 1959: 52; Śānti Bhikṣu Śāstri, 1963, notes on 110 (VP 1.113).

²³ These verses (VP 1.111-119) belong to the Vṛtti and not to the kārīkā-text according to the criterion that a verse genuinely belonging to the kārīkā should have been recognized as such in the Vṛtti. Verses 1.111-119 explaining the three views, are not separately commented upon in the Vṛtti, from which one may infer that they formed part of the Vṛtti itself (Iyer 1966: x; Aklujkar 1971). This criterion can be strictly adhered to only if we assume that the Vṛtti-author was identical with the author of the kārīkā (cf. now Aklujkar, 1993). If the Vṛtti is not by the same author (cf. Bronkhorst 1988; Houben 1998a, 1999b), it is possible that the Vṛtti-author assigned the status of 'illustrative statement' to kārīkā which he did find in the kārīkā-text he was commenting on.

²⁴ TS 5.23: *sparśa-rasa-gandha-varṇa-vantaḥ pudgalāḥ*; 5.24: *śabda-bandha-saukṣmya-sthaulya-samsthāna-bheda-tamaś-chāyā-tapo-dyota-vantaś ca*; 5.25: *aṇavaḥ skandhāś ca*.

paramāṇavaḥ are accumulated like clouds when their own capacity manifests itself, and when they are stirred by an (articulatory) effort. That the verse seems to speak of atoms which are specifically *śabdākhyāḥ*, was for Virendra Sharma (1977: 13, 17) the main reason to consider the attribution of the atom-view to the Jainas as impossible.²⁵

§3.4

However, if we understand the verse this way, it would no longer be an illustration of one of the three views according to which “something becomes *śabda*” (1.110). If something becomes *śabda*, this something can obviously not already be *śabda*. Kārikā 1.110 mentioned three ‘things’ which become *śabda* according to different views. If we read the second verse in a slightly different way, there is no conflict with this statement in 1.110. The first verse speaks clearly of atoms which transform into several things, among them *śabda*. If this is true for the second verse also *śabdākhyāḥ* is not an epithet of the atoms before they are accumulated on account of their capacity and on account of a specific effort, but it tells us something about the product which arises from this accumulation. The word *śabdākhyāḥ* would express the *vikārya karman*, one of the three types of *karman* accepted by the Sanskrit grammarians (cf. VP 3.7.45-50). Accordingly, the verse may be translated as follows:

The ultimate atoms, when their own capacity manifests itself, instigated by effort, accumulate like [atoms into] clouds and appear as sounds.

It is therefore very well possible that not only the first but also the second verse explaining the atom-view of 1.110 referred to the Jaina-view on sound and speech.

§3.5

The Jainas, as correctly pointed out by Sharma (1977: 13-17), seem not to have been the only ones to think of sound and speech as configurations of subtle matter. The Vṛtti explaining 1.110, after having illustrated the three views referred to in the kārikā with several verses, remarks that all this is just an example (*nidarśanamātram cedam*, VP I:175.5). Next, it is said that the views of Śikṣās and of authors of Sūtras and Bhāṣyas is manifold (*bahudhā śikṣāsūtrakārabhāṣyakāramatāni dṛśyante*, VP I:175.5-6). Several (mostly untraced) quotations from Śikṣā-authors follow, and in one it is said that breath puts subtle parts together which become a compact mass of sound (*prāṇo ... sūkṣmāṁśam...samhanti/sa... śabdaghanah...*). Instead of the word *aṇu* the word *sūkṣmāṁśam* is used here, whose meaning amounts to the same. It is not unlikely that the Jainas had not only their own Sanskrit

²⁵ Biardeau (1964: 146, note 1) understood the second verse as a reference to a different view among the atom-views.

grammarians, but also their own phoneticians; and it is therefore very well possible that the Śikṣā-author referred to here in the Vṛtti was a Jaina phonetician. Yet, from a remark at the end of the Vṛtti on 1.110 one would infer that the Vṛtti was only referring to Śikṣās belonging to different Vedic schools (VP I:177.5, *ityevamādi pratiśākham...*), at least in the passage from *bahudhā śikṣāsūtrakārabhāṣyakāramatāni dṛśyante* (VP I: 175.5-6) onward. (The two verses VP 1.113-114 need not be included in the reference *ityevamādi pratiśākham...*) Moreover, different kārīkās speak of sound as something that can be accumulated and diffused (VP 1.106, 108; 3.9.63-64), even though this is only seemingly so from the point of view of the permanent *śabda* or *sphoṭa*; nothing indicates that Bhartṛhari would here refer to a view of the Jains. The Vṛtti on 1.48 speaks suddenly (i.e. without specific indication in the kārīkā) of a 'subtle pervading sound' (*sūkṣme vyāpini dhvanau*) which is accumulated like a cloud-mass.

§3.6

It may therefore be that also among the Brahmanical authors, for instance authors of Śikṣās, there were some who worked with a theory of subtle, material sound and speech. Among the important philosophical systems, it was Sāṃkhya which considered audible sound a derivative of *śabdatanmātra*, the subtle element of sound.²⁶ In Sāṃkhya, however, the atoms are specific, unlike the atoms in at least the first of the two verses in the Vṛtti on kārīkā 1.110; this verse is, as we have seen, remarkably close to the TS. Whatever we have to think of other places where Bhartṛhari refers to a view according to which sound is made of atoms, the emphatic denial that these verses refer to Jaina ideas (Sharma, 1977: 13, 17) is without any reasonable basis.²⁷ If the atom-view in kārīkā 1.110 is correctly illustrated by

²⁶ Nāgeśa explained the *aṇus* which transform into *śabda* as *śabdatanmātrādi*, thus suggesting that they referred to a Sāṃkhya-view (Nāgeśa's Uddyota on Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa on the MBh on P. 1.4.29).

²⁷ (a) According to Sharma's confused argumentation on pp. 11-12, the two verses do not refer to the Sāṃkhya view because the atoms are of a single general nature (have the same *jāti*, universal) and transform into different specific entities (including *śabda*) according to the first verse, and they cannot refer to the Jaina-view because they are specifically called *śabda* according to the second verse. However, atoms that are accepted to be of a single general nature, and transform into shadow, etc., are indeed very much in accordance with the Jaina view. The verse in which they are called *śabda* could refer to a different view (note 25, or rather, as explained in section 3.4, it should be interpreted both in accordance with the first verse according to which one type of atom has all capacities, and in accordance with 1.110 according to which something (which is not yet *śabda*) is transformed into *śabda*.

(b) Sharma argues, further, that the view with atoms should be in accordance with the grammarian's *sphoṭa* theory (Sharma 1977: 16-17). It is, however, very clear that Bhartṛhari intended to discuss or at least refer to many different views, and was not simply explaining a single theory to the exclusion of others (cf. *darśanabheda* in 1.110, *bhinnaṃ darśanam* in 1.75 and *vādās trayo' bhivyaktivādinām* in 1.80).

the two verses in the Vṛtti (1.113-114), then we have to accept that Bhartṛhari referred at least at this place to the view of the Jainas.

§4.1

Two kārīkās in Vākyapadīya book 2 are indicative of Bhartṛhari's familiarity with quite a different Jaina text. Both seem to refer to a technicality in the Jainendra-vyākaraṇa, a Jaina Sanskrit grammar adapted from Pāṇini by replacing, for instance, long technical terms by shorter ones (cf. Tripathi, 1956; Scharfe, 1977: 168-169).

The two kārīkās are 2.40 and 444:

*so'yam ity abhisambandho buddhyā prakramyate yadā/
vākyārthasya tadaiko'pi varṇaḥ pratyāyakaḥ kva cit// 2.40//
anekaśakter ekasya pravibhāgo'nugamyate/
ekārthatvaṁ hi vākyasya mātrayāpi pratiyate// 2.444//*

The translation of these kārīkās does not present many problems:

If the relation of identification is adopted by the mind, then, in some cases a single phoneme can be expressive of the meaning of a sentence.

Of one [entity] with many capacities, a division is understood; for it is understood in just (one) unit (*mātrā*) that the sentence has a single meaning.

The interpretation of these kārīkās in the larger context of the discussion in the VP does not present many problems either. The subject in the second Kāṇḍa of the VP is the nature of the sentence and the sentence meaning, and of words and their meanings. The problem is discussed from different angles.

Kārīkās 2.40 and 444 occur both in the context of passages in support of the view that the sentence meaning, and by implication also the sentence, is one and indivisible, although secondarily a division in words and word meanings may be adopted. The unity and indivisibility of the sentence is demonstrated by the fact that, theoretically, a whole sentence meaning could be expressed by a single phoneme. The unity of meaning of a sentence becomes this way clear in one small (prosodial) unit (*mātrā*).

(c) A final point is that Sharma apparently includes VP 1.113-114 in the reference in VP I:177.5, *ityevamādi pratiśākhāṁ*... by reading *nidarśanamātram cedam, bahudhā* etc. (VP I:175.5-6) as a continuous statement (Sharma 1977: 13, n. 4). While the verses VP 1.113-114 are not necessarily included in the reference to the authors 'belonging to each branch (of the Veda)', it is on the other hand to be admitted that any explicit reference to the Jainas, in spite of the remarkable similarity of VP 1.113-114 with their views, is rigorously avoided. The same is true in other situations where Bhartṛhari seems to refer without much doubt to Buddhist and/or Jainas, and the Vṛtti, most probably making use of material derived from Jaina sources, avoids an explicit reference to them (see above, section 2.2.5, and below, section 4.6-11). Sharma's conviction that VP 1.113-114 have nothing to do with Jaina doctrine is therefore closely related to his acceptance of the Vṛtti as a work of Bhartṛhari, the author of the kārīkās (cf. Sharma, 1977: 12, 13). The justifiability of this acceptance is, however, disputable (cf. Bronkhorst 1988, and Houben 1997a, 1998a, 1999b).

§4.2

Because *kārikā* 40 speaks of the adoption of the relation of identification, it seems that the author asks us to imagine a situation in which the meaning of a whole sentence is by convention equated with a single phoneme. Even if we are favourably disposed towards the view that the sentence is one and indivisible, this argument given in support of it seems a bit vague and far-fetched. Puṇyarāja's commentary and the later interpreters are not of much help, because they only explain the general implication of the *kārikās* in the wider context. It is only the *Vṛtti*, the most ancient commentary available, which seems to make the example used in the *kārikās* more concrete.

§4.3

The *Vṛtti* refers to a problem in the technical understanding of Pāṇini's grammar which received some attention in the *Vārttika*'s and in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, and which was also important in Bhartrhari's *Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā*. The problem is connected with sūtra P 1.1.45, which defines the technical term *saṁprasāraṇa* as follows: *ig yaṇaḥ saṁprasāraṇam*. This means:

When *i*, *u*, *r* and *l* (in all possible prosodic varieties) replace *y*, *r*, *l*, *v*, this is called *saṁprasāraṇa* or 'vocalization'.

In the *Mahābhāṣya* (MBh) the question is asked, whether *saṁprasāraṇa* should be considered the technical term for the phonemes *ik* (*i*, *u*, *r*, *l* and their prosodic variants²⁸) when they replace *yaṇ* (*y*, *v*, *r*, *l*); or whether it is rather the technical term for the sentence: *ig yaṇaḥ* '*i*, *u*, *r*, *l* replace *y*, *v*, *r*, *l*'. In the discussion in the MBh it is pointed out that in some technical contexts the term is required as denotative of the phonemes which replace the other phonemes, in others as denotative of the sentence that some phonemes replace others. The sūtra that is mentioned as specifically requiring the sentence interpretation of *saṁprasāraṇa* is A 6.1.13 (*ṣyaṇaḥ saṁprasāraṇam putrapatyos tatpuruṣe*). The last *Vārttika* on sūtra 1.1.45 accepts that the term *saṁprasāraṇa* is, according to the technical context, both a term for the phonemes and a term for the sentence. (Patañjali continues to consider other possibilities to solve the technical problems. Whatever Patañjali's ultimate position may be – something which is not always unequivocally clear – the idea that a word refers to a whole sentence presents no problem to him.)

§4.4

The reference to *saṁprasāraṇa* is found both in the *Vṛtti* on 40 and in the *Vṛtti* on 444 (Iyer, 1983: 209-210; 314). The idea expressed in the *kārikās* could accordingly be that because the single word *saṁprasāraṇa* expresses

²⁸ The phrase 'and their prosodic variants' is to be understood wherever I refer to the phonemes indicated by *ik*.

the meaning of the sentence *ig yaṇah*, the sentence meaning must be accepted as one. This is the interpretation of the later commentator Puṇyarāja when he explains 2.444. But then it remains a bit strange that the long term *saṁprasāraṇa* is called a *mātrā* in the *kārikā*. After all, *mātrā* is not only the general word for 'measure' or 'small element', but it is also the term for a single prosodic unit equivalent to the time needed to pronounce a short vowel.²⁹ According to Puṇyarāja, the term *saṁprasāraṇa* is called a *mātrā* in the *kārikā* because it is just a single, small element. The reference to *saṁprasāraṇa* would in this way be unsuitable in *kārikā* 40, which speaks of a single phoneme that is expressive of the sentence meaning. Puṇyarāja has therefore to keep his explanation of this *kārikā* very abstract.

The Vṛtti on 40, however, does refer to the term *saṁprasāraṇa*. In addition, it seems to give two times an example of the 'single phoneme' mentioned in the *kārikā*. Unfortunately, it is not very clear to which phonemes he refers. Iyer's edition has *saṁprasāraṇam iti vādīti vā*, and in the next sentence *bhami ityekavarṇayā*. In a footnote to the first passage he remarks that the manuscript he used for the passage is illegible, and that Charudeva Shastri read quite something else, namely *bha bhi iti vā*. Iyer does not note that at the second place Charudeva Shastri reads *bhabhi* (as a single word). Probably, Iyer's *bhami* at the second place is just a printing error for *bhabhi*, for this is what Charudeva Shastri has (Iyer does not note the difference). The transcript which was at the basis of Iyer's and Charudeva Shastri's editions of this passage, B[8] in Rau's list of mss (Rau 1971: 28; Charudeva Shastri used B[5], which is based on B[8] according to Rau, 1971: 27³⁰), reads in fact *bhabhīty*. It is not clear on what Iyer's *vādīti* (at the

²⁹ The grammarians considered the time needed to pronounce a consonant equal to half a *mātrā*. But in prosody, especially of metres regulated by the number of syllabic instants, a syllable measures either one or two *mātrās* or prosodic units. Thus, syllables such as *bha*, *bhi*, *ghu*, *ji*, etc., if not followed by certain sounds or combinations of sounds, count as one *mātrā* and not as one-and-a-half. Cf. Weber's edition, translation, and study of Piṅgala's *Chandas* (Weber 1863: esp. 290-326); Appendix A of Apte's *Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 1. For the date of Piṅgala's *Chandaḥśāstra*, "the earliest comprehensive treatment on Vedic and Sanskrit metres," cf. Van Nooten 1993: 31-33.

³⁰ In his foreword to Iyer's edition of the second *Kāṇḍa* of the VP (Iyer 1983: xvii), Aklujkar, explaining the features of his own forthcoming edition, reports that he rediscovered, in 1977, the original ms of the photocopy and transcript used by Iyer for the Vṛtti on the second *Kāṇḍa* (for 2.40 this is the only source; for 2.444 another fragmentary ms is available, called P in Iyer's edition). Cf. also Aklujkar's article on the number of *kārikās* in the second *Kāṇḍa* (Aklujkar, 1978). Both Iyer and Charudeva Shastri based themselves on the same transcript (in Devanāgarī) of the Malayalam original rediscovered by Aklujkar (cf. Aklujkar, in Iyer 1983: xvii; Charudeva Shastri, introduction to vol. 1, (his ms ṭa); Rau 1971: 27, 28). Both this transcript (B[8] in Rau 1971) and another transcript (B[7] in Rau 1971) were checked with the original according to notes on the transcripts and in the catalogues. According to a letter written to me by Professor Aklujkar on 28 February 1994, "B[8] and B[7] are very carefully

first place) is based, nor what it should mean, but B[8] has at that place *vā bhīti*. A second hand in B[8] has corrected the first reference (*vā bhīti*) into *vā ṭīti*, and the second (*bha bhīti*) into *ṭīti*.

The relevant passage of the Vṛtti on 2.40 may now be read as follows:³¹

*nāvaśyaṃ vicchinnaṇāpadarūpavigraha eva śabdaḥ paurvāparya-
yuktam anugata vibhāgam evārthaṃ pratyāyayati/ yadā hi
vākyaṛthasyaivegyaṇaḥ sthāne³² bhavatīti evamāder buddhi-
viśayaḥ samprasāraṇam iti vā, bha bhi iti vā so'yaṃ ityabhi-
sambandhaḥ kriyate, atho yathaivegyaṇa ity anena paurvā-
paryānupātini pratipattir bhavati/evam apaurvāparyayā bhabhi
ityekavarṇayā tasyārthasya samjñayā pratyastamita-paurvā-
paryaḥ sa evārthātmā pratīyate/*

It is not necessarily only a linguistic unit which may be analysed in the form of separate words that expresses the meaning endowed with sequence, and with division understood. For if, for a sentence meaning, such as “*ik* comes in the place of *yaṇ*”, the relation of identity is created as an object of the mind: “[the meaning of the sentence “*ik* comes in the place of *yaṇ*” is] *samprasāraṇa*,” or “[the meaning of the sentence “*ik* comes in the place of *yaṇ*” is] *bha* (or) *bhi*,” then, just as there is an understanding which follows a sequence with this (sentence): “*ik* [comes] in the place of *yaṇ*”, similarly the same unit of meaning is understood with suppressed sequence through the technical term for that meaning consisting of a single phoneme “*bha, bhi*.”

§4.5

At this point the available philological evidence cannot help us much further in the interpretation of the passage with *bhabhi* or *bha bhi*. We may therefore try to approach the problem from a different angle. The term *samprasāraṇa*, according to the discussion of the relevant sūtra A 1.1.45 in the Vārttikas and in the Mahābhāṣya, may stand for the sentence *ig yaṇaḥ*. The author of the Vṛtti apparently equates this technical term *samprasāraṇa* with a technical term consisting of a single phoneme.³³ This single phoneme would express the meaning of the sentence. This would suit the statement in the kārikās. But is it just a purely hypothetical example, or was there any

made and corrected (by comparing with the original, before the original was returned to Kerala) transcripts.” The microfilm made of the original in 1977 could not be consulted during my stay in Madras on 19-23 March 1994 because the necessary reading equipment was not available.

³¹ I follow B[7] and B[8] with some unavoidable (mostly minor) emendations as suggested by Charudeva Shastri and adopted by Iyer. For the crucial references under discussion I follow only B[7] and B[8].

³² B[7] and B[8] read *vākyaṛthasya guṇyagūṇasthāne* which makes no sense in the context. I follow Charudeva Shastri's emendation.

³³ For the grammarians' understanding of *varṇa*, ‘phoneme’ (*a, i, k, v*, etc.), cf. the discussion in the MBh about the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of phonemes (MBh 1:30). In the work of later grammarians (after Bhartrhari), *varṇasphoṭa*, as the smallest meaningful unit, “stands virtually for the notion of morpheme” (Joshi 1967: 74).

concrete basis for Bhartṛhari's statement? In order to find an answer, we have to widen our horizon a bit and try to imagine the grammatical activities with which Bhartṛhari may be expected to have been familiar. In the concluding passage of the second Kāṇḍa mention is made of a grammarian Candra. This may be a reference to the Buddhist grammarian Candragomin. But in Candragomin's grammar nothing is found about a single phoneme which would denote *ig yaṇaḥ*. In fact, Candragomin tried to avoid as much as possible the use of technical terms,³⁴ apparently trying to make the grammar this way more easily accessible.³⁵

§4.6

The Jainas, when they had started to use Sanskrit, wrote not only doctrinal works in this language, but also works on technical subjects, including Sanskrit. The oldest Jaina grammar we know of is the Jainendra-Vyākaraṇa (JV), attributed to Pūjyapāda Devanandin. The date is not certain, but the work may very well have originated around the fifth century, i.e., around the time when Bhartṛhari was living and working.³⁶ While Candragomin improved upon Pāṇini's grammar by reducing the number of technical terms, the Jainendra-Vyākaraṇa tried to outdo Pāṇini in something for which he is most famous, namely brevity.³⁷ One of the devices used in the Jainendra-Vyākaraṇa to reach maximum brevity is the replacement of long technical terms by shorter ones. Otherwise, it follows the rules of Pāṇini very closely, and maintains also their original order to a great extent. It became this way more compact than Pāṇini's grammar, but also much more technical, with a great number of new

³⁴ Cf. Scharfe 1977: 165, and the expression *candropajñam asaṃjñakam vyākaraṇam*.

³⁵ This would be in accordance with the need of Buddhist communities which adopted Sanskrit as a language for their sacred books. Buddhist monks with a non-brahmanical or non-sanskritic background had to become acquainted with this language. Cf. Scharfe 1977: 162-165.

³⁶ In the section devoted to Jaina grammarians in Scharfe's *Grammatical Literature*, the author observes that some scholars place Devanandin even before Candragomin (whom he attributes to the 5th century; VP 2.486 probably refers to this Buddhist grammarian), whereas others put him later than the authors of the Kāśika (early 7th century) (Scharfe 1977: 168). Later on, however, Scharfe gives some reasons why an early date of Devanandin would be more probable, without, however, drawing any explicit conclusion (Scharfe 1977: 168-169). According to Abhyankar and Shukla (1977: 162), Devanandin wrote his grammar in the fifth century A.D., according to Pt. Nathuramji Premī in the sixth century of the Vikrama Era (in an introductory essay on Devanandi and his Jainendrayyākaraṇa, in Tripāthi 1956: 17-37). Yudhiṣṭhira Mimāṃsaka places Devanandin 'before 500 Vikrama Era' (*saṃ, 500 vi. se pūrvā*, Yudhiṣṭhira 1984: 489, 657), or, more precisely, "between the latter half of the fifth century of Vikrama Era and the first quarter of the sixth" (*vikrama ki pāṃcviṃ śatī ke ullarārdha se ṣaṣṭhī śatī ke prathama carāṇa ke madhya*, Yudhiṣṭhira 1984: 494).

³⁷ For brevity or the principle of economy in Pāṇini's grammar, see Buiskool 1939: 1, 155; Cardona, 1969 and 1976: 204-205 and references; Kiparsky 1991: 239-261; and, most recently, Smith 1992, and Bhate 1995.

one-syllabic terms denoting a host of technical notions. The five-syllable term *saṁprasāraṇa* is of course a good candidate for replacement by a shorter term. The JV replaced it by *jī*. The sūtra where it is defined is otherwise identical to Pāṇini's rule, and it has moreover the same number, namely 1.1.45. A 1.1.45 thus becomes JV 1.1.45 *ig yaṇo jīḥ*. The sūtra which was mentioned in the MBh discussion as a sūtra where the sentence interpretation of *saṁprasāraṇam* is definitely needed, namely A 6.1.13 *ṣyaṇaḥ saṁprasāraṇam putrapatyos tatpuruṣe*, is also present in the Jainendra-Vyākaraṇa, where it has become sūtra JV 4.3.9 *ṣe ṣyasya putrapatyor jīḥ*.

§4.7

By now it must be clear that the technical term *jīḥ* of JV 1.1.45 perfectly fits into the slot of the two apparently corrupt places with *bhīti* and *bha bhīty* in the Vṛtti on 2.40. In the light of the wider context of the Pāṇinian and non-Pāṇinian grammatical literature discussed above, it seems more than likely that the Vṛtti is referring to this sūtra *ig yaṇo jīḥ*, the Jainendra-Vyākaraṇa's recast of A 1.1.45. This was no more recognized by the later grammarians from Puṇyārāja onwards, who were very familiar with the Pāṇinian tradition but apparently not so with the Jainendra-Vyākaraṇa. Instead of the syllables *bha* and *bhi*, which the Vṛtti would mention according to the transcripts of the only available manuscript, I assume that the original Vṛtti must have had *jī*, a technical term consisting of a single phoneme, *j*, and an *i* added to make utterance (and hearing) possible.³⁸ But because the meaning of this syllable was no longer recognized, the relevant passages could easily become corrupt. The first step of the corruption may have been made when a 'knowledgeable' scribe emended an un-understood *jī* which he found in his source, to a Pāṇinian technical term with which he was familiar, namely *bha*. The second hand in transcript B[8], in a despondent attempt to make sense of the passage, corrected the two places into references to another monosyllabic technical term in Pāṇini's system, namely *ṭi*.

§4.8

Not only does the term *jī* perfectly fit into the passage of the Vṛtti explaining 2.40, also the kārikā itself, if we try to forget the Vṛtti for a while, becomes less vague and richer in meaning. How does the term *jī* suit 2.444?

³⁸ In the critical investigation of the meaning of each and every phoneme, already the MBh had to accept that some phonemes were possibly present (or sometimes absent) only to make utterance and hearing of other, more crucial phonemes, possible. Cf. the use of the phrase *uccāraṇasāmarthyāt* (e.g., MBh 1.3.9, 1:265.10), and the terms *mukhasukhārtha* (e.g. MBh 1.1.1, 1:42.23-24, contrasted with *asamdehārtha*), *śravaṇārtha* (e.g., MBh 1.3.2, 1:260.11-14). According to the Kāśika on P. 2.4.36 the phoneme *i* of *jagdhi* is for the sake of utterance (*ikāra uccāraṇārthah*, *nānubandhah*); similarly the *i* of *clī* in P. 3.1.43 (Kāśikā: *ikāra uccāraṇārthah*, *cakārah svarārthah*).

According to 2.444, “ it is understood in just (one) unit (*mātrā*) that the sentence has a single meaning” (see above, section 3.0). Again, the statement seems vague and cryptical, unless we connect it with the concrete example of *ji* standing for the sentence *ig yaṇaḥ (bhavati)*. Puṇyarāja, oblivious of the JV’s technical term *ji*, is forced to interpret *mātrayā* in the *kārikā* unconvincingly as a reference to the whole term *saṁprasāraṇa* as a single unit (*ataḥ saṁprasāraṇam ityevam ekasaṁkhyena laghīyastvān mātrayā vyapadiśyate*). Something similar was already done by the author of the *Vṛtti*, but he explained *mātrā* as a reference to ‘*saṁprasāraṇa* and so forth’ (Iyer 1983: 314.15). Of course, in the larger context of the argument in the VP, the implication of a reference to *ji*, prosodically equivalent to a single *mātrā* and standing for the sentence *ig yaṇaḥ (bhavati)*, is that also the term *saṁprasāraṇa* and in fact any word and sentence is to be considered as a single unit. The crucial step of the example of *ji* is presupposed but no longer emphasized in the *Vṛtti* on 2.444 and was completely forgotten since Puṇyarāja. As explained above (section 3.3 and note 24), the word *mātrā* may refer to any (small) unit, but in the context of linguistic units it denotes especially a well-defined prosodic unit.

§4.9

If we now cast a glance at another work attributed to Bhartṛhari, namely the *Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā*, we find that there too, Bhartṛhari showed much interest in the problem of referring to a whole sentence or complex expression through one single term. The problem is inevitably discussed when the MBhD comments on the *saṁprasāraṇa* sūtra P. 1.1.45 (MBhD 7:1-3). In the second *Āhnika* the problem is even discussed at a place where it is by no means called for from the point of view of the MBh on which the MBhD is commenting: The MBhD suddenly asks how the word *idam* in a phrase in the MBh can possibly refer to a whole sentence-meaning and starts an elaborate discussion (MBhD 2:16.23-17.2). Commenting on the MBh on A 1.1.44, the MBhD investigates in great detail how *vibhāṣā* can be the name of the expression *na vā* (MBhD 6b:23.18-25.2). The broad outlines of the discussion in the MBh are followed in the MBhD, but the issues raised in the MBh are treated in an extremely elaborate and rather independent way.

§4.10

While the interest shown in the MBhD for the problem of how a single term may refer to a complex expression or sentence corresponds with the two *kārikās* and the theme of the second *Kāṇḍa* of the VP, we miss in the MBhD any reference to the extreme case of only one single phoneme referring to a whole sentence meaning. If the MBhD is accepted as Bhartṛhari’s earlier work, we may surmise that Bhartṛhari, while writing

that work, was not yet acquainted with the JV. This could either mean that Bhartṛhari had not yet widened his horizon to include the grammar of the Jainas in all its technical details, or that that grammar was at that time not yet written. Once Bhartṛhari became familiar with that grammar, the fact that a whole sentence was conventionally equated with a single phoneme impressed him so much that he referred to it in two kārīkās.

§4.11

As for the author of the Vṛtti, he shows awareness of the relevance of the technical term *jī* for the interpretation of kārīkā 2.40. But he seems to admit this relevance only grudgingly. In his interpretation of 2.444, where this term seems equally relevant, it is even more relegated to the background in his explanation. Above we have seen how explicit references to the Jainas are avoided in the Vṛtti's treatment of VP 1.110 and 113-114 (cf. note 22(c)). This contrasts with the explicit and non-polemical references to the Jainas and Buddhists in the MBhD, and it reinforces our impression that the Vṛtti is not by the same author as the one who wrote the VP-kārīkās and the MBhD.³⁹

§5.1

After the Buddhist logician Dinnāga who must have been very close in time to Bhartṛhari, Mallavādin is one of the earliest authors to take thoroughly notice of Bhartṛhari's work. The Vākyapadiya is frequently referred to and cited in the Dvādaśāranayacakara and in Sīmhasūri's commentary. The numerous references to schools and positions which are often not directly accessible to modern students, the references to Jaina scriptures that are not always identifiable, and the frequently virtually untranslatable philosophical argumentation that has recourse to Sanskrit etymologization, make Sīmhasūri's work very difficult; and this applies even more to Mallavādin's work that is not directly transmitted but is to be reconstructed on the basis of the commentary.⁴⁰ The outlines, however, are as follows. Mallavādin presents a scheme which should cover all possible views, and which he illustrates with the viewpoints of authors and schools with which Mallavādin is familiar. Mallavādin holds that a thing can be considered either according to its general feature (*sāmānya*), which is the substance (*dravya* or *bhāva*), or according to its special feature (*viśeṣa*), which is the quality or state (*guṇa*, *prayāsa*). Considering the thing according

³⁹ Cf. Bronkhorst 1998 and Houben 1998a, 1999b.

⁴⁰ Cf. Wezler 1981 for an elaborate discussion of the difficulties of this work, and further the very brief but useful English introductions to the three volumes of the edition, by E. Frauwallner (Vol. I), Muni Jambuvijaya (Vol. II), and J.W. de Jong (Vol. III), and the Sanskrit *prāṭhakanams* by Muni Jambuvijaya. For a more detailed analysis of the DNC with reference to Bhartṛhari's work, see now Houben 2008.

to its general feature corresponds to a general affirmative statement, considering the thing according to its special feature corresponds to a restriction or specific negation. In Mallavādin's terminology, apparently inspired by the grammarians, the general affirmative statement is called *vidhi*, the restriction or negation is *niyama*.⁴¹ In addition, Mallavādin accepts a third way of considering a thing, which is a combination of both affirmation and negation. This he calls *vidhi-niyama* or *ubhaya*. These three modes of considering a thing are subject of the same three approaches. This results in a scheme of twelve *nayas*, twelve viewpoints or modes of considering things:

vidhi, and next respectively *vidhi*, *vidhi-niyama* and *niyama* applied to *vidhi*; *vidhi-niyama*, and next resp. *vidhi*, *vidhi-niyama* and *niyama* applied to *vidhi-niyama*; *niyama*, and next resp. *vidhi*, *vidhi-niyama* and *niyama* applied to *niyama*.

Typically, a chapter starts with refuting the view of the preceding *naya* and establishes its own view. At the end of the chapter it is pointed out that the view is nothing new as it is already hinted at in the Jaina scriptures. In this scheme, references to current views and citations from the Vākyapadīya are distributed as follows. An overview of the DNC with special attention to the references to Bhartṛhari's VP can illustrate the importance of the latter for Mallavādin, and, for us, the importance of Mallavādin's work for understanding Bhartṛhari and the early reception of his work.

⁴¹ Frauwallner's observations and judgements in this regard (see his introduction to the first volume of DNC) are in my view basically right. It is to be noted that Wezler 2002 expresses his dissatisfaction with the correspondences of terms given by Frauwallner, and tries to formulate detailed paraphrases for Mallavādin's *vidhi* and *niyama*. Wezler wants to consider *vidhi* and *niyama* as 'expressions,' not as 'terms.' The questions asked by Wezler are profound and pertinent, but in my view he finally confuses the explanations given by Śiṃhasūri in the beginning of the first chapter with the words, *vidhi* and *niyama*, to which the explanations are applied. These words do *function* as terms throughout the work of Mallavādin as much as in Śiṃhasūri's commentary. It is unfortunate that a few crucial terms at the beginning of Mallavādin's work (DNC 10) cannot be reconstructed on the basis of the immediate comments of Śiṃhasūri. However, there are more occasions where Śiṃhasūri employs, glosses and "plays with" the terms *vidhi* and *niyama*, and it may be expected that a systematic study of these passages, together with the observed applications, will allow a more precise determination of the accepted values of the terms *vidhi* and *niyama*. For instance, at the end of chapter three, in Mallavādin's terminology (p. 10) devoted to *vidher vidhi-niyamaḥ*, the following passage is found (*sandhi* and punctuation as in the edition, DNC 333.1-3): *ayaṃ vidher ubhayabhāk / vidhir vyākhyāto lokavad anapavādapravṛttiḥ, tasya utsargāt sa vidhīyate, sarvasarvātmakatvād nirapavādaḥ pravartata eva. / niyamaḥ sannidhiprayojyasator apravṛtteḥ tayoṛ asatsattvāt*. It cannot be analysed here how this passage refers back to the preceding discussion in the chapter and how it evokes aspects of Jaina doctrine, but regarding the terms under discussion the following correspondences emerge: for *vidhi*: *anapavāda*, *utsarga*; for *niyama*: *apavāda*, *asattva*. Cf. also the analysis of Mallavādin's *nayas* and *aras* by Dixit 1971: 92-93.

§5.2

The first chapter is the first *ara* ('spoke') devoted to the *naya* characterized by *vidhi*, the simple affirmation of things. This is the viewpoint of ordinary men or *laukikāḥ*, but also the worldview of Mīmāṃsā is discussed here. In the course of the discussion, Simhasūri cites a relativizing remark on the power of argumentation (*anumāna*) from the Vākyapadīya (VP 1.34, DNC 36.4-5). A common sense view on perception is introduced and next defended against more sophisticated views such as the one of Dīnnāga and other Buddhists, the Sāṃkhya, and the Vaiśeṣikas. Simhasūri illustrates Mallavādin's statement *viññānamātrakam idaṃ tribhuvanam* with a citation of VP 3.7.41 (DNC 105.22-23). Towards the end of the chapter Mallavādin mentions the view that the meaning or object of a word is 'unknown' (*ajñāta*), and illustrates it with VP 2.119 (DNC 114.2-3) according to which also the terms *apūrva* and *devatā* have a meaning or object (*artha*). Explaining Mallavādin's remarks that the sentence meaning accepted in this view is 'all the words,' the commentary refers to the sentence definition in Mīmāṃsāsūtra 2.1.46, and contrasts this position with the various views that do make a distinction between word and sentence meaning. The views of these others are indicated by citing the two *kārikās* VP 2.1-2 (DNC 114.18-21) that give a series of divergent definitions of the sentence.

The second chapter is devoted to the viewpoint of *vidher vidhiḥ*, the affirmation of the affirmation. First the attention is drawn to problems in the preceding view of simple *vidhi*. A positive underlying principle is searched for the things which the first viewpoint of common sense affirmation (*vidhi*) accepts positively. Accepting the analysis for the thing (*bhāvaḥ* or *dravya*) as *bhavatīti bhāvaḥ*, it is asked: *ko bhavati* (DNC 175.2). The first answer explored is: the *puruṣa*. Later (DNC 193) this is rejected as unsatisfactory and *niyati* 'fate' is explored as *kartrī*. Next, *kāla* 'time' is said to be the agent of *bhavati* (DNC 205ff), and *svabhāva* (DNC 219ff); finally a non-dualistic *bhāva* (DNC 230) is presented as the underlying cause. At the beginning of the second chapter (DNC 127.14), Simhasūri gives an illustrative citation of VP 2.315-316 where factors that determine the meaning of a word are enumerated. More important in the structure of the chapter is the citation of VP 1.1 *anādinidhanam brahma ...* in Simhasūri's commentary (DNC 230.17-18) as one of numerous *kāraṇavādas* 'views that speak of a cause (of all things)', at the beginning of the section that criticizes *svabhāvanavāda* and establishes the (non-dualistic) *bhāvanavāda*. A phrase that is very similar to a phrase in the Vṛtti on VP 1.1 (VP Vṛtti I:5: *na cāsyordhvam ...*) is found in Mallavādin's text in the same section devoted to *bhāvanavāda* (DNC 239.1-2). Again, verses found in the Vṛtti on VP 1.1⁴² are

⁴² VP Vṛtti I:13.5f. The verses are part of a longer series of verses which the Vṛtti introduces

cited by Mallavādin in the same section (DNC 241.4-11). Simḥasūri also speaks of “monocausal theories that accept, etc. (?)”, the viewpoint of the affirmation of the affirmation (such as) the *śabda-brahma* (view)” *śabda-brahma-vidhi-vidhi-naya-grahādy-eka-kāraṇa-vādā*[h] (DN 242.18). Mallavādin notes (DNC 242) that for this *naya* word meaning is not ‘unknown’ (*ajñāta*) as in the preceding *naya*, but ‘without conceptualization’ (*avikalpa*), and cites VP 2.233 *śāstreṣu prakriyābhedair...*. In connection with this topic, Simḥasūri gives the well-known but so far untraced quotation *vikalpayonayaḥ śabdā vikalpā śabdayonayaḥ ...* (which has been attributed to Dinnāga⁴³). The sentence meaning is in this *naya* defined as *eko ’navayavaḥ śabdaḥ ...* (VP 2.1) ‘a single, indivisible linguistic unit’ (VP 2.1, DNC 243.8-9). Bhartṛhari’s list of sentence definitions (VP 2.1-2) is again cited in Simḥasūri’s commentary (DNC 244.7-10).

The third chapter is devoted to the *vidhi-niyama* of *vidhi*, or the affirmation-plus-restriction of the affirmation. This *naya* is represented by Sāmkhya and an *īśvaravāda*. When Mallavādin says that the sentence in this *naya* is ‘each word separately,’ Simḥasūri again briefly refers to Bhartṛhari’s list of sentence definitions, VP 2.1-2 (DNC 333.25f).

The fourth chapter deals with the *niyama* of *vidhi*. There are many untraced citations so that it is difficult to identify a school or author. There is no reference to any verse of Bhartṛhari, but a curious citation found in the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā (MBhD 1:22.20-21) is also found in Simḥasūri’s commentary (DNC 373.6-7).⁴⁴

Chapter five deals with the *vidhi-niyama* view. Mallavādin discusses here the grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇāḥ*). There are numerous citations from Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī, from the Dhātupāṭha, and from Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, **but there is no reference to Bhartṛhari** except for an incidental citation of VP 3.7.2 (DNC 393.20-21) in Simḥasūri’s commentary.

Chapter six deals with the *vidhi* of *vidhi-niyama*. The discussion concerns a position of Vaiśeṣika character, and a few citations from the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra are found in the commentary. Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadiya is cited once to clarify the view attributed to this *naya*, viz., that the last word constitutes the sentence meaning (VP 1.86, at DNC 450.5-6).

with *tathā hy uktam*, in other words, they appear as quotations from another work which may have been the direct source of Mallavādin.

⁴³ Helārāja cites the first two pādas in his commentary on VP 3.3.54; cf. Houben 1995: 393 note 834.

⁴⁴ After the introductory phrase *nityaḥ pṛthivīdhātuh* (MBhD 1:22.19), MBhD 1:22.20-21 has the text: *pṛthivīdhātāu kiṃ satyam/vikalpāḥ/ vikalpe kiṃ satyam/ jñānam/ jñāne kiṃ satyam/ om/ atha tad brahma/*; DNC 373.6-7 does not have *nityaḥ pṛthivīdhātuh* at the beginning, and the *atha* is missing in the last phrase.

Chapter seven is devoted to the *vidhi-niyama* of *vidhi-niyama*. Several old and now lost Vaiśeṣika works are cited here. The view of the Buddhist logician Diñnāga that the word meaning is *anyāpoha* is mentioned here, and also the corresponding view on the sentence meaning, viz., that it is *pratibhā* (DNC 547-548).

Next, it is in chapter eight, dealing with the *niyama* of *vidhi-niyama*, that Mallavādin explicitly mentions and directly addresses the view of Bhartrhari. He refers to a subtle difference with the view of an author whom he calls Vasurāta and identifies as Bhartrhari's teacher, and finally he gives an extensive discussion of the views of Diñnāga. Citations which we know from the work of Bhartrhari are found in the discussion of Bhartrhari but also in the discussion of Diñnāga. In the part that precedes the discussion of Bhartrhari, Simhasūri already cites VP 1.159ab (DNC 558.14-15), and Mallavādin cites VP 1.13 (DNC 579.8-9). Simhasūri explains VP 1.13 in his own way, quite independent from the VPVṛtti. Mallavādin's critical discussion of the views of Bhartrhari and his teacher starts with a citation of VP 1.128-130, 131 (DNC 580-582). To illustrate a certain view on word meaning (not the one considered specific for this *naya*) Mallavādin cites VP 2.127ab (DNC 604.5). In the discussion of Diñnāga, Mallavādin refers to VP 3.5.4 (DNC 622.6-7) and VP 2.233 (DNC 669.8-9), VP 2.315-316 (DNC 716.4-7), VP 3.14.8 (DNC 731.5-6). At the end of the chapter there is a critical discussion on *apoha* as the word meaning, where it is argued, among other things, that the word meaning is a certain object, not the mere exclusion of other meanings (*tad dravyam śabdārthaḥ, nāpohamātram*, DNC 732.1-2). At the end, the word meaning belonging to this *naya* is said to be a collection (*saṃghāta*), whether one accepts origination or manifestation (*utpattāu abhivyaaktau vā*, DNC 736.1). In his discussion of this view on the word meaning Mallavādin states that people have unstable arguments (*anavasthitatarkatvāt puruṣaṇām*), which Simhasūri illustrates with references to VP 1.34 and 1.42.

In chapter nine, devoted to *niyama*, it is not directly clear which particular current view or views are intended, but Mallavādin deals with the relationship between universal and particular. Bhartrhari is cited in connection with the view on word meaning (*abhijalpa*) and sentence meaning (which is particular, and arises after disappearance of the general word meanings) attributed to this *naya*: VP 2.127cd, 128 (DNC 761.2-4), and VP 2.15 (DNC 762.12-13).

Chapter ten, *vidhi* of *niyama*, with a number of still unidentified citations, apparently discusses Buddhist ideas; according to de Jong in his introduction to DNC vol. 3, they correspond to Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika positions. On p. 777.24-25 we find an illustrative citation of VP 2.238 *upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānām...*

Chapter eleven, *vidhi-niyama* of *niyama*, with numerous unidentified citations, speaks of the momentariness of all things, and of the destruction of things 'by themselves,' simply because they once have come into being. In the discussion of the view on word meaning attributed to this *naya*, Mallavādin cites VP 2.132 (DNC 804.1-2) that refers to a word meaning whose domain is the mind but that has a link with the outer object.

Chapter twelve, the *niyama* of *niyama*, refutes first, as usual, the preceding *naya*, and next establishes *śūnyavāda* or the theory of the insubstantiality of all things. Bhartṛhari is cited incidentally in the commentary (VP 1.13, DNC 815.14-15; and VP 3.7.41, DNC 22-23). After chapter twelve, the work continues with an intermediary section, called *dvādaśāntara*, that makes the transition of the twelfth *naya* back to the first view of *vidhi* or the straightforward affirmation of things, and thus to a new round of the wheel.

Finally, there is a section called *cakratumba* or 'nave of the wheel' that expounds the Jaina view as the central position at the nave, the all-round basis of all views that are one-sided and rejectable when considered in isolation.

§5.3

The important conclusion to be drawn from this brief overview is that Mallavādin did not identify Bhartṛhari with the grammarians. Pāṇini and Patañjali, and occasionally Kātyāyana, are cited to illustrate the viewpoint of the grammarians. Bhartṛhari, however, appears elsewhere in the work. He is treated as an author in his own right, whose work apparently showed parallels with the work of Buddhist thinkers such as Dīnnāga. Mallavādin either felt that he was permitted to refer to Bhartṛhari to illustrate viewpoints of Dīnnāga, or Dīnnāga has copied more from the VP than only the *Traikālyaparīkṣā* (i.e., almost the entire second part of the *Sambandha-samuddeśa*, VP 3.3.53ff; cf. Houben 1995: 273ff). At places Bhartṛhari's work is cited as an encyclopedia on theories on word meaning and on sentence meaning. Elsewhere his framework of *śabdabrahman*, and his theory of *abhijalpa* or identification of word and meaning are severely criticized. Mallavādin's work and Simhasūri's commentary contain unique references to Bhartṛhari's teacher Vasurāta, and they may contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between the *Vākyapadīya* and the ancient *Vṛtti* on it.

§6.1

We have thus seen, first of all, that Bhartṛhari shows explicit awareness of the Jainas in the MBhD, and that several statements in VP gain in

significance if we assume that he was referring to the views and works of the Jainas. Apparently, Bhartrhari's horizon included the non-Vedic schools such as that of the Jainas. This means that we, as modern students of Bhartrhari, also have to widen our horizon to include these schools, in order to be able to fully appreciate the accomplishment of Bhartrhari.

In our introductory paragraph, we have made the general remark that Bhartrhari's attitude may be described as 'encyclopedic' and as 'perspectivistic', and that the Jainas developed a characteristic approach which may also be called 'perspectivistic'. It would be difficult to determine to what extent Bhartrhari was influenced by the Jainas in his perspectivistic attitude, to what extent he followed in this respect other sources such as his own grammatical tradition, and to what extent he followed his personal inclinations and insights. For the moment, it seems admissible to assume that there was at least some reinforcement from early Jaina 'perspectivism' on Bhartrhari's attitude. Perhaps there was also, vice versa, some reinforcement from grammarians such as Patañjali on later exponents of the Jaina approach of *anekāntavāda* such as Mallavādin. As far as Bhartrhari is concerned, Mallavādin seems to have been more intrigued by the specific views which he found problematic, taking his perspectivism and encyclopedic richness for granted. Mallavādin's and Simhasūri's references provide us a welcome participant's view on the field of philosophical discussion in fifth-sixth century India, and on the special place occupied by Bhartrhari. They give us information about Bhartrhari's immediate context, and thus help us to understand and evaluate Bhartrhari's work, and his relation to different philosophical orientations of his time including that of the Jainas. The work of Mallavādin is thus crucial for understanding the early reception of Bhartrhari's work. He also provides new light on perspectivistic approaches to philosophical discussion, suggesting a framework for 'knowledge' that "grows" in discontinuity and dialogical confrontation"⁴⁵ that deserves our full attention in the current age when modern means of communication and transport make strong confrontations between incompatible thought systems unavoidable.

⁴⁵ In a penetrating study of the 'philosophy of reflection' and of German philosophers of the twentieth century Julian Roberts (1992: 286-287) observed: "Knowledge 'grows' in discontinuity and dialogical confrontation with the unfamiliar. Monologically, it merely consolidates itself... In this respect, the 'interest' of knowledge... lies in the dialogue with other worlds. ... 'I' need to know whether 'you' know things that can destroy my universal generalisations, or disrupt my implications... we could say that any interest in 'truth' presupposes interaction between a plurality of knowledge bearers." (author's emphasis)

ABBREVIATIONS

- A = Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī.
- DNC = Dvādaśāranayacakram, with Nyāyāgamānusārīṇī commentary by Simhasūri, references to page no. and line in edited by Muni Jambuvijaya 1966, 1976, 1988.
- JV = Jainendra-Vyākaraṇa, references to Tripathi's edition (Tripathi 1956).
- MBh = Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, references to number of volume: page. line in Kielhorn's edition, usually preceded by the number of Pāṇini's sūtra commented upon.
- MBhD = Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā, references to the Poona edition, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (1985-1991). The only available manuscript was reproduced in *Mahābhāṣyadīpika of Bhartṛhari*, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 1980.
- ms = manuscript
- ŚYPr = Śuklayajuhprātisākhya, references to Shrimati Indu Rastogi, ed. and tr. (Kāśī Skt. Granthamāla 179), Varanasi 1967.
- TS = Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, references to H.R. Kapadia's edition (*Tattvārthasūtram, ŚrīUmāsvātivācakamukhyasandṛbham*, edited by Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia, Bombay 1926), cf. also Dixit 1974.
- VP = Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya, references to the kārikās (with two or three arabic numerals separated by periods) follow W. Rau's critical edition of the kārikās (Rau 1977).
- VP I = Iyer's edition (Iyer 1966) [references to this edition: VP I (page) (line)].
- VP II = Iyer's edition (Iyer 1983) [references to this edition: VP II (page) (line)].

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Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist Criticism on Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya 2.119 and His Counterarguments*

TOSHIYA UNEBE

§1

In his Ślokaṽārttika and Tantravārttika, the eminent Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila (660 CE)¹ occasionally refers to an opponent who, unlike him and several other thinkers, does not acknowledge *ākṛti* (class property), *jāti* (generic property), or universal, as is denoted by each word, and insists that all words denote mere *sattā* (Being/Existence). This opponent is referred to as *sattādvaitavādin* (Being-monist) by a succeeding commentator, Bhaṭṭaputra Jayamiśra² (690 CE) and an idea very similar to that of the opponent is found in Bhartṛhari's (450 CE) Vākyapadīya (VP).

* The author is grateful to receive an invitation from the editor to contribute to this volume despite his absence at the Delhi Seminar. The present paper is an English version of the first half of Unebe (2002), which has been reorganized in order to fulfill the editor's request to provide some information regarding Buddhist as well as other thinkers' interpretation of Bhartṛhari's thought. The English version of the remaining portions of the original article, in which I chiefly discuss the latter half of VP 2.119, will be made available in a forthcoming volume of the *Journal of the Faculty of Letters, Nagoya University*.

¹ Regarding the dates associated with the authors that are mentioned in this paper, I consulted the online updated version of Potter (1995), which is available at <http://faculty.washington.edu/kpotter/>, in order to compensate for my limited knowledge of chronology.

² See ŚVT, p.14. The author of the commentary on VP 3, Helārāja, also refers to a similar type of view as *sattādvaitavāda* in his PP on the VP 3.1.34, and to *sattādvaitavādin* as well in the PP on VP 3.2.1. See Unebe (1999) for a detailed discussion on the view.

In this paper, I would like to examine VP 2.119, which several thinkers belonging to various schools regarded as a typical enunciation of the above-mentioned idea. Among those thinkers, Kumārila, and a Buddhist Śāntarakṣita (750 CE) (and his commentator Kamalaśīla [770 CE]) have put forward comprehensive arguments on VP 2.119. Since its commentary, Vṛtti, in which I believe the explanation of the verse by Bhartṛhari himself should have been expressed, is presently lost and not available for reference, these subsequent interpretations and criticisms are highly valuable for a proper understanding of the verse.

§2

VP 2.119 appears in the section in which Bhartṛhari refers to different views on word meaning. As is well known, Bhartṛhari considered sentences (*vākya*) alone to be the primary indivisible unit of language; therefore, according to him, although one can extract word meanings from a sentence for grammatical analysis, they are conceived or merely abstracted for practical purposes. However, Bhartṛhari occasionally explained various views on word meaning, and in the section including the VP 2.119 he enumerates as many as twelve views.³

The first one of the twelve views is introduced by the verse in question as follows:

*asty arthaḥ sarvaśabdānām iti pratyāyylakṣaṇam/
apūrvadevatāsvargaiḥ samam āhur gavādiṣu//*

VP 2.119 (VP II, p. 58; VPwr, p. 68)

Puṇyarāja (1000 CE) or the author of the only extant commentary Ṭikā⁴ explains the verse as follows:

Some thinkers state that *vācyā* (what is to be denoted) of all words (*sarvaśabdānām*) is *arthamātra* (an object in general), which does not have any particular form recognized, it is this *pratyāyylakṣaṇa* of all words (*sarvaśabdānām*), namely, the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of *pratyāyylā* (what is to be conveyed), i.e., *vācyā* (what is to be denoted), that requires to be acknowledged.

[Q.] What could this be identical to?

[Those who hold this view] state '*apūrvadevatā*..... and so on [in order to answer the question as follows: It is identical to what is to be denoted by words such as '*apūrvā*' and '*devatā*'] since no concrete images (*ākūra*: form) appear [in one's mind] on the basis of words such as '*apūrvā*' [Unprecedented Energy]

³ See Iyer (1977, xii-xiii) for a summary of the twelve views enumerated in the section from VP 2.119 onward.

⁴ Although this paper refers to the author of the Ṭikā as Puṇyarāja for the sake of convenience, his authorship is in question. Aklujkar (1974) suggested that the Ṭikā was, in fact, (a summary of) a work of Helārāja. The date for his work can be attributed to approximately 980 CE. Also, see Coward and Raja 1990: 193, 201.

and 'devatā' (Divinity). In contrast [to the case of words such as 'apūrva' and 'devatā'], certain images appear on the basis of words such as 'cow,' [however] this [process] should be understood as a subsequent result (*nāntarīyaka*). Had it not been so, certain images could have appeared from words, 'apūrva,' 'devatā,' and 'svarga' (Heaven), as in the case of words such as 'cow' and 'horse.' [However, the truth differs.] Since no images appear [in one's mind] from them (words such as 'apūrva'), it is reasonable to assert that what is to be conveyed (*pratyāyya*) by them is *arthamātra* (an object in general).⁵

Since the words such as 'cow' and 'horse' immediately stir one's images accompanied with particular forms of a cow and a horse, one tends to consider these words as directly expressing the objects endowed with *ākāras* (forms), unlike the words that are associated with objects without any tangible forms, such as 'apūrva' and 'devatā.' However, according to the above-mentioned view, the power of each word is confined to represent an *arthamātra*, and the understanding of these particular forms of a cow and a horse is the result of the repeated use of the words for specific objects.⁶ The denoting power of the words such as 'cow' and that of the words such as 'apūrva' should not be different.

Thus Puṇyarāja summarizes the idea propounded by VP 2.119. However, to our regret, he neither clarifies the meaning of, nor connection between, each word. In particular, the manner in which the *pāda-a*, *asty arthaḥ sarvaśabdānām* should be interpreted is absolutely unclear. To put it concretely, he does not explain whether or not the word 'artha' in the verse should be interpreted as 'arthamātra'; whether 'asti' (is/exists) is a conjugational form of verbal root *√as* or *nipāta* (indeclinable) derived from it, which means 'existence'; whether 'sarvaśabdānām' qualifies 'artha' in *pāda-a* or 'pratyāyya-lakṣaṇam' in *pāda-b* since it appears twice in his commentary.

In order to understand these points, we shall refer to the comments made on the verse by thinkers belonging to other schools. A Jain scholar Mallavādin (450 CE), who is believed to be contemporary with Bhartṛhari, quotes VP 2.119 in his *Dvādaśāranayacakra**. And the oldest extant explanation on VP 2.119 is available in its commentary *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*

⁵VP II, p. 58: *sarvaśabdānām aparāmrṣṭākāraviśeṣam arthamātram vācyam iti kecid āhuḥ/ etat sarvaśabdānām pratyāyyalakṣaṇam pratyāyyasya vācyasya lakṣaṇam boddhavyam/ kena tulyam etat syād ity āha — apūrvadevalā ityādi/ apūrvadevalādīpadeṣu hi nākāraprathanam/ yat tu gavādīpadeṣu ākāraprathanam tan nāntarīyakatayā boddhavyam/ anyathā 'pūrvāśabdād devatāśabdāt svargaśabdād aśvagavādīśabdavad ākārādīprathanam syāt/ yataś ca tebhyo nāsty ākārādīprathanam ato 'rthamātram eve taiḥ pratyāyyata iti yuktaḥ/*

⁶This is explained by the succeeding verse, VP 2.120:

*prayogadarśanābhyāsād ākārāvagrahas tu yaḥ/
na sa śabdasya viśayaḥ sa hi yatnāntarāśrayaḥ//* (VP II, p. 58)

*After the submission of the manuscript of this paper, an overall study on Mallavādin and the Grammarians, Houben (2008), has been published.

of *Simhasūrigaṇi* (600 CE). In his commentary, *Simhasūrigaṇi* paraphrases '*asty arthaḥ sarvaśabdānām*' as '*sattāmātram arthaḥ sarvaśabdānām*.'⁷ On the basis of this paraphrase, it may be said that *Simhasūri* interprets '*sarvaśabdānām*' as that which qualifies '*artha*', and thus interprets the *pāda* as one that advocates the referent/meaning (*arthaḥ*) of all words (*sarvaśabdānām*) as '*asti*', namely, the Being only (*sattāmātram*). In this interpretation, the word '*asti*' does not appear to be a finite verb but a *nipāta* expressing 'existence.'⁸ In place of *Puṇyarāja*'s '*arthamātra*,' in this case, *Simhasūri* explicitly states that all words denote '*sattā*' (Being), an abstract noun that is derived from the verbal root *√as*. Words such as '*apūrva*,' '*devatā*,' and '*svarga*' do not have any tangible form and merely indicate the existence of something. In the same way, words such as 'cow' also denote the Being or the mere existence of something and the cognition of particular forms of objects such as a cow is the subsequent result of their repeated use.

Kumārila quotes VP 2.119 in his *Tantravārttika* on the *Ākrtyadhikaraṇa* section of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*. He also provides a paraphrase of the *pāda* in question although his primary purpose is to criticize the idea propounded in VP 2.119, which will be discussed in the next section of this paper; therefore, he does not elucidate on the verse itself. According to him,⁹ the phrase '*astyarthaḥ sarvaśabdānām*' should be interpreted as '*vastvarthaḥ sarvaśabdānām*.' He further states that the word '*asti*' is an indeclinable (*avyaya*) since it is a synonym for '*vastu*' (thing). *Kumārila* interprets the first word in *pāda* as a compound word, '*asty-arthaḥ*'. In this case, the first component '*asti*' connotes an existing thing (*vastu*). Thus, *Kumārila* interprets the phrase '*astyarthaḥ sarvaśabdānām*' as follows: "Of each word, there exists a thing that is its referent/meaning (*artha*).¹⁰" This is nothing but his reinterpretation of

⁷NC, p. 114: *sattāmātram arthaḥ sarvaśabdānām, ko 'pyasyārtho 'sti, na nirarthakaḥ śabdaḥ, sa punar artho na nirūpayitum śakyah 'ayam ayam' iti, elat pratyāyalaṅkāṣaṇam/ ... 'kaścid asty arthaḥ' ity etāvat pratipattavyam/*

⁸Based on *Pāṇinisūtra* 1.1.37: *svarādinipātam avyayam*, we may understand '*asti*' as *nipāta* (indeclinable), for the indeclinable '*asti*' is classified under the category of *svarādi* in the wordlist, *Ganapāṭha*. See *Katre* 1987: 16; 1324, for the text and translation.

⁹The following is based on *Kumārila*'s TV, p. 298 (239-40)*: *tena yadi nāma mahāsāmānyam abhidheyaṃ pratiṣṭhāyate tato vastvarthaḥ sarvaśabdānām iti pratyāyalaṅkāṣaṇam iti kāmam vaktavyam nāstyartha iti/...*

*seyaṃ avyayaśabdena vastuparyāyavācīnā/
bhavatsādhāraṇārthena prasiddhīr upapādītā//
astitvam astitety evaṃ dṛśyete pratyayaḥ yataḥ/
sa vastuvacanaḥ śabda ākhyātāpratirūpakah//
aprātipadikatvād dhi nākhyātāt tvatalau smṛtau/
astikṣirā samāsaś ca tena sadvācīṣyate//*

* The page numbers of the easily available third edition of TV (*Joshi* 1981) has been provided in parenthesis in order to cover the inaccuracy of the item in the bibliography of *Unebe* 1999.

the verse (from his own standpoint), according to which all words should possess their own concrete objects and simply denote them. Although this does not appear to be a straightforward explanation of the verse, it can still be said that he understands the word ‘*asti*’ in the *pāda* in question as an indeclinable and a component of the compound as well; the word ‘*sarvaśabdānām*’ is grammatically connected with this compound.

Further, as Hattori (1993) has already pointed out, Śāntarakṣita in the 16th chapter, Śābdārthaparīkṣā, of his Tattvasaṅgraha, quotes the VP 2.119 as the verse 887 along with other verses from the same section of VP 2, and Kamalaśīla’s elaborate commentary, Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā, on these verses is also available. In his commentary on the verse in question, Kamalaśīla explains the *pāda* in question as follows:

The order of the word *iti* [in the phrase *asty arthaḥ sarvaśabdānām iti...* of *pāda*-ab of VP 2.119] has been separated [from the grammatically connected words]. It should be connected uninterruptedly with *asty arthaḥ*. With this [emendation], the purport [of the phrase] becomes as follows: It is understood that *something exists* (*asty arthaḥ*); this is the characteristic of *pratyāyya* (what is to be conveyed), i.e., *abhidheya* (what is to be expressed) of all words.¹⁰

Unlike Siṃhasūri and Kumārila, in this case, Kamalaśīla clearly construes the word ‘*sarvaśabdānām*’ to *pāda*-b. As translated above, he appears to interpret ‘*asti*’ as a conjugation of the verbal root *√as*; therefore, the phrase ‘*asty arthaḥ*’ implies that ‘[some] referent/meaning (*artha*) exists (*asti*).’ This interpretation is repeated later in a plural conjugational form (*santi...arthāḥ*) in his commentary of this verse: “There exist some objects for which words such as ‘*apūrva*’ are used (*santi ke ’py arthā yeṣu apūrvādayaḥ śabdāḥ prayujyante*).”¹¹ However, in his further discussion on this verse, Kamalaśīla sometimes interprets ‘*astyarthaḥ*’ as a compound that refers to “what is denoted by the verb ‘to be’, (*√as*).”¹² Taking this into consideration, the purport of the *pāda*-ab can also be interpreted as translated by Jha (1937: 480): what is denoted by the verb ‘to be’ constitutes the ‘import’ of all words.

As was shown so far, all thinkers belonging to other schools have interpreted the issue addressed by VP 2.119 in relation to the verbal root *√as* and its derivation. All of them appear to maintain the idea, which was later referred to as ‘*sattādvaitavāda*’ (Being-monism), in their mind. In contrast, the commentator of VP proper, Puṇyarāja, does not refer to the issue of *√as/sattā* at all. Puṇyarāja’s attitude is justified because it cannot be

¹⁰ TS p. 283: *itiśabdo bhinnakramaḥ ‘asty artha’ ity asyānantaram sambadhyate/ lenāyam artho bhavati – asty artha iti yad etat pratyate, tat sarvaśabdānām pratyāyyasyābhidheyaḥ lakṣaṇam/*

¹¹ TS pp. 283-84: ... *santi ke ’py arthā yeṣu apūrvādayaḥ śabdāḥ prayujyantu...*

¹² See for example, Tattvasaṅgraha, pp. 893-94 and Pañjikā on it. We will discuss them in the next section.

said that VP 2.119 is overall less crucial to Bhartṛhari's discussion on the *sattā* in VP. In VP 3.1 (Jāṭisamuddeśa), he is concerned about the *sattā* in particular; first, it is not even clear whether he states his own view(s) on word meaning or merely introduces the various views held by his predecessors in the section including VP 2.119. It should, however, be noted that VP 2.119 has been interpreted to be closely related to the *vas/sattā* issue by other thinkers, and all of these interpretations are considerably older than that of the author of the commentary on VP 2.,

§3

Focus shall now be drawn to Kumārila's criticism on VP 2.119. As mentioned earlier, according to Kumārila, each word directly denotes its own object, *ākṛti* (class property, or the class-specific 'shape'), which is nothing but a universal (*sāmānya*): for example, the word 'go' (cow) denotes *gotva* (cowness).¹³ According to him, by means of an *arthāpatti* (inference based on circumstances), it can be understood that the expressive power of a word is restricted to a certain object.¹⁴ After quoting VP 2.119, he divides the idea advocated in the first half of the verse into two positions and rejects both of them as follows:

And then, those who insist [that all words denote] Being cannot claim [that the words] denote (1) pure Being nor (2) [the Being qualified] by some qualifiers. For, neither of the two is possible.¹⁵

Kumārila argues that if words denoted the Being, then it would be either a (1) pure Being or (2) Being qualified by some qualifiers. However, neither is acceptable to him. He further criticized the assumption (1) on the basis of the following three points:

(1.1) First, in case [the words] denoted the pure [Being only], all words would express one object and hence acquire synonymity.

(1.2) And, the use of the verb *asti* (the verb 'to be/to exist') [as a predicate] would not be possible as it will cause a reiterative error [since the subject itself will denote the 'being'].

(1.3) Further, the use of [expressions such as] *gaur na asti* (there is not a cow) would be unacceptable as it would pose a contradiction. Because one cannot

¹³ As a Mīmāṃsaka, Kumārila, based on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.33: *ākṛtis tu kriyārthatvāt*, asserts that words denote *ākṛti* (class property). For a detailed discussion, see Scharf 1996: 195-288. Kumārila states that the term *ākṛti* implies the same as the terms *sāmānya* (universal) and *jāti* (generic property). ŚV, p. 2:

*jātim evākṛtiṃ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā/
sāmānyam tac ca piṇḍānām ekabudhinibandhanam//*

Ākṛtivāda 3. Also see Scharf 1996: 205-6)

¹⁴ TV p. 297 (239): *pratīniyatārthaviṣayā hi śabdānām vācakaśaktir arthāpattiyā gamyate/*

¹⁵ TV p. 297 (239): *sattām ete vadantaś ca na śuddhām saviśeṣaṇām/
vadanīty abhidhātum hi śakyam dvedhā 'py asaṃbhavāt//*

understand that 'Being is not being/Existence does not exist' (*sattā na asti*) at any rate.¹⁶

This criticism is quite convincing; indeed it appears to be a natural conclusion. It is reasonable to conclude that all words acquire synonymity while denoting the pure Being; expressions such as "there 'is' a being cow" (an existing cow exists) and "there 'is not' a being cow" (an existing cow does not exist) involve an unnecessary repetition and self-contradiction, respectively. Correspondingly, the Buddhist Kamalaśīla provides a more concrete objection, which is in keeping with the above-mentioned point (1.1), as follows:

Further, since the *asty-artha* (the meaning of the *vas*) has no particular form ascertained, in case it is exclusively expressed by words, it would not result in diverse verbal usage, such as *go* (cow), *gavaya* (gayal), and *gaja* (elephant), because it (the diversity) is not expressed by these words.¹⁷

This objection, however, does not appear to be very effective in its application to Bhartṛhari's idea of *sattā* (Being). The opening verse of the section in which he introduces his own view on the denotation of *sattā* in VP 3.1 (Jāṭisamuddeśa) reads as follows:

It is *sattā* (Being), which is differentiated in [individuals] such as cows on the basis of the differences among those to which it is related, that is called a generic property (*jāti*) [such as cowness]. All words are placed in it (i.e. the differentiated Being called the 'generic property'). (VP 3.1.33)¹⁸

The expression found in the *pāda*-cd, that is, 'being placed in' (i.e., the combination of *vyavasthita* and a word ending in a locative case) commonly implies 'being used in the sense of' in grammatical and lexical statements. Therefore, with this verse, Bhartṛhari explicitly asserts that all words denote Being (*sattā*). He, however, does not intend to convey that all words

¹⁶TV p. 297 (239): *śuddhavacanatve tāvat sarveṣāṃ ekārthapratyāyanāi paryāyatvaprasaṅgaḥ/ punarūktatvāc cāstīśabdprayogānupapattiḥ/*

gaur nāstīti prayogaś ca virodhān nāvakalpate/
na hi sattaiva nāstīti kathamcit sampratīyate//

¹⁷TS p. 286: *kiṃ cānirdhāritarūpaviśeṣatvād astyarthasya tasmin kevale śabdaiḥ pratipadyamāne gaur gavayo gaja ityādibhedena vyavahāro na syāt, tasya śabdair apratīpādītatvāt/* This is a simple explanation to the Tattvasaṃgraha 894 bcd, and, Śāntarakṣita presented this objection with the verse itself; TS, p. 286: *astyarthe kevale 'pi ca/ pratīpādye na bhedenā vyavahāro 'vakalpate/* (Further, also in case of *asty-artha* [the meaning of the *vas* : Being] alone is to be expressed, [there would be an error that] there cannot be diverse verbal usage.)

¹⁸VP III.1, p. 41:

sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu/
jātir ity ucyate tasyāṃ sarve śabdā vyavasthīlāḥ//

In Unebe 1999, a full-fledged discussion on this verse and the next (VP 3.1.34) has been included.

synonymously denote the 'pure' Being, or the highest univesal (*mahāsāmānya*) only, because in his theory also words such as 'cow' can denote a certain generic property (*jāti*), or a lower universal (*aparāsāmānya*) such as cowness. The lower universal is nothing but the Being (*sattā*) that is differentiated on the basis of the differences observed in related individuals (*vyakti*) such as cows. Eventually, this theory is somewhat similar to the commonest view held in Indian linguistics, which assumes that the word 'cow' denotes cowness. This is after all his interpretation of this view.

It is probably safe to say that the second assumption made by Kumārila, namely, (2) 'the Being qualified by some qualifiers' corresponds with this theory made by Bhartṛhari. Kumārila's objection against this theory is as follows:

Since it is wrong to consider that [all words] denote the pure [Being], even if the opponent] claims that what is to be denoted is the highest universal (*mahāsāmānya*) that is qualified by these [individuals such as cows], this is also unconvincing.

Also, in this case, the objection raised against the two positions, which assert that [words] denote an individual (*vyakti*) that is qualified with the universal (*ākṛti*) or the universal that is qualified by the individual, is easily applicable because [words] must denote the qualifier first.¹⁹

At this point, he argues that the universal (*sāmānya/ākṛti*) is necessarily recognized prior to individuals; therefore, an individual cannot qualify the universal. According to him, an individual is always recognized after the universal, even in case of verbal recognition. For example, it is impossible to recognize a certain animal endowed with a dewlap or grazing in the field as individual cow in advance of the recognition of cowness. And also, when we hear the word 'cow' ('go'), we must initially understand universal cowness (*gotva*) and later we recognize an object qualified with it as an individual cow (*go*). Thus, a word must denote its own object, universal first.²⁰

Kumārila continues to object against the view of Bhartṛhari as follows:

Further, if the word 'cow' (*go*) would also denote the Being (*sattā*) of a cow, then would it (cow) express it (Being) as qualified by (2.1) the generic property of cows (*go-jāti*) or (2.2) the individuals (*vyakti*, i.e., cows)?

¹⁹TV p. 298 (240):

*śuddhābhīdhānapakṣasya duṣṭatvāt tair viśeṣitam/
mahāsāmānyam iṣṭam ced vācyaṃ tad api durlabham//*

*yad evākṛtīviśiṣṭavyaktyabhīdhānapakṣe vyaktīviśiṣṭākṛtīpakṣe vā nirākaraṇakāraṇam tad
atrāpi sulabham viśeṣaṇasya pūrvatarābhīdhānaprasaṅgāt/*

²⁰This explanation is based on the following statement of Kumārila: TV p. 314 (261):
*gośabdoccāraṇe hi pūrvam evāgrhīlāsu vyaktīṣu sāmānyam pralīyate tadākārajñānotpalteḥ paścād
vyaktayaḥ pralīyante 'taś cākṛtīpratyayasya nimittāntarābhāvād vyaktīpratyaye ca pūrvapratītasāmānya-
nimittatvād ākṛtiḥ sabdārtha iti vijñāyate/*

Among these two,

(2.1) If it is assumed that [the word 'cow' denotes the Being (*sattā*)] that is qualified by the generic property, i.e., cowness, why should it (*sattā*) be [repeatedly] denoted, given that it has already been established by the qualifier (i.e., cowness) that has previously been denoted?...

(2.2) Similarly, against the view that considers [the word 'cow' to denote] the Being (*sattā*) that is qualified with individuals (i.e., cows), the same is the basis for rejection. [In other words, since the individual cows are also established by cowness that is previously denoted, the Being will not be required to be denoted.]²¹

In summary, Kumārila believes that neither the recognition of the Being (*sattā*) as the highest universal (*mahāsāmānya*), which subsumes universals such as cowness, nor the recognition of individuals such as cows can precede the recognition of an *ākṛti* (class-property) or (lower) universals such as cowness. The process should be the same for verbal cognition. Therefore, one must admit that words denote *ākṛti* first.

In the *Ākṛtivāda* chapter of his magnum opus *Śloka-vārttika* also, Kumārila states that "the difference of cowness and so on [from other universals] is self-dependent and not based on the differences in the factors (i.e., individuals such as cow) that manifest [universals such as cowness]"²² and criticizes Bhartṛhari's view, which claims that lower universals such as cowness and horseness are merely the Being (*sattā*) and the highest universal is differentiated through its relation with individuals such as cows and horses. It is in this context that the commentator Bhaṭṭaputra Jayamiśra refers to the opponent as '*sattādvaitavādin*' (Being-monist).

Thus, Kumārila repeatedly criticizes the view that maintains all words denote the Being. It appears essential for him to reject this view.

§4

As has been examined in the preceding section, Kumārila objects against the view that Bhartṛhari certainly stated in his VP. Interestingly enough, although Bhartṛhari is considered to be Kumārila's antecedent, some arguments that one may interpret as responses to Kumārila's objection have also been stated in VP. We have already discussed the argument put

²¹ TV pp. 298-99 (241):

gosattāṃ cāpi gośabdo yadi nāma bravīty ayam/
gojātyā vā viśiṣṭāṃ tām vadet vyaktibhir eva vā//

latra

gotvajātivīṣiṣṭā cet sattā 'nenābhidhīyate/
uktād viśeṣaṇād eva tatsiddheḥ sā kim ucyate//

...tathā vyaktiviśiṣṭasattābhidhāne 'pi eṣa eva nirākaraṇahetuḥ/ anityasaṃbandhajñānānanta-
śabdaśaktivyaktyabhidhānapūrvakāikasattābhidhānakalpanāyāś ca kevalavyaktyabhidhānapakṣavad
anupapattiḥ/

²² ŚV p. 15: *svato gotvādibhedas tu na tu vyañjakabhedalah/ / Ākṛtivāda 48 cd*

forth by Bhartṛhari that appears as a response to Kumārila's above-mentioned assumption (1.1). Here, the presumed counter-argument against the issue, which is represented in Kumārila's assumptions (1.2) and (1.3), will be examined: if all words denote the Being, it would be impossible to use the predicate 'is' in an affirmative sentence and 'is not' in a negative sentence. As an explanation to this problem (1.2), Bhartṛhari states in VP 3.3, Sambandhasamuddeśa as follows:

Further, prior to its connection with existence (Being: *sattā*) [expressed by the predicate '√as (to be/to exist)'], how can there be a Primary existence (*mukhyā sattā*)? And [yet], what does not exist cannot be the agent of the verb √as. [Therefore, a subject word in a sentence must express the required existence of the agent.] But [this expression of existence is] Secondary (*upacāra*) [and not Primary], as in the previous case [of the √jan (to be born)]. (VP 3.3.48)²³

For example, in the case of the sentence '*gaur asti*' (there is a cow/a cow exists), does the subject word '*gauḥ*' express an 'existing' cow prior to its connection with the predicate '*asti*'? If yes, then as Kumārila pointed out, it is useless to add the predicate '*asti*' since it has already been expressed by the subject word itself. If no, it necessarily implies that the word '*gauḥ*' expresses a 'non-existing' cow, and the 'non-existing' cow cannot be an agent of the action 'to be/to exist' or any other actions as it is non-existing.

Bhartṛhari offered a solution to this dilemma in *pāda*-d of the above-mentioned verse. The existence expressed by the subject word, such as 'cow,' does not necessarily imply the physical existence (Primary Being: *mukhyā sattā*) of the object denoted by it. Although the subject word *gauḥ* certainly expresses an 'existing' cow, in this case, the expressed existence is not the physical existence or the Primary Being (*mukhyasattā*) of the cow but the inner presupposed existence or the Secondary Being (*upacārasattā*). Therefore, it is neither difficult for the predicate '*asti*', which expresses the former, to follow nor is there any error of repetition.

Same is the case with the verb √jan (to be born), which is discussed in the section preceding the above-mentioned verse in the VP.²⁴ For example, in case of a sentence such as '*aṅkuro jāyate*' (a bud comes into being/a bud grows out), literally speaking, the bud cannot be existent

²³ VP III.1, p.157:

*prāk ca sattābhisambandhān mukhyā sattā katham bhavel/
asamś ca nāsteḥ kartā syād upacāras tu pūrvavat//*

For *upacāra* (secondary application) in general, see Unebe 2004: 137

²⁴ The issue is expressed in the following verse:

*ātmalābhasya janmākhyā sattā labhyaṃ ca labhyate/
yadi saḥ jāyate kasmād athāsaj jāyate katham//* VP 3.3.43

See Houben 1995: 257-272, 381 for a detailed discussion on Bhartṛhari's *upacāra-sattā* theory and an annotated translation of the verses in question.

prior to establishing a connection with 'jāyate' (come into existence, become born) since nothing can exist prior to being 'born.' As is actually claimed by several other Indian thinkers, if one should consider any word to have a corresponding physically existing object, the word 'aṅkuraḥ' (bud) cannot be used since it is yet to come into existence. It poses a serious problem to the effort of expressing something that is not yet existent and is presently coming into existence with the sentence such as 'aṅkuro jāyate', since the agent would still be inexpressible. Bhartṛhari introduced his Secondary Being (*upacārasattā*) theory in order to eliminate this problem. Bhartṛhari admits a certain level of existence of a bud that is yet physically non-existent in order to express it as the agent of the action of coming into existence. Since the level of existence varies, 'aṅkuro jāyate' does not cause the problem of 'something already existing coming into existence again.'

Thus, with this Secondary Being (*upacārasattā*) theory, Bhartṛhari avoided the problem pointed out by Kumārila in his assumption (1.2) by stating that the expression 'gaur asti' would fall into the fatal error of repetition such as 'an existing cow exists' if all words were to denote Being (*sattā*: existence). This theory can be applied in order to avoid Kumārila's criticism (1.3), namely, the error of self-contradiction, that might be found in negative sentences such as 'an existing cow does not exist' ('gaur nāsti'). Should the level of both types of existence be different, as considered by Bhartṛhari, the problem of self-contradiction will not arise.

While this type of solution is actually found in the same section of VP 3,²⁵ Bhartṛhari suggests another solution to this problem from the viewpoint of his theory of an indivisible sentence (*akhaṇḍa-vākya*) presented in the second volume of VP:

Having understood an object that follows the recognition of a word in one manner, in a [complete] sentence, one understands the same object in another manner. (VP 2.239)

Even if many objects are understood on the basis of many [words in a sentence], these [words] stop [to express the existence of those objects] when a negation is made at the end [of that sentence]. Therefore, one should not rely on them in this case. (VP 2.240)

And a sentence, 'vṛkṣo nāsti' (there is not a tree/a tree does not exist) is [certainly] an indication of the non-existence of a certain object [i.e., a tree].

²⁵ Bhartṛhari explains as follows:

*evaṃ ca pratīṣedhyeṣu pratīṣedhaprakṛtiḥ/
āśrīteṣūpacāreṇa pratīṣedhaḥ pravartate//* VP 3.3.42

Also see Houben 1995: 262-68, 379-80.

[However] the object [expressed by the word *vrkṣaḥ* (tree), and the notion [corresponding to it] remain unconnected to the negation. (VP 2.241)²⁶

Similar to Kumārila's concerns with the sentence *gaur nāsti*, in this case, Bhartṛhari considers a sentence *vrkṣo nāsti* (there is not a tree/a tree does not exist). According to him, even if the overall meaning of the sentence is indicated as the non-existence of the tree, the negation in the sentence is dissociated with the referent/meaning of the word 'tree,' namely, a tree out in the world or a notion of the tree. Words in a sentence may cause various notions of their objects, but they are not the main figures since the overall meaning of the sentence alone is important. Even if it is admitted that a negative particle is considered to negate the existence of the tree, what is finally understood is, as a matter of course, not the meanings of words but the meaning of the sentence. If Bhartṛhari had to state that each word denotes each object, he would have had a serious problem regarding a series of contradictory words: '*vrkṣaḥ*' (an existing tree) '*na*' (does not) '*asti*' (exist). However, since he only admits a single meaning for a sentence, which implies that the sentence simply denotes one indivisible fact of non-existence of the tree in this case, Kumārila's objection is not adequate. Thus, Bhartṛhari has answered the objection corresponding to Kumārila's criticism(1.3) by presenting his indivisible sentence (*akhaṇḍa-vākya*) theory as well.

§5

Lastly, Bhartṛhari's argument related to Kumārila's criticism (2) shall be examined. As is seen in section 3, Kumārila rejects the assumption of words denoting Being (*sattā*) that is qualified by certain qualifiers. Since, in that case, the qualifier must be *ākṛti* (class-property), which is synonymously used with the lower universal (*aparasāmānya*) and generic property (*jāti*), such as cowness, it is proper to say that words directly denote *ākṛti*.

The following counter-argument can be anticipated against this objection: the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila refers to *ākṛti*, which is defined as being synonymous with *sāmānya* or *jāti* but literally implies a 'form' or a particular 'shape' that is common to all the members of a class. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, this type of 'shape' of cows is not a *saṃsthāna* (phenomenal concrete shape/configuration) that is individually possessed

²⁶VP II, pp. 98-99:

*anyathā pratipadyārthaṃ padagrahaṇapūrvakam/
punar vākye tam evārthaṃ anyathā pratipadyate//
upāttā bahavo 'py arthā yeṣu ante pratiśedhanam/
kriyate te nivartante tasmāt tāṃs tatra nāśrayet//
vrkṣo nāstīti vākyaṃ ca viśiṣṭābhāvalakṣaṇam/
nārthena* buddhau saṃbandho nirvrtter avatiṣṭhate//* *read *nārthe na* (VPwr, p. 240)

by each cow and varies with each cow; rather it is an eternal common shape that all of them exclusively possess.²⁷ However, can this shape (*ākṛti*) alone be really considered as the direct referent or the object of words? Is this type of shape also merely one of the qualifying factors of the object itself? For example, the word 'cow' cannot express the complete features of its object (a certain cow). It is impossible to identify whether or not the cow in question has horns or if it is black or white on the basis of the use of the word 'cow.' Since the object denoted by the word 'cow' has all such features but the *ākṛti* of cows does not include them, *ākṛti* cannot be eligible for the object of the word 'cow.' The *ākṛti*, namely, the universal of individual cows is one of the qualifying factors or distinguishing features of the object. In consequence, the object to be qualified is now expressed only as 'something existing.' It will not be misleading to consider 'something existing' as that which Puṇyārāja referred to as *arthamātra* (object in general) in his commentary on VP 2.119.

This type of counter-argument is, as a matter of fact, found in the Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita in verse 895. Kamalaśīla states, "anticipating the answer of the other thinker...", and introduces the verse, which reads as follows:

Due to the recognition of the mere Being (*sattāmātra*) as the object qualified with cowness and the word 'cow,' [our daily linguistic activity (*vyavahāra*)] can be established. Now that [whether the object (cow) has] a horn [or not, what its concrete] shape (*ākṛti*) [looks like, whether it has] a blue-black color [or not], and so on are not expressed [by the word 'cow'], this view [asserts that the mere Being should be accepted as the object of words.]²⁸ (Tattvasaṃgraha 895)

Although the *ākṛti* in this verse does not appear to be the class property assumed by Mīmāṃsakas anymore, in any case, the 'shape' (*ākṛti*) is not the object of words, instead it is one of the qualifiers of the real object of all words, Being (*sattā*).

This verse is not directly quoted from Bhartṛhari's VP itself; it is, however, quite reasonable to anticipate a counter-argument such as this since Bhartṛhari himself conveys a similar idea as follows:

For example, the word 'cow' is used for an object (a cow) characterized by connected things [such as a cowbell], but [the same word 'cow'] does not indicate such [outer] characteristics. (VP 2.153)

²⁷ See Scharf (1996: 212-16) for a detailed discussion on that point, the source text and a translation as well.

²⁸ TS, p. 287: *gotvetyādinā parasyottaram āśaṅkate:*

*gotvaśabdaviśiṣṭārthasattāmātragater bhavet/
viśāṇākṛtīnīlādibhedākhyātes tu tanmatam//*

Based on Pañjikā on it, words in the brackets are supplied.

In a similar manner, words such as 'cow' are used for [an object] such as a cow, which are [internally] connected with a [particular] form (*ākāra*), color, and parts. Although [such] a word is used, it does not admit them [as its objects]. (VP 2.154)

A word is used for an object qualified with configuration (*saṁsthāna*), color, and parts. [However] its application to the components [i.e., configuration, color, and parts] is not observed. (VP 2.155)²⁹

As is explicitly stated above, the shape (*ākāra*, *saṁsthāna*) of the cow is nothing more than one of the characteristics qualifying the object of the word 'cow.' Even though the word 'cow' refers to an object that has a certain particular shape, color, and distinguished parts, it is not used to indicate these internally connected characteristics in the same way as it is not applied to the separable characteristics such as a cowbell tied to the cow being referred to.

Although neither the main text of the VP nor its commentaries (both *Vṛtti* and *Ṭikā*) explicitly state that the object of the word is the Being (*sattā*), it is not completely unreasonable to consider it as the mere Being (*sattāmātra*), as stated by Śāntarakṣita.

§6

The objection against VP 2.119 by Kumārila and the corresponding arguments found scattered in Bhartṛhari's VP have been examined in this paper. Since Bhartṛhari's statements cannot be considered as direct counter-arguments against Kumārila because the former is considered to be the latter's predecessor, the objection against the *sattādvaitavādin* in Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* and the corresponding argument found in the VP could be reflections of an earlier dispute over what words denote.

Although it is uncertain whether Kumārila presented further arguments in response to Bhartṛhari elsewhere, it is difficult to locate the continuation of these arguments at least in the same section of the *Tantravārttika*. On the other hand, in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, a brief rejection of the above-mentioned view stating that one doesn't experience any 'Being' apart from the thing equipped with characteristics such as shape and color has been found.³⁰

²⁹ VP II, pp. 68-69:

yathā saṁyogibhir dravyair lakṣite 'rthe prayujyate/
gośabdo na tv asau teṣāṁ viśeṣānāṁ prakāśakaḥ//
ākāravarnāvayavaiḥ saṁsṛṣṭeṣu gavādiṣu/
śabdaḥ pravartamāno 'pi na tān aṅgīkaroty asau//
saṁsthānavarnāvayavair viśiṣṭe yaḥ* prayujyate/
śabdo na tasyāvayave pravṛttiṃ upalabhyate//

* read 'rthe (VPwr, p.71)

³⁰ This is stated in *pāda*-d of the following verse, which is the conclusion of Śāntarakṣita's discussion on the issue raised by VP 2.119.

nanv evaṁ tadvato 'rthasya bhedānāṁ cābhidhā bhavet/
tadbhāve latra doṣaś ca nānyo 'styarthaś ca dṛṣyate// TS 896: p. 287

To our regret, it remains unclear how far Bhartṛhari himself construed the text of VP 2.119 in a manner similar to the above-mentioned observations. However, it is presently clear that the controversy over what is expressed in VP 2.119 can probably be dated back to the era prior to Bhartṛhari; regardless of whether he and his commentator intended to do so, the verse has been interpreted and criticized by the succeeding thinkers of other schools as that which asserts that all words denote the Being (*sattā*) with reference to Bhartṛhari's own discussion on the Being found in the third kāṇḍa of VP.

ABBREVIATIONS

NC	Dvādaśāranayacakra, Part I (Jambuvijaya 1966).
PP	Prakīrṇaparakāśa, see VP III.1.
ŚV	Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika (Raja 1946).
ŚVT	Mīmāṃsāślokavārttikaṭikā, see ŚV.
TS	Tattvasaṃgraha (Krishnamacharya 1984).
TV	Tantravārttika (Subbāśāstrī 1929)
VP	Vākyapadīya, see VP II, VP III.1
VP II	Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa 2 (Iyer 1983).
VP III.1	Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa 3, Part 1 (Iyer 1963).
VPwr	Vākyapadīya (Rau 1977).

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Bhartrhari and the Syntax of Sanskrit Gerunds

BRENDAN S. GILLON

1. Introduction

Working over the past fifteen years, I have elaborated and substantiated a hypothesis pertaining to word order in Classical Sanskrit, first conjectured by J.F. Staal (1967). I wish to substantiate this hypothesis still further here by availing myself of the insights into the gerunds of Classical Sanskrit found in the work of the great Indian philosopher of language and Sanskrit grammarian, Bhartrhari (Seventh century A.D.), insights which have been brought to light by Madhav Deshpande (1980).

The paper divides into four parts. First is set out the hypothesis pertaining to the structure of Classical Sanskrit. Second are reviewed the established facts pertaining to the gerund in Classical Sanskrit. Next, drawing on Madhav Deshpande's important work, I lay out the relevant insights from Bhartrhari into the non-finite verbs. Finally, I show how a puzzle about the constituency of gerund phrases is resolved by Bhartrhari's insights.

2. Constituent structure and word order in Classical Sanskrit

Five assumptions are needed to apply Staal's conjecture to Classical Sanskrit. First, Classical Sanskrit has the four basic lexical categories of adjectives (A), nouns (N), prepositions (P), and verbs (V). Second, each of these lexical categories are the heads of constituents. Third, a phrase comprises

its head and any number of phrasal complements or clausal complements. Fourth, a clause comprises an optional (subject) noun phrase (NP), an optional auxiliary verb (Aux) and a verb phrase (VP). And fifth, neither parentheticals, which include vocatives and interjections, nor conjunctions participate in the syntactic structures just outlined, though their placement in a sentence does depend on them. These five assumptions can be encapsulated in the following order-free constituency rules.¹

(1.1) $XP \rightarrow \dots, X, \dots$

(1.2) $S \rightarrow (NP), (Aux), VP$

(The commas remind us that the phrase markers generated by them are not ordered by precedence.)

These auxiliary assumptions say nothing about word order in Classical Sanskrit prose sentences. Thus, word order must be characterized in some other way. Elsewhere (Gillon 1989, 1996), I have suggested that this can be done very elegantly on the basis of Staal's conjecture. His conjecture is that syntactic structure of Classical Sanskrit prose is like a Calder mobile: the root node of a constituency tree is the basic point of suspension, and other nodes are other points of suspension; rotation of the nodes immediately beneath a given node is perfectly free. More precisely, the idea is that sisters of a given constituent may occur in any order. In other words, the transposition of any two sisters of a given constituent does not disturb grammaticality.

One way to make this insight mathematically precise is as follows. Let the words of a Classical Sanskrit sentence be linearized freely, *modulo* what I call Staal's Constraint: namely, order is free.

(2) Staal's Constraint:

Let T be a labelled, order-free phrase marker associated with a sentence S ; let n_i and n_j be distinct sister nodes in T . Then, if any word in S dominated by n_i precedes any word in S dominated by n_j , then every word in S dominated by n_i precedes every word in S dominated by n_j .

(In her joint honors thesis in linguistics and mathematics, Janet Nielsen (2004) has proven that all linear orders which satisfy Staal's constraint are precisely the linear orders obtained by the free permutation of sister nodes in a constituency tree.)

It is a consequence of the preceding that all constituents are continuous, though the order of the sisters of any constituent is completely free. It is important to point out that this consequence does not imply that word order in Classical Sanskrit prose is free. Indeed, to the contrary, it

¹ Classical Sanskrit clauses have a complementizer, located at the left periphery of its clause. Since the complementizer does not bear on what follows, its discussion has been omitted.

implies that Classical Sanskrit prose has no discontinuous constituents, which is, in fact, false.

Staal (1967: 79, fn. 6) recognized that discontinuous constituents obtain in Classical Sanskrit prose, and for that reason, he dispaired of the ultimate viability of his idea. However, close empirical investigation of Classical Sanskrit prose has shown his conjecture to be correct.

To investigate Staal's conjecture, I have compiled a tree bank of almost two thousand prose sentences from Classical Sanskrit. The sentences in this bank include over one thousand five hundred sentences from a single prose text, a prose philosophical text by the philosopher Dharmakīrti (Seventh century A.D.), the remainder are the prose sentences found in Apte (1885), in which the author sets down in traditional western grammatical terms the traditional Indian wisdom regarding the usage of particles and the usage of verbal and nominal forms. He appends to each chapter a set of sentences, prose and verse, to illustrate the grammatical points made in the chapter. These prose sentences provide an ideal sample. First, they are taken from the best examples of Classical Sanskrit literature. And second, they are selected without any prejudice as to word order in Classical Sanskrit, since not only is the selection of sentences not motivated by any considerations dependent of those relevant to word order — they are selected to illustrate points pertaining to morphology and the usage of particles — but the author in fact maintains that 'the order of words in a Sanskrit sentence is not a material point for consideration' (§399).

Careful investigation of these sentences shows that over two-thirds of the sentences obey Staal's constraint, that is, have only continuous constituents, while one-third have at least one constituent which is discontinuous. What is truly remarkable is that this one-third evinces distributional patterns well known from languages with so-called fixed word order. All cases of discontinuity in Classical Sanskrit turn out to be either cases of extraposition from subject noun phrase, topicalization of verb complements or extraposition from verb complements. In each case, the linear distribution is such that the subordinate element making up the discontinuity is found at the periphery of its clause of origin. Here are some illustrations.²

(3.1) M 4.5.7 (= SG 14.1.2)

[S [NP6 *tayoḥ baddhayoḥ*] [VP0 *kiṃ-nimittāḥ*] [NPls — *ayam mokṣaḥ*]]

What basis does the release of the two prisoners have?

Here, the sixth, or genitive, case constituent *tayoḥ baddhayoḥ* (*of the two prisoners*), subordinate to the noun *mokṣaḥ* (*release*), the head of the subject

²To enhance readability, irrelevant brackets are omitted.

noun phrase, is not found in continuity with the rest of the subject noun phrase, situated at the right periphery of the sentence, but is found at the left periphery, separated from the subject noun phrase's head noun. This is the familiar case of extraposition from the subject noun phrase.

Next comes the familiar case of topicalization.

(3.2) PV 10.1

[S [NP₂ (karaṇa-guṇa) + (vaktu-kāmate)] hi [NP_{1s} vacanam]
[VP— anumāpayet]]

Speech should imply both qualities in the organ (of speech) and a desire to speak alone.

Here, the object of the verb, the compound *karaṇa-guṇa + vaktu-kāmate* (qualities in the organ and a desire to speak), is not contiguous with the verb *anumāpayet* (should imply), situated at the right periphery of the clause, but is separated from it, located at the left periphery.

(3.3) Māl 8.90 (= SG 27.1.11)

[S [CMP yathā] [AP₃ ((itaḥ-mukha)- āgataiḥ) api] [NP_{1s} mahān kalakalaḥ]
[VPśrutaḥ [NP₃ — asmābhiḥ]] ...]

As a great uproar was heard by us, even while coming in this direction ...

The compound adjective *itaḥ-mukha-āgataiḥ* (coming in this direction), which modifies the third, or instrumental, case pronoun *asmābhiḥ* (us), complement to the passive verb *śrutaḥ* (heard), appears at the left periphery of the clause, separated from the pronoun it modifies. In other words, we have a familiar case of extraposition from a verb complement.

3. Gerunds in Classical Sanskrit

Having sketched the basic ideas pertaining to constituency and word order in Classical Sanskrit prose, let me turn to the morpho-syntactic details of the gerund. A gerund in Classical Sanskrit is a non-finite form of the verb, devoid of any overt indication of person, number, gender, tense, mood or voice. It often occurs with various complements and modifiers. We shall call the constituent comprising a gerund and its complements and modifiers a gerund phrase.

A gerund phrase is clearly a subordinate constituent. First, it cannot stand on its own, but rather must be subordinate to a clause which either is immediately adjacent to, or completely surrounds, it. Second, the tense with which the gerund is construed is dependent on that of the verb of the subordinating clause. Finally, the value of what would be the subject of the gerund phrase, were it to have one, is almost always the agent (*kartṛ*) of the verb of the subordinating clause. Each of these characteristics are illustrated by the next example.

(4) P 1.61.27 (= SG 26.2.1)

[S tat adya [GP mām bhakṣitvā] [VP prāṇān dhārayatu] [NP1s svāmī]] ...

Now, then, may my master eat me and sustain his life ...

Here, notice especially that the gerund and the main verb are construed to have the same imperative force, though only the main verb appears in the imperative tense.

The question arises: what kind of subordinate constituent is a gerund phrase? Like gerund constructions in other languages, the gerund constituent in Classical Sanskrit has some of the properties of a clause and lacks some of its properties. On the one hand, the gerund is a non-finite form of the verb. In particular, it evinces no inflectional alternations. On the other hand, all of its subordinate constituents behave as though the gerund were a verb. In other words, they behave as they would behave were the gerund phrase re-constituted as a clause with the gerund reconstituted in an appropriate active finite form. Moreover, when discontinuities are observed in the gerund phrases of Classical Sanskrit, they pattern with those noted above for clauses: the immediately subordinate constituent of the discontinuous constituent is found at the gerund phrase's periphery.³

Having described the gerund's morphology and the constituency of the phrase it constitutes, let us look more closely at its position with respect to the clause to which it is subordinate.

In general, a subordinate clause in Classical Sanskrit occurs at the periphery of the clause to which it is immediately subordinate. This is especially clear of relative clauses. Gerund phrases are no exception. They typically occur at the left periphery, as illustrated next.

(5) P 1.64.27 (= SG 20.1.1)

[S [GP tat ākarṇya] [NP1s Damanakaḥ] [VP cintayām] [AUX āsa]]

Damanaka heard this and thought.

They also occur between a subject noun phrase and the verb phrase, as illustrated next.

(6) Mu 3.17.3 (= SG 3.2.6)

[S ārya [NP1s ... devaḥ Candraguptaḥ] [GP āryam śirasā praṇamya]

[VP vijñāpayati [S a-kṛta-kriyā-antarāyam āryam draṣṭum icchāmi it]]

Sir, Lord Candragupta bows his head to you and informs you that he wishes to see you when unobstructed by your duties.

This distribution is compatible with the assumptions made above, for the subject noun phrase, the verb phrase and the gerund phrase are all taken to be immediate constituents of a clause. Where it is problematic is where

³See Gillon 1996, §6.3 for details and examples.

a gerund phrase intervenes between a subject noun phrase and its modifier and the modifier is not at the periphery of the clause but the subject noun phrase is.

(7) K 219.18 (= SG 7.1.9)

[S [NPls Candrāpīḍaḥ] tu [GP samupasṛtya pūrvavat eva tām Mahāśvetā-praṇāma-puraḥ-saram] [AP1 (darśita-vinayaḥ)-B [VP praṇanāma]]

Candrāpīḍa, after he had bowed to Mahāśvetā, approached her (Kādambarī) just as before and bowed to her with a display of decorum.

Here the gerund phrase occurs between the subject noun phrase's head noun, *Candrāpīḍaḥ*, situated at the left periphery of the sentence, and the bahuvrīhi compound *darśita-vinayaḥ* (*who showed decorum*), which is true of the denotation of the subject noun phrase. Thus instead of the subordinate element in the discontinuous constituent appearing at the periphery of its clause, it is the head element which appears at the periphery.

This configuration should not be confused with the following unproblematic configuration.

(8) V 3.3.46 (= SG 9.1.6)

[S [AP1 eṣaḥ] khalu [NP3 Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna] [NP1s — Droṇaḥ] [GP keśeṣu ākr̥ṣya] [VP — asi-patreṇa vyāpādyate]]

As is well known, Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna drags Droṇa by the hair and kills him with the blade of his sword.

Here the discontinuities fit into the well known pattern where the superordinate element, or the head, is found in a suitable place in the clause, while the subordinate element is found at the clause's periphery, one resulting from extraposition from the subject, the other from topicalization of a complement to the verb. These discontinuities could arise even if the gerund clause were not present.

4. Bhartṛhari on non-finite verbs

In Pāṇini's grammar, as is well known, associated with each verb is the action (*bhāva*) the verb denotes. And associated with each action are its *kāraḥ* (valences). While the nouns in the sentence being derived denote the relevant *kāraḥ*, a *kāra* is not considered to be properly expressed, unless it is denoted either by a inflectional verbal suffix or by a noun with a declensional suffix for an appropriate, oblique case. In particular, the inflectional verbal suffix for the active voice, once attached to a verb, is said to express properly the agent (*kartṛ*) of the action denoted by the verb, while the inflectional verbal suffix for the middle voice is said to express

⁴The use of the passive voice with intransitive verbs introduce further complications which are omitted here, since this usage does not bear the problem being addressed.

properly its patient (*karman*). Any noun denoting a *kāraka* which has been otherwise properly expressed is assigned the first, or nominative, case.⁴

Let us illustrate these principles. We begin with a simple clause with a transitive verb.

(9.1) devadattaḥ odanaṁ pacati.

Devadatta is cooking rice.

(9.2) odanaḥ devadattena pacyate.

Rice is being cooked by Devadatta.

In the sentence in (9.1), the verb *pac* (to cook) denotes the action, the noun *devadatta* denotes its agent (*karṭṛ*) and the noun *odana* (rice) its patient (*karman*). The inflectional verbal suffix *-ti* properly expresses the agent (*karṭṛ*) of the cooking. Since the agent (*karṭṛ*), denoted by the noun *devadatta*, has been otherwise properly expressed, the noun *devadatta* is assigned the first, or nominative, case. The patient (*karman*), denoted by the noun *odana* (rice), has not been otherwise properly expressed. To be expressed properly, it is assigned the oblique second, or accusative, case. In the sentence in (9.2), the inflectional verbal suffix *-te* properly expresses the patient (*karman*) of the cooking. Since the patient (*karman*) has been otherwise properly expressed, the noun *odana* (rice), denoting the patient (*karman*), is assigned the first, or nominative, case. The agent (*karṭṛ*), denoted by the noun *devadatta*, has not been otherwise properly expressed. It is assigned the oblique third, or instrumental, case in order to be properly expressed. As a result, the two sentences in (9) express one and the same situation.

How, then, are gerund phrases derived? Deshpande (1980, ch. 8.3; ch. 10.6) argues that Aṣṭādhyāyī requires that the non-finite suffixes for gerunds (*-tvā*, *-ya* and *-am*) and the non-finite suffix for infinitives (*-tum*) express the agent (*karṭṛ*) of the action of the verb to which they are attached.

(10) pratinivṛtṭya devadattaḥ svapiti.

Having returned, Devadatta is sleeping.

Here we have two actions, that of returning (*pratinivṛt*) and that of sleeping (*svap*), the former being subordinate to the latter. Devadatta is the agent (*karṭṛ*) of each. The agent (*karṭṛ*) of the returning is expressed by the gerundive suffix *-ya* and the agent (*karṭṛ*) of the sleeping is expressed by the active verbal inflection *-ti*. Since the agent (*karṭṛ*) of each action has been expressed, the noun denoting the agent (*karṭṛ*) is assigned the unoblique first, or nominative, case.

Nothing in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, as far as I know, rules out the next sentence.

(11) *devadattaḥ pratinivṛtṭya devadattaḥ svapiti.

Devadatta having returned, Devadatta is sleeping.

Yet this sentence, in which the subject noun phrase appears twice is, presumably, unacceptable. Bhartṛhari's rule for gerundive and infinitival phrases, however, excludes such sentences, since it requires that, when something bears the same *kāraka* relation to two actions, one action denoted by a subordinate verb, the other denoted by the superordinate one, the *kāraka* be denoted at most once and that the word denoting the *kāraka* be taken in connection with the verb denoting the principal action. Here is what Bhartṛhari's rule states:

Bhartṛhari's Rule (VP 3.7.81-82)

When an entity (*dravya*) is separately related to a main (*pradhāna*) and a subordinate (*guṇa*) action, in such contexts the particular *kāraka* relation based on the subordinate action abides by the *kāraka* relation based on the main action. Where the particular *kāraka* relation with respect to the main action is expressed by the main verbal inflection, the *kāraka* relation based on the subordinate action, even though not denoted, becomes manifest. (translated by Deshpande 1980: 59)

Deshpande (1980: 58-59) explains this passage as follows:

If there are two actions related to each other such that one of them is the principal action and the other is the subordinate action, then the surface syntax (i.e., case endings) of the SHARED KĀRAKAS is determined by the principal action and not the subordinate action.

The sentence in (11) is not the only sentence ruled out by Bhartṛhari's rule. Without his rule, both of the following sentences would be permitted by the grammar. However, sentences such as the one in (12.2) are unacceptable.

- (12.1) *odanaṁ paktvā devadattaḥ aśnāti.*
 Having cooked the rice, Devadatta is eating it.
- (12.2) **paktvā odanaṁ devadattena aśyate.*
 Having cooked the rice, it is being eaten by Devadatta.

(See Deshpande 1980: 77 for a slightly different rendering of the second sentence.) Without Bhartṛhari's restriction that a shared *kāraka* be expressed properly at most once, the sentence in (12.2) would be permitted by the grammar.

Before returning to our problem, we should notice one thing about Bhartṛhari's rule. It is completely silent about constituency. This is not surprising: phrasal constituency has no explicit role in the grammar of Pāṇini and his successors. Thus, Bhartṛhari's view is indifferent with respect to whether or not a gerund phrase can have a subject noun phrase. Should it have one, Bhartṛhari's rule requires that it appear in the first, or nominative,

case, since the agent (*kartṛ*) is properly expressed by the gerundive suffix. It would also require that the clause to which the gerund phrase is subordinate have no noun denoting the agent (*kartṛ*) of the main subordinating clause's verb. In other words, Bharṭṛhari's rule excludes sentences of the form in (13.1), an instance of which is found in (11), but it is consistent with sentences of the form given in (13.2) and (13.3).

(13.1) [*s* [*GP* NP1s ... *G*] NP1s VP]

(13.2) [*s* [*GP* NP1s ... *G*] VP]

(13.3) [*s* [*GP* ... *G*] NP1s VP]

5. The Problem

Let us return to the problem illustrated by the sentence in (7). The schematic form of the offending configuration is this:

(14) NP1s GC XP1 VP

(where XP1 is either an adjectival phrase (AP) or a participial phrase (PC) in the first, or nominative, case and apparently modifying the subject noun phrase). The problem, to repeat what was observed above, is that this configuration appears to contain a discontinuous constituent — a subject noun phrase — in which the subordinate element — a modifying adjectival phrase or participial phrase — is separated from the element to which it is subordinate — the head noun of the phrase — and yet the subordinate constituent is not at the periphery of the clause.

The solution is that the first, or nominative, case modifiers do not form a constituent with the subject noun phrase, and hence they and the subject noun phrase do not form a discontinuous constituent. While the first, or nominative, case noun phrase is indeed a subject, it is not the subject of the main clause. It is the subject of the gerund phrase; and while the first, or nominative, case modifiers denote attributes of what the first, or nominative, case noun phrase denotes, they are not part of the gerund phrase, rather they are constituents of the subordinating clause.

The solution is to analyze problematic sentences of the form given in (14), an instance of which is found in (7), as having the constituency essentially of that given in (13.2).

(15) [*s* [*GP* NP1s ... *G*] AP1 VP]

This analysis relies on two assumptions: first, a gerund phrase may have a subject; second, a clause may contain a first, or nominative, case modifiers, even though it contains no first, or nominative, case noun to modify. There is independent evidence for each of these assumptions. The independent evidence for the second assumption is direct. Here are two examples of sentences in which no first, or nominative, case noun occurs, but in which

first, or nominative, case modifiers occur, modifiers which are true of the agent (*kartṛ*) of the (main) verb in the active voice.

(16.1) DK 163.10 (= SG 29.1.4)

[S uṣasi [GP snātvā] [AP1 (kṛta-maṅgalaḥ)-B] [VP mantribhiḥ saha samāgacche]]

In the morning, I washed and I, who had done my duties, joined with my ministers.

Here the bahuvrihi compound *kṛta-maṅgalaḥ* (*who had done my duties*) appears in the first, or nominative, case, but the clause containing it has no first, or nominative, case noun to modify. A similar distribution occurs in the sentence below:

(16.2) Ś 7.0.1 (= SG 8.1.1)

[S [AP1 (anuṣṭhita-nideśaḥ)-B api] [NP5 (satkriyā-viśeṣāt)] [VP an-upayuktam iva ātmānaṁ samarthaye]]

Mātali, even though I have accomplished Indra's mission, I (now) think myself unworthy, on account of the extraordinary reception.

The first assumption is not so directly established, simply because Bhartrhari's rule precludes two noun phrases expressing the agent, one for the gerund and the other for the main verb, when the agent is the same. But what would happen if the agents were not the same? This is not, in general, the case. However, such cases are not unheard of. As reported in Deshpande (1980: fn. 52), the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa contains a sentence in which the gerund phrase has a subject, which occurs in the first, or nominative, case and it is distinct from the subject of the main clause.

(17) ŚPB 2.3.1.10 (= Delbrück 1888: 408-409)

[S [GP [NPls te paśavaḥ] [VP oṣdhiḥ jagdhvā] [VP āpaḥ pītā]] tataḥ [NPls eṣaḥ rasaḥ] [VP sambhavati]]

Those animals having eaten plants and having drunk water, this essence is then produced.

If it could be shown that such sentences are not isolated cases, then it would appear that the constraint of Classical Sanskrit in the period during and after Pāṇini in which such sentences are excluded is the result of a change. Moreover, if such a change took place, it did not take place uniformly in all the descendants of pre-Pāṇinian Sanskrit, for, again as reported by Deshpande (1980: fn. 52), gerund phrases with a first, or nominative, case subject denoting an agent (*kartṛ*) distinct from the agent (*kartṛ*) of the main verb, are found in Prakrit. Here is the Sanskrit translation of the example cited by Deshpande (1980: 136) from the Svapnavāsavadattam.

(18) [S [GP [NPls āryaputraḥ] [VP iha āgatyā] [VP imāṁ kusuma-samṛddhiṁ dr̥ṣṭvā]] [VP sammānitā bhaveyam]]

My husband having come here and having seen the richness of flowers, I should feel honored.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, I have set out a hypothesis to the effect that Classical Sanskrit has constituent structure. The constituent structure hypothesized here differs from that typically ascribed to languages not thought to have free word order, for in Classical Sanskrit, as conjectured by J.F. Staal, the word order within a constituent is free. In addition, I have set out Bhartṛhari's view of gerunds, which, should Deshpande (1980) be right, is indeed the treatment originally found in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. These considerations taken together make sense out of otherwise puzzling distributions pertaining to subject noun phrases and modifying adjectival and participial phrases in the first, or nominative, case. Finally, I showed that these otherwise puzzling distributions fit nicely with diachronic data noticed by Deshpande (1980).

NOTATION

- Phrasal constituent structure is indicated by labelled square brackets.
- The labels for the square brackets include the usual phrasal labels AP, NP, PP and VP as well as Aux for auxiliary verb, CMP for complementizer, CNJ for conjunction, GP for gerund phrase, PC for participial clause (phrase) and VOC for vocative.
- Numerals are added to the labels AP, NP and PC to indicate the relevant case. They follow Pāṇini's numbering (1 nominative; 2 accusative; 3 instrumental; 4 dative; 5 ablative; 6 genitive; 7 locative).
- 's' appended to NP1 indicates that the first, or nominative, case noun phrase (NP1) is the subject of the clause.
- '0' indicates a phonetically null copula.
- Lexical constituent structure is indicated by parentheses.
- 'x-y' means that 'x' and 'y' form a compound.
- 'x+y' means that 'x' and 'y' form a dvandva compound.
- 'B' is appended to bahuvrīhi, or exocentric, compounds.

ABBREVIATIONS

- DK = Daśakumāracaritam, edited by N.B. Godabole, revised by W.L. Paṇṣīkar (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1933) [reference: page and line]. Also edited by M.R. Kale (Bombay: Gopal Narayan & Co., 1925).
- K = Kādambarī, edited by P. Peterson (Bombay: Government Central Book Depot, Bombay Sanskrit Series: v. 24, 1885) [reference: page and line].
- M = Mālavikāgnimitra, edited by Seshadri Iyer (Poona, 1896). [reference: act, verse, and line following verse].
- Māl = Mālatīmādhava, edited by R.G. Bhandarkar (Bombay: Government Central Book Depot, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series: v. 15, second edition, 1905) [reference: page and line].
- Mu = Mudrārākṣasam, edited by K.T. Telang (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagara Press, Bombay Sanskrit Series: v. 27, 1935) [reference: act, verse, and line after verse].
- P = Pañcatantra, edited by F. Kielhorn (Tantra I) and by G. Buhler (Tantra II through Tantra V) (Bombay: Government Central Book Depot, Bombay Sanskrit Series: v. 1, v. 3, and v. 4, 1896, 1891, 1891) [reference: tantra, page, line].
- PV = Pramāṇavārttika, edited by R. Gnoli (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, Serie Orientale Roma: v. 23, 1960). [page, line].
- Ś = Śakuntalā, edited by N.B. Godabole, revised by W.L. Paṇṣīkar (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1933) [reference: act, verse, and line after verse], also edited by S.K. Belvalkar (New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1965).
- SG = Student's Guide to Sanskrit Composition, Apte 1885 [reference to chapter, exercise set, example sentence].
- ŚPB = Śatapathabrāhmaṇa.
- V = Vikramorvaśīyam, edited by S.P. Pandit (Bombay: Government Central Book Depot, Bombay Sanskrit Series: v. 16, second edition, 1889) [reference: act, verse, and line after verse].
- VP = Vākyapadiya, edited by K.A. Subramania Iyer (Poona: Deccan College, 1966) [reference: kāṇḍa, samuddeśa, verse]

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The Case of the Accusative: Contemporary Relevance of Bhartṛhari on the Kāraḥas

ARINDAM CHAKRABARTI

§1.

‘Contemporary’ is a slippery word. Just as slippery as Time, about which Bhartṛhari tells us that it could be looked upon as a power, as the self, or a worship-worthy deity. Whether in language or in thought, those who worship what is ephemerally new and current tend to ignore the timeless universal structures of human experience, thinking, and speech about which Bhartṛhari tries to make us aware in an avowedly non-partisan manner. When fashions of philosophizing change rather fast and philosophers and linguists change their views as radically within a couple of decades as Hilary Putnam, or Noam Chomsky has been doing, it becomes hard to figure out what is contemporary in philosophy of mind and language. Luckily, some philosophical issues never go out of fashion, in the East or in the West. The problem of human freedom or agency of actions is one such perennial issue. Here one can argue that Bhartṛhari’s discussion of the meanings of the agent/subject-term in *Sādhana-Samuddeśa* (VP III.7.101-124) is extremely relevant, if not to the solution, certainly to a clear articulation, of the contemporary question: “When can someone X be said to be a free agent of an action?” Were the suicidal religious fanatics, who flew the planes through the Twin Towers on nine eleven, **agents** of that catastrophic act?

Bhartṛhari breaks down this question of free agency to seven distinct factors or sub-questions:

- (a) Did X start acting before deriving its power from anything else, such as the instruments?
- (b) Did X retain its predominance by subjugating all other contributors to the action to itself?
- (c) Are the operations of all other causal factors subject to the functioning of X?
- (d) If X wishes or stops functioning, do all the other conditions stop producing effects?
- (e) Is X irreplaceable or non-substitutable with another entity for this kind of action?
- (f) Even if any other action-condition (e.g., the ablative, the accusative, the instrumental, the locus) is lacking, does X have to be there for this action to be possible?
- (g) Does X get the action done, even if indirectly from a distance, through its influence over other more directly involved employed agents? (VP III.7.101–102)

Bharṭṛhari's subtle analysis of the concept of an other-employed agent, I think, can help us locate responsibility for violence even in such apparently 'hired or other-appointed killers' whether in the sky of New York or in the communal atrocities of Gujarat! When such other-impelled doers try to pass the buck of responsibility to the *prayojaka-kartā*, the instigator, we could use Bharṭṛhari's sharp formulation: "It is out of someone's own freedom that one assumes that subordinate role of an instrumental agent under someone else's deployment" (*prayoga-mātre nyagbhāvaṃ svātantryād eva niḥśritaḥ*, VP III.7.123).

This moral relevance of the theory of the nominative case is not a dramatic first discovery on my part. The grammatical notion of an agent as someone free or someone causing another free individual to do something has been exploited fully by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta who call their Trika philosophy 'the philosophy of freedom' (*ayaṃ svātantryavādaḥ pramāṇitaḥ* – IPVV, Vol. I, p. 9). Also, Raffaele Torella has already alluded to the same subtle point of Bharṭṛhari's analysis of agency in an insightful footnote (12) to page 150 of his exemplary translation of Utpala's *Vṛtti* on IPK, in the epistemological context of deciding whether the Māyā-induced experiencer has any share of creative responsibility in projecting the objects that are made to be manifested to it. Indeed Torella traces the influence of Bharṭṛhari's grammatical insight about the agency of the other-induced doer on Abhinavagupta's deep statement (from a lost text): *preryo'pi sa bhaved yasya śaktatā nāma vidyate*, "Only one who has the capability can be an impelled agent". Thus, the problem of agency is a well-researched area of overlap between philosophy and grammar.

The concept of an agent finds its natural counterpart in the concept of an accusative, just as the concept of a subject has a natural counterpart in the concept of an object. If somebody does something, there usually is something or somebody else to which or whom he or she does it. Rāma bends and breaks the bow, Rāvaṇa steals Sītā, America attacks Iraq. They cannot just bend, break, steal or attack without an object in each case.

In this paper I wish to take this other equally important 'case-study' in both the senses of that term, as a special case of Bhartṛhari's general relevance to the contemporary linguistic formulation of deeper moral, metaphysical, or epistemological issues, and as a study of the second important case or *kāraḥa* (though I share the standard scholarly scruples about translating *kāraḥa* as 'case'). I shall discuss the notion of the accusative or object to a verb. This concept is at the heart of the problem of intentionality as it has been discussed by both early 20th century phenomenologists such as Husserl as well as by late 20th century analytic philosophers such as Wittgenstein, John Searle or Gareth Evans. To put the problem in a vivid Wittgensteinian idiom: "What makes my perception, thought or expectation of something, the perception, thought or expectation of that thing? What makes the object of my knowledge or desire, the **object** of that thought or that desire?"

Sometimes a new insight strikes you precisely when you delve deep into an old text; a light about a Western problem dawns gradually as you focus on a culturally alien Indian debate. That the contemporary central philosophical issue about what makes something an object of awareness is best addressed via the different criteria of objecthood – *karmatva* – discussed in Sanskrit philosophical grammars struck me first when I studied the nearly interminable arguments and counter-arguments between the Dualist and Non-dualist Vedāntins starting from Vyāsātīrtha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the many-tiered, centuries-old, commentarial disputation between Nyāyāmṛta and Advaitasiddhi. At one point (N.1.33: *dṛg-dṛśya-sambandhānupapattibhaṅga*) Vyāsātīrtha remarks that some *māyī-bhikṣavaḥ* (with a pun on *māyin*, meaning both: those who propose that the world is *māyā* or illusory, and: cheating tricksters) have borrowed the following argument from the Yogācāra Buddhists in order to show that whatever is an object of awareness must be 'false', in their technical sense.

An object has to figure either as related to the awareness or as unrelated to it. It cannot figure as totally unrelated because then anything can be the object of any awareness which is intolerable. But what relation does the intentional object have with the cognition? Here nine initial definitions of objecthood are tried out and rejected by the imaginary non-dualist opponent. Intentionality or its converse: objecthood, though it looks like a relational property, is not a two-term relation such as inherence or

contact, hence it cannot be a relation (*viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāvasya ca a-dviṣṭhatvena a-sambandhatvāt*). If the relation between awareness and object remains logically inscrutable then this entire objective world remains inscrutable as well and what is indeterminable as either real or unreal is 'false'.

In his list of initially rejected definitions Vyāsātīrtha first considers a cognitively adapted version of the grammatical definition of the accusative: "The Object is that which is the locus of the resultant effect of the cognition/action denoted by the verb" (*jñāna/kriyā-janya-phalāśrayatvam*). The third definition in that list is more explicitly grammatical: "The Object is that which assumes the case-role of the accusative to a cognition." And it is rejected because it suffers from under-coverage, failing to apply to objects of God's unlimited cognition, since such uncaused omniscience is not caused by any *kāraka* at all!

When I first struggled with these conjectures and refutations, it struck me that the problem of the adequacy conditions for something being an object of a mental state is a special case of the problem of the meaning of the accusative case as discussed by Bhartṛhari. In this short paper, I would like to first summarize Bhartṛhari's discussion of the four kinds of criteria of objecthood and then apply those criteria to some vexed cases of intentionality to show how considerable clarity can be achieved by this cross-fertilization of Classical Indian philosophical grammar and the contemporary analytic issue of what makes something an object of a cognitive or mental state.

§2.

"What is most desired by the doer is the object"—this is the initial common-sensical definition of the accusative in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (1.4.49). The category of the 'desired' is itself subdivided by Bhartṛhari into three major kinds:

A1.1: what has to be brought about (*nirvartyam*)

A1.2: what has to be modified (*vikāryam*)

A1.3: the target (*prāpyam*).

A1.1 can again be conceived of in two ways:

A1.11: When we say, "Potter (the clay-artisan or the great American Naiyāyika) makes the pot or edits the book" we may mean that the desired object was an absentee to a prior absence and is now brought about: a hitherto non-existent jar or a volume of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies has begun to exist thanks to the effort of the potter or Potter (*asat jāyate*).

Or A1.12: When we say, "The speaker uttered the word", we may mean that the word was already there in the speaker's mind as an object of

his wish-to-speak, and this pre-existent word has been only manifested by the noise produced at the *vaikhari* level. (*sat janmanā prakāśyate*). The difference here reflects the metaphysical difference between Beginningism and Transformationism, the competing causal theories of Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya respectively.

The second kind of desired object – that which is to be modified (A1.2) – admits of a division into two similar sorts:

A1.21: When we say ‘Arjuna burnt the forest,’ the kind of modification that the doer makes the forest undergo is called ‘destruction.’ It would be disingenuous on Arjuna’s part to plead, when accosted by a militant environmentalist, that he was merely trying to give the forest a different form!

A1.22: When about a goldsmith we say, ‘He is shaping the gold into an ear-ring,’ the gold is the object of desire as something ‘to be modified’ which is not at all describable as ‘to be destroyed’ (unless the customer so detests the design that she says that the goldsmith ‘ruined the precious metal’).

In English, since the word ‘rice’ refers to both the grains that are taken to be cooked, and the cooked product, that is, before and after the softening by boiling, the object, rice, mentioned in the sentence: ‘Ashok is cooking rice’ could be both the to-be-brought-about and to-be-modified kind of object. Ashok is trying to make steamed rice (*odanam* = *nirvartya*) by steaming rice (*taṇḍulam* = *vikārya*). In Sanskrit sometimes both the ‘what is brought about’ and ‘what is changed’ senses are present in a sentence with a verb with two objects. Take the first quarter of the famous invocation verse: *mūkaṃ karoti vācālam* ‘Makes the mute garrulous’. English can disambiguate it by the use of ‘out of’: “Makes a garrulous person **out of the mute**”. Here the *vikārya* – to be modified – character of the mute is made apparent by making a material-cause-ablative out of one of the objects. On the other hand English can use ‘into’ to mark out the final product (*nirvartya*) sense of the desired object: “Changes the mute **into a garrulous person**”. But the original has the flexibility of a reversal of meaning because of the two kinds of accusatives being expressed by the same case-ending, especially since word-order is unimportant. Thus: *mūkaṃ karoti vācālam* can also mean ‘Makes the garrulous mute’, when for instance, a talkative person is rendered silent by a vocal-cord problem. To express this unambiguously, of course we can use that elegant device called *abhūta-tadbhāve cūi* and say *mūkīkaroti vācālam*!

A1.3: Now comes the third all-important category, the target or destination which does not get changed at all by the action described by the verb. By coming to a country I don’t change or devastate it unless I am

Chengis Khan or Christopher Columbus or Captain Cook for whom the foreign country you land on is not a *prāpya* but a *vikārya*. So the object of coming or going or visiting is an accusative in this third non-causal sense. And if we are realists about the objects of thought then thinking of is like visiting. Sanskrit uses the verb 'to go' or 'to get' or its prefixed versions (*avagacchati* or *upalabhate*) for knowing, understanding, and other cognitive acts. Thus, when I say 'I get your point' or *bhavatā vivakṣitam artham avagacchāmi*, there is a specific claim that I have not made any change in the meaning that I grasped, that I have known it just as it was intended by you prior to my knowing. Such knowledge of meaning is not a post-modernist creative interpretation in the sense that the speaker's meaning is a *vikārya*, and the interpreter's object of understanding is a subjective *nirvartya*. I have neither deconstructed your meaning like the burnt wood, nor have I reconstructed it like the reshaped gold. I have simply got what you had put into words. Hence it is a target-desirable, not a product or a modifiable:

*kriyākṛta-viśeṣānām siddhir yatra na gamyate,
darśanād anumānād vā tat prāpyam iti kathyate* (VP III.7.51).

Most objects of cognitive attitudes fall under this *prāpya* category. When I recall a past event or anticipate a future event, I don't expect my remembering or my expectation to actually bring about or modify the event. Of course, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas are notorious for insisting that every act of cognition makes a difference to the object, by conferring on it the new property of cognizedness (*jñātata*). Knowing, after all, is an action and its object must show some effect of the action, otherwise it would not be the object. For them, therefore, an object of knowledge will have some new attribute as a result of being known rather than stay unaffected as a mere target. There are deep implications of this much-refuted Bhāṭṭa theory of objecthood. It is intimately connected to the peculiar externalist doctrine that our awareness of our own awarenesses is inferential – we infer that we must have had knowledge from the sign that the object has this new property of knownness – and not perceptual; it is also connected to the insistence that only that which is freshly known, and was not known before (at least by me) can be known by me. I cannot be said to have known something unless I have brought about the following change in it: that it was unknown before and now it is known! This Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the necessary freshness of the content of knowledge leads to the Advaita Vedānta theory that everything which we come to know is first concealed by a veil of positive ignorance, that we have to fish it out of this darkness of ignorance. J.N. Mohanty has done some very subtle work in this area exploring the Advaita doctrine that either as known or as unknown, everything is an object of witness-consciousness. His insights on how

something can be an object of ignorance or unknowing as well should count as extremely important contemporary work in the phenomenology of knowledge. And I suspect that just as we shall see shortly that the 'undesired' must be an object if the desired is, similarly, what I do not know must be an object of my witness within, if what I know is its object!

Although Bhāṭṭas are realists, they have made it easier for the Advaita constructivists by starting to talk about the object of knowledge as partly something to be changed by the act of knowing! Bhartṛhari mentions this sort of view: that there are no targets which are not changed by the verb, by a rather extreme example of the alleged poisonous sight of some snakes which incinerate whatever they see. We could call such snakes 'Rorty', since under the annihilating scrutiny of their relativistic vision, the objects lose all their objective reality!

But besides these three kinds of desired objects there is a fourth mixed category (A2) of undesired, ignored, otherwise unsaid, and shunted away from some other case by some quirk of the verb-form. Such objects are exemplified in uses like:

"He saw the thief." (not because the thief was the most desired, unless of course 'he' is a police-man and the thief was 'wanted'!)

"He took poison." (the undesired.)

"She trampled the grass while walking." (to which the doer is indifferent.)

"He milks the cow." (when the ablative-ness of "gets milk from the cow" is somehow left unsaid)

"The boss upbraided the servant." (a yelling is usually given to or meant for a subordinate who takes the case-role of a dative, but in this case, because of the quirk of 'upbraid' or *abhi-krudh* the servant becomes an object.)

Even 'He fears the tiger,' exemplifies an object of this sort, because it is surely undesired or unmentioned as a 'source' of fear. In a subsequent verse Bhartṛhari says that even the objectively undesirable can become a desired object when the doer, out of improper greed or a rash yearning, seeks what is bad for him (*ahiteṣu yathā laulyāt kartur icchopajāyate* –VP III.7.80). Helārāja quotes a perceptive passage from Mahābhāṣya here: "A man who has suffered much prefers to eat poison rather than take any more of those other torments that he has gone through" (on Pāṇini 1.4.50).

The last part of the section on the accusative is devoted to the so-called objectless (intransitive?) verbs and how even they can be given objects in different uses. What was the changeable object to a verb in a sentence like: 'The developer destroys the forest' can assume the role of a dummy

subject or agent when, wishing to protect the developer from blame, we make the forest the nominative and use an objectless verb as in: 'The forest perishes'. The object to the verb 'see' can enjoy a certain 'independence' and become a virtual nominative in the sentence: 'The duck-rabbit is seen,' the accusative having its own 'voice' as it were!

There is an adverbial use as well of the accusative, where 'Cooks a little' or 'Worries a lot' does not mean that what is cooked or worried about is small or large in amount, but that the cooking is light or the worrying intense.

§3.

This adverbial use of the object-role is the best place to start talking about the contemporary philosophical relevance of the theory of the accusative case. In the heyday of logical empiricist phenomenalism, the external object of perception was said to be simply a logical construction out of some adverbial modifications of the verbs for sensation. Thus, when one has a loud auditory experience, one would say 'I heard a loud noise.' But actually the object of the act of hearing was not a separate external entity called a loud sound, just as there is no particular *prāpya* target called 'a little' (*stokam*) in 'Cooks a little.' A little is a manner of cooking; analogously, loud sound is a manner of hearing. That was the theory which generated those famous 'foundations of empirical knowledge' with indubitable first person statements like: 'I am appeared to redly and applishly' from which eventually 'I see red apples' was supposed to be logically constructed!! This is a sort of early 20th century Western Yogācāra elimination of the external object of mind through an adverbial analysis.

Although this particular use of the 2nd case-ending is not taken as a proper occurrence of the accusative case by Bhartṛhari, in later grammarians such as Nāgeśa there is an effort to subsume it under the category of the accusative although even with such artificial 'object' the verb remains objectless all the same. One immediate application that we can make of Bhartṛhari's complex and completely non-prescriptive discussion of what makes something an object is to recognize that there is no single way of defining objecthood. Objecthood seems to be very much a family resemblance concept.

Some objects of seeing such as some Escher drawings of impossible staircases simply strike our eyes as if they are the agents and we — the perceivers — are under their power. A word like *sadṛśa* is broken up to mean 'that which looks similar' where the object itself seems to do the work of looking a certain way, leaving little freedom for the viewer. So Bhartṛhari remarks: *sadṛśādiṣu yat karma kartṛtvaṁ pratipadyate* (VP, III.7.64).

Here the object assumes the role of the doer in the context of phrases such as 'looks the same' or 'appears similar'. Yet in other cases, the object remains a simple target unaffected by the act of seeing. In yet others such as the object of imagination, the accusative is very much a product to be brought about, whereas the object of such a complex mental act as exaggeration or understatement seems to be very much a *vikārya*, something to be changed by the mental act. Take the sentence: "The political campaign has hugely inflated the number of new jobs created by the minister." The number is the accusative to the verb 'inflate.' But which number? The actual number is an object as 'something to be modified by exaggeration,' although the exaggeration is only a mental act of will to deceive. Sometimes the target-object and the cooked object coincide. One later grammarian (Śṛṣṭidharācārya, in his commentary on Puruṣottama's Bhāṣā-Vṛtti on Aṣṭādhyāyī) discusses the philosophically puzzling case of the second accusative in the sentence: 'He takes sea-shell to be silver' (*śuktim rajatam manyate*).

Surely the illusory silver, though it is an accusative of 'taking', cannot be a 'locus of the effect of action denoted by the verb', since no effect of '(mis)taking' or the mis-perceiving act can actually reside in the silver as there is no silver there. The silver is in one sense a *prāpya*, wished to be obtained, in another sense a *nirvartya*, to be cooked or made up, and in another sense it is neither. It has some affinity with the exaggerated number in the previous example, but it actually belongs to a unique class of '(imaginary) objects' by itself.

Wittgenstein raises the question: When one draws the picture of a person, is the picture or the person the object of the act of drawing (PI: pt II)? This can be easily answered with the help of Bhartṛhari's multiple criteria for objecthood. The person is the target-object (*prāpya*) whereas the picture is the to-be-brought about or product (*nirvartya*) object! I draw you (without scratching your surface), by producing my drawing of you, and by changing the surface of the paper. You, the drawing, and the paper, are each an accusative of drawing, as target, as producible, and as modifiable.

Here one might object that Bhartṛhari does want to unify all of these senses because he remarks: "Just as the same one ablative is explained in many different ways in the discursive texts, the same *karmatva* or accusativeness is shown through different means here" (VP. III.7.78). So the spirit of Bhartṛhari is very different from that of an anti-reductionist anti-essentialist Wittgenstein who just draws our attention to multiple uses of the objectual formulation such as 'what is thought', 'what is seen', 'what is imagined', 'what is read', 'what is remembered', 'what is expected' etc. and does not want to bring them under any unified sense. But this objection is rather superficial. After all, the whole division of the different words

(other than the verb) of the sentence into words standing for different action-promoters by the way of the agent, the instrument, the source, the locus, the receiver, the object etc. is something that the speaker's intention imposes upon an undivided sentence-awareness unity, according to Bhartṛhari. What analytic philosophers are trying to describe clearly is this language-imposed or use-determined structure, which breaks up the situation spoken of into different action-related roles. Even the action itself, thus can be meant as its own object as in cognate objects in English as in 'I ran a good run' or in Sanskrit when the word *karma* meaning action assumes the accusative place: *niyataṁ kuru karma tvam*. What should I do? Actions!

In spite of tantalizing similarities of concern, no one can claim that Wittgenstein or Quine is a linguistic non-dualist in the same way that Bhartṛhari is. But Bhartṛhari's analysis of the multiple criteria of objecthood can surely throw a lot of light on the somewhat murky Wittgenstein-inspired contemporary attempts at spelling out the concept of an intentional object of a mental act. We must remember though, that what one is looking for is not a definition but a set of criteria and an analysis. So the fact that the concept of an object is hidden within the notion of 'what is desired' or 'what is to be attained as it is' or 'what is intended to be brought about' should not tempt us to bring the charge of circularity against such an analysis of objecthood. We have a robust pragmatic grasp over what it is to desire or not desire something, what it is to wish to modify or simply get something. If we can explain the relation between awareness and its object in terms of these more ordinary relationships then that is quite a gain in conceptual clarity than being told for instance, (blatantly inviting a regress) that a mental state is about an object if the concept or idea of that object constitutes its content. The obviously invited question: "What makes the concept or idea, a concept or idea of that object?" renders this empiricist analysis regressive and redundant. Of course, analyzing the concept of an object in general into that which is most desired, undesired, attained, transformed, or produced is not entirely free from circularity. But it is still less immediately circular and more illuminating than the British empiricist answer: "An object of a mental act is that of which the idea is the content of the mental act".

To be absolutely honest, I find the idea of 'content' multiply ambiguous and rather murky. The so-called content of a cognition seems to be sometimes very much part of the cognition itself, and sometimes an object or a nexus of objects and relations intended by the cognition. Yet the concept of an accusative of a mental act seems to be clearer, even if it admits of many different sub-varieties. When I think of something, I sometimes think of it as desired or hated — in both cases I am acutely interested in it, or sometimes I think of it as what I have to take and transform physically or in imagination, and sometimes I think of it as barely to be registered and

noted as it is, and yet at other times I think of it as something I have to bring about for the first time. Bhartṛhari seems to have captured this entire loosely unified field of meanings of 'object' by his nuanced discussion of the various actual uses of the accusative case in Sanskrit.

§4.

But what is gained philosophically when all these distinctions are drawn and confusions are clarified? Let me answer this popular and plaintive question with the help of a story inspired by Kierkegaard. A man who has gathered a lot of dirty linen, rushes into a very sleek shop which has a sign in its window saying WASHING DONE HERE. The man takes it transitively to mean that some objects such as dirty clothes are washed there. But, a very suave shopkeeper approaches him and explains: "Sorry, we do not wash clothes. Washing is not done here". This reminds me of the use that Helārāja discusses in the context of verbs becoming objectless because the speaker does not wish to mention any object: "Cooking is not done here" (*neha pacyate*). But then the customer yelled, "Why does the sign say that you do?" The answer was: "We are a shop that sells those signs". (What Kierkegaard exactly says in *Either/Or*, Part I, p. 32, is this: "What philosophers say about actuality is often just as disappointing as it is when one reads a sign in a secondhand shop: Pressing Done Here. If a person were to bring his clothes to be pressed, he would be duped, for the sign is merely for sale.")

I have not told you what makes something a *viśaya* – an object – of knowledge, desire, or ignorance or an imaginative awareness. One can read Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya's *Viśayatāvāda* (translated by and commented upon by Sibajiban Bhattacharya) or Tyler Burge on objects of thought for that. But I hope I have been able to sell the sign that Bhartṛhari's analysis of the accusative case is an extremely useful guide for finding an answer or a set of answers to that sort of a question. To quote Wittgenstein, Bhartṛhari's discussion on accusative case, I have tried to show, is "A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar" (PI : II, xi, page 222 e). As it is growing arid rather fast, contemporary analytic philosophy can use some rain from that cloud.

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Bhartrhari on Śeṣa Relationships

VINCENZO VERGIANI

In the *Sādhanaśamuddeśa*,¹ the seventh chapter in the third *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*² of Bhartrhari, a specific subsection is devoted to *śeṣa* relationships. The chapter is composed of a theoretical introduction (vv. 1-44) followed by a discussion of *kāraṇas* (vv. 45-155) divided into seven subsections that the tradition calls *adhikāras* – one for each *kāraṇa*, including one for the *hetu*, the causal agent – followed by an *adhikāra* on *śeṣa* (vv. 156-162).³ The very presence of an *adhikāra* on *śeṣa* within the *SāS* indicates – I think – that according to Bhartrhari there is a conceptual affinity between the notions of *kāraṇa* and *śeṣa*. Here I would like to examine the way Bhartrhari deals with *śeṣa* relationships and show how an investigation into his treatment of *śeṣa* can throw light on his notion of *sādhana*, which I propose to translate as ‘factor’ of action.⁴ In short, the point I want to make is that Bhartrhari’s

¹ Henceforth, *SāS*.

² Henceforth, *VP*.

³ *Śeṣādhikāra*, henceforth, *ŚA*. The chapter is ended by a few closing *kārikās* (vv. 163-167).

⁴ In the sense of “anything that contributes causally to a result” (<http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn>, s.v. [30/8/2004]). As is known, *sādhana* is an agent noun from the root *sādh-* ‘to succeed’ or ‘to accomplish’ and literally means ‘accomplisher’. See *SāS* 1cd where Bhartrhari defines *sādhana* as *sāmarthya* “capacity” (*kriyāṇām abhiniṣpattau sāmāthyam sādhanam viduḥ*); and *SāS* 14ab where he affirms: *nimillabhāvo bhāvānām upakārārtham āśritaḥ | natir āvarjanety evaṃ siddhaḥ sādhanam iṣyate* “For the sake of assistance [in the accomplishment of actions], one has recourse to the causal nature of entities as if this were a

notion of *sādhana* seems broader than that of *kāraka* and embraces at least some – if not all – *śeṣa* relationships. Moreover, this notion is on a different theoretical plane: it is that plane of semantics that escapes formalization, at least in the Pāṇinian system, as opposed to the plane of the formal description of the language.

I. *śeṣa vis-à-vis kāraka*

The Sanskrit grammarians use the term *śeṣa* to refer to non-*kāraka* relationships taking the cue from Pāṇini's sūtra Aṣṭādhyāyī⁵ 2.3.50, *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe*, which provides for the 6th declensional ending (*ṣaṣṭhī*, the 'genitive') to signify the syntactic relationships not dealt with in previous rules (and therefore, 'remaining' – *śeṣa* – to be considered).⁶ Nonetheless, in v. 44 of the SāS Bhartṛhari states:

sāmānyam kārakam tasya sapṭādyā bhedayonayaḥ |
ṣaṭ karmākhyādibhedena śeṣabhedas tu sapṭamī ||

kāraka is a general notion. It has seven main sources of differentiation: six on account of the distinction between what is called *karman* etc., while the seventh is distinguished as *śeṣa* 'residual'.

This *kārikā* has a strategic position in the chapter since it concludes the theoretical introduction and serves as a link between the first part and the second, which discusses various aspects of Pāṇini's grammar in the light of the conclusions drawn in the first part. Clearly, here *kāraka* must have a broader meaning than the one in which the term is usually employed, for—as the verse itself says – the categories *karman* etc. established by Pāṇini are only six.⁷ Saying that *kāraka* is a general notion implies that *kāraka* should not be regarded as a proper 'technical' term: after all, Patañjali's conclusion

kind of inclination or surrender. Being such, something established [in its own nature] is acknowledged as a factor of action. "Thus, *sādhana* is primarily this *nimittabhāva* 'causal nature' and, secondarily, anything having such a nature.

⁵ Henceforth, A.

⁶ On the other hand, *ṣaṣṭhī* is also expressly prescribed to denote certain *kārakas*. In particular A 2.3.65, *karṭṛkarmanoh kṛtī*, provides for *ṣaṣṭhī* to denote *karṭṛ* and *karman* when they are governed by a *kṛt* 'primary suffix': this is the so-called *kr̥dyogā ṣaṣṭhī*, corresponding to the traditional Western categories of subjective and objective genitive as, for instance, in *viprasya bhojanam* and *odanasya paktiḥ* respectively. Each of these may well have been treated as a *śeṣa* relationship and be covered by A 2.3.65, had they never occurred together. However, since they do happen to occur together, in which case the object alone is denoted by *ṣaṣṭhī* while the agent is denoted by its 'preferential' *vibhakti*, i.e., *tr̥tīyā* (the 'instrumental'), Pāṇini has to formulate a sūtra to regulate this possibility, namely A 2.3.66, *ubhayaprāptau karmāṇi* "if they both occur [in a sentence], [*ṣaṣṭhī*] is [introduced] to denote the object [alone]".

⁷ For a discussion of a passage in the Mahābhāṣyaṭikā in which Bhartṛhari mentions in passing the *kāratva* of *śeṣa* relationships, see Vergiani (forthcoming).

on this point is that A 1.4.23 states nothing more than a semantic condition for the application of the following rules.⁸

But *kāraka* is a general notion also in another sense. By positing *śeṣa* as one of the articulations of the notion of *kāraka*, Bhartṛhari indicates that every nominal (noun or pronoun) appearing in a sentence should be regarded as having a relationship with an action.

From an epistemological point of view, this reflects Bhartṛhari's view that in ordinary human cognition the relationship with the action is one of the *upādhis* that inevitably accompany the apprehension of any entity (or *dravya* 'substance'). As is affirmed in VP II.428:

kriyānuṣaṅgeṇa vinā na padārthaḥ pratiyate |
satyo vā viparīto vā vyavahāre na so'sty ataḥ ||

Nothing meant by a [single] word, whether real or unreal, is cognized except as connected with action. Therefore in ordinary language [the isolated word-meaning] does not exist.

Moreover, two things can only be connected – conceptually – through an action. Thus, the Vṛtti on VP II.197 affirms: *kriyā hi dvayor arthayor upaśleṣikā niśrayaṇīparvasambandhanakāṣṭhavad upagrāhikā* "it is indeed action that connects two meanings [and] holds [them] together like the wooden pieces joining the steps of a ladder."⁹ And in the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa*¹⁰ Helārāja points out that "[a relationship] can only be brought about by an action, because there is no mutual relation between substances – like iron bars – whose own nature is complete in itself."¹¹

From a linguistic point of view, this idea is expounded in v.156 of the SāS (ŚA):

sambandhaḥ kārakebhyo 'nyaḥ kriyākārapūrvakaḥ |
*śrutāyām aśrutāyām vā kriyāyām so 'bhidhīyate ||*¹²

That relation which is different from [that between] *kāra* [and action] and [yet] presupposes [a relationship between] a *kāraka* and an action, whether the action is mentioned or not, is now described.

⁸ In the *Mahābhāṣya* (henceforth, MBh), at the end of the long discussion on A 1.4.23 Patañjali remarks: *athavā yāvad brūyāt kriyāyām iti tāvat kāraka iti* "Or, just as one says *kārake*, one might say *kriyāyām* 'in an action'" (MBh I.326.16).

⁹ *Vākya*padīyavṛtti (henceforth, VPVṛ) II.197, p. 237.

¹⁰ Henceforth, PrPr.

¹¹ *dravyāṇām hi siddhasvabhāvānām ayaḥśalākākalpānām parasparasambandhābhāvāt kriyākṛta eva saḥ* (PrPr i.355.12-13).

¹² Interestingly, here the term *śeṣa* itself is not used. I think this may be because Bhartṛhari acknowledges that it is not pregnant in itself, but it only acquires the meaning of 'non-*kāraka*', in addition to 'residual', within the context of Pāṇini's grammar and in the following grammatical literature.

Here Bhartṛhari affirms that all non-*kāraka* relationships are *kriyākārapūrvaka*, i.e., they are based on a relationship between an entity serving as a *kāraka* and an action. The authority of the Mahābhāṣya can be invoked to support this statement, for Patañjali's commentary on A 2.3.50 declares that "there are no meanings, in fact, which are different from *karman* etc."¹³ and *śeṣa* is glossed as *karmādinām avivakṣā*, "the speaker's intention not to express any *kāraka*."¹⁴

In other words, *śeṣa* relationships cannot be classified as *kāraḥ* because they do not satisfy either the semantic and/or formal conditions laid out by Pāṇini to assign any of the six proper *kāraka* designations. Nonetheless, they possess *kāratva* in a general sense. As Helārāja remarks in his commentary on v.156, "with the expression *kriyākārapūrvaka* [Bhartṛhari] affirms that a residual relation has the nature of a *kāraka*".¹⁵ In order to illustrate this statement, Helārāja analyzes a few phrases – *rājñah puruṣaḥ* 'the king's servant,' *vrkṣasya śākhā* 'the branch of the tree,' *paśoḥ pādaḥ* 'the animal's paw' and *pituh putraḥ* 'the father's son'¹⁶ – as conveying relationships "between owner and owned, part and whole, producer and produced etc., originated by actions such as giving, residing, generating etc.", in which, he says, "the previous nature of *kāraka* is continued also in the subsequent stage", and therefore concludes that 'a *śeṣa* relationship is indeed a *kāraka*'¹⁷ insofar as it is, or has been, productive.

Then, the question arises: what is the difference between the six *kāraḥ* proper and *śeṣa*? I think that Pāṇini's distinction between *kāraka* and *śeṣa* as understood by Bhartṛhari captures a substantial difference between these types of semantic-syntactic relationships and reflects a theoretical stand on what can be formalized and what cannot.

But before trying to clarify the distinction between *kāraka* and *śeṣa*, it is worth considering in some detail which relationships are subsumed by Bhartṛhari under the notion of *śeṣa* and how they are characterized.

¹³ MBh on A 2.3.50: *na hi karmādinibhyo 'nye 'rthāḥ santi* (I.463.10).

¹⁴ MBh on A 2.3.50: *evaṃ tarhi karmādinām avivakṣā śeṣaḥ* "let us say then that *śeṣa* 'residual relation' is the absence of the speaker's intention to express the object and so on" (I.463.13).

¹⁵ PrPr on VP III.7.156: *kriyākārapūrvaka ity anena kāratvaṃ vyācāṣṭe śeṣasya* (i.355.2).

¹⁶ The first two examples are taken from MBh on A2.3.50 (MBh I.463.10,11); the other two are found in Kāśikāvṛtti (henceforth, KV) on A 2.3.50.

¹⁷ PrPr on 3.7.156: *svasvāmibhāvāvayavāvayavibhāvajanyajanakabhāvādaḥ sambandhe dadālisthitijanyādikriyāprabhāvitē pūrvabhāvīkāratvaṃ uttarāvasthāyām apy anugatam iti bhavaty eva śeṣaḥ kāraḥ* (i.355.5).

II. Types of śeṣa relationships according to Bhartṛhari

§II.1. NOUN-NOUN RELATIONSHIPS

In keeping with the common understanding of the term, for Bhartṛhari śeṣa relationships are first of all those occurring between two nominals, in which the action that originated the relation is *āsruta*, 'not expressed' any longer (see v. III.7.156cd, quoted above). These are the easiest to distinguish from *kāraḥ*, since the latter are noun-verb relations. They are usually qualifier-qualified relationships in which the word denoting the qualifier is followed by *śaṣṭhī*, as in *rājñah puruṣaḥ*. However, as will be shown below, according to Bhartṛhari this group should also include other kinds of noun-noun relationships, in particular those of a causal nature and those in which *karmapravacanīyas* are involved.

§II.2. NOUN-VERB ŚEṢA RELATIONSHIPS

As is specified in the first verse of ŚA quoted above, śeṣa relationships may also occur when the action is *śruta* 'expressed'. In other words, sometimes they occur between a nominal and a verb, e.g., in *mātuḥ smarati* 'he remembers [his]mother' or *naṭasya śṛṇoti* 'he listens to the actor.' The difference between these two examples simply consists in the fact that the former occurrence of *śaṣṭhī* is expressly provided for by A 2.3.52 *adhīgarthad-ayeṣāṃ karmaṇi* and is therefore called *pratīpadavidhānā*, 'prescribed ad hoc' by the Pāṇinīyas,¹⁸ whereas the latter is not and is therefore classified by them under the blanket notion of *sambandhaśaṣṭhī*, the 6th declensional ending denoting a general relationship.

§§ II.2.1. *pratīpadavidhānā śaṣṭhī*

As Patañjali explains in the MBh, *pratīpadavidhānā śaṣṭhī* is used to denote *kāraḥ* that the speaker does not wish to express as such. To this extent, it might be considered a subdomain of *śeṣaśaṣṭhī*.¹⁹ However, Patañjali's interpretation of śeṣa as *karmādinām avivakṣā* raises a further

¹⁸ 'Prescribed ad hoc' (*pratīpadavidhānā*) because it is conditioned by the use of one of the verbs expressly mentioned in the rule: those having the meaning 'to remember' (*adhīgartha*), *day-* and *īś-*. This label applies whenever a 6th declensional ending is provided for by one of Pāṇini's sūtras between A 2.3.51 and 2.3.64.

¹⁹ See MBh on A 2.3.52 (I.465.14-16): *avivakṣite karmaṇi śaṣṭhī bhavati. kiṃ vaktavyam etat. na hi. katham anucyamānaṃ gaṃsyate. śeṣa iti vartate. śeṣaś ca kaḥ. karmādinām avivakṣā śeṣaḥ. yadā karma vivakṣitaṃ bhavati tadā śaṣṭhī na bhavati. tad yathā. smarāmy ahaṃ mātaram. smarāmy ahaṃ pītaram. "When one does not intend to express the object, śaṣṭhī occurs. Should this be stated? No, it should not. Being unsaid, how will it be understood? (śaṣṭhī) śeṣe continues [here in A 2.3.52 from A 2.3.50]. And what is śeṣa? śeṣa is the speaker's unwillingness to express the object etc. When one intends to express the object, [on the other hand,] then śaṣṭhī does not occur, for example in *smarāmy ahaṃ mātaram, smarāmy ahaṃ pītaram*" (I.465./14-17. cf. n. 10 above).*

problem: if any *kāraka* can be optionally expressed as *śeṣa* (i.e., by a 6th *vibhakti*), what is the purpose of stating specific rules (A 2.3.51-64) for a number of such cases? The sūtras in question risk being redundant.

The reason for the reiterated prescription of *ṣaṣṭhī* is explained by Bhartṛhari in VP II.198ab:²⁰ “With regard to that [relationship that occurs when a word denoting an action is used²¹], the 6th declensional ending is expressly prescribed for certain words (i.e., verbal bases) in order to prevent compounding,”²² namely to prohibit compounds of the *ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa* kind in the case of a phrase such as *mātuḥ smṛtam* ‘the mother was remembered.’²³ The same view is presented again in SāS 159 (ŚA): “However, the 6th declensional ending has been prescribed ad hoc to denote [a relationship] that is indicated [in a sūtra] by means of [terms denoting] *sādhana*s when this [relationship] is within the scope of an expressed action, in order to prevent the formation of a compound word.”²⁴

Clearly, compounding can only take place between nominals, while A 2.3.51 ff. primarily apply in the case of a relationship between a nominal and a verb form.²⁵ Consequently, the prohibition must apply to certain primary derivatives (*kṛt*) governing a word ending in *ṣaṣṭhī*. Therefore, the question is: how can one distinguish the cases in which a word ending in

²⁰ In the second kāṇḍa this topic forms a digression in the discussion on the function of *karmapravacanīyas*.

²¹ *śrūyamāṇe kriyāśabde sambandhaḥ*, mentioned in VP II.197cd.

²² *tatra ṣaṣṭhī pratipadam samāsasya nivṛttaye*.

²³ Literally, “there was remembrance of the mother”. This view too goes back to the MBh. Rule A 2.2.8, *ṣaṣṭhī*, provides for the formation of a *ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa* compound between a word ending in *ṣaṣṭhī* and another nominal base which is semantically and syntactically connected with it. vt. 1, *kṛdyogā ca*, explicitly provides for the compounding of a word ending in a *kṛdyogā ṣaṣṭhī* (see n. 6 above), as in *idhmaṣṭraśāṇaḥ* ‘wood-cutting instrument’ and *palāśaśāṭanaḥ* ‘leaf-cutting instrument’ (MBh I.412.19). Patañjali specifies that this is a prior exception (*purastādapakarṣa*) to a rule which is stated later: *pratipadavidhānā ca ṣaṣṭhī na samasyate* “a [word ending in a] 6th declensional ending prescribed ad hoc for specific words is not compounded” (MBh I.412.20, repeated in MBh. I.413.16). This is in fact Patañjali’s own gloss of the vārttika “*pratipadavidhānā ca*” on a later rule (A 2.2.10, *na nirdhāraṇe*), by means of which Kātyāyana intends to prohibit the compounds in question.

²⁴ *sādhanaḥ vyapadiṣṭe ca śrūyamāṇakriyepunaḥ | proktā pratipadam ṣaṣṭhī samāsasya nivṛttaye*.

²⁵ As Bhartṛhari recalls in VPV II.198 (p. 237): *yo ’yam śrūyamāṇakriyāpadam* [read *śrūyamāṇe kriyāpade*?] *kriyādravyasambandhaḥ* [sic] *tatra śeṣa ity eva siddhā ṣaṣṭhī. pratipadam punar ārabhyate samāsapraṭiśedhaḥ katham syād iti. kim udāharaṇam? mātuḥ smarāṭi. naitad asti. sup supeti vartate*. “The 6th *vibhakti* is established precisely to denote *śeṣa* [by A 2.3.50] when there is a relationship between an action and a substance if a word denoting the action is used. [It is objected:] ‘But [when] it is formulated ad hoc, how could there be prohibition of compounding?’ What is an example [of a phrase where such a compound is not allowed]? *mātuḥ smarāṭi*. It is not. A compound is formed by an inflected nominal with another nominal [not with a finite verb like *smarāṭi*].”

śaṣṭhī is allowed to be compounded with a primary derivative from those in which it is not? Or, in other words, as Patañjali puts it in the *bhāṣya* on A 2.2.8: “But which is the 6th declensional ending that is prescribed ad hoc [for certain verbs] and which is the one that is connected with a *kṛt*?”²⁶ His answer is that “every 6th declensional ending is *pratipadavidhānā* except one [provided for] by A 2.3.50. One which is [provided for] by A 2.3.65 is *kṛdyogā*.”²⁷ Consequently, the domain of *kṛdyogā śaṣṭhī* has nothing to do with the domain of *śeṣaśaṣṭhī* and with its related sub-domain of *pratipadavidhānā śaṣṭhī*; and in the case of the former, compounding is in fact allowed.

However, there are a number of exceptions to A 2.3.65. A major one is recalled by Bhartrhari in SāS 160ab (ŚA): “Moreover, the 6th declensional ending referring to an object is prohibited [by A 2.3.69] with regard to [an action expressed by a derivative ending in] a *niṣṭhā* suffix.”²⁸ In fact, A 2.3.69, *na lokāvyayaniṣṭhākhalarthatṛnām*, prohibits the 6th ending to denote the agent or the object of an action expressed by a verbal base ending in any among several suffixes, including the so-called *niṣṭhā* suffixes, namely *Kta* (= *-ta*) or *KtavatU* (= *-tavat*). Thus, although these are classified as *kṛts*, it is correct to say *tena kṛtam*, *grāmaṃ gataḥ*, *taṃ dṛṣṭavān*, etc.

Therefore, in a sentence such as *mātuḥ smṛtam*, in which the mother is the object of remembering, the 6th declensional ending cannot be introduced by A 2.3.65, since *smṛtam* ends in a *niṣṭhā* suffix and the *kṛdyogā śaṣṭhī* is blocked by A 2.3.69. Hence, as Helārāja remarks on SāS 160, “it is indeed by (A 2.3.52) *adhīgarthadayeśāṃ karmaṇi* that the 6th *vibhakti* occurs [in *mātuḥ smṛtam*] to denote an object that one intends to express as *śeṣa*. Thus, since the 6th *vibhakti* is established by the general rule [i.e., A 2.3.50], it is acknowledged that, on account of its reiterated prescription [in A 2.3.52], the purpose is to prohibit compounding.”²⁹ On the other hand, with a derivative of *smṛ-* such as *smaraṇa*, the object of remembering is necessarily to be expressed by a *kṛdyogā śaṣṭhī* according to A 2.3.65, so that the only correct phrase is *mātuḥ smaraṇam* and compounding is not allowed. In fact, Bhartrhari himself explicitly confines the application of vt.1 on A 2.2.10 to *mātuḥ smṛtam* in a passage of VPVṛ II. 198 in

²⁶ *kā punaḥ śaṣṭhī pratipadavidhānā kā kṛdyogā* (MBh I.412.21).

²⁷ *sarvā śaṣṭhī pratipadavidhānā śeṣalakṣaṇām varjayitvā. kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛtī yā śaṣṭhī sā kṛdyogā* (MBh I.412.21-23). As Helārāja remarks about A 2.3.65 in PrPr on VP III.7.160: *na hyeṣa śaṣṭhyā niyamāḥ ‘kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛtī’ iti punaḥ karmagrahaṇāc cheṣagrahaṇasya nivṛtter ity apūrvavidhānam idam* “this is not a restrictive provision concerning the 6th *vibhakti*, since [the *anuvṛtī* of] the term *śeṣa* is blocked by the reiterated mention of [the term] *karmaṇi* in (A 2.3.65) *kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛtī*; it is [instead] the prescription of a new [operation]” (PrPr i.360. 11-12).

²⁸ VP III.7.160ab: *niṣṭhāyām karmaviśayā śaṣṭhī ca pratiśidhyate*.

²⁹ *‘adhīgarthadayeśāṃ karmaṇi’ ity anenaiva karmaṇi śeṣatvena vivakṣite śaṣṭhī sāmānyena siddhāyām punarvidhānāt samāsapratīṣedhārthā vijñāyate* (PrPr i. 360.16-18).

which he excludes in succession that *mātuḥ smaraṇam*, *mātuḥ smaraḥ* and *mātuḥ smṛtiḥ* can be regarded as suitable examples of phrases where compounding is not permitted.³⁰

What is interesting in the context of this article is that by briefly recalling the discussion on permitted and prohibited *śaṣṭhītatpuruṣas* in the MBh, Bhartṛhari reaffirms: 1) that noun-verb *śeṣa* relationships are indeed *kāraka* relationships, although of an 'undefined' type; 2) that the distinction between *kāraka* and non-*kāraka* is mainly formal, namely that it has to do with the grammatical means employed to express the various syntactic relationships, but it does not always hold on the semantic level. In this respect it is interesting that in SāS 159 (ŚA) Bhartṛhari uses the term *sādhana* (*sādhanair vyapadiṣṭe...*³¹) instead of *kāraka* to refer to A 2.3.51 ff. whereas in these sūtras Pāṇini employs specific *kāraka* names. Possibly in this way Bhartṛhari wants to emphasize that **formally** there is no *kāraka* relationship between the noun and the verb and therefore he uses the unambiguous term *sādhana*, thus marking the conceptual distinction between the two notions.

§§ II.2.2. Other kinds of noun-verb *śeṣa* relationships

As the sūtras providing for *pratipadavidhānā śaṣṭhī* are introduced only in order to prevent compounding, we may say that all the cases in which the relationship of a noun with a verb is denoted by the 6th *vibhakti* are basically regulated by the general rule A 2.3.50, *śaṣṭhī śeṣe*. Thus, at the beginning of VPVṛ II.198 Bhartṛhari remarks: "It is only on the basis of (A 2.3.50) [*śaṣṭhī*] *śeṣe* that the 6th *vibhakti* is established to denote a relation between an action and a substance when a word for action is used."³² Apparently, Bhartṛhari believes that Patañjali's definition of *śeṣa* as *karmādinām avivakṣā* leaves room for the introduction of *śaṣṭhī* in all those cases where there is no ad hoc Pāṇinian rule.³³

As was said above, an example of such a noun-verb *śeṣa* relationship is *naṭasya śṛṇoti*, 'he listens to the actor'. Such a sentence is implicitly referred to by Bhartṛhari in SāS 72cd: *ākhyātānupayoge tu nīyamāc cheṣa iṣyate*: "But, when there is no regular instruction, the one who speaks is considered as [participating in] a residual relationship (*śeṣa*) because of the restriction

³⁰ VP Vṛ II. 198 (Iyer II, pp. 237-38). Incidentally, for each of these nominal expressions he also confutes the objection that the accent of the compound would be different according to whether the *śaṣṭhī* is *pratipadavidhānā* or *kṛdyogā*.

³¹ See above, n. 24.

³² *yo 'yaṃ śrūyamānakriyāpadam* [read °*padē*?] *kriyādravyasambandhaḥ tatra śeṣa ity eva siddhā śaṣṭhī* (VPVṛ II.198, p. 237, first line of the Vṛtti).

³³ Several other instances of verbs usually construed with the genitive are presented by Speijer 1886: 87-101.

[concerning the roots that can govern a double object]”, which alludes to a discussion in the MBh on A 1.4.29, *ākhyātopayoge*.³⁴ The bhāṣya explains that if the actor (*naṭa*) in *naṭasya śṛṇoti* did not assist in bringing about the action, the condition *kārake* (A 1.4.23) would not have a chance to apply, and therefore it would be redundant to specify that the rule applies only when there is systematic teaching.³⁵

More examples of ‘unregulated’ *śaṣṭhī* governed by a verb are given at the end of VPVṛ II.198:³⁶ *na māśāṇām aśnīyāt* ‘he should not eat pulses’,³⁷ *subhāṣitasya śikṣate* ‘he learns the saying’; *ihāheḥ sṛptam* ‘here is where the snake crawls.’³⁸

It is assumed that here, although there is indeed a *kārake* relation between the noun and the verb, the speaker does not want to express any specific *kārake*. In fact, Helārāja makes it clear that this kind of *śeṣa* relationship cannot be regarded as being literally *kriyākārake*: “A relationship which is within the scope of an expressed action is indeed a differentiation of [the notion of] *kārake*, and that is precisely a relationship between *kārake* and action, having the nature of a general relation in which [however] one does not wish to express any specific feature such as *karman* etc., therefore, it does not presuppose any [*kārake*-action relationship].”³⁹ This seems to contradict Bhartṛhari’s formulation in SāS 156 (ŚA). However, in VPVṛ II.197, replying to what looks like a *pūrvapakṣa*,⁴⁰ Bhartṛhari himself

³⁴ This *sūtra* assigns the designation *apādāna* to someone who speaks (*ākhyāṭ*) when he provides systematic teaching (*upayoga*), as in *upādhyāyād adhī* ‘he learns from the teacher’ (this example is found in MBh I.329.20).

³⁵ The whole issue is briefly recalled by Helārāja in his commentary on SāS 156 (PrPr i.356.10-12).

³⁶ VPVṛ II.198, p. 238, last two lines of the Vṛtti (read *sṛptam* instead of *sṛplām*, which is clearly a misprint).

³⁷ This example is also quoted in PrPr on VP III.7.156 (i.356.13).

³⁸ The last example is taken from MBh on A 2.3.67, *klasya ca vartamāne*, which provides for *śaṣṭhī* to denote the agent of a word ending with the participial suffix *Kta* (= -ta) when the latter is used to denote a present action. This is a prior exception to A 2.3.69 that excludes *Kta* derivatives (among others) from the domain of application of A 2.3.65, *karṭṛkarmanoh kṛti*. However, *sṛp-* is not among the verbs whose past participle can have a present meaning (according to A 3.2.188, *matibuddhipūjārthebhyas ca*, this applies only to verbs having the meaning of *matī* ‘wishing,’ *buddhi* ‘knowing’ and *pūjā* ‘honouring’). Therefore, a vārttika, *klasya ca vartamāne napuṃsake bhāva upasamkhyānam*, extends the application of the rule to neuter action nouns ending in *Kta* (according to A 3.3.114, *napuṃsake bhāve Kta*). However, the following vārttika rejects the suggested emendation maintaining that the desired result is achieved by considering it a case of *śeṣaśaṣṭhī* (I have given only the gist of the discussion in MBh I.468.14-23, omitting a number of details that are not relevant here; for an exhaustive treatment, see Joshi and Roodbergen 1981: 144-47).

³⁹ *śrūyamānakriyāviśayas tu sambandhaḥ kārakabheda eva, avivakṣitakarmādiviśeṣaḥ sambandhasāmānyasvabhāvaḥ kriyākārakasambandha eva sa iti na tatpūrvakaḥ* (PrPr i.356.8-10).

⁴⁰ The *pūrvapakṣa* reads as follows: *mātuḥ smarātīty atra tu dravyasya karmabhāvavivakṣāyām saty api kriyāyāḥ sādhyatve kriyādravyasambandhaḥ kriyāpūrvakaḥ. kriyā hi dvayor arthayor upaśeṣikā....*

clearly affirms that a sentence like *mātuḥ smarati* does not imply any unmentioned action: "It can be ascertained that [in *mātuḥ smarati*] there is no other action the nature of which is not indicated. Moreover, it is indeed [the expressed] action which connects etc.; it does not depend on any other action within it."⁴¹

A possible solution to this seeming contradiction is indicated by Helārāja. Glossing °*kāraḥapūrvakaḥ* "which presupposes [a relation between] a *kāraḥa* (and an action)" in SāS 156, he remarks that "here the word *kāraḥa* conveys the different factors, such as instrument etc., in which one [common] meaning of *kāraḥatva* inheres, but [it does] not [denote] *kāraḥa* as a general notion as well."⁴² However, as he comments in another place of the commentary on the same verse, "the relation called *śeṣa*, which [really] exists in the form of the object etc. and finds a foothold on the very substratum [previously] experienced as a specific [*kāraḥa*] such as *karman* and the like, manifests itself in a form in which the speaker does not intend to express any of the different *kāraḥas* such as *karman* etc."⁴³ One might say, then, that some specific *kāraḥa* is the necessary *notional* antecedent to any *śeṣa* relationship, whether the action is expressed or not, since the Pāṇinīyas tacitly seem to postulate that the six *kāraḥa* categories established by Pāṇini cover the whole semantic range of possible relationships between a substance and an action. From this point of view, one can legitimately say that even noun-verb *śeṣa* relationships are *kriyākāraḥapūrvaka*, namely, logically preceded by a relationship between action and *kāraḥa*.

tasman mātuḥ smaratiṭy atrāpi kriyādravyopaśleṣahetunā kriyāntareṇa bhavitavyam "But here in *mātuḥ smarati*, since the speaker's intention is to convey that the substance [i.e., *mātr*] has the nature of a [grammatical] object, although the action [of remembering] is [still] to be accomplished, the relation between action and substance presupposes an [other] action. For it is action which connects two meanings [and] holds [them] together ... Therefore, also here in *mātuḥ smarati* there must be another action which is the cause of the connection between action and substance" (VPVṛ II.197, p. 237).

⁴¹*nānirdiṣṭarūpakriyāntaram astū śakyam adhyavasātum. api ca kriyāvopaśleṣaṇādikā sā svagataṃ kriyāntaram nāpekṣate* (VPVṛ II.197, p. 237). It is worth quoting the end of the passage, where the above mentioned simile of the ladder is slightly modified to adjust to the new context: *kāṣṭhayaṃ hi jatvādi dravyaṃ saṃśleṣakaṃ bhavati, na tu jatukāṣṭhayaṃ iti* "For it is a material such as gum and the like which holds together two pieces of wood, while there is nothing [holding together] the wood and the gum." Thus, while two *arthas* 'things meant' can be conceptually linked only through an action, the mother and the action of remembering are connected to each other like wood and gum, with no intermediary.

⁴²*kāraḥapūrvaka ity atra ca kāraḥatvaikārthasamavāyinaḥ karaṇādayaḥ sādhanabhedāḥ kāraḥasābdenocyante, na tu kāraḥasāmānyam api* (PrPr i.355, 11-12).

⁴³*śeṣākhyāḥ sambandhaḥ karmādirūpo 'vatiṣṭhamāno 'nubhūtakarmādiviśeṣe svādhāre padam upanibadhnann avivakṣitakarmādbhedarūpam ātmānam uddarśayati* (PrPr i.355.18-19).

II.3. OTHER NON-KĀRAKA RELATIONSHIPS THAT ARE NOT EXPRESSED BY ŚAṢṬHĪ

Furthermore, for Bhartṛhari *all* non-*kāra*ka relationships dealt with in the sūtras prior to A 2.3.50 are also to be subsumed under *śeṣa*. Therefore, they are in principle conveyed by *śaṣṭhī*. However, specific rules – to be regarded as *apavādas* to A 2.3.50 – can prescribe different *vibhaktis* under particular semantic conditions: thus, A 2.3.23, *hetau*, provides for *ṭṛtīyā* instead when a cause is to be conveyed, as in *adhyāyanena vasati* ‘he lives [here] because of his studies’ (see below, note 80).⁴⁴ This interpretation of the Pāṇinian rules that are relevant for the assignment of non-*kāra*ka *vibhaktis* is propounded in VPVṛ II.203, which is worth quoting in full:

Once *anu*, of which the capacity to indicate the action of listening is seen in paraphrase [of *śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvarṣat*]⁴⁵, has specified that the relationship produced by the action of listening is a cause-effect relation⁴⁶ between the action of listening, the form [= the signifier] of which has disappeared, [and the rain], *śaṣṭhī* would have a chance to occur in the sense of *hetu* because it is an additional feature to the meaning of the nominal base [i.e., *saṃhitā*]; and **as an exception to that**, *ṭṛtīyā* would [also] have a chance to occur [instead] to denote ‘cause’, as well as *dvitīyā* according to (A 2.3.8) *karmapravacanīyayukte dvitīyā*.⁴⁷

The same point of view is recalled in the PrPr on Sās 24: “[Cause] is the domain of a non-*kāra*ka declensional ending indicative of a residual relationship, [i.e.] *ṭṛtīyā*, which blocks [the affixation of] *śaṣṭhī* denoting a [general] relationship. [...] of these two, *ṭṛtīyā* occurs to denote a cause where *śaṣṭhī* denoting a residual relationship should obtain.”⁴⁸

⁴⁴ On the relationship between A 2.3.50 and A 2.3.23, see Cardona 1975 (in particular, pp. 269-70 and nn. 32 and 34), in which, however, no mention is made of the passage from the Vṛtti of VP II. 203 that I quote below and where, to my knowledge, this idea is first found.

⁴⁵ “It rained after the recitation of Śākalya.” This example occurs in the MBh on A 1.4.84, *anur lakṣane* (I.346.21). The paraphrase in question is given in the same passage (I.347.3).

⁴⁶ According to A 1.4.84, *anur lakṣane*, the designation *karmapravacanīya* (that continues here from A 1.4.83) is assigned to *anu* when a *lakṣaṇa* is to be denoted. According to the Pāṇinīyas, starting from Patañjali, the word *lakṣaṇa*, which generally means ‘sign, distinctive mark’, is used here in the sense of *hetu* ‘cause’.

⁴⁷ *vākyāntare niśamayatikriyādyotane dṛṣṭasāmarthyenānunā niśamayatikriyājānitasya saṃbandhasya tirobhūtarūpāyā niśamayatikriyāyā hetu hetumatsaṃbandho’yam ity avacchede kṛte prātipadikārtahavyatirekāddhetau śaṣṭhyām prāptāyām tadapavādatvāc ca hetuṭṛtīyāyām karmapravacanīyayukte dvitīyā iti ca dvitīyāyām ...* The Vṛtti then goes on explaining that “since *ṭṛtīyā* in the sense of ‘cause’ would have a chance to occur because it is prescribed by the latter of two rules [i.e., A 2.3.23 vs. A 2.3.8], both having scope [elsewhere], it is indeed *dvitīyā* that occurs, having acquired a different status because of the reiterated prescription [of the designation *karmapravacanīya* to *anu* in A 1.4.84 and A 1.4.90] due to the fact that there is a different reason [for assigning the *saṃjñā*], although [*dvitīyā*] is [assigned by] one and the same rule [i.e., A 2.3.8]” (... *ubhayoḥ sāvakāśayoḥ paratvād hetuṭṛtīyāyāḥ prasāṅge punarārambhān nimittabhede saty ekalakṣaṇāpi kaksyāntara-prāptā dvitīyāiva bhavati* (VPVṛ II.203, p. 240).

⁴⁸ *sa* [i.e., *hetu*] *akāra*ka *vibhakteḥ śeṣalakṣaṇāyā viśayaḥ ṭṛtīyasyāḥ saṃbandhaśaṣṭhibādhi* *kāyāḥ ... tayoḥ saṃbandhe śeṣaśaṣṭhyām prāptāyām hetau ṭṛtīyā* (i.250.22-23, 251.1).

In this way relationships of a causal (*hetu*) or modal (*lakṣaṇa*) nature as well as those signified by *upapadavibhaktis* – with their wide range of meanings – are equally subsumed under *śeṣa*. In this way the digression occurring in SāS 24-27, where some of them – *hetu*, *lakṣaṇa* and *tādarthya* – are discussed, can be explained in the light of its connection with the ŚA. Furthermore, *karmapravacanīyas* are mentioned in SāS 158 (ŚA);⁴⁹ and the so-called comitative, commonly expressed in Sanskrit by *saha* construed with *tṛtīyā*, is hinted at in SāS 162cd.⁵⁰

III. The semantics of *śeṣa* relationships

So far, it has been shown that in Bhartṛhari's view all *śeṣa* relationships possess *kāraṭva* in one way or another. In this respect, that type of *śeṣa* relationship in which the action is directly expressed (*śrūta*) stands apart from the others for, as we saw above, it is unmistakably a *kriyā-kāraṭva* relationship, although it is not specified which kind of *kāraṭva* is actually involved. In fact, this reminds those instances in which a semantic notion usually associated with a certain *kāraṭva* designation is expressly assigned a different *saṃjñā* by one of Pāṇini's rules.⁵¹ Thus, Helārāja remarks that "since *karmaṇi* [in A 2.3.52] or *karāṇe* [in A 2.3.51⁵²] are qualifiers of *śeṣe* ⁵³ on the basis of the status of *karman* etc. [that occurred] in a previous stage [of derivation], it follows that [the 6th *vibhakti* is introduced] to denote a residual relation which is the outcome inherent in the same thing [which used to be] the object etc."⁵⁴ Therefore, according to this interpretation,

⁴⁹ VP III.7.158: *nimittanīyamaḥ śabdāt saṃbandhasya na gṛhyate | karmapravacanīyais tu sa viśeṣo'varudhyate* "The specific cause of the relation is not grasped from its verbal expression. But the particular [underlying action] is circumscribed by *karmapravacanīyas* (pre- and post-positions)". Note that the etymological explanation of this term given in the bhāṣya on 1.4.83, *karmapravacanīyāḥ*, is *karma proktavanta[ḥ]* 'those which [once] denoted action' (MBh I.346.16). Thus, Patañjali's authority can be invoked to maintain that the kind of noun-verb relationship mediated (or rather, in Bhartṛhari's own words, 'circumscribed') by *karmapravacanīyas* is also *kriyākāraṭvapūrvaka* and, therefore, that it has to be subsumed under *śeṣa*.

⁵⁰ VP III.7.162: *prādhānyaṃ svaguṇe labdhvā pradhāne yāti śeṣatām | sahayoge svayoge 'taḥ pradhānatvaṃ na hīyate*.

⁵¹ For example, in A1.4.46-48 what is semantically a substratum (*ādhāra*) of the action is termed *karman* – instead of *adhikaraṇa* – because it occurs with certain verbs listed in these sūtras.

⁵² A 2.3.51 *jñā* 'vidarthasya karāṇe prescribes the 6th *vibhakti* after the instrument (*karāṇa*) of *jñā* – when it is not used in the sense of 'to know'. According to Sharma (1995: 154), "[h]ere *jñā* means 'to proceed, engage in', but to do so on the basis of false knowledge or of a misapprehension"; for instance, "one proceeds with the ritual oblation treating some other substance as if it were ghee".

⁵³ As was pointed out above, according to Patañjali *śeṣa* continues in A 2.3.51-64 (see n. 19 above).

⁵⁴ *karmaṇi karāṇa iti vā bhūtāvasthāgatakarmatvādirūpāśrayeṇa śeṣasya viśeṣaṇāl karmādyekārthasamavāyini phalabhūte śeṣa ity artho 'vatiṣṭhate* (PrPr i.359.19-20).

in the initial stage of the derivation an item is designated *karman* or *karaṇa*; this *saṃjñā* is then superseded by *śeṣa* because of the co-occurrence of one of the verbs listed in the relevant rules.

Proving the *kāraṇatva* of *śeṣa* relationships in which the action is unexpressed requires a more complex argument. A phrase such as *rājñah puruṣaḥ* can be analyzed as *rājā puruṣāya dadāti* to unearth, as it were, the action of giving the means of support that once originated the owner-owned relationship. This kind of semantic analysis is already found in the MBh: after defining *śeṣa* as *karmādinām avivakṣā*, in a rather terse statement Patañjali remarks that “as long as [one can say that somebody is] ‘the king’s servant’, then the king is the agent and the servant is the recipient.”⁵⁵

In the VP Bharṭṛhari re-proposes this analysis giving it a new significance. In a *kārikā* of the second *kāṇḍa* he states: “After generating a relation, an action can cease. Sometimes, a relation is generated while the action is expressed.”⁵⁶ In order to support this view, the Vṛtti on this verse quotes the Saṃgraha, an ancient and authoritative grammatical work which is no longer extant: “In the Saṃgraha one reads, in fact, that there are two types of relation: one in which the word for action is obscured and the one in which the word for action is present. So it says: ‘...two substances have a relationship as if there were an expressed action because [such a relationship] used to be within the scope of an action’.”⁵⁷

In the same passage Bharṭṛhari provides the following illustration of how the semantic analysis of a *śeṣa* relationship can bring to light the underlying action: “Here in *rājñah puruṣaḥ* the core (?) [of the relation] is the action of giving: it generates a relation between the owner and the owned who are the substrata of agency and recipient-hood [respectively] and whose own natures, consisting in the powers of the agent and the recipient, have [now] been obscured.”⁵⁸ Thus, the phrase *rājñah puruṣaḥ* ‘the king’s servant’ denotes an owner-owned relation that originates from an act of giving (a wage, or the means of support) on the king’s (i.e., the

⁵⁵ *tāvad rājñah puruṣa iti rājā kartā puruṣaḥ saṃpradānam* (MBh I.463.11).

⁵⁶ VP II.197: *janayitvā kriyā kā cit sambandham vinivartate | śrūyamāṇe kriyāśabde sambandho jāyate kva cit*. This verse appears in a section of the Vākyakāṇḍa dealing with the classification of speech units and, specifically, with the function of *karmapravacanīyas* (this topic is also dealt with in v. 158 of ŚA, see above, n. 49).

⁵⁷ *dvividho hi sambandhaḥ saṃgrāhe paṭhyate. tirobhūtakriyāpadaḥ sannihitākriyāpadaś* [read °*hitakri*°] *ca. evaṃ hy āha: ... śrūyamāṇakriyāvad dravyayoḥ sambandho viśayabhūtāt kriyāyā iti* (VPVṛ on II.197, Iyer p. 237).

⁵⁸ *tatra rājñah puruṣa iti dadātikriyānikaro bhavati (?) kartṛsaṃpradānādhārayoḥ tirobhūtakartṛsaṃpradānaśaktisvarūpayoś ca svasvāmīnoḥ sambandham upajanayati* (VPVṛ on II.197, Iyer p. 237). The question mark after *bhavati* appears in the printed edition. My translation of the word *nikara* (provided that it is not a corrupt reading) is only tentative, but the uncertainty about its meaning does not affect the understanding of the whole statement.

agent's) part in which the servant acts as the recipient (i.e., the *saṃpradāna*, the one to whom it is given).

More examples of this kind of semantic analysis are provided by Helārāja in the PrPr on SāS 156 (ŚA).⁵⁹ There, for instance, he interprets *paśoḥ pādah* as a part-whole relation (*avayavāvayavibhāva*) presupposing the action of 'residing' (*sthiti*), and *pituh putraḥ* 'the father's son' as a generator-generated relation (*janyajanakabhāva*) originating from the action of 'procreating' (*janana*) (PrPr i).⁶⁰

Going back to *rājñah puruṣah*, once the action of giving is no longer mentioned, the two original *kāraka* roles are absorbed, as it were, into the residual relation,⁶¹ so that instead of the specific *vibhaktis* that denoted them one finds the 6th declensional ending after the subordinate item, the qualifier (the king in *rājñah puruṣah*), and the 1st ending (or any other which is appropriate in the context) after the principal item, the qualified (here, *puruṣah*). For, as is pointed out in SāS 157 (ŚA),⁶² although a relation necessarily involves two terms and therefore it is *dviṣṭha*, it is verbally conveyed only by the ending of the subordinate term, the qualifier, since the main term, the qualified, stands, as it were, on its own.

Thus, with regard to phrases like *rājñah puruṣah*, Helārāja remarks: "actions such as giving etc., which are inferred because they cannot be accounted for in any other way but through their effect, namely, the relation [itself], are indeed proximate (*saṃnihitā[h]*)."⁶³ Clearly, by the word

⁵⁹ See PrPr i. 355.4-5.

⁶⁰ See also the Ṭikā on VP II.197, where an analogous semantic analysis of the phrase *rājñah puruṣah* is presented. Interestingly, here the author employs slightly different terms: *rājñah puruṣo 'yaṃ yasmāt sa rājā puruṣam bibharti, ato bharaṇalakṣaṇā kriyā āśrayāśrayibhāvalakṣaṇam sambandham janayitvā nivṛtā* "... the king supports the servant, therefore that is the king's servant; therefore, after generating a relationship defined as a connection between supporter and supported, the action of supporting has ceased" (VKT 197, p. 84). On the authorship of the Ṭikā, Aklujkar (1993: 23 and n. 13) maintains that the "ṭikā available at present should be considered a shortened version of Helārāja's as yet lost commentary on that kāṇḍa", possibly written by Puṇyarāja.

⁶¹ In Helārāja's words: *tataś ca rājāpuruṣayor dātṛtvasaṃpradānatve eva [sic] phalāvasthāyām anudriktasvasvarūpe sāmānyarūpeṇa sambandha iti vyapadeśam arhataḥ* "the status of giver and that of recipient that exist in the king and in the servant [at the time of original action], the respective forms of which are indistinct in the state that is the outcome [of that action], can be legitimately defined as a 'relationship' on the basis of the general notion [of *kāraṇatva*]" (PrPr i.355.19-20).

⁶² *dviṣṭho 'py asau parārthatvād guṇeṣu vyatiricyate | latrābhidhīyamānaḥ san pradhāne 'py upayujyate* "Although this [relationship] is based on both [related items], it is evident in the subordinate because the latter is dependent. Being expressed there, it is also associated with the main [item]".

⁶³ *sambandhalakṣaṇakāryānyathānupapattyānumīyamānās ca dānādikriyāḥ saṃnihitā eveti* (PrPr i.356.3-4). The commentary then continues as follows: "by means of them, the close association of the two relata is explained, and also the relation that is the outcome is indeed based on the

saṃnihita here Helārāja does not intend the usual notion of contiguity (*saṃnidhi*) of words in a sentence, but rather contiguity of a conceptual order. In this respect, we may compare Bhartṛhari's use of the word *saṃnidhi* in VP II.301: "In the same way, when a certain meaning is meant to be conveyed, a word too illuminates also an unintended meaning because of its [i.e., the latter's] *contiguity*."⁶⁴ If I understand the purport of this *kārikā* correctly, Bhartṛhari means to say that the unintended meanings, namely, those that are not directly conveyed by any lexical items – for instance, the activities of the various *kāraka* or non-*kāraka* items mentioned in the utterance – are conceptually proximate in the awareness of the speaker (as well as of the listener, insofar as they speak the same language).

It appears, then, that for Bhartṛhari *śeṣa* relationships may be equated to *kāraḥ* since they too presuppose a connection of the entity involved with an activity that is logically contiguous to – i.e., congruent with – the main verbalized action. The difference between *kāraka* and *śeṣa* would consist, then, in the degree of contiguity (*saṃnidhi*) of the respective activities with the main action. This has to do with the denotative power of words. Thus, for example, the verb *pacati* has certain established distinctive features in Sanskrit so that, on hearing a sentence such as *devadatta edhaiḥ sthālyām odanaṃ pacati* "Devadatta cooks the rice in the pot with firewood", any Sanskrit speaker immediately understands which role a *karman* like *odana*, or a *kāraka* like *edha*, and so on, play in the action denoted by *pacati*, namely, the activities they perform that contribute towards accomplishing that action. As is known, this kind of semantic analysis already appears in the MBh on A 1.4.23, in particular, *vārttikas* 7-10 and the *bhāṣyas* thereon, which presuppose an example like the sentence quoted above.

In the Grammarians' view, action is a mentally-constructed process comprised of several constituent or intermediate actions.⁶⁵ These correspond to the activities of the entities that contribute towards accomplishing the core action. In linguistic terms, this action is denoted by the main verb, while the factors of its accomplishment are designated by nominals having a *kāraka* relationship with it.⁶⁶

property of being a *kāraka* – like a *karman* (or any other *kāraka*) – which has an action as its cause" (*tanmukhena saṃanvayoḥ pāṭiḥ sambandhinoḥ phalasyāpi ca sambandhasya kriyānimittatvaṃ kārakatvanibandhanam asty eva karmaṇa iveti....*).

⁶⁴ *tathā śabdo 'pi kasmimś cit pratyāyē 'rthe vivakṣite | avivakṣitam apy arthaṃ prakāśayati saṃnidheḥ.*

⁶⁵ *avāntaravyāpāra* (see e.g., PrPr on VP III.7.18, i.246.10, and III.7.20, i.247.18; and Kaiyaṭa's *Mahābhāṣya-Pradīpā* II.246a).

⁶⁶ Note that even in grammatical literature the term *kāraka*, designating the syntactical relationship with the verb, is also loosely used to denote the entity involved in that relationship.

Any Sanskrit verb denotes an activity that has either the *kartṛ* or the *karman* as its substratum.⁶⁷ Nonetheless, the semantic scope of certain verbs necessarily encompasses the activities pertaining to other *kāraṅkas*.⁶⁸ For instance, apart from the *kartṛ* and the *karman* a verb like *chinatti* logically implies the activity of a sharp-edged cutting *karāṇa*, even if this is not mentioned; verbs of giving like *dadāti* demand – or rather, expect, as the Grammarians would put it – a *saṃpradāna*, a recipient; verbs of ‘parting’ (*apāya*) require an *apādāna*, and so on.

Clearly, some verbs have no expectation for certain *kāraṅkas*, which may therefore be present or not and are better considered redundant features of the verb meaning. For example, from a sentence like *devadatta odanaṃ rājñe pacati*, one understands that the king is going to be the final recipient of the rice since the 4th *viḍhakti* (*caturthī*) after *rājan* identifies him as a *saṃpradāna*, “the one whom the agent intends as a goal through the object”⁶⁹ according to Pāṇini’s definition; thus, in Bhartṛhari’s words, the king’s activity can be characterized as *anirākaraṇa* ‘not refusing’ and *preraṇa* ‘soliciting, inducing’ or *anumati* ‘consenting’.⁷⁰ Still, had the king not been mentioned, his absence would not be felt, that is, the sentence would not sound incomplete.

As for *śeṣa* relationships, they are further removed from the semantic scope of the main verb or, in other words, their semantic connection with the verbalized action is contextual, not intrinsic. If the sentence mentioned above is modified, for example, to include a qualifier of *odana*, so that we get the new sentence *devadatto rājñā odanaṃ pacati* “Devadatta is cooking the king’s rice”, one understands that the rice being cooked belongs to the king, but clearly here the king has no activity that could be considered

⁶⁷ See the following remark by Helārāja in his commentary on Sās 1: *kartṛkarmasthā tu pradhānakriyā karaṇādīnām āśrayāntarasamavetā* “the principal action resides in the agent and/or the object, [whereas the action] of the instrument etc. inheres in a different substratum” (PrPr i.231.24).

⁶⁸ Thus, although the Pāṇinīyas regard action (i.e., the verb signifying it) as the main syntactic element in the sentence, they recognize that there is in fact mutual semantic dependence between verbs and nouns, as Bhartṛhari remarks in VP II.430-431a-c: *ākhyātapadavācye ’rthe sādhanopanibandhane | vinā sattuābhidhānena nākāṅkṣā vinivartate; prādhānyāt tu kriyā pūrvam arthasya pravibhajyate | sādhyaprayuktāny aṅgāni* “As the meaning expressed by a verb form is dependent on the factors of action, expectation does not cease until words denoting existents are used; but, because it is the main item, the action is analyzed first from the meaning [of the sentence], [while] the auxiliary items are used for [the action] to be brought about.”

⁶⁹ A 1.4.32, *karmanā yam abhipraiti sa saṃpradānam*.

⁷⁰ See the first verse of the *Sampradānādhikāra*, Sās 129: *anirākaraṇāt kartus tyāgāṅgam karmanepsitam | preraṇānumatibhyām ca labhate saṃpradānatām* “That constituent in [the act of] relinquishing that the agent intends to attain through the object acquires the status of *saṃpradāna* because there is no refusal [on his part], but [rather] either induction or consent.”

a constituent activity of cooking as denoted by *pac-* and the rice might ultimately be served to someone else (for instance, to the brahmins being fed on a special occasion).

In this respect we may say, in Helārāja's words, that the original "relation between action and *kāraṇa* has become the cause (*kāraṇa*), while the *śeṣa* relation is its result (*phala*). For the relation between action and *kāraṇa* that existed (*ṛttatā*) [earlier] in its substratum ends once it is incorporated into the residual relation which is its result... But at the time of the *śeṣa* relation, there is no [direct] cognition of specific roles such as agent and the like. Thus, [only] a general *kāraṇatva* subsists, which is the residual [again, *śeṣa*!] of that"⁷¹ previous action-*kāraṇa* relation.⁷²

From the vantage point of semantics, this explains why Bhartṛhari subsumes all non-*kāraṇa* relationships under the notion of *śeṣa*. The crucial feature shared by all such relationships is precisely that the activities of the nominal items involved are outside the semantic scope of the verb denoting the main action. Thus, with regard to *hetu* 'cause' in the *laukika* sense of the word – as opposed to its *pāribhāṣika* sense of 'causal agent'⁷³ – in SāS 24 Bhartṛhari remarks that according to the Grammarians a causal factor (*nimitta*) is a *hetu* in the common sense when the speaker has no recourse to its activity (*anāśrite ... vyāpāre*).⁷⁴ In a previous *kārikā* of the SāS he had stated that "for the sake of assistance [in the accomplishment of actions], one has recourse to the causal nature (*nimittabhāva*) of entities", so that a *sādhana* is by definition something *siddha*, 'established' in its own nature and endowed with such a capacity to bring about actions.⁷⁵ It follows, then,

⁷¹ PrPr on SāS 156: *tatra kriyākāraṇasambandhaḥ kāraṇabhūtaḥ śeṣasambandhas tu phalabhūtaḥ. kriyākāraṇasambandho hi ṛttatā svāśraye śeṣasambandham phalam nivesyoparamate ... śeṣasambandhakāle tu kartrādiviśeṣarūpatānavagama iti taccheṣabhūtaṁ sāmānyam kāraṇatavam avatiṣṭhate* (i.355.7-10).

⁷² Interestingly, here Helārāja seems to attach new semantic significance to the word *śeṣa* suggesting that it collectively refers to non-*kāraṇa* relationships not only because the bulk of Pāṇini's rules prior to A 2.3.50 leaves them out (the original sense of *śeṣa* in the grammatical literature), but also because they represent what is left of a previous *kāraṇa* relationship between an action (e.g., *dadāti*) and the entities (e.g., *rājan* and *puruṣa*) that contribute towards bringing it about.

⁷³ On the affinity between the two kinds of *hetu*, however, see below.

⁷⁴ VP III.7.24ab: *anāśrite tu vyāpāre nimittam hetur iṣyate* "However, [that which acts as] the cause [of an action] when there is no recourse to its activity is considered a *hetu*." The use of the verb *iṣyate*, literally 'is desired', indicates that this is the accepted view, the *siddhānta*, among the Grammarians.

⁷⁵ VP III.7.14: *nimittabhāvo bhāvānām upakārārtham āśritaḥ | natir āvarjanety evam siddhaḥ sāadhanam iṣyate* "For the sake of assistance [in the accomplishment of actions], one has recourse to the causal nature of entities, as if this were a kind of inclination or surrender. Being such, something established [in its own nature] is acknowledged as a factor of action." Note again the use of *iṣyate* (see the preceding note).

that an entity acting as a *kāraka* and one serving as a cause are both *nimittas* 'causal factors' in a broad sense, but only the former is spoken of as performing a function which is somehow a constituent activity of the main action.⁷⁶

In this connection it is worth noting that Helārāja provides an illustration of how causal relations can be semantically explained in such a way as to bring out the action that originated them, not unlike that provided by Patañjali and Bhartṛhari for *rājñah puruṣaḥ*. Thus, in his commentary on SāS 25ab,⁷⁷ he first gives a few examples of *hetus*, among them *dhanena kulam* 'a prestigious family because of its wealth', *kanyayā śokaḥ* 'grief because of girl' and *vidyayā yaśaḥ* 'fame due to learning', and then he analyzes them as follows:

The relation of the family with wealth is generated by the action of prospering (*sampattikriyāprabhāvitah*). The renown of the family is, in fact, produced by wealth. In this case, wealth, the activity of which has ceased, is the cause of the family[']s prestige] because of its general ability (*yogyatāmātrāt*) [to produce prestige]. Therefore, a 3rd *vibhakti* denoting a cause is affixed [to *dhana*], blocking the 6th *vibhakti* that signifies a [general] residual relation. And equally a girl is [the cause] of her father's grief through the action of being born. Likewise, learning, which is certainly achieved by a celebrated [scholar], is the cause of his fame: here, the residual relation originates from the action of achieving.⁷⁸

All the phrases quoted above may be independent sentences in themselves – assuming, as the Sanskrit grammarians do, that *asti* is to be supplied (e.g., 'there is grief for [the birth of] a girl' etc.) – or they may be embedded in a larger utterance. The same holds for *rājñah puruṣaḥ* and the like, of course. In both cases, the action connecting the two nominals is no longer in the foreground, as it were, and therefore, according to Bhartṛhari, the resulting relationship is *śeṣa*.

This explains why *hetu* in the non-technical sense of 'cause' is not a *kāraka*. There is a logical connection, of course, between the cause and its effect. However, the action that links them is neither directly nor indirectly signified by any lexical item, but it is to be inferred from the sentence as a whole as well as from the larger context. And this also explains why there is

⁷⁶ Here, again, Helārāja's remark in the introductory lines of his commentary on SāS 24 is particularly enlightening: *kriyāsādhanaśamarthaṃ apy anāśritavyāpāraṃ hetur eveti* "a cause is something the activity of which is not resorted to [in an utterance] although it is capable of bringing about the action" (PrPr i.255.17).

⁷⁷ VP III.7.25ab: *dravyādiviśayo hetuḥ kārakaṃ niyatakriyam* "A cause has substance etc. as its domain, [whereas] a *kāraka* is confined to action."

⁷⁸ *dhanena saha sampattikriyāprabhāvitah kulasya sambandhaḥ. kulasya hi dhanena prasiddhir upajanyate tatra coparatavyāpāraṃ dhanam yogyatāmātrāt kulasya hetur iti śeṣaśaṭhībādhikayā hetuṣṭīyayā samyujyate. kanyāpi janayituḥ śokasya jananakriyādvāreṇa. vidyāpi yaśasvinā prāpyamāṇaiva yaśaso hetur iti prāptikriyājanīto 'tra śeṣasambandhaḥ* (PrPr i.255.19-256.1).

such a close affinity between *hetu* in the *laukika* sense of ‘cause’ and *hetu* in the *pāribhāṣika* sense of ‘causal agent.’ The latter’s activity – just like that of the *laukika* cause – is not part of the denotatum of the root, it is signified by *NiC*. In fact, Bhartrhari describes the causal agent in rather vague terms as *preṣaṇādhyeṣaṇe kurvams tatsamarthāni cācaran* “urging or requesting [others to act] and providing the necessary for something [to be done].”⁷⁹ It is not surprising, therefore, that a *laukika* cause can be easily turned into a *pāribhāṣika* cause, i.e., a *kāraka*, even in connection with one and the same event, as shown by Helārāja with the following example in his commentary on SāS 26: *adhyayanena vasati* ‘he lives [here] because of his studies’, *adhyayanam vāsayati* “his studies make him live [here].”⁸⁰

IV. Formal and non-formal

To summarize what has been said so far: each *śeṣa* relation hides a little story of its own, as it were, that can be easily brought to light, as I have shown, through a kind of non-formal semantic analysis. Both Bhartrhari and Helārāja give many examples of such semantic analysis. But as far as the grammatical procedure is concerned, Bhartrhari sticks to Pāṇini’s method that consists in introducing affixes after verbal and nominal bases under certain semantic and/or formal conditions within the boundaries of individual sentences. Neither the larger linguistic context, nor the extra-linguistic factors that nonetheless contribute towards determining the sense⁸¹ of an utterance are taken into consideration. Thus, the initial string of any *prakriyā* already contains all the necessary information to derive the final sentence, as Houben has convincingly shown in a recent article;⁸² vice

⁷⁹ VP III.7.125ab. The second line emphasizes that *grammatically* this is indeed an agent: *kartaiva vihitām śāstre hetusaṃjñāṃ prapadyate* (125 cd.). The need to stress such an obvious fact is due, I think, precisely to the acknowledgement that the causal agent is not so directly involved in the action as other *kāraṅkas*. On the notion of *hetu* in Pāṇini’s grammar, see Cardona 1971.

⁸⁰ PrPr i.256.22 and 257.7-8.

⁸¹ Its *śābdabodha* ‘verbal cognition’ as opposed to its denotation: see Cardona 1975, in particular p. 260.

⁸² According to Houben (1999), the starting point of any derivation in Pāṇini’s grammar is a “*provisional statement*, namely, the provisional statement which the user [of the grammar, VV] has in mind” (p. 40; italics in the text). Thus, he summarizes the results of his discussion of various earlier interpretations of Pāṇini’s system of grammar saying that this can be regarded as based on a four-level model: “level 1: semantics, pragmatics, INTENTIONALITY (*artha*, *prakaraṇa*, VIVAKṢĀ); level 2: abstract syntax; level 3: morphological representations; level 4: phonological representations” (p. 46 [this is arranged in a diagram by Houben; capital letters in the text]); and he adds: “While levels 2 - 4 can be considered formal or grammatical systems, level 1 is principally non-formal and not formalizable. This does not mean that there would be some principal or theoretical reason why the choices of the speaker/user are unrelatable to

versa the analysis of an utterance must take into account only the words actually used by the speaker.

This principle is clearly affirmed, for example, in Sās 77, in which Bhartṛhari objects to the grammatical evaluation of causative verb forms and of certain roots governing a double object by means of what he calls *bhedavākya*, 'paraphrases':

bhedavākyaṃ tu yaṇ ṇyante nīduhiprakṛtau ca yat |
śabdāntaratvān naivāsti saṃsparśas tasya dhātunā ||

Because it consists of different words, however, that which is [in fact] a paraphrase of causative stems as well as of the [underived] roots *nī-* and *duh-* has no connection whatsoever with the verbal base.

In his commentary to this verse Helārāja gives some examples: *dogdhi* 'he milks [the cow]' = *kṣarantīm kṣārayati* = *gām kṣarantīm prayuṅkte* 'he makes the yielding [cow] yield [milk]' and *gamayati* = *gacchantam prayuṅkte* 'he prompts [to go] the one who is going'; and a few lines below he explains in very clear terms what is meant by the *kārikā*. It is worth quoting the passage in full here for it compares this kind of discursive (and, therefore, grammatically inappropriate) semantic analysis with that of *śeṣa* relationships:

Indeed, this [kind of analytical sentence] is not really the verb meaning; it is [rather] a description of the mere meaning [of the verb] made without pushing it too far, just as in the case of *rājapuruṣa* etc. [the analytical sentence is:] *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*. Thus, in the analytical sentence *gacchantam prayuṅkte* 'he prompts the one who is going' there is the explicit mention of the impelled agent, [while] from a causative verb-form such as *gamayati* it is just the impelled agent's action that is cognised.⁸³ However, the *prayojya* can be denoted by his own specific term, [e.g.] in '*devadattam [gamayati]*'. And if the paraphrase is far removed in the case of a causative verb-form, the distance is even greater in the case of *nī-* etc., for here no sentence-meaning is denoted by the verbal base (*dhātūpādāna*).⁸⁴

However, the discursive kind of semantic analysis is relevant to epistemology. In fact, different verbal renderings of the same event in the external world are due to a different segmentation of reality on the part of individual speakers. However, as Houben remarks in the article quoted

pragmatic, socio-linguistic, and/or psychological conditions, but only that Pāṇini's system leaves the choice to the speaker/user in the relevant cases" (p. 47).

⁸³ Thus, according to Helārāja, semantically the two phrases *gacchantam prayuṅkte* and *gamayati* are not exactly equivalent, although they might refer to the same external event, since the verb form *gamayati* provides no definite information about the *prayojya* or causee himself, but only about his action (*gam-*).

⁸⁴ *na hy eṣo dhātūvarthaḥ paramārthataḥ adūraviprakarṣeṇārthamātrakathanam etat. yathā rājapuruṣādaḥ rājñāḥ puruṣa ityādi. tathā hi gacchantam prayuṅkte ityādaḥ vākyaḥ prayojyakartur nīdarśanam gamayati ityādaḥ ṇyante prayojyakriyāmātram pratiyate. prayojyas tu svaśabdopādāno devadattam iti. yatra caitad bhedavākyaṃ vidūram ṇyante tatra nayatyādīnām sutarām vidūratā. na hy atra vākyaārtho dhātūpādānaḥ kaścit* (PrPr i. 293.8-12).

above,⁸⁵ these preliminary cognitive choices made by the speaker escape formalization in Pāṇini's grammar (and, I suspect, in any grammar). This means that they can only be unveiled a posteriori through a non-formal – i.e., contextual – analysis of the semantic content of an utterance because they are already encoded *as such* in the initial sequence of its derivation. Therefore, the difference in verbal expression is caused by a more primordial kind of *vivakṣā* than the one involved in the selection of derivational alternatives (e.g., active vs. passive construction). This view is conveyed by several statements in the VP. See for example, VP III.7.2: *śaktimātrāsamūhasya viśvasyānekadharmanah | sarvadā sarvathā bhāvāt kvacit kimcid vivakṣyate*, in which Bhartṛhari affirms that according to the circumstances a speaker will choose to present one aspect or the other of reality.

Similarly, the possibility of 'raising' a non-agent to the status of agent – as in the famous examples, *asiś chinatti*, *sthāli pacati*, and the like – is a matter of *vivakṣā* on a cognitive level, which Bhartṛhari would consider the level of inner speech.⁸⁶ It is evident, in fact, that *asiś chinatti* is not a derivational alternative to *devadattaḥ asinā chinatti*, although it may very well be employed to speak about the same event, but a cognitive variant which is dictated by the individual speaker's personal circumstances and contingent needs. As is remarked in SāS. 104:

*ekasya buddhyavasthābhir bhede ca parikalpate |
kartṛtvaṃ karaṇatvaṃ ca karmatvaṃ copajāyate ||*

The status of agent or instrument or object of one and the same [entity] arises when difference is conceived [in it] according to [various] states of the mind.

Similarly, speakers normally assume that their listeners share their experience and knowledge of the surrounding world. Thus, they can use the phrase *rājñah puruṣah* without specifying how the king and the servant got related to each other in the first place because the semantic content of this phrase is obvious for them on the basis of the larger linguistic and extra-linguistic context. However, all that a Pāṇinīya can affirm from a grammatical point of view about a *śeṣa* relationship is precisely that there is a relationship, originating from an activity the precise nature of which can only be arrived at through a discursive kind of semantic analysis since it is not denoted by the main verb.

⁸⁵ See n. 82 above.

⁸⁶ See Aklujkar (2000: in particular pp. 5-7) on the correlation – or rather, identity – that Bhartṛhari establishes between *madhyamā vāc* (that Aklujkar renders as 'language₂', the 'lower' level of inner language) and *jñāna* 'cognition,' and between *paśyanlī* (the 'higher' level of 'language₃') and *buddhi* 'mind, intellect.'

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All Words Denote the Universal (jāti): Bhartrhari's Approach

YOSHIE KOBAYASHI

The third kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya deals with word meanings fictitiously posited through abstraction (*apoddhārapadārtha*). A universal (*jāti*) and substance (*dravya*) are among them. There are two traditional views about the word meaning: One is the view, ascribed to Vājapyāyana, that a word denotes a universal; and the other is the view, ascribed to Vyāḍi, that a word denotes a substance.¹ Bhartrhari takes up these views in the Jāṭisamuddeśa and the Dravyasamuddeśa respectively. Here, our concern is to consider Bhartrhari's treatment of the thesis that a word denotes a universal, making clear what his denotation theory is.

1. Bhartrhari's theory of denotation

Bhartrhari expounds his own denotation theory in the Guṇasamuddeśa. Let us begin by considering his statements in the Guṇasamuddeśa which pertain to his denotation theory.

§1.1. DENOTATION THEORY IN THE GUṆASAMUDDEŚA

§§1.1.1

In the Guṇasamuddeśa, Bhartrhari refers to his theory of denotation in connection with the question of how the introduction of affixes for

¹ According to Kātyāyana, Vājapyāyana holds the view that a word denotes a universal and Vyāḍi holds the view that it denotes a substance. Vt.35 on A1.2.64: *ākṛtyabhidhānād vaikaṃ vibhaktau vājapyāyanah*// Vt. 48 on A1.2.64: *dravyābhidhānaṃ vyāḍih*/

excellence (*atiśāyana*, *prakarṣa*), such as *tarap* and *tamap*,² is to be accounted for. He states:

*dravyasyāvyapadeśasya ya upādīyate guṇaḥ/
bhedako vyapadeśāya tatprakarṣo 'bhidhīyate'// (VP 3.5.2)
arūpaṃ pararūpeṇa dravyam ākhyāyate yathā/
aprakarṣaṃ prakarṣeṇa guṇasyāviśyate tathā// (VP 3.5.9)*

A quality which is a differentiator is adopted for the purpose of denoting a substance which cannot be expressed by itself. It is the excellence of such a quality that is denoted [by an affix for excellence].

Just as a substance which has no form is expressed through a form which is different from the substance, so also, a substance, which [in itself] has no excellence, acquires excellence through that of a quality.

What is to be noticed here is that Bhartṛhari considers the question precisely on the basis of his denotation theory. According to the former *kārikā*, a substance cannot be verbalized by itself; in order to be expressed, it requires a quality (*guṇa*). And according to the latter *kārikā*, a substance, which has no form in itself, is denoted with the help of a certain form which is different from the substance (*pararūpa*). What is meant by the term *rūpa* 'form' in this *kārikā* is nothing but what is meant by the term *guṇa* in the preceding *kārikā*.³

§§1.1.2. *dravya* and *guṇa*

What is more, the denotation theory, it is to be noted, involves two essential factors: *dravya* (substance) and *guṇa* (quality). Bhartṛhari defines them as follows:

*vastūpalakṣaṇaṃ yatra sarvanāma prayujyate /
dravyam ity ucyate so 'rtho bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ // (VP 3.4.3)
saṃsargi bhedakaṃ yad yat savyāpāraṃ pratiyate /
guṇatvaṃ paratantratvāt tasya śāstra udāhṛtam // (VP 3.5.1)*

An object, with reference to which a demonstrative pronoun referring to a thing is used and which is intended to be conveyed as something to be differentiated [by a quality], is called *dravya*.

Whatever is connected [with a certain thing] and differentiates that thing [from others] is, being dependent, regarded as *guṇa* when it activates the function [of differentiating]. This is what has been illustrated in grammar.

According to Bhartṛhari, something that is intended to be conveyed as what is to be differentiated (*bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ*) is called *dravya*, and something that is connected with a certain thing (*saṃsargin*) and differentiates that thing from others (*bhedaka*) is called *guṇa*.

² A 5.3.55: *atiśāyane tamabīṣṭhanau* / A 5.3.57: *dvivacanavibhajyopapade tarabīyasunau //*

³ In his *Prakāśa* on VP 3.5.9 Helārāja glosses the word *nirūpa* 'formless' with the term *nirupādhi* 'adjunct-less'. Bhartṛhari uses the terms *upādhi* and *guṇa* synonymously to refer to what qualifies a substance, although the latter tends to be used in an ontological sense, while the former as a semantic term.

In this connection it is noticeable that comparison is made in VP 3.5.9 between the denotation of a substance and the excellence of a substance. In his Vākyapadīya Bhartṛhari repeatedly states that for the denotation of the excellence of a certain thing it is absolutely necessary to posit something differentiated from the thing and connected with it.⁴ This is because he thinks that anything necessarily exceeds all other things of the same class to which it belongs exclusively on the basis of that with which it is connected (*samsargin*).⁵

Consider the following expressions: *śuklataṛaḥ paṭaḥ* '[this] cloth is whiter [than that cloth]' and *śuklataram asya rūpam* 'this has a whiter color'. From the former the excellence of the cloth in question with reference to the quality white is understood, while from the latter the excellence of the quality white with reference to its brightness (*bhāsvaratā*) is understood. We immediately recognize that, in the expression *śuklataṛaḥ paṭaḥ*, in order to convey excellence in the substance cloth, the quality white is resorted to; and that, in the expression *śuklataram asya rūpam*, in order to convey excellence in the quality white, the property brightness which is connected with this quality is resorted to.⁶ We have to note that, in this latter expression, the quality white is taken in isolation from the substance (*dravyān niṣkṛṣṭaḥ*) and hence considered as something independent (*svatantra*), so that it is precisely what behaves like a substance (*dravyāyamāṇa*).⁷

Now consider the following sentences: *ayaṃ śuklaḥ* 'this is white' and *paṭasya śuklaḥ* 'the white color of the cloth'. In the former, in order to convey the substance as something white, the quality white, which is connected with it, is resorted to. In the latter sentence by which one intends to express the quality white as something related to the cloth, however, the universal whiteness, which is connected with this quality, is resorted to, since in this case the quality in question behaves like a substance.⁸

⁴ See VP 1.64-65: *sāmānyam āsṛitaṃ yad yad upamānopameyayoḥ / tasya tasyopamāneṣu dharmo'nyo vyatiricyate // guṇaḥ prakarṣahetur yaḥ svātantryeṇopadiśyate / tasyāśrītād guṇād eva prakṛṣṭatvaṃ pralīyate //* VP 3.14.454-455: *yathā prakarṣaḥ sarvatra nimittāntarahetukaḥ/dravyavad guṇaśabde'pi sa nimittam apekṣate // yo ya uccāryate śabdaḥ sa svarūpanibandhanaḥ / yathā tathopamāneṣu vyapekṣā na nivartate //*

⁵ VP 3.5.6: *sarvaṃ ca sarvalo'vaśyaṃ niyameṇa prakṛṣyate / samsarginā nimittena niḥkṛṣṭenādhikena vā //*

⁶ Prakāśa on VP 3.14.454 (453 in Iyer's edn.): *śuklataṛaḥ paṭa iti svasamavāyīśuklaguṇahetuko 'tiśayaḥ / evaṃ yadāsau śuklo guṇo 'tiśayavattvena vivakṣyate tadā dravyāyamāṇaḥ svaśabdenābhīhito bhāsvaratādīsvagatanimittāpekṣas tathocyate śuklataram asya rūpam iti //*

⁷ Prakāśa on VP 3.5.3: *yathā ca nirupādhisto dravyasya prakarṣo nāsti tathā dravyān niṣkṛṣṭasya svatantrasya guṇasyāpi śuklataram rūpam iti svataḥ prakarṣo nāsti, api tu tadavasthāyāṃ dravyāyamāṇatvād guṇasyāparasamsargidharmāntaranimitta eva prakarṣa ityāha /* The property of being independent (*svātantrya*) is one of the characteristics of a substance. See fn. 10.

⁸ A quality is differentiated from other qualities by its universal, so that it is regarded as a substance with respect to its own universal. Prakāśa on VP 3.4.3: *guṇa api sāmānyaviśiṣṭa ucyamāṇa dravyaṃ padārtha ... /* Vṛṣabha gives the example *śuklaḥ paṭasya* in order to illustrate the case

Thus in the comparison it is clearly shown that Bhartṛhari assumes that at the semantic level the status of being a substance and that of being a quality are not fixed, so that what is a quality with respect to a certain substance becomes a substance with respect to another quality. In this connection it will be useful to quote the following *kārikā*:

*dravyadharmā padārthe tu dravye sarvo'rtha ucyate/
dravyadharmāśrayād dravyam ataḥ sarvo'rtha iṣyate // (VP 3.1.13)*

On the other hand, in the view that a word meaning is a substance, it is said that every word meaning has the property of a substance (*dravyadharman*). Consequently, it is admitted by resorting to the property of a substance that any word meaning is a substance.

What is considered to have the property of a substance is: something that is to be differentiated (*bhedyabhāva*);⁹ something capable of being referred to by demonstrative pronouns such as *idam* 'this' and *tad* 'that' (*idam tad iti pratyavamarśayogyatvam*); something that has already been brought to completion (*pariniṣpannatā*); something that is viewed as independent compared to a *guṇa* (*svātantrya*); something that is connected with gender and number (*liṅgaśaṅkhyāyoga*).¹⁰ Thus, insofar as they have the properties of a substance as described above, a universal, a quality, and an action are also considered as substances. And when they are treated as substances, it goes without saying, things different from and connected with them have to be posited as qualities.

We should notice that Bhartṛhari distinguishes between two kinds of substances. Helārāja describes one substance as being on the verbal level (*sāmvyavahārikam dravyam*) and the other as being on the ultimate level (*pāramārthikam dravyam*). The substance discussed just above is the former.¹¹ The latter will be considered in §1.2.

§§1.1.3.

From the above we see that Bhartṛhari views a substance and a quality as relative to each other. As is suggested in VP 3.5.2, what is called *guṇa* in relation to what is called *dravya* serves as the cause of the verbalization of the latter. There can be no doubt that Bhartṛhari bases this idea on what Kātyāyana states in his *vārttika* on A 5.1.119, which runs as follows:

Vt. 5 on A 5.1.119: *siddham tu yasya guṇasya bhāvād dravye śabdaniveśas tadabhidhāne tvatalau /*

where one intends to express a quality as something independent (*svātantrya*). Paddhati on Vṛtti ad VP 1.64: *tadāśrītatvam svātantryeṇāpi vivakṣite guṇe 'sti [iti] śuklaḥ paṭasyetyavacchinatti ... /*

⁹ VP 3.11.5: *asvatantre svatantratvam paradharmo yathā guṇe / abhedye bhedyabhāvo 'pi dravyadharman lathā guṇe / /*

¹⁰ Prakāśa on VP 3.1.13: *tatra dravyadharmā idam tad iti pratyavamarśayogyatvam, pariniṣpannatā, svātantryam, liṅgaśaṅkhyāyogaś cetyevamādayaḥ /*

¹¹ Prakāśa on VP 3.2.1: *dravyam ca dvividham, pāramārthikam sāmvyavahārikam ca / tatra dvitīyam bhedyabhedakaprastāveṇa guṇasamuddheṣe vakṣyate vastūpalakṣaṇam yatra ityādinā /*

However, this is established. A word is applied to a substance on the basis of the presence of a certain quality [in that substance]; the *taddhita* affixes *tva* and *tal* are used to convey the quality.

Here Kātyāyana clearly states that the application of a word to a substance is determined by the presence of a quality in that substance.¹²

All this makes clear the following: It forms the core of Bhartṛhari's denotation theory that a word denotes a substance, which is posited as what is intended to be conveyed as something to be differentiated from others, in relation to a quality, which is posited as a differentiator of such a substance.

§1.2. DENOTATION THEORY IN THE DRAVYASAMUDDĒŚA

The Dravyasamuddeśa is meant for the establishment of the thesis that all words denote the Substance, Brahman as the ultimate reality. He states:

*satyaṃ vastu tadākārair asatyair avadhāryate /
asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaiḥ satyaṃ evābhidhīyate //* (VP 3.2.2)

The real entity is determined through its forms which are unreal. It is the real entity that is denoted by words through unreal adjuncts.

According to Bhartṛhari, the Substance Brahman is denoted by words through its unreal adjuncts. It is to be noted that, when he tries to establish the thesis, the function carried out by a quality has to be naturally replaced by the function of an adjunct, from his monistic point of view.

Bhartṛhari illustrates this denotation theory as follows: Someone says *ado devadattasya grhaṃ yatrāsau kākāḥ prativasati* 'That is Devadatta's house, on which that crow is sitting'. Here, the word *grha* 'house' is applied to Devadatta's house itself on account of the crow which is an impermanent and tentative determiner (*upalakṣaṇa*) of the house. Similarly, words are applied to the real entity itself on the grounds of its unreal adjuncts.¹³

What is common here with the denotation theory developed in the Guṇasamuddeśa is that a factor delimiting Brahman, comparable to a quality qualifying a substance, is considered to be the cause for the application of a word to Brahman, comparable to a substance connected with a quality.¹⁴

¹² A quality, on account of which a word is applied to a substance and which is denoted by affixes such as *tva* and *tal* in *gotvam* and *gotā*, is called *śabdapravṛttikāraṇa* or the cause for the use of a word. Prakāśa on VP 3.5.1: *tathāhi gotvād gavākāreṇa dravyaṃ prāṇīyate, śuklādiguṇāt tadākāreṇeti, paropādhim antareṇārthānām avyavahāryatvenāsalkalpatvāt / tataś ca viśeṣaṇenābhedam āpāditaṃ śabdo 'bhidhātta iti śabdapravṛttikāraṇam api bhavaty artharūpasambandhi /*

¹³ VP 3.2.3: *adhruveṇa nimittena devadattagrhaṃ yathā / grhītaṃ grhaśabdena śuddham evābhidhīyate //*

¹⁴ In his Mahābhāṣyadīpikā on vārttika 1 of the Paspasā, in order to show that in the view that a word meaning is a substance and cowness, being an adjunct, is not denoted by the word *go* but serves as the cause for the use of this word (*śabdasyopādhibhūtāḥ pravṛttinimittam*), Bhartṛhari

However we have to note that Bhartṛhari illustrates the given denotation theory by another example, the Gold-model. Gold is transformed into various things, such as a gold necklace, a gold charm, and a gold earring. In other words, gold is differentiated by its own forms. It is observed that a particular form of the gold disappears when another form of it appears. However the gold is considered to remain constant. Consequently, it follows that both the word *rucaka* 'a gold necklace' and the word *kuṇḍala* 'a gold earring', equally denote the gold itself.¹⁵

Viewed in this light, it is established that any word denotes Brahman, since it is proper to say that the word *ghaṭa* and the word *paṭa* equally denote Brahman delimited by its different adjuncts. In this view, it is Brahman who is considered to be denoted as a pot, a cloth, and so on.¹⁶

2. Denotation theory in the Jāṭisamuddeśa

From the above it has become clear what is Bhartṛhari's theory of denotation. Let us consider next how Bhartṛhari develops the theory to establish the thesis that a word denotes a universal.

§2.1.

In the Jāṭisamuddeśa we find Bhartṛhari's theory of denotation in the following kārikās:

*bhinnā iti paropādhir abhinnā iti vā punaḥ /
bhāvātmasu prapañco 'yaṁ saṁśṛṣṭeṣu eva jāyate //* (VP 3.1.20)

offers an illustration similar to the one given in VP 3.2.3. MbhD 22, 7-9: *dravyam evābhidhīyate / gotvādayas tu anabhidhīyamānāḥ śabdasyopādhībhūtāḥ pravṛtlinimittam / yathā svastikādayo devadattagrhasyāvācakāḥ santa upalakṣaṇam grhasya bhavanti*/According to Bhartṛhari here, the swastika of Devadatta's house is not denoted by the word *devadattagrha* 'Devadatta's house', but, as an impermanent and tentative determiner of Devadatta's house, it functions as the cause for the use of the word *devadattagrha*.

¹⁵VP 3.2.4: *suvarṇādi yathā bhinnam svair ākārair apāyibhiḥ / rucakādyabhidhānānām śuddham evaiti vācyatām //*

¹⁶Prakāśa on VP 3.2.5: *ghaṭākāropadhānapuraḥsaram ghaṭaśabdena brahmadravayam abhimukhikriyate paṭākāropadhānena tu paṭaśabdenetyādyupādhirūpāhilaivivekitvam abhidhānīyam /*

In this view, the word *go* denotes Brahman which is appearing as a cow and the word *paṭa* denotes Brahman which is appearing as a cloth. What they denote does not differ in that both denote Brahman. But if so, it would follow that what is denoted by the word *go* is what is denoted by the word *paṭa* and vice versa. This is the fault Bhartṛhari calls *sārvārthya*, that a word signifies a meaning which is signified by another word (*śabdāntarābhidhīyamānārthatva*, according to Helārāja). However this fault does not come about. For in this view a word denotes Brahman delimited by an adjunct and not bare Brahman. This is likened to the case in which one sees something through a tube. Having the capacity of the eye limited by the tube, one who looks something through a tube sees only as much of it as is visible through the hole of the tube. See VP 3.2.5: *ākāraiś ca vyavacchedāt sārvārthyam avarudhyate / yathaiiva cakṣurādīnaṁ sāmārthyam nālikādibhiḥ //* We must not forget that from Bhartṛhari's monistic viewpoint things in the phenomenal world are nothing but the appearances of Brahman due to nescience.

*naikatvaṃ nāpi nānātvaṃ na sattvaṃ na ca nāstitā /
ātmatattveṣu bhāvānām asaṃśṛṣṭeṣu vidyate //* (VP 3.1.21)

With reference to entities, one has, resorting to their delimitation by others (*paropādhi*), a diversity of verbal expressions: 'They are differentiated' or 'They are non-differentiated'. This takes place only when they themselves are united with [those delimiting factors].

Unless entities themselves are united [with factors delimiting them], one cannot speak of them either as identical or as different; either as existent or as absent.

The point made is as follows: With reference to a certain thing, one speaks of it as different from or as identical with some other thing. This is possible only when the thing to be expressed is connected with a certain delimiting factor which is different from it; otherwise, one could not express it.

The view set forth here is characterized with the term *saṃsargadarśana* 'connection-view' or *vyatiriktopādhidarśana* 'separate-adjunct-view' by Helārāja.¹⁷ These terms touch the very core of Bhartṛhari's theory of denotation. For the theory claims that a thing comes to be expressed only when it is connected with (*saṃśṛṣṭa*) a delimiting factor which is different from it (*vyatiriktopādhi*).

¹⁷Prakāśa on VP 3.1.21: *saṃsargadarśane sarvaḥ paropādśrayo'yaṃ prapañco vaicitryam*/Prakāśa on VP 3.1.22: *evaṃ vyatiriktopādhidarśanam upanyasya ...* /

Note that Bhartṛhari also uses the term *saṃsargadarśana*. VP 3.1.104: *jñāneṣu api yathārtheṣu tathā sarveṣu jātayaḥ / saṃsargadarśane sanli tās cārthasya prasādhikāḥ //* Helārāja describes the upholders of the *saṃsargadarśana* mentioned here as follows: *vastūnām bhedābdhedādirūpam arthāntarasamṣarganimittaṃ manyamānāḥ*. According to Helārāja, they argue that a thing appears as differentiated or non-differentiated from others on the basis of the connection of that thing with something other than it.

The *saṃsargadarśana* is referred to in connection with the question of the denotation of the Substance Brahman also. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.52: *saṃsargadarśane svalto gaur na gauḥ, gotvābhisambandhād gaur iti brahmakalpam sākṣād avyavahāryam eva dravyam paropādhiyamānarūpaviśeṣam vyavahāram anupalati*. Helārāja says: In the view called the *saṃsargadarśana*, a cow is not a cow by itself (*svalatā*), but it is a cow because of its relation with cowness, so that a substance, which is almost like Brahman and which cannot be directly denoted by a word, comes within the range of verbal communication when it takes a particular form delimited by others.

It is not proper to identify elliptically the upholders of the *saṃsargadarśana* at issue with *saṃsargavādins*. Bhartṛhari uses the term *saṃsargavādin* in two *kārikās*: VP 3.7.9 and 3.11.12, in the commentaries on both of which Helārāja interprets it as referring to a Vaiśeṣika. Prakāśa on VP 3.7.9: *saṃsargavādino vaiśeṣikāḥ*/Prakāśa on VP 3.11.12: *ato dharmānām saṃsargam ekatra dravye ye 'bhyupayanti kāṇādās...* / However, *saṃsargavādins* or *Vaiśeṣikas* who analyze the phenomenal world from the viewpoint of how things are related to one another have enough background to accept tentatively Bhartṛhari's denotation theory which presupposes the relation of a thing to be denoted and its delimiting factor. Prakāśa on VP 3.11.1: *prthaktvavaśāddhi dravyāṇām prthaktvena vyavahārah, ekādivyavahāras tu samkhyāvaśāt saṃsargavādibhir abhyupagamyate*. Bhartṛhari's denotation theory does not conflict with the Vaiśeṣika ontological theory. However, this does not mean that the *saṃsargadarśana* is held by *saṃsargavādins* or *Vaiśeṣikas*.

§2.2.

According to the denotation theory described above, a thing to be denoted requires something which is other than that thing and which is connected with it. As a theoretical consequence, therefore, for the establishment of the present thesis, that a word denotes a universal, Bhartṛhari has to postulate a certain delimiting factor of a universal, that is, a specific kind of universal such as cowness-ness (*gotvatva*). Consider the following statements by Helārāja:

Prakāśa on VP 3.1.6: *jātau śabdenābhidhīyamānāyām tatra jātyantarābhāvān nirnimittā śabdasya pravṛttir āyātā .../*

When a universal is denoted by a word, if there did not exist another universal in the universal, then it would follow that the application of the word to the universal in question has no occasioning ground.

Prakāśa on VP 3.1.20: *nirupādhino vastuno'vyavahāryatvāt sarva eva paropāśrayo vyavahāra iti sāmānyādaḥ vyatiriktasāmānyakalpanaivam akārīty atra tātparyārthaḥ //*

What Bhartṛhari intends to say here is as follows: I assumed in this manner that things such as a universal have universals which are different [from them], for the reason that one has any verbal expression of an entity by resorting to something other than the entity because no entity can be expressed without its delimiting factor.

These statements of Helārāja make clear that a delimiting factor of a universal is indispensable for the denotation of a universal and it is a universal in a universal.

§2.3.

Then what is the universal which is possessed by a universal and which serves as the occasioning ground of the application of the word? Bhartṛhari considers such a universal to be a word-universal (*śabdajāti*) or a universal's accompanying nature (*anuvṛtti*).

§§2.3.1 śabdajāti

According to Bhartṛhari, all words unconditionally denote their own universals and the word-universals are superimposed on the object-universals which the words denote. He states:

*svā jātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvair evābhidhīyate /
tato 'rthajātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā //* (VP 3.1.6)

Every word denotes its own universal. It is assumed that a word-universal is first denoted and then superimposed on an object-universal.

The word *go* first denotes its own universal, the generic property of being the word *go*, namely, the word-universal *gośabdatva*.¹⁸ This word-universal is

¹⁸ This is justified by one of the interpretations of A 1.1.68 *svam rūpam śabdasyāśabdasamjñā*. According to some Pāṇinīyas, the phrase *svam rūpam* in the sūtra is paraphrased with *svā jātiḥ* '[a linguistic item's] own universal'. Prakāśa on VP 3.1.6: *rūpam hi svarūpam svā jātir veli darśanabhedena kathyate /* See Vṛtti on VP 1.70.

then superimposed on the object-universal cowness. This denotation theory is an application of his *adhyāsa* theory that a word is superimposed on its meaning, so that they are identified with each other.¹⁹

A word-universal, which is first denoted by a word and then superimposed on an object-universal (*arthajāti*) which is denoted by the word, leads to the denotation of the object-universal as identical with the word-universal itself and carries out the function of the universal (*jātikārya*). Bhartṛhari says:

*yathā rakte guṇe tattvaṃ kaṣāye vyapadiśyate /
saṃyogisannikarṣāc ca vastrādiṣu api grhyate //*
*tathā śabdārthasambandhāc chabde jātir avasthitā /
vyapadeśe 'rthajātinām jātikāryāya kalpate //* (VP 3.1.7-8)

Just as the generic property of [redness] (*tattva*) in the quality red is denoted with reference to red lac and it is understood with reference to things like clothes also on the basis of the relation between what are in contact with each other [i.e., the red lac and things], in the same manner the universal which resides in the word leads to the denotation of object-universals and performs the function of universal on the basis of the relation between word and meaning.

According to the view stated in the present *kārikā*, the universal of a word is treated as the cause for the application of the word to its meaning, the object-universal. Then, how is it possible that a word-universal brings about such a denotation of an object-universal, although a word-universal and an object-universal reside in different loci? Bhartṛhari answers this question as follows. When the expression *lohita lākṣā* 'red lac' is used, the universal redness is understood with reference to the red lac. The universal redness is the property that inheres in the quality red which in turn inheres in the lac. The relation which obtains between the universal redness and the lac is *samavetasamavāya* or the inherence in what is inherent. In this case, the universal redness is considered to lead to the denotation of the lac.²⁰ When the expression *lohitaṃ vastram* 'a red cloth' is used, on the other hand, the universal redness is understood with reference to the red cloth. In this case, the universal redness is the property that inheres in the quality red which inheres in the lac in contact with the cloth. Thus the relation between

¹⁹ In actual communication, a word and its meaning are identified with each other in the form *so 'yam* 'This is that'. This relation of identity between word and meaning is based on the superimposition of each other. Prakāśa on VP 3.1.7-8: *svābhāvikaś cāyam arthapratyāyane śabdānām abhedasambandho 'bhyupāya iti pratipādyo 'pi tathaiva pratipadyate / na hi puruṣādhiṇam elat / anādaḥ saṃsāre 'nenaiva prakāreṇa sambandhavyutpatteḥ ko 'tra niyato 'dhyāropayitā kalpyatām / avyutpannasamketasyāpi cābhinnapratyayotpatter arthajātir apy astīti na śabdajātir evādhyāropitāstv iti vācyam /*

²⁰ Prakāśa on VP 3.1.7-8: *tatsamavetasamavāyāt kaṣāye raktaguṇādhāre dravye vyapadiśyate vyapadeśāya kalpate / tadviśeṣaṇabhūtaṃ hi tat kaṣāyadravyam abhidhīyate lohita lākṣeti /*

the universal redness and the lac is *saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya* or the inherence in what is inherent in what is in contact with something. In this case also the universal redness is considered to lead to the denotation of the cloth.²¹ The word-universal is comparable to the universal in these cases. When the word *go* is uttered, the word-universal *gośabdatva* is understood with reference to the object-universal cowness. For, the word-universal inheres in the individual word-instance *go* which is related to its meaning, the object-universal cowness. Thus, the word-universal can be considered to lead to the denotation of the object-universal.²²

It is to be noted in passing that the function of the universal is to bring about the recurrence of one and the same word or cognition in different objects of the same class.²³

§§2.3.2. anuvṛtti

Now consider the following kārīkā:

anupravṛttidharmo vā jātis syāt sarvajātiṣu /
vyāvṛttidharmasāmānyam viśeṣe jātir iṣyate // (VP 3.1.14)

The property of accompanying [all individuals of the same class] could be the universal for all universals. With respect to the particular, the generic property of excluding [others] is admitted to be a universal.

This kārīkā states that any universal has its own universal, which is characterized as the property of accompanying its own loci. This accompanying nature of the universal has to be admitted even if the universal is held to be something mental and not something externally existent. Bhartṛhari states:

anupravṛttirūpā yā prakhyā tām ākṛtiṃ viduḥ /
kecid vyāvṛttirūpāṃ tu dravyatvena pracakṣate // (VP 3.1.19)

Some consider the universal (*ākṛti*) to be the appearance (*prakhyā*) which consists in a common characteristic (*anupravṛttirūpa*). On the other hand, they consider the substance to be [the appearance which] consists in exclusion (*vyāvṛttirūpa*).²⁴

²¹ Prakāśa on VP 3.1.7-8: *saṃyuktasamavetasamavāyād vastrādiṣu api laukīyanimitto vyāpadeśaḥ, lohitaṃ vastram .../*

²² In commenting on the Bhāṣya ad A 5.1.119 *tasya bhāvas tvalalau*, Kaiyaṭa says as follows: *gavādayo yadā jālimātravācīnas tadā tebhyaḥ śabdasvarūpe pratyayaḥ / tathā hi – arthe jātau śabdasvarūpam adhyasyate yo gośabdaḥ sa evārtha iti/ tataḥ śabdasvarūpam eva tatra pravṛttinimittaṃ nānyaḥ /* According to Kaiyaṭa, in the view that a word denotes a mere universal, the *bhāvapratyaya* occurring after the item *go* denotes the *svārūpa* of the item, which functions as the occasioning ground of the application of the item (*pravṛttinimitta*).

²³ Prakāśa on VP 3.1.7-8: *tatkāryaṃ śabdaḥ pratyayānupravṛttilakṣaṇam /*

²⁴ Regarding the pādas ab of this kārīkā, I have adopted the reading of Rau's edition, and not that of Iyer's: *anupravṛttirūpāṃ yāṃ prakhyālām ākṛtiṃ viduḥ.*

This kārīkā, obviously stated from Vijnānavādins' point of view, says that the form which figures in cognition as what consists in a common characteristic is called a universal, and the form which figures in cognition as what consists in exclusion is called a substance. What Bhartṛhari means to say is that when one has the cognitions: 'This is a cow', 'This is a cow', with reference to cows, one cannot deny that a certain common form which appears to the mind accompanies the cognitions, so that it is proper to assume that such a common mental representation is a universal. Thus it is plain that Bhartṛhari considers that the universal, which is nothing but a mental representation, has the property of consisting in a common characteristic.

§§2.3.3.

So far it has been shown that Bhartṛhari holds that in his denotation theory the delimiting factor of a universal is the word-universal or the accompanying character that a universal has. It is clear that these attempts of Bhartṛhari's for the justification of the universal of a universal to establish the *jātipadārtha*-thesis on the basis of his denotation theory are made under the restrictions set by the Vaiśeṣika ontology such that a universal has no further universal.²⁵ Finally, therefore, Bhartṛhari removes the restrictions by introducing his own metaphysics based on powers (*śakti*).

§2.4. BHARTṚHARI'S METAPHYSICS BASED ON POWERS AND THE DENOTATION OF THE UNIVERSAL

Bhartṛhari states:

*sarvaśaktyātmabhūtatvam ekasyaiveti nirṇayaḥ /
bhāvānām ātmabhedasya kalpanā syad anarthikā* // (VP 3.1.22)

*tasmād dravyādayaḥ sarvāḥ śaktayo bhinnalakṣaṇāḥ /
saṃsr̥ṣṭāḥ puruṣārthasya sādḥikā na tu kevalāḥ* // (VP 3.1.23)

We have the conclusive view that the One is identical with all powers (*sarvaśaktyātmabhūta*). It would be purposeless to postulate an intrinsic difference among entities.

Therefore, [categories] such as a substance are all powers [of the One], which are known from its different [functions] (*bhinnalakṣaṇa*). United [with other powers] (*saṃsr̥ṣṭa*), they realize human purposes, not separately.

²⁵ Vaiśeṣikasūtra 8.5: *sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvāt tala eva jñānam /*

See also Udayana's *jātibādhaka*. Kiraṇāvalī 23, 3-4: *vyakter abhedas tulyatvam saṃkaro'thānavasthitiḥ / rūpahānir asambandho jātibādhakasamgrahaḥ* // See Halbfass [1992: 132]: "We may paraphrase as follows: A universal cannot belong only to a single individual, such as ether (*ākāśa*); the same group of individual instances cannot possess several coextensive universals (i.e., synonyms, such as *buddhi*, *upalabdhi* and *jñāna*, do not represent more than one universal); there cannot be partially overlapping extensions for universals (i.e., no real universals can belong to such partially coextensive types of motion as 'going out' and 'entering'); no universal can be postulated for an entity if this would involve an infinite regress (i.e., there can be no universals for the ultimate particularities); there is no universal, if there is no possible connection with its instances (i.e., no universal can be inherent in *samavāya*, inherence itself)."

Bhartrhari reformulates the Vaiśeṣika category theory in a *śakti* terminology. From Bhartrhari's monistic standpoint, it is Brahman that is the one absolute reality. Brahman has several powers, with which it is viewed as identical and by virtue of which it appears as distinct entities. If we can explain the variety of the phenomenal world with the multiple powers of Brahman, there is no use in assuming that entities in the phenomenal world are different from one another in themselves.²⁶

In order to account for the variety of the phenomenal world, Vaiśeṣikas postulate six categories, such as a substance. According to Bhartrhari, these categories are nothing but the powers of Brahman which seem to be different from one another because of being inferred from their different effects.²⁷

How do these powers serve the realization of human purposes? Bhartrhari answers: When a certain power is united with (*saṁsṛṣṭa*) another power, it can help one to fulfill one's purpose, but not without being united with it. A power by itself cannot be conducive to the realization of human purposes. To illustrate this, let us consider the example mentioned in the Prakāśa on the above kārīkā.²⁸ Suppose the case where one wraps a certain thing in another thing (*prāvaraṇa*) to conceal the former. In this case, it is obvious that one cannot wrap the thing with a single yarn. However, if the yarn is united with other yarns, the unity of yarns, which becomes a piece of cloth, will help us to wrap the thing to be wrapped. In this manner, one can fulfill one's purpose with the help of the unity of powers. However, the unity of powers is not over and above the powers united.

What Bhartrhari means to say is clear. From the point of view of Bhartrhari's metaphysics based on powers, one cannot establish the distinction between cowness and cowness-ness or the one between universal and universal-ness. For the cowness and the cowness-ness, or the universal and the universal-ness, have it in common that they are powers. A substance as a power has its denotation accomplished through its unification with a quality as a power. Similarly, the cowness as a power has its denotation accomplished through its unification with the cowness-ness as a power. There is thus no harm in assuming that a universal has a further universal.

²⁶ Prakāśa on VP 3.1.22: *ekam eva brahma sarvaśaktīti pramāṇena siddhe 'sminn arthe 'vidyāparikalpitasya bhāvabhedasyāpārāmāṛthikatvāt kāryānānātvonnīyamānaḥ śaktībhedo evaikasya yukto na tu svarūpabhedah //*

²⁷ Prakāśa on VP 3.1.23: *dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyalaṅkāṇaḥ padārthā na prthagbhūtāḥ / ekasyaiva śaktayo vilakṣaṇavyāpārānumeyā iti ... /*

²⁸ Prakāśa on VP 3.1.23: *tā [=śaktayaḥ] yathāyatham upagatasamanvayāḥ prāvaraṇādyartha-kriyākāriṇya ity ... /*

On the *prāvaraṇa*, see also the following passage in the Tattvakaumudī. Tattvakaumudī on SK 9: . . . *evaṁ tantavaḥ pratyekaṁ prāvaraṇam akurvāṇā api militā āvirbhūtapāṭabhāvāḥ prāvarīṣyanti /*

§2.5 THE DENOTATION OF SATTĀ

Insofar as a universal is accepted as having a further universal, it is regarded as a substance according to the definition of substance, so that the denotation theory developed in the *Guṇasamuddeśa* is applicable for the establishment of the thesis that all words denote the universal.

Bhartṛhari tries to establish this thesis from another angle. If it is established that all words denote the highest, ultimate, universal *Sattā* 'Being', it naturally follows that all words denote the universal. This is the idea Bhartṛhari next advances in the *Jāṭisamuddeśa*.

Bhartṛhari explains the denotation of such a universal as follows:

sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu /

jātir ity ucyate tasyām sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ // (VP 3.1.33)

Being itself is called the universal such as cowness because it is differentiated according to the things which are connected with it. All words are established as denoting that [Being].

All words denote the highest universal Being, which is Brahman. This being has no variety in itself. It appears as something delimited by what is related to it, so that one has a specific universal like cowness.

Bhartṛhari enumerates delimiting factors of Being as follows:

āśrayaḥ svātmamātrā vā bhāvā vā vyatirekiṇaḥ /

svaśaktayo vā sattāyā bhedadarśanahetavaḥ // (VP 3.1.40)

It is its substratum or its own elements or entities different from it or its own capacities which are the causes of its appearing as differentiated.

The causes of manifesting Being differently are said to be its substratum or an individual, its own divisions such as cowness, or external entities such as place and time, or its own powers. Obviously preference is given to the powers of Being. For, all the rest are the unreal appearances of Being by virtue of its powers.²⁹

In this view, it is established that all words denote Being delimited by its adjuncts. Accordingly, we may say that Bhartṛhari adopts here the denotation theory established by the Gold-model in the *Dravyasamuddeśa*. In this view, Being is denoted as individual universals.

3. Conclusion

Bhartṛhari tries to establish the thesis that all words denote the universal in two ways. When Bhartṛhari views the universal as a substance which is to be differentiated, he applies the denotation theory which is developed in the

²⁹ Prakāśa on VP 3.1.40: *tathā cāyam atra paramārthaḥ— ātmīyā eva śaktayo yogyatākhyās sattāyās tathāvidhāḥ santi yābhir viśvaprapañcaṃ racayati / tadyathā cintāmanir arthinām yathāśayam ākāraṇānātvaṃ uddarśayati tathānantaśakti sanmātraṃ brahma avidyāvilasitasahaṃ samsārikapramāṭṛviṣaye nānārūpaṃ cakāśṭīy ante vastusatattvaṃ udghāṭitam //*

Guṇasamuddeśa. In this case, a universal in a universal is comparable to a quality. On the other hand, when he views different universals as evolutes of Being, he applies the denotation theory which is developed in the Dravyasamuddeśa.

No words can directly touch on a substance, whether it is a substance on the verbal level or on the level of ultimate value (the latter is equivalent to Being). In order to be expressed, it requires a thing which is different from and connected with it. This is the basic point of Bhartṛhari's denotation theory.

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Pradīpa: Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa, see Vedavrata.

Prakāśa: Helārāja's Prakāśa, see Subramania Iyer 1963, 1973.

MBh: Patañjali's Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya, see Vedavrata 1962-63.

MBhD I: Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, see Bronkhorst 1987.

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SK: Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, see Jāwaji 1940.

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VP: Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya, see Rau, Wilhelm; Iyer, K.A. Subramania [kārikā numbers are given according to Rau's edition].

VS: Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, see Jambuvijaya 1961.



The Conception of Liṅga in Vākyapadīya III.13

FERNANDO TOLA

CARMEN DRAGONETTI

Seven definitions of liṅga¹

Bhartṛhari begins his chapter on *liṅga* (grammatical gender), Vākyapadīya III. 13, pp. 130-148, giving in the first two *kārikās* seven different *vikalpas* or conceptions of *liṅga*. Helārāja understands *vikalpa* as *darśana* or point of view. Accordingly, we can admit that what Bhartṛhari intends to do in these two *kārikās* is to offer seven different definitions of the notion of *liṅga* proposed by those who have studied the matter (*liṅgatattvajña*).

According to these seven *vikalpas*, *liṅga* is: 1. the relation to breast, hair etc. considered as marks or signs of sex (*stanakeśādisaṃbandha*); 2. the particular sex signs or marks themselves (or following Helārāja's interpretation *ad* III.13.1-2, p. 130: the sex signs or marks united to an individual that is thus characterized by that relation: *prasavayogyastana-keśakalāpaprājananādibhir upavyaṅjanair avayavināḥ saṃbandhaḥ saṃyoga-samavāyalakṣaṇo liṅgam*); 3. the universal as manifested by the sex signs or marks (*tadupavyaṅjanā jātiḥ*); 4. the states of the Sāṃkhya *guṇas*; 5. the *guṇas* themselves; 6. a nature (or attribute) created (in the objects) by the word (*śabdopajanito'rthātmā*); and 7. a formation (attribute) of the word (*śabdasaṃskāra*).

¹ We quote following K.A. Subramania Iyer's edition, Poona 1973.

In the course of this chapter Bhartṛhari develops these definitions of grammatical gender although not in an exhaustive way.

First and second vikalpas or darśanas

Gender is constituted 1. by the connection (*saṃbandha*) with the marks of sexual differentiation, or 2. by these marks themselves. The presence of feminine sexual marks determines the attribution of feminine grammatical gender (*strī*, literally 'woman'), the presence of masculine sexual marks determines the attribution of masculine grammatical gender (*puruṣ*, literally 'man'), and the absence of sexual marks determines the attribution of neuter grammatical gender (cf. Helārāja's commentary *ad locum*). Helārāja quotes two verses quoted by Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya ad 4.1.3* (p. 196, Kielhorn ed.) which explain this *vikalpa* or *darśana*:

stanakeśavatī strī syāl lomaśaḥ puruṣaḥ smṛtaḥ /
ubhayor antaraṃ yac ca tadabhāve napuṃsakam //

But in fact, the first and second *vikalpas* or *darśanas* as proposed by Bhartṛhari and Helārāja cannot be wholly accepted, since there exist many asexual things to which a masculine or feminine grammatical gender is attributed (Helārāja *ad III.13.1-2*, p. 131, line 2: *etat tu darśanadvayam acetanānāṃ stanādirahitatvād avyāpakam ityuktam*).

Two facts are to be emphasised in the first two *kārikās* of Bhartṛhari and in the *ad loc* commentary of Helārāja: the link of the masculine, feminine and neuter grammatical gender to sex and the problem created by the attribution of the masculine or feminine gender to asexual things. These two facts must be taken into account in any discussion on gender in many languages.

Third vikalpa or darśana

Each one of the three genders undoubtedly is a universal (*jāti*), that in any particular individual coexists with other universals, which on their turn may be contradictory among themselves. Thus in the cow (*go*) coexist the universals of 'cowness' (*gotva*) and of femininity (*strītvā*) (III.13.4 and Helārāja *ad locum*, p. 133, lines 5-6). The vision of a female elephant and of a mare provokes in our mind the idea of the femininity universal, which coexists with their respective universals, 'elephantness' and 'mareness' (III.13.5).

This conception of gender is still linked with the sexual marks, and also in this case the masculinity and femininity universals are attributed to things that do not possess sex. Helārāja in his commentary *ad III.13.12*, concludes his explanation of the first three *vikalpas* or *darśanas* enumerated by Bhartṛhari, and begins dealing with the conception of gender based on the Sāṃkhya theory of *guṇas*.

In his commentary *ad* III.13.12, Helārāja refers to Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya *ad* IV.1.3 (pp. 195-201, Vol. II of Kielhorn's edition). Patañjali, commenting on Kātyāyana's vārttikas, points out a series of deficiencies in relation to gender when it is conceived as based on sex, and affirms as a consequence of that (p. 197, lines 25-26) that grammarians must not conceive gender as it is generally done (*laukika*), but should present a conception of gender that Helārāja calls technical (*pāribhāṣika*, p. 137, line 13).

In this quotation of Patañjali is manifested a characteristic of Indian grammarians, viz., that they have full awareness that they are dealing with a subject matter that has to do with language and that consequently, when they are explaining grammatical phenomena, they have to remain within the limits of language.

Fourth and fifth vikalpas or darśanas

The three grammatical genders are the states of the *guṇas* or the *guṇas* themselves (III.13.1, 13-14). K.A. Subramania Iyer² identifies both conceptions of gender, saying that the fifth one is only a variation of the fourth. Both *vikalpas* or *darśanas* are founded in the Sāṃkhya philosophical system. The word *guṇa* designates in the Sāṃkhya the three components of *prakṛti* or primordial matter. *prakṛti* (or its *guṇas*) in its evolution gives rise to the empirical reality, to all that exists in it, without exception (III.13.14). The empirical reality is thus nothing else than the *prakṛti*, nothing else than the *guṇas*. The three *guṇas* receive the names of *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*. According to III.13.13, the three possible states of the *guṇas* are *āvirbhāva*, to become visible, manifestation, *tirobhāva*, to become concealed, concealment, and *sthiti* to maintain itself in one of these two states. Each one of the *guṇas* becomes visible, remains concealed or maintains itself in one of the two states (manifestation or concealment) in a manner and degree which are proper of itself, and for a length of time that also is proper of itself.

Due to this diversity of the states, in which the *guṇas* present themselves, they give rise to diverse and varied combinations. This fact explains the diversity and variety of our reality, since the *guṇas*, as the component elements of the *prakṛti*, are also the component elements of all that exists.

Bhartrhari affirms also that the *guṇas* are in a constant process of transformation (III.13.15-16, Helārāja's commentary *ad locum* and texts quoted by him, especially the quotation from the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali,

² *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari, Chapter III, Pt. II, English translation*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974: 106.

ad IV.1.3, p. 198, lines 8-9 (Kielhorn's ed.): na hiha kaścit svasminn ātmani muhūrtam apyavatiṣṭhate).

Since all the component elements of the empirical reality are the *guṇas* (or are in them), it is possible to say that the three grammatical genders (*liṅga*) are present in all the manifestations of the empirical reality, in all the products, living beings and things, under whose form the *prakṛti* and its *guṇas* manifest themselves (*sthiteṣu sarvaliṅgeṣu*, III.13.19, and Helārāja *ad locum: sattvādiguṇatrayamayēṣu sarvabhāveṣu*). But only one gender corresponds to each living being or thing, with very few exceptions, as for instance *taṭaḥ*, *taṭī*, *taṭam* ('shore') pointed out by Kātyāyana and Patañjali, Mahābhāṣya *ad IV.1.3, Vol.II, p. 197, lines 22-24 (Kielhorn's ed.)*.

Helārāja in his commentary *ad III.13.20* resorts to a comparison. To the person, who works with wood and carries on different tasks as chiseling (TAKṢ) and cutting (CHID) etc., is given a name derived from the name of one of these functions (*takṣan*). Two instances of correspondence are worth-noticing in this comparison: the reference to the great number of tasks done by the carpenter corresponds to the presence, in varied forms, of the three grammatical genders in all beings and things; and the reference to the selection of one of these functions to designate the *takṣan*, 'carpenter' corresponds to the selection of one gender to be assigned to beings and things.

We must now ask, who makes the selection of the grammatical gender that corresponds to the words that designate living beings and things, from among the three grammatical genders that exist everywhere, and what is the nature of that selection ?

The *kārikā* III.13.21 gives the answer to that question: 'educated or cultured persons' (*śiṣṭa*), who know the true nature of beings and things (*bhāvatattvadṛśaḥ*), make known (i.e., select), for each word, the grammatical gender which corresponds to the living being or thing designated by that word and which becomes thus a constituent part of the nature of that living being or thing (*bhāvatattvadṛśaḥ śiṣṭāḥ śabdārtheṣu vyavasthitam / yad yad dharme 'ṅgatām eti liṅgam tat tat pracakṣate //*. Helārāja's glosses: for *śabdārtheṣu vyavasthitam: abhidheyeṣu samavetam* and for *dharme'ṅgatām eti: liṅgasya śabdasya dharmasāadhanatvam*).

It is not an arbitrary selection: among the three grammatical genders that exist in all beings and things, the educated or cultured persons select, as proper of the words that designate them, that grammatical gender which is the most appropriate for each living being or thing, taking into account the presence of any particular factor, characteristic or attribute that may exist in them. Thus, for instance, if they perceive that in a living being sexual masculine marks are more visible and the feminine are less visible or concealed, the masculine grammatical gender will be the most adequate.

for the word that designates that being; and, if they perceive that in it sexual feminine marks are more visible and the masculine are less visible or are concealed, the feminine grammatical gender will be the most adequate one, considering in both cases that the masculine grammatical gender and the feminine one are generally applied to masculine and feminine living beings respectively. It is also possible that the *śiṣṭas* attribute the masculine or feminine grammatical gender to things that **do not possess sex**, but that notwithstanding possess some characteristic that impels the *śiṣṭas* to attribute to them, by assimilation with sex, the masculine or feminine gender.

With this conception of *liṅga*, the grammatical gender is liberated from sex. The suffixes that indicate grammatical gender make known that the words in which they are found have such or such grammatical gender. That is their sole function. They do not indicate whether the object to which they refer have a sex or not, or which is its sex, if they have one. The existence of sex in the object and its nature must be ascertained from the object itself. This is an effect of the fact that masculine and feminine suffixes are rightly added not only to words that mean living beings provided with sex, but also to words that mean things devoid of sex but that present some attributes that have some characteristics that may be considered as proper to man or to woman. This possibility is generated by the absence of a link between grammatical gender and sex, which characterizes the first two *vikalpas* or *darśanas*.

In relation to the first two *vikalpas* or *darśanas* it is possible to ask why masculine and feminine grammatical gender, which are related to sex, are applied to things that do not possess it. This question was based on the idea that masculine and feminine grammatical suffixes are reserved by their essence to living beings of masculine and feminine sex, and that it is by exception that they are attributed to asexual things. Perhaps it was so in the first stages of language, but this situation disappeared in the course of the evolution of language.

In relation to the last two conceptions among those that we have discussed so far, it is possible to ask: why the masculine grammatical gender is attributed to some words that designate things without sex, and the feminine grammatical gender to others? What is the reason of this difference? For instance, why *kāma*, 'desire', is masculine? Why *gaṅgā*, the Ganges, is feminine? Why *agni*, 'fire', is masculine? Why *pṛthivī* is feminine? An answer is given by a French *śiṣṭa*. H. Delacroix says:

The grammatical category of gender corresponds to a [peculiar] vision of things, to a table of values, to a system of classification, to a mythology, to a code, to determinate institutions. This category expresses them all, more or less completely, more or less adequately to a moment of history.³

³ *Le langage et la pensée*, Paris: Félix Alcan 1930: 237.

This idea of Delacroix helps us to answer the questions about *kāma*, *gaṅgā*, *agni*, *pṛthivī* just posed. *kāma* and *agni* are considered of the masculine gender, because both of them were believed by tradition to be divine living beings, gods; and *gaṅgā* and *pṛthivī* were considered of the feminine gender, because both of them were believed by tradition to be divine living beings, goddesses. These were the characteristics perceived by the *śiṣṭas* when making their selection of gender for the words. These cases are easy to explain; in other cases it is more difficult to discover the reasons which occasioned the selection of the masculine or feminine grammatical gender, but it is reasonable to think that in all the cases there has been one or several factors, of diverse nature, inherent in the *guṇas*, that persuaded the *śiṣṭas* to adopt the masculine or feminine grammatical gender for words expressing non-living asexual things.

The fourth and fifth *vikalpas* or *darśanas* are the only ones that clearly explain why some things without life and sex are named with words provided with the grammatical mark corresponding to the masculine gender and others with words provided with the grammatical mark corresponding to the feminine gender.

Sixth vikalpa or darśana

In relation to living beings with sexual marks, the selection of the grammatical gender for the word that designates them, offers no difficulty: to those of the masculine sex is assigned the masculine grammatical gender, to those of the feminine sex is assigned the feminine grammatical gender. In these cases the grammatical gender agrees with sex; masculine with masculine, feminine with feminine (III.13.28: *iṣṭam nimittam keśāṇ cī jātṛyādivad avasthitam*, and commentary of Helārāja *ad locum*, who completes *keśāṇ cī* with *cetanānām arthānām* and who glosses *avasthitam* by *upalabdham*). Things that are not living beings and are devoid of sex, and are designated with words of the neuter grammatical gender, do not create problems either. The problem is the already known one: the things that are devoid of sex and to which are attributed words of the masculine or feminine gender. In fact the sixth *vikalpa* or *darśana* refers only to this last case.

According to *kārikā* III.13.28 and its commentary by Helārāja, a masculine or feminine grammatical gender is attributed to inanimate and asexual things in the same way as the masculine or feminine grammatical gender is attributed to living beings provided with sex. Helārāja comments that this happens due to habit of constantly seeing the distinctive mark of the grammatical gender in the words that designate living beings. It would be a process of extension.

The attribution of the masculine or feminine grammatical gender to non-living things devoid of sex is something without any correspondence in reality. It is a mere mental creation (III.13.28: *parikalpita*; Helārāja: 'kalpita' and 'na tu vāstavarūpatā'). In kārikā III.13.29, Bhartṛhari explains his idea by means of a comparison: in some cases plurality is grammatically attributed to things which constitute unities, as for instance *āpas*, 'the waters' and *sikatās*, 'the sands'. The plurality which is attributed to these words is, in reality, alien to them. The same thing occurs with femininity or masculinity. It is something arbitrary.

According to Helārāja *ad* III.13.28, lines 6-7, the attribution of the masculine or feminine grammatical gender to non-living things is imposed by the norm proper of Sanskrit that the grammatical gender expressed by a suffix is an essential unavoidable element for the correct formation of determinate kinds of words, the noun for instance.

Seventh vikalpa or darśana

The seventh conception of grammatical gender is very similar to the previous one. This conception maintains that the grammatical gender is an element required by grammar for the correct construction of certain words, among them the nouns (III.13.30: *śabdasaṃskāramātrakam*). The grammatical gender has its external support (the marks of sex) in the case of many words (III.13.30: *nimittadarśanād arthe*), and from there is extended to all the words (III.13.30: *sarvatra varṇyate*). According to Helārāja (*ad* III.13.30, p. 147, lines 12-13) this conception goes against the explanation given by the fourth and fifth *vikalpas* or *darśanas*, which have recourse to notions proper of the philosophical Sāṃkhya system. The seventh conception considers also that the grammatical gender has not, necessarily, to be only a mental creation (*parikalpita*, *kalpita*), but it can have a correlate in reality although not perceived (III.13.31).

To which of these seven definitions did Bhartṛhari adhere?

After the foregoing remarks about these seven definitions of *liṅga*, which to a certain degree are somewhat cryptic, it is convenient to say something about the important question: To which of these seven definitions did Bhartṛhari adhere?

According to K.A. Subramania Iyer, Bhartṛhari adheres to the fourth and fifth views.⁴ According to Ashok Aklujkar,⁵ Bhartṛhari "appears to lean

⁴ Bhartṛhari, Poona : Deccan College, 1969: 368-69.

⁵ H.G. Coward and K. Kunjuni Raja (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. V, *The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, p. 172, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1990.

toward the latter two views" [i.e., the sixth and the seventh]. These differences of opinion make it clear that we have here a problem concerning Bhartṛhari's conception of gender.

With due respect for the opposed theses of both quoted illustrious authors, we dare to advance the opinion that Bhartṛhari does not adhere *exclusively* to any of the seven definitions of *liṅga* presented in kārīkās 1-2, and analyzed in this chapter of his Vākyapadīya. He partially accepts the seven *vikalpas* or *darśanas*. All these *vikalpas* are valid from a certain perspective. It is a case in which the notion of 'perspectivism', accepted by Bhartṛhari (I.75 and II.136, Rau's edition) is to be applied. Each of them contributes to the comprehension of the notion of grammatical gender with a valuable element that cannot be ignored. If we leave aside one or several of the elements presented by the seven definitions, the notion of *liṅga* would be defective, some essential elements of that notion would be lacking.

Let us indicate the contributions of each of these seven *vikalpas* or *darśanas* to the notion of *liṅga*: 1 and 2. the presence of sex (beings have a sex and this is reflected in the language by means of the appropriate suffixes); 3. the notion of the universal, which corresponds to each one of the three grammatical genders; 4 and 5. the determination of the grammatical gender by characteristics that are perceptible in things; 6. the principle of extension and analogy applied to elements of the external reality or to merely linguistic elements; 7. the merely grammatical or linguistic conception of the category of grammatical gender.

In this chapter of the Vākyapadīya, as in the whole work of Bhartṛhari, shines forth in all its magnificence the light of the grammatical and linguistic genius of ancient India.

Some Remarks on the Term ‘vākyabheda’ in Bhartrhari’s Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā*

NORIYUKI KUDO

Sanskrit grammarians, especially the Pāṇinīyas, have long discussed how the rules prescribed in the Aṣṭādhyāyī are to be interpreted and managed. This means that there has been a long history of disagreement concerning the interpretation of these grammatical rules. Commentators such as Kātyāyana, Patañjali and so on have used a grammatical technique called ‘yogavibhāga: rule-split’ in order to explain, or to efficiently apply, some of the rules that they had on their hands.¹ According to Joshi-Roodbergen, “The term *yogavibhāga* is restricted to the case where a special rule is made effective for general purposes by taking away the special condition and by putting the remaining general condition as a separate rule.”² In the

* This paper is a revised English version of Kudo 1997.

¹ According to Padhy 2001: xix-xxi, a number of the cases where *yogavibhāga* is discussed in several commentaries is as follows: By Kātyāyana = 31 cases (P.1.1.17-18; 1.2.48; 1.4.9; 1.4.17; 1.4.58-59; 2.1.11-12; 2.3.62; 2.4.70; 2.4.83; 3.1.46; 3.1.67; 3.1.85; 3.2.4; 3.3.14; 3.3.15; 3.4.2; 4.3.1; 4.3.116; 5.3.5; 6.1.1; 6.1.32-33; 6.1.89; 6.1.102; 6.3.10; 7.2.62; 7.3.116; 7.3.118-119; 8.2.24; 8.3.58; 8.3.59; 8.4.3); by Patañjali, 57 cases; in the Kāśikāvṛtti 36 cases (4 from the Vārttika; 12 from the MBh; in the Siddhāntakaumudī, 27 (4 from Vārttika; 6 from the MBh; 10 from the Kāśikā). As to the number of rules, F. Kielhorn counts differently: by Kātyāyana, 25 cases and by Patañjali, 70 cases (“Notes on the Mahābhāṣya 7: Some devices of Indian grammarians,” in: *The Indian Antiquary* 16, August 1887: 247).

² Joshi-Roodbergen 1969: 95, fn. 477a. They also say: “Generally, in the case of *yogavibhāgas*, the (a) rule is intended for a wider application, so that it will cover more examples. But it has

commentaries on the Aṣṭādhyāyī – the Mahābhāṣya, the Kāśikāvṛtti and the Siddhāntakaumudī, etc. – we have instances where this *yogavibhāga* is proposed by someone only to have its proposal rejected by some other commentator(s).

The word '*vākyabheda*: splitting of the sentence' is used by grammarians in the course of interpreting of rules, and it seems to approximate *yogavibhāga* in its literal sense. Needless to say, '*vākyabheda*' is a well-known technical term in the textual tradition of the Mīmāṃsakas.³ According to them, it expresses the principle that each injunction should deal with only one thing. If a single sentence has more than two things to be realized, it would lead to a fault. That faulty construction is called '*vākyabheda*' and such 'splitting of the sentence' must be avoided.⁴

This paper attempts to investigate the usage of *vākyabheda* in the Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā (MBhD) of Bhartṛhari. While Patañjali did not use this word in his MBh, Bhartṛhari introduces this word into the grammatical text, and as far as I know he is the first to do so. Here, I would like to show the difference, if any, between *yogavibhāga* and *vākyabheda* especially in the first textual material, the MBhD. In the following, due to the limit of space, I shall confine myself to dealing with the meaning of the word *vākyabheda*; therefore other technical problems, such as the nature of the rule, its operation, scope and so on, will not be treated here. My question is whether or not the *vākyabheda* is to be regarded as a fault which causes double meanings to be derived from one sentence; or is it simply another interpretive device which is to be negatively accepted as in the Mīmāṃsā tradition?

to be kept in mind that this (a) rule is not meant to make other rules redundant. *Yogavibhāga* is meant for *iṣṭasiddhi* 'the establishing of desired forms', not for *aniṣṭasiddha* 'the establishing of undesired cases'. "Joshi-Roodbergen 1993: 87.

³ Jaiminiya Sūtra 1.2.25: *vidhau ca vākyabhedaḥ syāt*. 2.1.46: *arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyaṃ sākāṅkṣaṃ ced vibhāge syāt*. 47: *sameṣu vākyabhedaḥ*.

⁴ According to Kuroda [1993: 252], they attempt to avoid this *vākyabheda* as far as possible when they interpret the Vedic injunctions; on the other hand, in case of interpreting the sūtras, sometimes it is accepted as a final decision though passively. See also Edgerton 1929 (reprinted 1986): 14: "It means this: except in an originative injunction (*utpatti-vidhī*), not more than one thing may be enjoined at one time. That is, each section or sentence of the ritual code should deal with only one thing. Otherwise confusion would ensue. A single sentence should be devoted to laying down a single thing. Only in an originative injunction, laying down the general nature of a rite, is it felt that more than one subsidiary matter may be enjoined also, along with the main injunction, because the subsidiaries are really included in the main injunction, and so the unity of the subject-matter does not suffer thereby; in such a case we have a 'particularized injunction,' as we saw. But otherwise, to enjoin two things at once involves *vākyabheda*; the sentence is split. And this must be avoided."

1. Instances found in the MBhD

Bhartṛhari used the word *vākyabheda* seven times in his MBhD of which we have at present an incomplete text, that is, its available portion covers only upto P.1.1.55.

§1.1 FIRST EXAMPLE

In this case Bhartṛhari actually used the word *yogabheda*, which is quite an unusual word in the MBhD,⁵ while Kaiyaṭa, who wrote his commentary on the MBh. on the basis of the MBhD, reworded this to read as *vākyabheda*; we can surmise from this that their significance is the same (see below).

P.1.1.3: *iKo guṇavṛddhī*.

Usage: with P.7.3.84: *sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ*.

P.1.1.3 is a *paribhāṣā* rule and prescribes a substitution of *guṇa* for the vowel of a stem which is followed by a particular suffix such as *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes. However, its substituendum is not specified here; thus the rule is operative with other rules.

MBhD on MBh ad P.1.1.3 [Fasc. I, 15.15-19]: *tatrāpekṣāyām satyām kimartham yogabhedenapekṣā kriyate, na punar ekam evābhisambaddham vākyam? tatraivam apekṣiṣyāmahe — guṇavṛddhī iti ye guṇavṛddhī, te iKo bhavata ity etad anena bhāṣyeṇa kathayati — idam tatrāpekṣyate / ... yathaiva tarhi idam tatrāpekṣyate, evam ihāpi tadape[kṣi]syāmaha iti /*

Pradīpa on do. [I, 200 left]: *anyatarārtham punar iti vadatāvaśyam evam sambandhaḥ kartavyo "yatra guṇavṛddhiśabdoccāraṇena guṇavṛddhī vidhīyete tatreKa iti upatiṣṭhate" iti / anyathā yātā vātetyādiṣu vidhyarthatve sambhavati katham anyatarārtham punar vacanam syād ity ucyate? avaśyakartavyāyām cāpekṣāyām ekavākyatayaivāpekṣā 'stu / tenaikarūpa evārtho, na tu vākyabhedena svātantryam pāratantryam ca /*

Tr.: Now, when (mutual) expectation has to be there, why should expectation be made **on the basis of independent rules**? [emphasis given by NK. Those that follow are the same.] Why should not (they be regarded) as one integrated sentence? We can then (supply what is) needed thus: *Guṇa* and *Vṛddhi*, which are taught by (uttering the words) *guṇaḥ*, *vṛddhiḥ*, they (take the place) of *ik*. This is what he says in the Bhāṣya: "This will be made a necessary part of it... Well then

⁵ The word *yogabheda* appears once in the VP III.14.86 [= Iyer 85]: *taddhito yogabhedena vākyam vā syād vibhāṣitam | parimāṇādhike tatra prathamā śiṣyate punaḥ ||* Helārāja Comm. (p. 192): *atrāpy adhyāropeṇābhedasambandhe mānameyayogo niyamena na pratīyeta sāmīpyāder api sambhavād iti 'tad asya parimāṇam' (P.5.1.57) iti yogavibhāgena taddhitaḥ syāt | vākyam vā mahāvibhāṣayā, prasthaḥ parimāṇam eṣaṁ vṛhīṇām iti |* Apparently, this word is regarded as *yogavibhāga*.

just as this is made a necessary part of it, that also will be made a necessary part of it [tr. by G. B. Palsule, p. 39].⁶

What is discussed here is that if P.7.3.84 should be read with P.1.1.3 to have a correct derivation, in other words, if both P.1.1.3 and P.7.3.84 are each incomplete in itself, why are these two rules prescribed separately in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, one in chapter one and the other in chapter seven? The word *yogabheda* simply means 'separate/different rule' (in other words, P.1.1.3 and P.7.3.84 are different rules). Thus, in this case, the word *yogabheda* has nothing to do with the matter of 'rule-splitting'; hence, it is not equivalent to *yogavibhāga*.

§1.2 SECOND EXAMPLE

In the commentary on P.1.1.34.

P.1.1.34: *pūrvāparāvaradakṣiṇottarāparādharaṇi vyavasthāyām asaṃjñāyām*.

P.1.1.35: *svam ajñātidhanākhyāyām*.

P.1.1.36: *antaram bahiryogopasaṃvyanayoh*.

These three rules tell us that the words *pūrvā*, etc. are called *sarvanāman* (pronominal) when they denote a particular sense.⁷ A problem arises: since those words are enumerated in the Gaṇapāṭha 241.15-17 (exactly in the same sentences), what is the purpose of giving these rules twice?

⁶ Translator's Notes, p. 143: "*īatrāpekṣāyām satyām* ... etc. makes a point which is not made expressly in the Mbh. Bhar. says that if neither P.1.1.3 nor P.7.3.84 etc. is complete in itself and requires (*apekṣā*) the other to complete it, what is the use of regarding them as two independent rules (*vākyabheda*)?"

⁷ As to the reading of these rules, there is a diversity of interpretations among modern scholars concerning the problem whether or not P.1.1.32 continues to the following rules and whether or not the word *na* in P.1.1.29 should be read with them. Here, I will quote some of their readings:

Kiparsky 1979: 84 "These rules [= P.1.1.34-36, noted by NK] have been analyzed in an exemplary way by Bloomfield (1927). His interpretation, which I have followed in the above translation, differs in two respects from the traditional one. First, he takes the *anuvṛtti* of *vibhāṣā jasi* (32) no further than the next rule, whereas the tradition continues it all the way to 36. Bloomfield correctly notes that *ca* in 33 signals the *nivṛtti* (discontinuation) of *vibhāṣā jasi*." He also says [p. 86]: "Note that we do not read *na* from 29 into this rule [= 32, noted by NK], as it stopped by *ca* in 31." As to his reading, Joshi-Roodbergen 1991: 41 rejects: "But there is no sufficient evidence to say that *ca* discontinues *na*." See also Joshi-Bhate 1984: 112-29.

Katre 1987: 15 on P.1.1.32: "[The t.t.) *sarvanāman* 27] optionally (*vibhāṣā*) denotes [the class words whose first member is *sarva-* 27, (occurring at the end of 1.1.27) a *dvandva* compound 31] before (the nominative plural *sUP* ending) *Jas*." On P.1.1.36: "[The t.t.) *sarvanāman* 27 optionally denotes 32] the words *pūrvā* 'front, eastern,' [before affix *Jas* 32] provided they are employed in the sense of relative situation (*vyavasthā*) and not used as proper names (*asaṃjñāyām*)."

MBh ad P.1.1.34 [I, 93, 6]: *idaṃ tarhi prayojanaṃ Jasi vibhāṣāṃ vakṣyāmīti* /

MBhD on MBh ad P.1.1.34 [Fasc. III, 29.48]: *tatra pūrvādīnāṃ nityā saṃjñā tribhiḥ sūtraiḥ punar vidhiyate / vākyabhedenā ca svaritacihnāsañjanāt pratisūtram Jasi vibhāṣānumīyate / na cedam ekavākyabhāve vibhāṣāyāḥ sambhavati / pratipadoccāraṇaṃ vākyabhedenā vibhāṣāyāḥ saṃni-dhānārtham / ākāṅkṣāsambhāve 'sati tu yuktam ekavākyatvam /*

Pradīpa on do. [I, 343 left]: *vākyabhedenā ca vibhāṣā Jasi vidhiyate/ yathā 'mi pūrvāḥ [P.6.1.107]' 'saṃprasāraṇāc ca [P.6.1.108]' ity atra vākyabhedenā 'vā chandasi [P.6.1.106]' iti saṃbandhāc chandasi vikalpaḥ kriyate iti bhāvaḥ /*

Tr.: With reference to this the [sic.] (*sarvanāma*) *saṃjñā* is permanently given to *pūrvā* etc. by the three rules. And owing to the attachment of *svārīta* mark a **separate sentence** (is understood) by means of (which) optional (*sarvanāmasaṃjñā*) before *jas* is understood in every rule. This (statement about) option is not possible if (the rule) is one sentence. The reading of each word is meant for connecting (the statement) with option **through a separate sentence**. In the absence of expectancy, however, it is proper (to understand the rule as) one sentence [tr. by V.B. Bhagavat and Soroja Bhate, pp. 79-80].⁸

Based on Patañjali's answer, Bhartṛhari states that it is for the sake of the continuation (*anuvṛtti*) of P.1.1.32 (*vibhāṣā Jasi*) in P.1.1.34-36: the optional assignment of the term *sarvanāman* to *pūrvā*, etc. If this *vākyabheda* is not allowed in interpreting the rule, since there is no word 'ca' in P.1.1.33 we cannot read P.1.1.32 as being optionally assigned to P.1.1.34-36. In order to read 32 continuously with 34-36, we need some sort of extra treatment; that is, since these three rules are mentioned in the Gaṇapāṭha, we would

Sharma 1990: 32-34: on P.1.1.32: "*dvandve* (31) *saṃjñā jasi vibhāṣā sarvādīni sarvanāmasaṃjñāni* (27) *na* (29) *bhavanti*"; on P.1.1.36: "*pūrvādīni vibhāṣā jasi* (32) *sarvanāmasaṃjñāni* (27) *bhavanti vyavasthāyām asaṃjñāyām*."

Joshi-Roodbergen 1991: 41 on P.1.1.32: "(*sarva* 'all', etc. are) preferably (*na vibhāṣā*) (called *sarvanāman* 'pronoun') before (the pl. nom. ending) *jas* (in a *dvandva* cp.). 1. The rules P.1.1.27, P.1.1.29 (*na*) and P.1.1.31 are continued"; on P.1.1.34: "1. The items *sarvādīni* (P.1.1.27), *na* (P.1.1.29), *dvandve* (P.1.1.31) and *vibhāṣā jasi* (P.1.1.32) are discontinued. In fact, whatever is reinforced by *ca* in P.1.1.31 is discontinued."

⁸ Translators' Notes, pp. 212-13: "*vākyabhedenā ca* etc. ... However, if the repetition in these three rules [= P.1.1.34-36. noted by NK] is meant to serve some other purpose as pointed above, how can they achieve this purpose? The author's solution to this problem is the device of *vākyabheda*. According to this device, a rule is supposed to contain two *vākyas* or statements. Each of the rule *pūrvaparā* ... etc. accordingly consists of two statements. One statement simply teaches the *sarvanāmasaṃjñā* for *pūrvā* etc. whereas the other teaches optional *sarvanāmasaṃjñā* to *pūrvā* etc. before the nominative plural (suffix *jas*). This *vākyabheda* or understanding two sentences from a rule is obtained by imagining that all the three rules are marked with a *svārīta*. ...

"In this way the repetition serves a double purpose: it repeats the *sarvanāmasaṃjñā* of *pūrvā* etc. which results in cancelling the non-application of *tasī* etc. and it also helps *vākyabheda* leading to another statement by connecting itself with the words *jasi vibhāṣā*."

expect 34-36 to have an additional meaning. To supply this additional meaning, Bhartṛhari introduces *svarita*-markings to these rules. If P.1.1.34-36 are marked with *svarita*, according to P.1.3.11 we can read these rules as having additional function, namely, the optional assignment of the term *sarvanāma* to *pūrva* etc. ending in nom. pl. by the force of *anuvṛtti*. Therefore, the *vākyabheda* means in this case 'by reading P.1.1.34-36 in two ways.' One sentence prescribes "an assignment of the term *sarvanāmasamjñā* to the words *pūrva*, etc." and the other is that "when they end in nom. pl. they are optionally assigned *sarvanāmasamjñā*."

§1.3. THIRD EXAMPLE

In the commentary on P.1.1.42: *Śi sarvanāmasthanam*; P.1.1.43: *sUD anapumsakasya*. P.1.1.42 is a *samjñā* rule and prescribes what is called *sarvanāmasthāna* (strong case ending). By P.1.1.42 endings indicated by sigla /*Śi*/ [= n. pl. Nom., Acc. by P.7.1.20: *Jaś-Śasoḥ Śih*] are called *sarvanāmasthāna*; by 43 all nominal endings indicated by sigla /*sUT*/ [= sg. Nom., Acc.; du. Nom., Acc.; pl. Nom.] are called *sarvanāmasthāna* with the exception of those of a neuter.⁹

MBhD on MBh ad P.1.1.42-43 [Fasc. VII, 22.5-9] *apara evaṃ varṇayanti, yadi yathā 'Śi sarvanāmasthānam' iti svatantram lakṣaṇaṃ samjñāyām evaṃ vākyabhedena 'sUT sarvanāmasthānam' tato 'napumsakasyeti pratiṣedhavākye ayaṃ doṣaḥ /*

Uddyota [I, 369 left]: *Śi sarvanā° / bhāṣye 'asamarthasamāśaś ce' ti dūṣaṇāntaram / tatrāsāmarthyam – asaṃbandhāt / cena vākyabhedasyāpi saṃgrahaḥ /*

Tr.: Others explain thus: If *suṭ sarvanāmasthānam* (is read as) an independent sentence (laying down the name *sarvanāmasthāna* separately) just as *śi sarvanāmasthānam* is an independent rule teaching the name *sarvanāmasthāna*, then the defect (results) in the prohibitive rule *anapumsakasya* [tr. by V. B. Bhagavat and Saroja Bhate, p. 80].¹⁰

Although this *vākyabheda* appears in the opinion of other grammarians, the word *vākyabheda* means 'sentence divided into two' as stated in the text: *vākyabhedena 'sUT sarvanāmasthānam' tato 'napumsakasye' ti*. This sentence-splitting is rejected, of course.

In this case, by means of the *vākyabheda* we have two operations derived from this single rule P.1.1.43: (1) to assign the designation

⁹ As to the reading '*anapumsakasya*', the commentators have discussed how to interpret a negative compound '*anapumsaka*'.

¹⁰ Translators' Notes, p. 196: "*apare evaṃ ...* etc. The author cites the view of other grammarians in this connection [sic]. According to them although the rule *śi sarvanāmasthānam* and *suṭ anapumsakasya* are put together in the Vār. and they together form one topic, they should be treated separately as they are two separate sentences. In fact they are two independent rules. Therefore, the negation *anapumsakasya* is connected with the latter rule alone."

sarvanāmasthāna to *sUT* [general]; (2) to cancel its application to a neuter stem [special]. This is a case of dividing the sentences into two and its usage is quite similar to *yogavibhāga*.¹¹

§1.4. FOURTH EXAMPLE

In the commentary on P.1.1.44: *naveti vibhāṣā*, discussing P.1.2.3-4.

P.1.2.3: *vibhāṣorṇoḥ*; P.1.2.4: *sārvadhātukam aPIT*.

The former prescribes that [a suffix beginning with *iṭ*^{1.2.2}] is optionally regarded as marked with *Ṇ*^{1.2.1}] when it is added to the verbal base *ūrṇu* "to cover." The latter prescribes that a *sārvadhātuka* suffix which is not marked with *P* [is regarded as marked with *Ṇ*^{1.2.1}].

MBh ad P.1.1.44 [I, 106, 12-14]: *yady api nānaivam api samdehaḥ / katham / praurṇuvīti / sārvadhātukam aPIT* (P.1.2.4) *iti vā nitye prāpte 'nyatra vāprāpta ubhayatra veti / aprāpte /*

MBhD on MBh ad P.1.1.44 [Fasc. VII, 38.8-11]: *guṇapraṭiṣedho 'tra kāryam / sa tu kiṃ nityaḥ praṭiṣedha āhosvit vibhāseti / etad āha — 'ekam ced' iti / yady apy nānā evam api samdehaḥ / katham punar 'vibhāṣorṇoḥ' (P.1.2.3) ity etat 'sārvadhātukam aPIT' (P.1.2.4.) ity atra vartate? iṭas cāPITtvāt vākyabhedenā pravṛttir ity anumīyate.*

Pradīpa [I, 383 left]: *ūrṇor vibhāseti / 'vibhāṣorṇoḥ' iti sūtram yady 'asamyogāl IT KID' (P.1.2.5) ity atrānuvartate, ūrṇuś cāsamyogānta evety asamyogagrahaṇād vākyabhedenorṇoḥ parasyeDāder ITō nityam KIttvam prāptam vikalpyate, tataḥ prāptavibhāṣā / iḌupajīvanārtham tu sthānāntare sūtram paṭhitam / atha tatra sūtram nānuvartate, paraviṭpratiṣedhaś ca, tataḥ — aprāptavibhāṣā / atha pūrva-viṭpratiṣedhaḥ, tadā — ubhayatreṭi samśayaḥ /*

Uddyota [ibid.]: *vākyabhedenety asya vikalpyata ity anenānvayaḥ / idam sarvaṃ NITtvaKITtvayor aikyābhimānena /*

Pradīpa on do. [I, 383 right]: *sārvadhātukam aPID ity atra yadi vibhāṣorṇor ity etad vākyabhedenā sambadhyate, tataḥ — prāptavibhāṣā / athāsambandhaḥ pūrvaviṭpratiṣedhaḥ, tataḥ — ubhayatravibhāṣā / paraviṭpratiṣedhe tu — aprāpte /*

Uddyota on do: *vākyabhedeneti / pṛthakpāṭhasāmarthyād iti bhāvaḥ /*

Tr.: Here rejection of *guṇa* is the grammatical operation. Is this rejection obligatory? Or optional? In this connection (Patañjali) says: "If (the *kittva* and the *nittva* are) one and the same" etc. "There is a doubt even when (the *kittva* and the *nittva*) are different." How? The (rule) *vibhāṣorṇoḥ* is continued in the rule

¹¹ In the translation, the editors translate the word *vākyabheda* as 'independent rule.' However, since P.1.1.43 is divided into two — '*sUT* (*sarvanāmasthānam*)' and '*anapūmsakasya*'—, this word should be translated as 'rule-splitting.'

sārvadhātukam apit. Since *iṭ* is not *pit*, it is inferred that the rule (*vibhāṣorṇoḥ*) applies as a separate statement [ibid., p. 105].¹²

If P.1.2.3 and 4 are joined together in one rule, it would lead to a wrong restriction of the operation in P.1.2.4. That is, P.1.2.4 can be applied to only one example, i.e., *ūrṇu*. That is why Bhartṛhari says “*iṭas cāPITtvāt*”. His statement is intended to express the difference of scope between P.1.2.3 and 4. In this case, the word *vākyabheda* means ‘separate/different rule’ as stated by Nāgeśa: *prthakpāṭhasāmarthyād iti bhāvaḥ*.

§1.5. FIFTH EXAMPLE

Under P.1.1.44; discussion of P.3.1.48 and 66.

P.3.1.48: *Ṇi-śri-dru-sru-bhyaḥ kartari CaṆ*.

P.3.1.61: [*dhātoḥ*^{3.1.22} *lUNi*⁴³ *Cleḥ*⁴⁴ *kartari*⁴⁸ *CiṆ te*⁶⁰] *dīpa-jana-budha-pūritāyi-pyāyi-bhyo* ‘*nyatarasyām*. This rule prescribes that Aorist marker *CiṆ* is introduced optionally after verbal roots *dīp-* ... only when *ta* [*lUN* substitute] denotes an agent.

P.3.1.66: *CiṆ bhāvakarmaṇoḥ*: This rule says that *CiṆ* is introduced after verbal roots when *ta* [*lUN* substitute] denotes either *bhāva* or *karman*.

MBh ad do. [ibid., 107, 8-9]: *katham ca prāpte katham vāprāpte katham vobhyatra / bhāvakarmaṇoḥ* [P.3.1.66] *iti vā nitye prāpte* ‘*nyatra vāprāpta ubhayatra veti / aprāpte / kartarīti hi vartate / evam api saṁdeho nyāyye vā kartari, karmakartari veti. nāsti saṁdehaḥ /*

MBhD on do. [Fasc. VII, 40.19-20]: *yadi kartarīty etad api svaryate, tatra kartṛparigrhītā dīpādayo vākyabhedena kriyāśabdaṁ labhante /*

Pradīpa on do. [I, 385 left]: *bhāvakarmaṇor iti / ‘CiṆ bhāvakarmaṇor’ ity atra sūtre yadi dīpajanety etat sūtram anuvartya vākyabhedena sambandhaḥ kriyate prthagpāṭhasāmarthyāt. tadā – prāptavibhāṣā / atha nānuvartate paraviṣṭiṣedhaś ca, tadā – aprāptavibhāṣā / pūruvaviṣṭiṣedhe tūbhayatra – iti saṁśayaḥ /*

Tr.: If (the word) *kartari* is also marked with *svartia*, then *dīp* etc. being connected with *kartṛ*, there is a separate sentence and, therefore, (a separate) verb [ibid., p. 109].¹³

¹² Translators’ Notes, pp. 234-35: “The author of the *Dīp.* explains Pat.’s argument as follows: The rule *vibhāṣorṇoḥ* is continued in P.1.1.4 [sic.; read P.1.2.4]: *sārvadhātukam apit* which thus yields two statements: (1) an *apit* *sārvadhātuka* suffix added to a root is regarded as *ñit* and (2) *idādi* *sārvadhātuka* suffix following *ūrṇu* is optionally regarded as *ñit*. P.1.2.3 thus obviously becomes a *prāptavibhāṣā*. However, if it is not continued in P.1.2.4, then both the rules, namely P.1.2.3 and 1.2.4, having independent scopes, conflict with each other in derivations like *praurṇuvīti*. If *paraviṣṭiṣedha* is accepted, the application of P.1.2.3 being restricted to suffixes other than *sārvadhātuka* *apit* suffixes, it is an *aprāptavibhāṣā*. Pat. accepts the latter view.”

¹³ Translators’ Notes, pp. 239-40: “... After the *anuvṛtti* of the word *dīpa* ... in the rule *bhāvakarmaṇoḥ*, however, we obtain two separate statements rather than one single statement from the rule as follows: (1) *CiṆ* is invariably substituted in the place of *Cli* added to a root when

In this case, when P.3.1.61 is read with the word *kartari* continued from P.3.1.48, a condition for an optional application of P.3.1.61 is that "when *-ta* [3rd sg. A] denoting an agent is added to the verbal bases" If this *anuvṛtti* is rejected and a verbal ending *-ta* is regarded to express 'bhāva', then P.3.1.66 is introduced here; *CiN* should be obligatorily added to. But here a conflict between *CiN* as *kartari* (61) and *CiN* as *bhāvakarmanoh* (66) occurs. Therefore, rules 61 and 66 should be treated as separate rules. This is clearly stated by Kaiyaṭa: *prthagpāthasāmarthyāt* (on the strength of different formulas).

§1.6. SIXTH EXAMPLE

In the commentary on P.1.1.48: *eCa iGghrasvādeṣe*.

This rule is a *paribhāṣā* rule and prescribes a short replacement [*iK* = *i*, *u*, *ṛ*, *ḷ*] for vowels *eC* [= *e*, *o*, *ai*, *au*].

MBh ad P.1.1.48 [I, 117, 12]: *viṣayārtham etat syāt /*

MBhD on MBh ad P.1.1.48 [Fasc. VIII, 17, 6-12]: *hrasvādeṣe = hrasvādeṣavidhau, idam upatiṣṭhate 'eCo iG bhavati' iti / itarathā hi hrasvādeṣa ity asyāvacana ihāpi prāpnoti — deḥvadatteti / tasmāt hrasvāśāsanaviṣaye 'hrasvo bhavati' iti vākyabhedenopatiṣṭhate, prātipadikasya hrasvo bhavati, eCas tu iG bhavāṭity eCo 'nyatra hrasvo bhavati /*

Pradīpa on do. [I, 406 right]: *viṣayārtham iti / yatra hrasvo vidhīyate tatraivāsyopasthānam yathā syāt, deḥvadatteti plutādividhāv upasthānam mā bhūt / asmiṃś copasthite vākyabedenaiCa iKo vidhīyamānā antaratamā dīrghā eva prāpnuvanti / hrasvasya bādhitatvād dīrghṣu kṛṣṣu punar hrasvā 'prasaṅgaḥ /*

Uddyota on do.: *ekavākyabhāvenaiCa iti / ekavākyabhāvo nāma 'eCa iK' ity asya hrasve śeṣabhāvaḥ / na tu parasparanīyogā bhāvaḥ / anvayas tu vākyabhedenaiyeti /*

Tr.: This (rule) may be for (mentioning) the domain: *i*, *u*, *ṛ*, *ḷ* become substitutes of *e*, *o*, *ai*, *au* where a short (substitute) is laid down.

This (expression) viz. '*i*, *u*, *ṛ*, *ḷ* take the place of *e*, *o*, *ai*, *au*' presents itself in the *hrasvādeṣa*, i.e. in the rule which teaches a short substitute. For, otherwise, (i.e.) if *hrasvādeṣe* is not read (in the rule), (an *iK*) becomes due even here in *Deḥvadatta*. Therefore, in a rule which teaches a short substitute (saying:) 'a short substitute takes place', this (i.e. *eca ik*) presents itself as an **independent sentence** (thus resulting in the meaning:) (1) There is a short substitute for (the final of) a nominal stem, (and) (2) for *ec* (i.e., *e*, *o*, *ai*, *au*), however, *ik* (i.e., *i*, *u*, *ṛ*, *ḷ*) is the

ta conveying *bhāva* or *karman* follows, and (2) *CiN* is optionally substituted in the place of *Cli* added to *dīpa*, *jan* ... etc. when *ta* conveying *bhāva* or *karman* follows. The rule is thus a combination of two statements. The word *dīpajana* ... which is continued in the rule *bhāvakarmanoh* does not form part (*aṅga*) of the rule. Pāṇini certainly intended these two separate statements otherwise he would have made one rule as *bhāvakarmanor dīpajanabudhapūritāyipyāyibhyo 'nyatarasyām* rather than two separate rules as they exist in the present *sūtrapāṭha*."

substitute. Thus a short (substitute) will be there except for *ec* [tr. by G. B. Palsule and V. B. Bhagavat, p. 67].¹⁴

As stated by Bhartṛhari, P.1.1.48: *eCa iGghrasvādeśe* is divided into two sentences: *prātipadikasya hrasvo bhavati*, *eCas tu iG bhavati*. According to this division, we have two operations: (1) replacement of a short vowel in place of a final vowel of a neuter stem; (2) in case the final vowel is *eC*, it is replaced by *iK*. For example, P.1.2.47: *hrasvo napumsake prātipadikasya* (a short vowel is substituted for the final vowel of a nominal stem when it is used in the neuter). If the substitute is not read here, /*eC*/ would be replaced by *guru*-vowel, namely *phuta*, by P.8.2.86. In order to avoid this wrong substitution, there should be rules which prescribe an operation of substituting a *hrasva* and its substitute separately. Thus, the word *vākyabheda* means 'splitting the rule into two.'¹⁵

§1.7. SEVENTH EXAMPLE

In the commentary on P.1.1.51: *ur aṇ rAparah*.

This rule prescribes that /*aṇ*/ [*a, i, u,*]. coming as a substitute in the place of /*r*/, is automatically followed by /*r*/ . A problem arises; how to replace /*r*/ by /*aṇ*/ and to add /*r*/ after it?

MBh ad P.1.1.51 [I, 125, 17-18]: *kim idam ur aṇ raparavacanam anyanivṛttyartham/uḥ sthāne 'Ṇ eva bhavati rAparaś ceti/āhosvid rAparatvamātram anena vidhīyate/uḥ sthāne 'Ṇ cānaṇ ca aṇ tu rApara iti.* /

MBhD on MBh ad P.1.1.51 [Fasc. VIII, 30, 24-25]: *kim idam ur aṇ rAparavacanam anyanivṛttyartham? iKogunavṛddhisūtre (P.1.1.3) 'sya sūtrasya vijñātaṃ pāratantryam / saty. api tu pāratantrye ṣaṣṭhīnirdeśaviṣayatvamātram asyeti yatra ṣaṣṭhī tatrayam apūrvam ādeśāntarāṇāṃ bādhakam nirvartayati / nirvartya [cā]syaiiva rAparatvam vidhatte vākyabhedāt – uḥ sthāne 'Ṇ bhavati, sa ca rApara iti /*

Pradīpa on do. [I, 424 right]: *kim idam iti / ṣaṣṭhīprakaraṇād yatra ṣaṣṭhī tatredam upatiṣṭhate / tatra kim ādeśāntarāṇāṃ bādhakam aṇam nirvartayati, tasya ca vākyabhedena rAparatvam / āhosvid*

¹⁴ Translators' Notes, p.165: "This *Dīp.* works out the effect of the *viṣayārtham* view. P.1.2.47 teaches a short substitute for the final of a neuter stem. Therefore, by the present rule, the words *eca ig (bhavati)* enter into that rule. At this time we get two statements (*vākyabheda*): (1) *prātipadikasya hrasvo bhavati* '(a final vowel of neuter) nominal stem is replaced by a short vowel' and (2) *eca ig bhavati* 'under the same circumstance (the final) *ec* is replaced by *ik*.' The effect of this twofold statement is that a short substitute comes in when the original vowel is other than *ec*, while if it is *ec*, it will be replaced by *ik*. This *ik* will necessarily be a long *ik* on account of *āntaratamya*. The desired short *ik* will not be available."

¹⁵ Although in the translation the word *vākyabheda* is translated as 'independent sentence,' it is clear from its context that P.1.1.48 is divided into two sentences, each of which prescribes one grammatical treatment.

rAparatvamātram anena kriyate, uḥ sthāne lakṣaṇāntareṇa niṣpanno yo 'N sa rApara iti praśnaḥ //

Uddyota on do.: **vākyabhedena** — *ÑN ityādir* (P.6.1.197) *udātto bhavati, rvarṇasya tu aN bhavati sa ca rAparaḥ — ity artha iti bhāvaḥ /*

Tr.: ... The subservience of this rule is known from (the MBh. on) the rule *iko guṇavṛddhi* (P.1.1.3). In spite of its being subservient, all (rules) containing a Genitive (of *r*) form its province. Therefore, where(ever) there is a Genitive (of *r*), there it produces a new substitute (viz. *aṇ*) which supersedes other substitutes. And having produced it, it enjoins a *r* to follow that (substitute) only, this (latter) **on the basis of the splitting of the sentence (into two)**: "(1) *aṇ* takes the place of *r*. and (2) that (*aṇ*) is followed (invariably) by *r*". ... [tr. by G. B. Palsule and V.B. Bhagavat, pp. 85-86].¹⁶

According to the Nyāsa, there are three interpretations concerning this rule; the Padamañjarī adds one more interpretation.¹⁷

Nyāsa [I. 175]:

(1) *r* -> *aN* followed by *r*.

uḥ sthāne aN rAparatvaṇ ca anenobhayaṃ vidhīyate (in the place of /*r*/ a substitute /*aN*/ which is followed by /*r*/ is replaced; both operations are prescribed by this rule).

(2) *r* - -> *aN* (by some rule) and later -> *aNr*.

lakṣaṇāntareṇa vihitasyāN uḥ sthāne paścād anena rAparatvamātraṃ kriyate some other rule prescribes the replacement of /*r*/ by /*aN*/ and subsequently an addition of /*r*/ alone is enjoined by this rule [P.1.1.51]).

(3) *r* -> *aN* (by some rule) and -> *aNr* (1.1.51).

uḥ sthāne lakṣaṇāntareṇa vidhīyamāno 'N vidhānakāla eva tena lakṣaṇāntareṇa saha saṃhatya rAparatvaviśiṣṭo 'nena bhāvīyate (/ *aN*/ which is prescribed by some other rule to replace /*r*/) being joined with that rule only when it is formulated, is delimited by subsequential /*r*/; this substitution is done by this rule).

Padamañjarī [I. 175]:

(1) *r* -> *aN* followed by *r*.

uḥ sthāne raparo 'N bhavātīty anena rAparatvaviśiṣṭo 'N bhāvīyate. = (N- 1)

¹⁶ Translators' Notes, p. 232: "The *Dīp. yatra śaṣṭhī tatra* ... pinpoints the exact scope of this rule (*yatra śaṣṭhī tatra*), and says that this *aṇ* substitute supersedes other claimants (*ādeśāntarāṇāṃ bādhakam*). — This rule is further analysed and shown to be consisting of two statements: (1) *uḥ sthāne aṇ bhavati*, and (2) *sa ca raparaḥ* as the MBh. says. It is necessary to resort to this *vākyabheda*, *ekatra vidheyadvayāsambhavāt* (*Chāyā*)."

¹⁷ For details, see Sharma 1990: 52-53. Cf. Joshi-Roodbergen 1991: 71. They say: "we conclude that the *guṇa/vṛddhi* operation and the addition of *r* are meant to take place at the same time."

(2) $r \rightarrow aN + r$.

uḥ sthāne 'N eva bhavati, sa ca rApara iti aNanaNprasange 'N niyamyate, tasya ca rApa[ra]tvam vidhīyate. (/aN/ with a following /r/ alone comes in place of /r/).

(3) $r \rightarrow aN$ (by some rule) and later $\rightarrow aNr$ (1.1.51).

uḥ sthāne vihito 'N ity anūdya tasya vidhānottarakāle rAparatvamātram vidhīyate. = (N- 2).

(4) $r \rightarrow aN$ (by some rule) and $\rightarrow aNr$ (1.1.51).

yaḥ uḥ sthāne 'N vidhīyate ity anūdya tasya prasaṅgāvasthāyām eva rApa[ra]tvamātram vidhīyate. = [N- 3]

The above diversity of interpretations is based on how these two operations should be done: whether one operation is independently applied and then the other operation is employed subsequently. Dividing P.1.1.51 into two sentences, we have two operations represented by each sentence: (1) replacement of /aN/ to /r/; (2) /r/ follows /aN/. Although these two are concurrently employed, it is obvious that P.1.1.51 is a rule which has two grammatical treatments — replacement of /aN/ and addition of /r/. Therefore, in this case, the word *vākyabheda* means 'splitting the rule into two (sentences),' each having one grammatical operation respectively.

2. In sum

As we have seen, the usage of the word *vākyabheda* in the MBhD is either in the sense of 1) separate/different rule [1, 4, 5], 2) double meaning [2], or 3) splitting one rule into two (or more) [3, 6, 7]. The second usage is somewhat isolated but to read one sentence in two different ways postulates two independent sentences in reading. At least, our material tells us that the *vākyabheda* sometimes functions as the *yogavibhāga* with respect to the dividing of the rule into two (or more). Since the observations made in the present paper are based solely on one source, the MBhD,¹⁸ which itself is an incomplete text, they are necessarily limited, hence we inevitably need to further investigate and compare these findings with the later

¹⁸ In the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, we have two instances of the use of '*vākyabheda*':

II. 448: *ekatiṇ yasya vākyam tu śāstre niyatalakṣaṇam | tasyātiṅgrahaṇenārtho vākyabhedān na vidyate* || [= Iyer 443] (According to him [= Kātyāyana] who holds that the fixed definition of the sentence is that it should have only one verb, there would be a different sentence if there were more than one verb and, therefore, the mention of *atiṅgaḥ* [= P.8.1. 28] would be useless.)

471: *bhedanirvacane tu asya pratyeḥam vā samāpyate | śrutirvacanabhinnā vā vākyabhede 'vatiṣṭhate* || [= Iyer 466] (When the complex whole is analysed into its parts, the meaning of the sentence is connected with each part. Or the mention of the accessories is split up into many because of the plural suffix in it, results in the splitting up of the sentence.) [Sanskrit text and its numbering from Rau edition, English translation from Iyer 1977].

commentaries of the Pāṇinīyas. However, it seems to be certain that the above-mentioned distinction in the usage of the *vākyabheda* is not found consistently in the interpretations of the Pāṇini's sūtras and at least it is safe to say that the word *vākyabheda* has a wider denotation than that of *yogavibhāga*. In other words, the *vākyabheda* is inclusive of the notion of *yogavibhāga* but not vice versa.

As quoted above (Joshi-Roodbergen 1969: 95), the usage of the term *yogavibhāga* is restricted: to divide the rule into two (or more) – one for a sentence including an(non)-application in a particular case and the other for a sentence having an application in general. The implementation of *yogavibhāga* as a grammatical technique is thus for the purpose of dividing the scope or the condition for application.

However, the cases where the *vākyabheda* is understood to denote 'splitting the rule' are ones wherein two (sometimes opposite) operations are prescribed in one single rule as in the instances of (3), (6), and (7); each operation is then represented in one divided sentence by means of the *vākyabheda* and the operations are continuously or oppositely applied. It is most likely that when the grammarian(s) divided the rule, their criterion for doing so might have been to negotiate the conflict between a special/particular and a general range of application prescribed in the rule. Even though the rule allowed for two different interpretations, that does not necessarily constitute a fault, unlike the Mīmāṃsakas. The term *vākyabheda* is thus a sort of interpretive method that does not impart any change to the status of the rule, although it is not so technical or restrictive as *yogavibhāga*.¹⁹

¹⁹ It is well known that there are instances where a rule (or a word in the rule) is interpreted in two different ways and discussed which interpretation to accept. It is a case of interpretation of a negative compound included in the rule. There are two interpretations: *paryudāsa* and *prasajyapraṭiṣedha*. In the former interpretation, a meaning of negation is directed only to the last member of the compound and so the meaning of negative compound is regarded as an exception to the rule; in the latter, an operation is applied tentatively but it is cancelled. This latter interpretation is nothing but a 'dividing the rule into two sentences' or 'reading one rule in two sentences.' Those two interpretations sometimes do not stand each other; since two different meanings are based on one rule (word), we must cast away one interpretation as a fault. This is a case of 'double meaning' of the *vākyabheda*. The Nyāsa on P.1.1.42-43 says (I, 156): *tathā hi — vidhipraṭiṣedhayor virodhād ekena vākyena tāvac chakyo na vidhātum iti vākyabhedah kartavyaḥ — 'sUṭ sarvanāmasthānasamjño bhavati. napuṃsakasya ca na bhavati' iti.*

We have another instance wherein the *vākyabheda* and two negations are related together, see the Padamañjarī on P.3.3.19 (3, 25): *kāraagrahaṇam ityādi — paryudāse hi nañivayuktanyāyena kartur anyasmimś tatsadṛṣe kāraḥ eva pralīlir bhavati, yathā — abrahmaṇa iti kṣatriyāḍau. tasmāt paryudāse kāraagrahaṇam na kartavyam. prasajyapraṭiṣedhe tu vākyabhedena samjñāyām GHaÑ bhavati, kartari tu na bhavalīty eṣo'rtho bhavati. tatra prathame vākye'rthanirdesābhāvād "anirdiṣṭārthāḥ pratyayāḥ svārthe bhavanti" [Pbh 113] iti svārtha eva syāt.*

ABBREVIATIONS

- KV = Kāśikāvṛtti, with Jinendrabuddhi's Nyāsa (Kāśikāvivaranaṇapañjikā) and Haradatta's Padamañjarī, eds. D.D. Shastri and K.P. Shukla, six volumes, Prachya Bharati Series, Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1965-67 [text referred by volume and page].
- MBh = Mahābhāṣya, (a) edited by F. Kielhorn (revised by K.V. Abhyankar), three volumes, Poona: BORI, 1962, 1965, 1972, [text referred by volume, page, and line], (b) — with Pradīpa and Uddyota, eds. Bhārgavaśāstrī Bhikāji Joshi et al. six volumes, Vrajajīvan Prācyabhārati Granthamālā no. 23, Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan 1988 (reprint of NSP edition); Vol. 2 is edited by M.M. Pandit Shivadatta Sharma [text referred by volume, page and column].
- MBhD = Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā. fasc. I, G.B. Palsule, 1985; fasc. III, V.B. Bhagavat and Saroja Bhate, 1986; fasc. VII, V.B. Bhagavat and Saroja Bhate, 1990; fasc. VIII, G.B. Palsule and V.B. Bhagavat, 1991, Poona: BORI.
- PM = Padamañjarī, see KV.
- SK = Siddhāntakaumudī of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita with Bālaṃanoramā and Tattvabodhinī, eds. Giridhara Śarmā Caturveda and Paṛameśvarānanda Śarma Bhāskara, four Volumes, Delhi: Motilāl Banarsidass 1958-1961.
- VP = Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, ed. Wilhelm Rau, Wiesbaden 1977 (Abhandlung für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Bd. 42.4).

Although it is not a comprehensive result of investigation, the number of instances wherein *vākyabheda* is discussed in the Kāśikāvṛtti, the Nyāsa, and the Padamañjarī is 2 [P.6.1.94, 8.1.18], 12 [P.1.1.43, 1.1.50, 2.4.83, 4.2.51, 6.1.2, 6.1.94, 6.1.107, 6.1.108, 6.2.148, 6.2.173-74, 8.1.10, 8.1.18] and 12 [P.1.1.50, 1.3.67, 2.4.83, 3.1.1, 3.1.88, 3.3.19, 4.3.2, 6.1.94, 6.1.107, 6.1.108, 6.2.49, 8.1.18] times respectively. Here I simply quote the two passages in the KV (for details, see Kudo 1999): on P.6.1.94, *eṇi parārūpam* [4, 562]: *kecid "vā sUPy āpiśaleḥ [P.6.1.93]" ity anuvarttayanti. tac ca vākyabhedenā sUBdhātau vikalpaṃ karoti — upēśakīyati, upaiśakīyati, upodanīyati, upaudanīyati;* on P.8.1.18, *anudāttaṃ sarvaṃ apadādau* [4, 262]: *sarvagrahaṇaṃ sarvaṃ anūdyamānaṃ vidhīyamānaṃ cānudāttaṃ yathā syād iti* [p. 263] *tena yuṣmadasmadādeśānām api vākyabhedenā nudāttaṃ vidhīyate* |

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Bhartrhari as a 'Cognitive Linguist'

JAN E.M. HOUBEN

§1.1 Bhartrhari as grammarian

The 5th century Sanskrit grammarian and philosopher Bhartrhari has often been seen as the one who elaborates language-philosophical speculations hinted at in Patañjali's commentary on the grammar (*Aṣṭādhyāyī*) of Pāṇini.¹ In such a view Bhartrhari would carry us away from grammar to philosophy, and he would be introducing his own peculiar viewpoints, for instance the view that the sentence is the main unit in language. Is it possible that Bhartrhari is in fact all the time focusing on the actual starting points and presuppositions of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, taking into account Patañjali's commentary? Can we see Bhartrhari as an author offering a very convincing interpretation and exposition of the basic axioms and procedures of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*? Can it be that a simple point has been overlooked by most

¹ This paper is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation (U.S.A) under Grant No. 0135069.

¹ Cf. Pillai 1971: xi, "If the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* gives a study of the structure of the Sanskrit language with the rules governing its functioning, the *Vārttika* of Kātyāyana largely explains the sūtras of Pāṇini, sometimes taking positions different from those taken by the *Sūtrakāra*[,] and the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali besides extensively studying the topics in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and defending Pāṇini against the *Vārttikakāra*, also incidentally introduces subjects in linguistic philosophy, one can say with certainty that it is in the *Vākyapadīya* that a first full-fledged statement and discussion of a philosophy of Grammar is given."

Bhattacharya 1985: 1, "The *Vākyapadīya*, the *magnum opus* of the great Bhartrhari, is not only the most authoritative text on the analytic aspect of Sanskrit language as such, but also

scholars of Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, namely, that there too the starting point and final aim of the user of grammar has always been the sentence and never a word in isolation, that the starting point is a preliminary sentence that needs to be checked or that needs some little extra refinement? If the latter applies, a fresh look is required, at Bhartṛhari's work, at the Aṣṭādhyāyī, and also at our ideas of what a good grammar should be. At present I start with Bhartṛhari – elsewhere I addressed the Aṣṭādhyāyī and its context, purpose and formal structure (Houben 1999). At crucial points I will have to refer to the Aṣṭādhyāyī, its basic features and current interpretations and representations.

It has been said that a good historian must also be a philologist because he must be able to deal with his sources in a critical way; and, vice versa, a good philologist must also be a historian as he needs to place his sources in a historical context. A historian of science must evidently also be aware of basic theories and problems regarding the object of the sciences and disciplines with which he is dealing. The study, interpretation and translation of the work of the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari, especially the Vākyapadīya (VP),² the work on sentences and words, will inevitably involve a confrontation with theories we ourselves are holding, whether explicitly or implicitly, on sentences and words. With regard to Indian sciences and disciplines pertaining to language, it has been pointed out that it is difficult

one of the most important philosophical works dealing with some of the basic problems of linguistic philosophy, which has also engaged the attention of some of the most eminent linguistic philosophers of our age."

Patnaik 1994: ix, "Bhartṛhari ... belonged to the Grammarian tradition of Pāṇini and Patañjali. But he transcended the limits of grammar and language analysis set by his predecessors to develop a very original philosophy of language."

Chaturvedi 2001: 1, "Bhartṛhari ... raised the science of grammar to the status of a complete philosophical system and made significant contributions to linguistic philosophy."

Biardeau 1964: 252 saw even a contrast between the grammar that was Bhartṛhari's starting point and the philosophy he ended up with: "[L]a Grammaire de Pāṇini procède par dissection du langage en ses plus petites, parties, isolant racines, préfixes et désinences pour leur appliquer séparément des règles. Or Bhartṛhari, tout en se référant à cette même grammaire, et en particulier au *Mahābhāṣya* de Patañjali, proclame la seule réalité de la phrase complète et de son sens, qui serait différent du sens des mots, et l'unité ultime de la Parole. Double discontinuité donc, pour ne pas dire contradiction."

Without denying the philosophical importance of Bhartṛhari I would like to emphasize that he is also the one who for the first time in the history of Sanskrit grammar offers an elaborate theory of language (cf. Cardona 1976: 304f) and, more specifically, a full-fledged theory of grammar that gives a concrete and practical interpretation and explanation of the grammar of Pāṇini.

² The edition that will be used here is that of Rau 1977. A further step to be taken to arrive at a more definitive version of the text is to take into account on a systematic basis the evidence of the early commentaries that are usually more ancient witnesses than the oldest (kārikā) manuscripts.

for modern scholars to detect and appreciate something in the linguistic works of ancient India if they do not have already discovered it by themselves (Staal 1988: 47). With regard to Indian *philosophical* texts B.K. Matilal once remarked "... anybody who wants to explain and systematically translate an Indian philosophical text in a European language will, knowingly or unknowingly, be using the method of comparative philosophy" (Matilal 1990: 78), and the same must apply to Indian texts on theory and philosophy of language.

§1.2 Confronting Bhartr̥hari as grammarian

Suppose the discipline involved would have been astronomy. In that case there would be quite a solid basis of current knowledge whose validity is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and partly confirmed in the practice of sending humans to the moon and remote control cars to Mars. Nothing similar applies to linguistics, and the alternation of basic axioms and starting points at the basis of different schools of linguistic thought may perhaps be likened to the steady alternation of seasons with little or no overarching development in any direction except in the techniques of collecting large masses of data and organizing them in ever different ways. Under such circumstances it seems better to compare and contrast Bhartr̥hari's linguistic thought with modern theoretical currents in an entirely detached way, without any initial presupposition or commitment to the quality and appropriateness of the theories involved on either side of the comparison.

Linguistics in the twentieth century was dominated by structuralist approaches to language, with its earliest influential representative Ferdinand de Saussure. Later on, A. Noam Chomsky placed his theoretical position explicitly in the Saussurean tradition (cf. Kaldewaij 1986 and Chomsky 1957, 1965, 1972). Both de Saussure and Chomsky place emphasis on an abstract and idealised linguistic faculty or capacity, which they call respectively *la langue* and the competence. The first and foremost object of the science of linguistics as envisaged by de Saussure and Chomsky is the structure of this *langue* or competence. The real presence – the status of being given in advance – of some structure remains largely undiscussed, and is generally presupposed without explicit argumentation by Saussurean and Chomskian (transformational generative) structuralists. Even though students of Bhartr̥hari, and also students of the grammatical tradition of Pāṇini to which Bhartr̥hari belongs, and more generally students of Indian linguistic theories, seem often implicitly or explicitly guided by the presuppositions which they import from current structuralist views, it is precisely this assumption of a general encompassing structure in language which is glaringly absent in Sanskrit as reflected in Pāṇini's grammar, in any case in Bhartr̥hari's approach to language and Pāṇini's grammar.

§1.3 Beyond linguistic structuralism

Recent years have seen the development of theories which adopt starting points that are refreshingly different from, or even opposite to, those of Chomsky, and especially those of the early Chomsky. Rather than focusing on the idealized competence of a homogenized group of speakers these theories take the speaker's usage as point of departure, and rather than assuming a given very general structure they emphasize that knowledge of language gets structured in the course of the learning and language use of the speaker.

If the twentieth century was the century of structuralist linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure was its first influential representative. That would make 1916, the date of the posthumous publication of de Saussure's *Cours de Linguistique Générale*, the starting point of the age of linguistic structuralism. It has now been suggested (Verhagen 2002) that 2000 can be taken as the date of its end, because it is the year of publication of the important paper "A Dynamic Usage-Based Model" by Ronald W. Langacker in which the author formulates a research program that is in many respects diametrically opposed to the one formulated by Noam Chomsky a few decades ago. Referring to some of his own earlier publications, Langacker describes in his article the

'maximalist,' 'non-reductive,' 'bottom-up' nature of Cognitive Grammar.
(Langacker 2000: 1)

He points out that Cognitive Linguistics, or Cognitive Grammar as he calls it here, stands in these respects

in contrast to the 'minimalist,' 'reductive,' 'top-down' spirit of generative theory,
at least in its original (archetypal) formulation. (Langacker 2000: 1)

Scholars working on a research program such as the one described by Langacker refer to themselves as 'cognitive linguists' or 'cognitive grammarians' or also as 'construction grammarians' and 'usage-based grammarians.'³ Their research is reflected for instance in publications in the scholarly journal *Cognitive Linguistics* (appearing since 1990).

In vol. 7.1 (1996) of this journal, an article by Adele E. Goldberg appeared in which the author formulated some points which, according to

³ Although Langacker characterizes Cognitive Grammars as 'maximalist' in opposition to the 'minimalist' approach of transformational generativists, William Croft 2001 claims the term 'minimalist' for his own system of Radical Construction Grammar, speaking for instance of his 'genuinely minimalist model of syntactic representation' (Croft 2001: 362). Croft's 'minimalism' is not to be confounded with the formalist 'minimalism' propounded in Chomsky 1992.

her, were widely shared foundational assumptions of cognitive linguists.⁴ Next, she argued that an author who has since long made the transformational generative research program his starting point, R.S. Jackendoff (cf. Jackendoff 1983), is gradually getting closer to the cognitive linguistic approach to language, even though he is not associating himself explicitly. Goldberg's article thus presents first of all a series of 'foundational assumptions' plus a series of points on which Jackendoff would have got closer to cognitive linguistics. Most of the assumptions in the first series suit the ideas of the 5th century Sanskrit grammarian and philosopher Bharṭṛhari remarkably well. I will focus here first of all on a discussion of this first series, Goldberg's list of 'foundational assumptions' of the cognitive linguist. It will provide refreshing insights on discussions in Bharṭṛhari's work that otherwise appear rather idiosyncratic and unclear. I will next elaborate the problematic involved in especially the last of these seven points and show its pertinence for the problem of the presence or absence of a structure in language in general and Sanskrit in particular. At the end, I will show how our findings correspond with six (or seven) fundamental theses formulated by William Croft in his most recent publications.

The seven 'foundational assumptions' of cognitive linguistics, following Goldberg, are as follows (Goldberg 1996: 3-4)—

1. Semantics is based on the speaker's *construals* of situations, not on objective truth conditions (Langacker 1985, 1987a, 1988; Fauconnier 1985; Lakoff 1987; Talmy 1985).
2. Semantics and pragmatics form a continuum, and both play a role in linguistic meaning. Linguistic meaning is part of our overall conceptual system and not a separate modular component (Talmy 1978, 1985; Haiman 1980; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987a).
3. Categorization does not typically involve necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather central and extended senses (Rosch 1973; Rosch et al. 1976; Lakoff 1977, 1987; Haiman 1978; Fillmore 1982; Hopper and Thompson 1984; Givón 1986; Brugman 1988; Taylor 1989; Corrigan et al. 1989).
4. The primary function of language is to convey meaning. Thus formal distinctions are useful to the extent that they convey semantic or pragmatic (including discourse) distinctions (Wierzbicka 1986, 1988; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987a; Haiman 1985; Croft 1991; Deane 1991).

⁴ Note that the title of Goldberg 1996 speaks of 'construction-based grammar' but the body of the article elaborates the foundational assumptions of 'cognitive linguistics.'

5. Grammar does not involve any transformational component. Semantics is associated directly with surface form.
6. Grammatical constructions, like traditional lexical items, are pairings of form and meaning. They are taken to have a real cognitive status, and are not epiphenomena based on the operation of generative rules or universal principles (Fillmore et al. 1987; Lakoff 1987; Wierzbicka 1988; Goldberg 1995).
7. Grammar consists of a structured inventory of form-meaning pairings: phrasal grammatical constructions and lexical items (Fillmore and Kay 1993; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987a; Wierzbicka 1988; Goldberg 1995).

§2.1

According to the first of Goldberg's assumptions, "Semantics is based on the speaker's *construals* of situations, not on objective truth conditions."

This must sound familiar to any student of Bharṭṛhari's work. We find that Bharṭṛhari frequently emphasizes that there is a lack of correspondence between the way things are expressed in language and the way they really are. For instance, in the third book of the *Vākyapadīya*, verses 52 and 54 of the *Saṁbandha-samuddeśa* (VP 3.3), it is precisely this point that is elaborated:

52 *pradeśasyaikadeśam vā parato vā nirūpaṇam /*
viparyayam abhāvaṁ vā vyavahāro 'nuvartate //

54 *akṛtsnaviṣayābhāsam śabdaḥ pratyayam āśritaḥ /*
artham āhānyarūpeṇa svarūpeṇānirūpitam //

Verbal usage follows [only] one aspect of a part [of reality]; or [it follows] an ascertainment through an external factor; or a reversal [of reality]: or something non-existent.

A word is based on a cognition which does not reflect its object in its entirety. It expresses the object, not ascertained according to its own form, through another form.

In the second book, Bharṭṛhari observes that the speaker's perceptions and construals which are at the basis of his linguistic utterances do not represent the object as it is:

140 *talavad drśyate vyoma khadyoto havyavāḍ iva /*
naiva cāsti talam vyomni na khadyote hutāśanaḥ //

The sky is perceived as having a surface, the firefly as fire. But there is no surface in the sky, no fire in the firefly.

Even the same person may perceive the same thing differently at different times:

- 136 *ekasminn api dṛśye 'rthe darśanaṁ bhidyate pṛthak /
kālāntareṇa caiko 'pi taṁ paśyaty anyathā punaḥ //*

With regard to one and the same visible thing perception is different (for separate seers individually). And one and the same person sees that (same) thing again different (if he looks at it) after some time.

This lack of a necessary and direct correspondence gives a certain freedom to the speaker in representing a thing as he wants. Often, the notion of *vivakṣā*, 'the speaker's intention', plays a role here. An interesting passage is, for instance, VP 2.434-437:

- 434 *yo 'mśo yenopakāreṇa prayoktṛṇām vivakṣitaḥ /
arthasya sarvaśaktivāt sa tathaiva vyavasthitaḥ //*
- 435 *ārādvṛttiṣu sambandhaḥ kadā cid abhidhīyate /
āśliṣṭo yo 'nupaśliṣṭaḥ sa kadā cit pratīyate //*
- 436 *saṁsrṣṭānām vibhaktatvaṁ saṁsargaś ca vivekinām /
nānātmakānām ekatvaṁ nānātvaṁ ca viparyaye //*
- 437 *sarvātmakatvād arthasya nairātmyād vā vyavasthitaṁ /
atyantayataśaktivāc chabda eva nibandhanam //*

If the employers of language want to express a certain aspect [of an object] with a certain function, that [object] is in that way established, because the object has all capacities.

Sometimes a relation is expressed among things that occur far apart, or something is expressed as intertwined while it is not intertwined.

Separation of what is united, and union of what is distinct, unity of what has a manifold nature, and manifoldness in what is the opposite [in what is one],

are established, either because the object has all [these diverging] natures, or because it has no [own] nature at all; [in this regard] it is the word or language, whose capacity is extremely specific/restricted/under control, that is the basis.

§2.2

According to the second assumption, "Semantics and pragmatics form a continuum, and both play a role in linguistic meaning."

Many illustrations of this point can be found in the *Vākyapadīya*. In the second book, for instance, the example is given of the boy to whom one says that he must protect the butter (*sarpis*) from crows. He need not be told separately that he should also protect the butter from dogs and other animals:

- 2.312 *kākebhyo rakṣyatām sarpir iti bālo 'pi coditaḥ /
upaghātapare vākye na śvādibhyo na rakṣati //*

Even a child that is told, in a sentence that refers to a (possible) damage, "the butter must be protected from crows," will not refrain from protecting it from dogs (will of course also protect it from dogs).

Similarly, in the washing of dishes for the sake of having a dinner, cleaning of the vessels is also understood even if it is not explicitly said:

- 2.313 *prakṣālāne śarāvāṇām sthālisammārjanam⁵ tathā /
anuktaṁ api rūpeṇa bhujyaṅgatvāt pratīyate //*

In the washing of the dishes the cleaning of the vessels is also understood, although it is not expressed through an explicit (linguistic) form, because it is part of having dinner.

Taking into account the speaker's intention in a particular context, one sometimes has to decide that the intended meaning of an utterance is quite removed from what is literally stated.

- 2.321 *vyāghrādivyapadeśena yathā bālo nivartyate /
asatyō'pi tathā kaś cit pratyavāyō'bhidhīyate //*
- 2.322 *na samvidhānam kṛtvāpi pratyavāye tathāvidhe /
śāstreṇa pratiśiddhe'rthe vidvān kaś cit pravartate //*
- 2.323 *sarpeṣu samvidhāyāpi siddhair mantrauṣadhādibhiḥ /
nānyathā pratipattavyam na dato gamayed iti //*

Just as a boy is turned away by pointing out a tiger etc., like that some negative result is mentioned (for an undesirable action) even if it is not true (in order to keep someone away from doing something).

Not even after having taken precautionary measures with regard to such a negative result does a wise man undertake something that is forbidden by a (sacred) traditional text.

Also after having taken precautionary measures with proven spells and medicines etc., one should not act in a contrary way (when the sacred text, MS 1.8.5,⁶ says): "He should not let (the sacrificial cake) go to the teeth."

The continuity of semantics and pragmatics was not only illustrated in examples such as those mentioned, it was also subject of analytic reflection. In the verse following the one cited on washing dishes and vessels,

⁵ Wilhelm Rau reads *sthānanirmārjanam*, 'cleaning the place'.

⁶ MS 1.8.5, starting at p. 121, line 20, *aṅgūlyā prāśnāti / yād attvāya nā dató gamayed / yād dató gamāyet / sarpā enam ghātukāḥ syuḥ / sarpān evā śamayaty āhimsāyai*.

Bhartrhari gives a whole list of aspects, ranging from lexical to linguistic and pragmatic context, to be taken into account in the analysis of word meanings. First a brief list (in 314) is given, next an alternative, more elaborate list, as follows:

2.315-316 *samsargo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryam virodhitā /*
arthah prakaraṇam liṅgam śabdasyānyasya samnidhiḥ //
sāmarthyam aucitī deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ /
śabdārthasyānavacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ //

The verses and the technical terms may be rendered as follows:

Connection, separation, association, opposition, meaning (or purpose), context, indication, presence of another word, suitability, propriety, place, time, gender (? *vyaktiḥ*), accent (or tone), etc.; are the criteria for getting clear the distinctions when the meaning of a word is undetermined.

As far as the continuity of semantics and pragmatics is concerned, there are good reasons to extend Bhartrhari's interpretation and representation directly to Pāṇini's grammar and to the intended users of his grammar. Elsewhere (Houben 1999, 2003) I have argued that pragmatic conditions receive distinct attention in Pāṇini's grammar and that for the users of the grammar in Pāṇini's own time there was a continuity of semantics and pragmatics as well. These are points that do not appear with sufficient clarity in current representations of Pāṇini's grammar. I take it as an influence of peculiar mentalist models promoted by Chomsky and transformational generative linguists that major discussions of Pāṇini's system of grammar, for instance Kiparsky and Staal 1969, Kiparsky 1982, and also handbooks that attempt to remain close to Pāṇini without bringing in modern views, speak of syntax, morphology and semantics, but have no category nor even a subcategory of pragmatics.⁷ Currently standard translations of the locative expressing a meaning condition, for instance, "if such and such is to be denoted", require ad hoc adaptations in case Pāṇini refers to pragmatic meaning. Cf. A 8.2.83 *pratyabhivāde 'śūdre* "[a prolated vowel which is high-pitched replaces the syllable beginning with the last vowel of an utterance] in the context of *pratyabhivāda* 'greeting in return' if it does not concern a *śūdra* (member of the fourth socio-religious class)." Allowing for some exceptions (e.g., Deshpande 1992), it can be said that pragmatics is currently a blind spot in the study of Pāṇini's system of grammar,

⁷ This is not to deny that there have been points of contact and clarifying parallels between generative grammar and Pāṇini's grammar of rules and lists. One major point of divergence is the generativist's endeavour to put his hands on a real structure underlying language use and the ancient Indian grammarian's aim of 'mere' descriptive economy without any claim of mapping linguistic thought processes.

in spite of the emphasis placed on it in the Pāṇinian commentarial tradition and especially in the work of Bhartṛhari.

§2.3

The third assumption says that “Categorization does not typically involve necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather central and extended senses.”

In usage-based models of grammar we find also the terms prototype and extensions used, applied both to phonology and semantics (e.g. Langacker 1988, 2000). For Bhartṛhari the analytical scheme of central and extended meaning is normal. He distinguishes the meaning that is *mukhya* ‘principal’ from the meaning that is derived or secondary, *guṇa*. A peculiarity of Bhartṛhari’s exposition and of Sanskrit discussions on this topic is that *mukhya* ‘principal’ and *guṇa* ‘secondary’ normally or at least frequently apply to the word used in primary versus secondary meaning rather than to the meaning directly.

Bhartṛhari’s definitions: VP 2.265-266

2.265 *śuddhasyocārāṇe svārthaḥ prasiddho yasya gamyate /
sa mukhya iti vijñeyo rūpamātranibandhanah //*

2.266 *yas tu anyasya prayogeṇa yatnād iva niyujyate /
tam aprasiddham manyante gauṇārthābhiniवेशinam //*

The (word) of which its own well-known meaning is understood when it is uttered by itself, that is known as the primary (word), as it is only based on its form.

But the one which is employed together with the employment of another one, as if with effort, that they consider not-well-established, imbued with a secondary meaning.

Other schemes for analysis were developed in Nyāya and in Mīmāṃsā (involving for instance the notion of *lakṣaṇā*) but there is no indication that they were felt as competitive theories for the grammarians in the same way as the necessary-and-sufficient-condition approach of modern logic is a competitor for central and extended senses in modern linguistics. The usefulness of distinguishing conceptual prototypes and extensions in an analysis of the system of Pāṇini’s grammar has been demonstrated by Deshpande (1991).

§2.4

“The primary function of language is to convey meaning. Thus formal distinctions are useful to the extent that they convey semantic or pragmatic (including discourse) distinctions.”

This position contributes to the acceptance of semantic aspects even of very fundamental syntactic categories such as substantives and verbs, verbal

endings, conjugational endings etc. Accepting such semantic relevance of formally expressed fundamental syntactic categories would be undesirable and even highly embarrassing for linguists who try to describe a language in terms of a well-defined domain of purely formal syntax to which one appends lists of lexical items in order to take account of anything semantic in the language.

In the third book Bhartṛhari offers extensive investigations of semantic aspects of fundamental syntactic categories that play crucial roles in Pāṇini's system. Thus we find semantic investigations of the notions of the genus and the substantial individual, of relation, of spatial direction, of person (me, you and he/she), of number, of diathese (active/medial) and of gender, as well as detailed investigations of the *kāraṅgas* or factors in an action.

Against the background of transformational-generative research programs the entire third book of the *Vākyapadīya* has at the most some value as a curiosity. In the light of cognitive linguistics it is of direct relevance to a central research question. Croft 2001: 87, for instance, draws attention to the importance of a description of semantic properties of prototypical parts of speech. We can see the third *Kāṇḍa* of Bhartṛhari as dealing precisely with this, i.e., the semantic properties of the prototypical parts of a highly inflecting language.

§2.5

"Grammar does not involve any transformational component. Semantics is associated directly with surface form."

While initially transformational components have been proposed for Pāṇini's grammar, Kiparsky 1982: 26 argues that it "lacks rules that convert, either directly or indirectly, one grammatical category into another." On the other hand, Pāṇini does work with different levels that are formally distinct (on which see now Houben 1999). For the moment I propose to accept for Sanskrit, Pāṇinian grammar and Bhartṛharian linguistic theory the validity of the first part but not of the second part of Goldberg's fifth foundational assumption. I think that Goldberg's statement is even problematic for English where phonological realization is to be distinguished from the phonetic and morphological form of linguistic utterances, so that it makes sense to accept at least two formally distinct levels in the description of English.

§2.6

"Grammatical constructions, like traditional lexical items, are pairings of form and meaning. They are taken to have a real cognitive status, and are

not epiphenomena based on the operation of generative rules or universal principles.”

This formulation of Goldberg suggests that she intends to place grammatical constructions, which classical transformational generativists would like to analyse into the strictly formal syntactical rules and the lexical items to which the rules apply, in the lexicon. This thesis has also become known as the syntax-lexicon continuum. The lexicon thus becomes an inventory of lexical items in the strict sense as well as constructions and even lexically unfilled constructional idioms. Here lies one of the remaining differences between Jackendoff, as read by Goldberg, and the Cognitive linguists. Another strategy applied by Cognitive Linguists in order to overcome the separation of a pure syntax as postulated in transformational generative grammar goes in the other direction: the inclusion of lists of lexical items in the syntax. This is precisely the situation we find in the grammar that is the starting point for Bhartṛhari. Pāṇini's grammar contains numerous lists within its rule system, next to a number of major lists such as the lists of assorted roots and nouns that are appended to the grammar.

Pāṇini's grammar is in this respect closer to an approach according to Cognitive Linguistics, but there is no trace that this was ever a conscious theoretical choice in opposition to a view which would like to have a strict separation of autonomous syntax and the lexicon. In his 2000 article, Langacker speaks of the Rule/List fallacy, which implies “the spurious assumption that rules and lists are mutually exclusive” (p. 2). He formulates his alternative as follows:

to include in the grammar both rules and instantiating expressions. This option allows any valid generalizations to be captured (by means of rules), and while the descriptions it affords may not be maximally economical, they have to be preferred on grounds of psychological accuracy to the extent that specific expressions do in fact become established as well-rehearsed units. Such units are cognitive entities in their own right whose existence is not reducible to that of the general patterns they instantiate.

To Langacker's remarks we should add that the aim to have an accurate description of psychological processes underlying the use of language is shared with Transformational Generative grammar, but for such a theoretical aim there is no explicit trace in Pāṇini's grammar. In Bhartṛhari's discussions in the *Vākyapadīya* arguments derived from introspection do play a role but not directly in a justification of the form of Pāṇinian grammar.

We should also add that Goldberg's statement is apparently based on research into a language in which the sequence of words has not just stylistic or pragmatic value, but is directly related to primary syntax. This would apply less strictly to Sanskrit and other highly inflecting languages.

§2.7

The seventh and last assumption formulated by Goldberg is: "Grammar consists of a structured inventory of form-meaning pairings: phrasal grammatical constructions and lexical items"

This assumption again undercuts the theoretical basis for a grammar consisting in a pure and autonomous syntax to which lists of lexical items are appended. It also undercuts the theoretical basis for a structure that is given beforehand, whether in the Saussurean sense or in a more dynamic Chomskian sense (cf. again Kaldewaij 1986). Instead of a reifiable structure given beforehand in language (cf. in different wording Langacker 2000: 8-9), cognitive linguists investigate basic psychological mechanisms underlying all cognitive domains including the learning and use of language. Here we can finally accommodate the fact that Bharṭṛhari's linguistic views, even though in some points parallel with Saussure's theory (Houben 1990), leave no room for the presence of a "structure given beforehand" in Sanskrit, in spite of what one might expect on the basis of the oft-cited words of Sir William Jones (1786): "The Sanskrit language, whatever may be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure."

To state the argument briefly (see also Houben 1993): First of all, in explicit statements, Bharṭṛhari denies the reality of elements that should be central in a supposed structure in language.

- 2.14 *brāhmaṇārtho yathā nāsti kaś cid brāhmaṇakambale /
devadattādayo vākye tathaiiva syur anarthakāḥ //*

Just as there is no thing *brāhmaṇa* 'Brahmin' in *brāhmaṇakambala* 'Brahmin's blanket' like that (the isolated word) 'Devadatta' etc. in the sentence (e.g., Devadatta, bring the cow) would be without meaning.

- 2.36 *yathāśvakarṇa ity ukte vinaivāśvena gamyate /
kaś cid eva viśiṣṭo'rthaḥ sarveṣu pratyayas tathā //*

If (the word) *śvakarṇa* 'Horse-ear' (i.e., the name of a well-known plant) is uttered, a specific thing (namely, a specific plant with leaves like the ears of a horse) is understood, without a horse; like that is the understanding in all cases (especially in the case of sentences and the words one might provisionally isolate from them).

Bharṭṛhari thus relativizes the elements that should be central in a supposed structure in language not by placing them in larger 'structure in language' but, as I argued in Houben 1995a: 77-79, by placing them in the utterance or sentence (*vākya*) which is the starting point of grammatical analysis (which implies a reconstitutive role of grammar rather than a 'mere'

synthetic role, Houben 1999).⁸ Even when words and word-meanings are accepted as provisory units, especially in book 3 of the *Vākyapadiya* which is devoted to their investigation, their non-absolute status is presupposed and now and then explicitly stated (cf. Houben 1995a: 132f). The situation is different when a compounded word is the starting point of analysis, as in the example of the plant 'Horse-ear' in VP 2.36. In the last chapter of book 3, the *Vṛttisamuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari argues that in that case the compound is the basic unit and the meanings of its members are derived from it. Bhartṛhari argues for the acceptance of the sentence in a peculiar way, by showing that there are concrete examples, arguments, and authoritative statements in favour of both the views. The two views have both their value, but it becomes clear that Bhartṛhari prefers to take the sentence as primary unit (Houben 1995b).

Second, Bhartṛhari also emphasizes that words and sentences can be analysed and explained in several ways, and that hence the parts used to explain the whole have no definitive status. In 2.170ab, Bhartṛhari says: *anvākhyānāni bhidyante śabdavyutpattikarmasu* "In the derivations of words the ways of explaining are different." This he illustrates as follows in 2.171abc: *vaira-vāsiṣṭha-giriśās tathaiḥkāgārikādayaḥ / kaiś cit katham cid ākhyātā[h]* "Words like *vaira*, *vāsiṣṭha*, *giriśa*, and *aikāgārika* are explained by different persons in different ways." With a reference to the various explanations and derivations of the word *go* 'bull' or 'cow' (some want to derive it from the root *gam* 'to go', others from *garj* 'bellow', etc.) he finally makes a more general statement:

2.172 *yathā pathaḥ samākhyānam vṛkṣa-valmika-parvataiḥ /
aviruddham gavādīnām bhinnaiś ca saha cārībhiḥ //*

Just as the explanation of a road (is possible) by means of trees, anthills or mountains, (like that the explanation of words such as) *go* 'bull' or 'cow' etc. is possible by means of different accompanying features (the bull's going, its bellowing, etc.).

Also in the understanding of a sentence by a language user there is no definite status of the parts of sentence, which each individual may provisorily isolate in his own way:

2.39 *artham katham cit puruṣaḥ kaś cit sampratipadyate /
saṁsṛṣṭā vā vibhaktā vā bhedā vākyanibandhanāḥ //*

A person understands a meaning in one way or the other. Whether combined or separated, parts are based on the sentence.

⁸ The non-definite status of these elements also follows from the investigation of views on sentence analysis of grammarians and others, cf. the detailed study of Cardona 1975.

Finally, in the case of Prakrit, or, in Bharṭṛhari's terms, substandard words (*apabhraṃśa*, according to the examples cited corresponding with what we call Prakrit words), it is the individual words that are substandard, there is no systemic or structural change from the language 'Sanskrit' to a language 'Prakrit' as is the consistent perspective (and aim of reconstruction) of modern scholars of Sanskrit and middle Indic (cf. VP 1.175-183 and Houben 1996: 181-182).

§3.1 Conventional and radical construction grammar

Recently, William Croft has argued in favour of what he calls Radical Construction Grammar (e.g., Croft 2001, 2003, in prep.). This in contradistinction with conventional construction grammar, which he labels 'vanilla construction grammar'. From a Croftian perspective, our argument so far amounts to showing the compatibility of Bharṭṛhari with conventional construction grammar. For this conventional Construction Grammar, Croft formulates three theses (Croft 2003), which are as follows:

(1) The basic unit of grammatical representation is a pairing of form and meaning, where the form may range from the complex and schematic to the atomic and substantive. This refers to the syntax-lexicon continuum, which Goldberg addressed in foundational assumption no. 6: "Grammatical constructions, like traditional lexical items, are pairings of word and meaning."⁹

(2) The basic units of grammatical representation are symbolic, that is, for a grammatical unit there is no separation of the form and meaning or function of that form.¹⁰ This amounts to an entailment of Goldberg's foundational assumption 4 and 6: grammatical constructions do not have an independent formal status, nor do meaning and function resort to a separate component of the grammar. In Croft's formulation the thesis includes the acceptance of a continuity of semantics and, what Croft 2003: 3 calls, 'conventional discourse or information structural properties.' This is Goldberg's foundational assumption 2, the continuity of semantics and pragmatics.

(3) According to Croft's third thesis, the constructions of a language form a structured inventory. This corresponds to Goldberg's foundational assumption 7, which we showed to be relevant to Bharṭṛhari's position in its negative implication, the absence of a 'structure in language' given beforehand. Croft discusses the positive side of this thesis: the inventory is widely characterized

⁹ In Croft (in prep.) this is the second of the first three theses.

¹⁰ This seems to correspond to the very briefly formulated first thesis of Croft (in prep.), "the basic unit of grammatical representation is a pairing of form and meaning, both terms taken broadly."

as a network. But he adds that the nature and structure of this network is a matter of debate, with one of the parameters as the extent to which inheritance and usage play a role in the formation of this network.

(4) In Croft (in prep.) we find a fourth thesis, which he says is accepted by only some of the proponents of construction grammar. According to this thesis, usage is the basis of the constructions. In Bhartṛhari's approach, inheritance plays at least some role in the human capacity for language.

After this, Croft continues with three more theses which, according to him, characterize Radical Construction Grammar.

(5) "[C]onstructions are the primitive elements of syntactic representation," grammatical categories such as 'noun', 'verb' etc. are derived from these.

(6) "[T]he formal representation of constructions consists only of a (complex) construction and its component parts. That is, there are no syntactic relations at all." This is the formulation in Croft 2003: 4. In Croft (in prep.) we read: the only internal syntactic structure of constructions is their meronomic structure (i.e., the part-whole relation defined by an element's role in a construction), and symbolic links to components of semantic structure.

(7) Finally, "there are no universal constructions (e.g., a universal passive)." This means that all constructions are language specific, and that all formal grammatical structure is language-specific and construction-specific.

§3.2 Bhartṛhari and radical construction grammar

The first three theses are thus equivalent to some of the foundational assumptions of Goldberg which we have discussed and shown to be directly applicable to Bhartṛhari's work. Croft's optional fourth thesis I leave out of consideration for now; it will be interesting to explore it with regard to Bhartṛhari at a later stage. What is next most remarkable is that theses 5 and 6, which are central to Croft's Radical Construction Grammar, go to the heart of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* and its plaidoyer, especially in *Vākyapadīya* book 2, for the acceptance of the larger unit, the utterance or sentence (*vākya*), as primary, and words and their categories as secondary or derived, and the parallel argument in the *Vṛttisamuddeśa*-chapter of *Vākyapadīya* book 3 that the members of a compound derive their meaning and function from the compound as a whole (see above, paragraph 2.7).

§4. Conclusion: Bhartṛhari as a cognitive linguist

According to an image with which Bhartṛhari was familiar, the perception of a crystal is greatly influenced by the background, e.g., a white or red flower (VP 3.3.40-41). This applies to Bhartṛhari's theory of language as

well: it appears different depending on the (theoretical) background against which one places it. The change of season in the linguistic research program of which we are currently perceiving the first signs, from transformational generative to cognitive and constructive, from top-down to bottom up, from reductive to non-reductive, could very well turn out to be inspiring and clarifying for the study of Bhartrhari (as cognitive linguist) as well as for the study of Pāṇinian grammar (as construction grammar). If the theories and methods which we bring with us when we approach an ancient discipline is anywhere of crucial and pervading importance it is in grammar. Modern cognitive linguists and construction grammarians, on their part, may find to their surprise an extensive amount of investigations in Bhartrhari's work and in the Bhartrharian way of Pāṇinian grammar that directly pertain to basic issues in their research program. A rapprochement between Bhartrhari studies and cognitive linguistics is therefore expected to be most fruitful and stimulating for both parties.

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Comparing Humboldt and Bhartṛhari

ANA AGUD

In Europe the German scholar Wilhelm von Humboldt was the first linguist to develop a true philosophy of language beyond the scope of the medieval speculative theories of meaning. Himself philologist and grammarian, and a good knower of several ancient and modern languages, Sanskrit among them, he for the first time wrote different essays and finally an imposing book on a general theory of what language is, and on what the human capacity of speech really means for the very concept of the human. It is an Introduction to the grammar of the Kawi language in Java, and bears the title *About the diversity of the human language structure and its influence on the spiritual development of mankind*.

Humboldt's linguistic thinking divides the history of epistemology in Europe before him and from him on. But this is far from being a general opinion. Most scholars in Europe, both in Linguistics and Philosophy, don't know anything about him. Nobody who knows Humboldt's work doubts about the transcendental importance of his intellectual achievements but his work has remained largely unknown for various reasons.

Among philosophers he is scarcely known because he was only concerned with theory of language, and this in a time when philosophy had not yet begun to reflect on its own linguistic presuppositions. As Humboldt came from the philological corner and was developing such radical insights

into the linguistic conditioning of thinking, which would have thrown into utmost confusion most contemporary philosophers, he was simply ignored by them. Hegel, his contemporary and in some sense his spiritual brother, came by himself to some analogous ideas, but did not care for Humboldt's work, although surely knowing about it. They both lived in Berlin, but no contact between them is attested. And yet, they were the only two thinkers of that time who understood the depth of the linguistic conditioning of thinking. But Hegel was interested in his own total revolution of Western Philosophy, and he was to a large extent self sufficient. And Humboldt would not have been able to follow the extremely difficult philosophical reasoning of Hegel. He had not enough philosophical background for it. So they developed their views in parallel and never met each other.

Only recently, in the forties and fifties of the 20th century, they were put in relation to each other by a German Hegelian Philosopher called Bruno Liebrucks, whose disciple Josef Simon, my teacher, has carried on his line of thinking and has produced a highly original philosophy of language, giving birth to a philosophical school to which I also belong. But worldwide, you know, it is the analytical, mostly English writing philosophers who have gained most approval and exert some kind of monopoly on this subject. The matters I want to present in this paper belong thus to a less known philosophical tradition, and to a highly critical one.

In European Linguistics Humboldt remained largely unknown because of the extreme difficulty of his speculative language for empirical linguists, and also because more or less at the same time when he was designing the future theoretical linguistics as a typological comparison both of languages and forms of thinking, his colleague and friend Franz Bopp was putting the first stone of the most impressive scientific building in human sciences in the nineteenth century: the historical-comparative linguistics of the Indo-European family. He was opening the door to such a large and promising field of entirely new research that Humboldt's ideas were left aside and forgotten even before they were definitively formulated.

Since I read in M. Biardeau's book on the Indian Philosophy of Speech about Bhartṛhari I was sure that he has represented in some sense a revolution akin only to that of Humboldt in the West. Bhartṛhari's ideas are in the Indian context not as revolutionary as Humboldt's were among us, because Indians had already approached language in a quite different manner and had spared a lot of energy not making from the very beginning some of the mistakes with which European grammar began. As in the field of the aesthetic theory, here also Indians seem to me to have made a sounder beginning. Their grammatical tradition seems to me to expose itself to a lesser charge of disturbing metaphysical prejudices.

In order to get acquainted with Bhartṛhari's main ideas on language I've been translating into Spanish the *kārikās* of the *Brahmakāṇḍa*. From the rest, I've only read fragments in the translation of Iyer. Only a couple of weeks ago, during a short stay in Berlin, I got the edition and translation of Wilhelm Rau, which I've incorporated into my work. Out of this short but intensive experience with Bhartṛhari, I'll try to present in this paper those ideas of Humboldt which have some similarity to Bhartṛhari's, as well as those which seem to be in contradiction with his but are about comparable topics and intuitions.

Shortly before Humboldt's first writings on the subject, a French grammarian called Condillac, who had written his own grammar for the instruction of a young prince whose teacher he was, stated that language provides the first analysis of ideas, that it is an analytical method in itself and that every language is such a method. Condillac's and Humboldt's context was that of the so-called 'general and reasoning grammar,' a line of grammatical thinking coming from the Latin grammar of the Spanish scholar Francisco Sanchez de las Brozas, also called Sanctius, who for the first time tried to demonstrate with concrete arguments that different languages are but different manifestations of some common, universal grammatical principles. Contrary to the Indian grammatical tradition, from this time on our theoreticians were confronted not with the inner differences of linguistic expression, but with the outer divergence among different languages. The reference to the multiplicity of languages became thus the new empirical field of research, and modern philosophy of language refers to it from its very beginning. The tension between unity and diversity in language among us is thus focussed on in different terms, but basically the problem is the same as that approached by Bhartṛhari.

To the idea of Condillac that languages are as many analytical methods, Humboldt adds his own certainty that languages are not fixed, well established patterns of expression, but some dynamic process of expression which every moment yields its own pattern, which is either identical or different from previous or from alien patterns. The patterns in themselves are being established by the 'making language every moment'. They are the result of the latter. Previous experience is the basis out of which we form our expression every time. To speak is not to use or apply some pattern or some pieces and rules, but to *recreate* language.

Consequently the whole form is prior to its analysis into parts, just as Bhartṛhari states, the latter apparently on the basis of the former Indian theoreticians. Only, for Humboldt the speaker is actually analysing while speaking. The speaker does not use parts to compose the whole, but in making the whole he himself produces parts. Former experience provides some form for the new contents, the new expression becomes a possible

form for next utterances. So form and content are in an eternal relation: later what was a content becomes form for next's contents, and forms may also become contents of new forms. Nothing is in itself a form or a content: something becomes form or content relatively to the other.

For Humboldt the great epistemological problem of the relation between the generic, the specific and the individual in language, which also occupies a great deal of Bharṭṛhari's speculations in the first kāṇḍa, is the problem of how to conceive of the work of the individual and that of the linguistic community in the generation of linguistic patterns. Humboldt starts from a critical insight: he is sure that the linguistic meaning is a strictly individual concern, which lives in the non communicable interiority of the individual soul. Only the *śabda* makes the way from one person to the other: the meaning does not follow it. It remains in the soul of the speaker, and the hearer 'regenerates' his own meaning out of the sound perceived. Actually nobody knows exactly what his own meanings are. They are changing constantly. So the great axiom of Humboldt's philosophy of language is: "language certainly builds bridges from one individuality to the other, and mediates in reciprocal understanding, but the difference between both is even enlarged thereby."¹ Individuals are absolutely different from each other, and their linguistic communication, inasmuch as it enriches the experience of each and causes more and more complex inner associations, yields as a result individualities more and more different or differentiated.

It is out of this inner richness and differentiation that every person forms his linguistic expression every moment. For Humboldt, **making language every moment is the only real in language**. "Language gets its last determination only in the individual." All patterns and structures, all pieces obtained through analysis, are but secondary results of the many singular and momentary linguistic actions. In his own words:

Taken in its real essence, language is continuously and in every moment something passing. Even its conservation in script is always incomplete and mummified, and it needs to get again sensible through alive reading. It is no work (*ergon*) but an activity (*energeia*). Its true definition can thus be only a genetic one. And this is so because language is that eternally repeated work of the spirit which makes the articulated sound able to give expression to the idea. Taken directly and strictly, this is the definition of the speaking in every moment. But in a true and essential sense only the totality of such speaking can be considered as the language. In the scattered chaos of words and rules which we use to call a

¹ W.V. Humboldt, "Über die verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts" (1830-35), in W.V. Humboldt, *Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Verschiedenheit, Darmstadt 1963, p. 439. (All Humboldt's quotations refer to the pages of this German edition. Translations have been done by me.)

language, the only existing things are the singular products of such speaking, and even they not in a complete manner, because new work is needed to recognize in them the living speech and to provide thus a true image of the living language. Precisely the highest and the finest could not be recognized in the separate elements; it only can be perceived or guessed in the bound speech. This in its turn proves again that the authentic language lies in the act of its being generated. And this bound speech is what we have to think of as the true and first object whenever we aim to enter through research into the living essence of language. To cut it into words and rules isn't but the inert botch of scientific quartering.²

Sounds, when used in language, are thus for Humboldt already articulated, that is, they are not pure *dḥvani* or *nāda*, but already structured *śabda*. This is due to the linguistic history of the speaking community. When sound enters language, it is already articulated, that is, linguistically structured sound. Also ideas, when entering language, are articulated thought and no more pure or diffuse intuitions. Previous to every linguistic production both ideas and sounds are already articulated by former linguistic experience. But this articulation is neither general, common to everybody, nor permanent; it is in no sense *nitya*. Thinking is historical, processual, and, although it is always linguistically articulated, every new articulation in speech adds new determinations. Sound and meaning are thus mutually interdependent, but their relation is a concrete new one in every utterance.

Let me present the passage immediately following the last one:

"To designate languages as a work of the spirit is an entirely correct and adequate expression, because the existence of the spirit can only be represented in activity and as such an activity. The analysis of its structure, demanded by its study, forces us even to consider it as a procedure, guiding through means to certain goals, and thus to see it really as formed by the nations. (...)

"I have already shown that, if it is allowed to speak so, in studying language we find ourselves put into a historical middle point, as no nation or language actually known to us can be considered as primitive. Each has received a material from the former generations going back to unknown prehistory. Thus the spiritual activity which brings forth the expression of the ideas is always simultaneously directed towards something already given. It is not creating in some absolute sense, but it is reshaping.

"Now, this work acts in a constant and homogeneous manner, because it is being exerted by one and the same spiritual force, which allows only a certain diversity, restricted to narrow limits. Its goal is understanding. Thus no one should speak to another differently from how the latter would have spoken to him under similar circumstances. And as the transmitted material has an equal origin, it is not only corresponding but also entirely akin to the orientation of the spirit. Now, what remains constant and homogeneous within this work of the spirit to raise the articulated sound to the expression of the ideas, when grasped as completely and coherently as possible and represented systematically, makes the form of language.

² p. 418 ff.

"In this definition language appears as an abstraction yielded by science. But it would be a mistake to think of it as being also itself such a pure intellectual entity without its own existence. Actually it is above all the entirely individual drive through which a nation provides validity in language to ideas and sensibility. But we are never allowed to perceive this drive in the whole, non analyzed totality of its urging. We only realize its singular effects in every case. This is why we can't but resume the homogeneity of its operating manner within a general, deal concept. In itself this drive is one and alive."

In these passages Humboldt shows himself trying to answer rationally to the problem of unity and diversity, which also occupies to a large extent Bhartṛhari. His language differs sharply from the common phraseology among linguists of his time and shows remarkable affinities to that of Bhartṛhari: ideas like the unitariness of the spiritual impulse to generate language, or even more, the idea of 'force' as origin of language and linguistic utterances, are new in Europe. Of course, linguistic diversity is for Humboldt above all diversity of historical languages. But in some sense this is also the case with Bhartṛhari, who surely does not reflect on different languages as such, but often quotes the corruption of the colloquial idioms as a manifestation of diversity within a language, and was fully aware of the existence of linguistic alternatives to Sanskrit. I don't know if it would be correct to ascribe to authors like him and the *trimuni* the certainty, or rather the impression that the spoken languages they had as mother tongues were the result of such a corruption. In Europe learned people knew about the Latin origin of romanic languages. They simply did not make this a subject of reflection. Was it so in India?

Humboldt reflects on the linguistic utterance as being the act in and through which linguistic form arises and becomes a pattern for further linguistic generation. So his idea of the formal structure is dynamic and historical. But it is astonishing that he never reflects on the temporality of the utterance in itself, on the sequence of sounds and words as possibly determining this form. Bhartṛhari devotes much effort to this subject. For him the temporal sequence of the sounds is the principle of differentiation. But it only concerns the level of the sensible manifestation of speech. Behind or above this level there is for him some static, constant and unitary form. *śabda* and *spṛṣṭa* seem to designate this level, as different from that of *dhvani* or *nāda*. One has the impression that this constant level is the essence of speech, and that sequence, time and change are only accidental.

Now, also for Humboldt the phonic moment of speech is the principle of differentiation. Let us hear himself speaking:

The natural disposition for language is a general one in mankind, and everyone bears in himself the key to the understanding of every language. From this follows naturally that the form of all languages has to be essentially the same, and that it always has to reach the general goal. Diversity may only lie in the

means, and must remain restricted to the limits allowed for the achievement of the goal. But diversity is a fact variously given in language, and it does not only affect the sounds, that is, not only the same things are variously designated. It also affects the manner the linguistic sense uses sounds aiming the form of language, or even more, it affects the own perception of this form. Were the linguistic sense the only operating factor, it would only produce uniformity, as far as languages are pure forms, because it has to require always the correct building of forms, according to valid rules, and this can't be but one and the same. But in reality things run otherwise, partly because sounds have some backward effect, and partly because of the individuality of the inner sense in the manifestation. All depends on the energy of the force with which this inner sense acts on the sound and turns it into the living expression of ideas in all nuances, even in the finest ones. But this energy cannot be the same in all cases. It cannot show the same intensity, vitality and regularity in every case. It also cannot be supported always by the same disposition to treat ideas symbolically, or by the same aesthetic pleasure with richness of sounds and harmony. Notwithstanding, the inner linguistic sense tends always to equality in the languages, and it tries to dominate also the divergent forms and to reconduct them in one or the other manner to the right path. On the contrary the sound is truly the principle increasing the diversity. And this is so because it depends on the constitution of the organs, which are the main origin of the alphabet, and, as a correctly carried analysis of the latter shows, it is the basis of every language. Further on, the articulated sound has its own laws and uses, supported partly by the tendency to easiness and partly by euphony of the pronunciation. Such laws tend normally to uniformity, but in the particular application they necessarily yield diversity. And finally, as we never are confronted with an entirely new, original and isolated language, that inner sense has always to connect with former or alien elements. All this together is the origin of the necessary diversity of the human language structure. Languages cannot bear one and the same structure because the nations speaking them are different and their existence depends on different situations and positions.³

These passages show actually the same kind of hesitations that we find in the Vākyapadīya and its commentary. In European history these reflections are new. No grammarian before Humboldt had ever been interested in the problem of unity and diversity in language. And it is possible that Humboldt met this subject in the context of his contact with Sanskrit grammar. The research about Humboldt as a theoretician of language is not very rich, and nobody seems to know what exactly he knew about Sanskrit, and what his sources were. He shows familiarity with Indian terminology, speaks about *guṇa* and *vrddhi*, about *kṛt* and *taddhita* suffixes, etc. But as far as I know, he doesn't quote Sanskrit grammarians themselves. Possibly his learning with Bopp was based on William Jones, who had learned Sanskrit with Indian paṇḍits. The very fact that he, for the first time in Europe, was concerned with this kind of linguistic speculations makes it plausible that he got decisive impulse from his contact with Indian grammatical tradition, even if this contact was a limited and second hand one.

³ p. 651 f.

Another important subject Humboldt is concerned with is also absolutely alien to Western tradition and well known in India's. It is the problem of the unity of the word and of the sentence. European grammar never had asked for the ontological problem of unity and diversity because European, Christian as well as Greco-Latin tradition, does not know about India's central core of thinking, that of *dvaita* and *advaita*. Starting from a strict theological separation of transcendent and immanent, from god and man, Europeans did not put into the centre of philosophy the problem of the relation between unitary *brahman* and diversity of individual souls. God, if any, is in Europe a sovereign creator who actually governs the world in every sense and aspect. There can be no question of identity with him: men are his creatures and sons, absolutely different from him. The identity of *ātman* and *brahman* is in this context an aberration, with a few more or less heterodox exceptions (mystics, some philosophers). So among us men are from the very beginning individuals, different from each other, and consequently speaking different languages. Language is always the way of differentiation, and in Europe only at the very beginning one philosopher, Parmenides, expressed that linguistic and hence conceptual differentiations are illusory, because being and non-being cannot be mixed. But his work was the starting point for an immediate realistic reaction, definitely formulated by Plato and converted by Aristotle into the basis of analysis as the only epistemologically correct approach to reality. Thus grammar accepted from the very beginning that analysis into parts is realistic and is an adequate method of knowledge, and concentrated exclusively on the identification and characterization of the parts and subparts of speech. The linguistic synthesis in its turn was the subject of a specific part of grammar, the syntax, which also analysed the synthesis as identifiable patterns of connection of the parts.

And this remained so till Humboldt, and after him. Only rare efforts were made after him to integrate his philosophical reflections in grammar, and most were naive and failed. The only Western linguist who showed a deep insight into Humboldt's ideas was Eugenio Coseriu, who recently died. His huge analytical work is the only one integrating Humboldt's ideas in the study of concrete linguistic phenomena, but his own attitude was too analytic and Aristotelic to question the validity of analysis in itself.

Humboldt, on the contrary, understood that the idea of linguistic unity is opposite to the analytical method, and decidedly chose the unitary reflection as the better approach to the reality of language, as we have already seen. But he also wanted to analyse, because he thought that the sense of unity itself has to be grasped in a systematic and communicable way. He wanted to make grammar, not to remain in a contemplative silence.

So he was put in the same kind of conflictive theoretic situation one also perceives in Bhartṛhari.

In Indian tradition, or at least in Bhartṛhari, the unity of the word is sometimes said to be produced by the utterance of its last sound, that is, by the arrival at the temporal point where the word shows to be complete and thus conveys its meaning as a unity. Humboldt also tries to find some materially perceptible, resonant element being responsible for the inner unity of the word. He decides that it is the accent which creates the unity of the word and thus its completion to convey meaning. Accent actually plays in European languages a role much more important than in Sanskrit. Humboldt mentions English as a language where this function of the accent is most clearly decided. Accent is for Humboldt a phenomenon caused by intonation, and, as he says, "the tone (...) depends on the liberty of the speaker. It is a force provided to the syllable by the speaker himself and is like an alien spirit projected into the syllable. Being a principle even more akin to the soul as the material language itself, it floats over the speech and is the immediate expression of the validity the speaker wants to accord to its speech and to its parts. In itself every syllable could bear the accent. But when among many only one actually gets the tone, the intonation of the others becomes cancelled, except if the speaker explicitly wants to stress another, and through this cancellation there emerges a certain connexion between syllables with tone and syllables deprived of it, the former exerting some predominance and domination on the latter. Both facts, the stressing of the tone and the connection of the syllables, condition each other and each produces immediately and spontaneously the other. This is the origin of the word accent and of the unity of the word caused by it. No independent word could be imagined without an accent, and every word can bear only one main accent. If it had two, it would become divided into two wholes and would thus yield two words."⁴ This solution is actually different from Bhartṛhari's, but it answers to the same problem and in a similar manner. And it faces a theoretical problem never identified before him in Europe.

Humboldt seems to see in the intonation in some sense the purely spiritual and individual part of language through which the speaker makes a totally individual and free use of the established linguistic means. And this stands in some relation to Bhartṛhari's treatment of the sound side of the language as responsible for individuation. In distinguishing between the materiality of the sound system of the language and the spirituality of the individual intonation, Humboldt arrives at an elegant solution to the theoretical problem of individuality and community of the linguistic sounds.

⁴ p. 524 f.

But elegance in this case is not the same as truth or adequacy. I do not believe that Humboldt was right in proceeding with this idea. But he was probably guided to it by the fact that he saw in the morphology of languages their own individual form, thus assuming two kinds of individuality in language: that of the speaker and that of the singular historical language.

For his part Bhartṛhari seems to consider individuality as a special case of differentiation, and as the contrary of unity or identity. If I have rightly understood him, his model or paradigm of identity is provided by the notion of *brahman*, which, if viewed as linguistic, is the *akṣara*. Om is a peculiar Indian invention without any parallel in the West: it is the word which is not part of any real vocabulary, and in which *śabda* and *artha* **are identical**. It is the **limit of the idea of language**, in which all differences or *dvaitas* are cancelled, and this implies a cancellation of such *dvaitas* as speaker and hearer, word and object, sound and meaning, man and god, *ātman* and *brahman*. Real, existing language is, on the contrary, differentiation. For Bhartṛhari the absolute is *brahman*, and so there can be no place for the absolute in **real, concrete and historical** language. In it the absolute **enters manifestation and thus differentiation** and conditioned being.

In Humboldt, as in Kant and Hegel, **the absolute is the individuality**, that is, the extreme differentiation. Identity is for all of them **the historical result of an intellectual operation of identifying the different beings through abstractions**. This is certainly the deepest difference between a philosophy of language based on the German critical philosophy and one based on the Indian grammatical tradition. And this is why to compare both is such a difficult task. One should go back to the deepest metaphysical assumptions in both traditions and retrace the way both lines of grammatical thinking have developed more or less in accordance with the metaphysical background of each culture. In the West critical philosophy cleared the intellectual space to make possible Humboldt's approach to language as a purely historical and dynamic process of individuation through the development of shared patterns; in India the attachment to *śruti* together with a kind of religiosity not bound to any institutional control of orthodoxy, cleared the intellectual space to an approach to language simultaneously analytical and contrary to analysis. So both traditions stood in a deep inner tension only perceived by the most intelligent, as Humboldt and Bhartṛhari surely were. Both tried to face the intellectual difficulty of the grammarian's job going back to its ultimate philosophical presuppositions.

Let me finally present the last subject in Humboldt's efforts to grasp the true essence of language: his idea of the 'autonomous putting or setting', 'das selbstthätige (sic) Setzen.' According to him every real act of speaking

makes, establishes or sets a synthesis. "As the synthesis we are now speaking about is no quality at all, nor even any real action, but the very fact of ephemerously acting every moment, there cannot be any special sign for it in the words themselves, and to look for such a sign would indicate lack of the due force of this act, denoting that its nature had not been grasped. The real presence of the synthesis has to become immaterially manifest in language. One has to realize that it enlightens like a bolt of lightning, and that it melts the material ready to be united as would do a fire coming from unknown regions."⁵

Shortly after, he states the following, which at least apparently contradicts the former. "The verb (...) is neatly distinguished from the noun and other parts of speech possibly appearing in the simple sentence by the very fact that only to it is attributed the act of autonomous setting as its grammatical function. Like in the case of the declined noun, also the verb originates in the melting of its grammatical elements with the stem through such an act (of synthesis), but it has also obtained its form in order to possess the disposition and capacity to exert by itself this act in the intention of the sentence. Thus between the verb and other words of the simple sentence there is a difference which forbids to put them all under the same species. All other words of the sentence are like inert matter lying there in order to become united. Only the verb is the middle point containing and expanding life. Through one and the same synthetic act it connects the predicate with the subject through being, but so that the being, which passes to action with an energetic predicate, is attributed to the subject itself, that is, what has been merely thought of as fit to be connected turns into a state or process in reality. One no more merely thinks of the falling lightning, but lightning itself comes down. One no more merely considers 'spirit' and 'imperishable' as notions possibly connected with each other, but spirit *is* imperishable. If it is allowed to speak so: through the verb the idea leaves its inner home and turns into reality."

Such words are very strange in European tradition, but they are easily translatable into Sanskrit phraseology. Humboldt moves within a spiritual space of his own, totally different from that of other Western grammarians and philosophers. Even if his single ideas and solutions to the problem of rationally grasping the nature of language differ from those of Bhartṛhari, one feels a strong affinity in the general attitude with which he approaches language and puts questions. I believe there is a large field of research concerning the comparison of both which promises fascinating results.

Let me finish with a quotation from a German poet very close to Humboldt, Goethe, who in the first scene of his *Faust* presents us the old

scholar tormented with all kinds of doubts and searching for inner peace in translating the Bible into German. He begins with the Gospel of St. John.

"It is written: in the beginning was the *word*".
 I hesitate. Who could help me to go forward?
 I can't give to the word a value so high,
 I have to try to translate otherwise
 If spirit rightly enlightens me.
 "Written is: in the beginning was the *sense*".
 Be careful with your line the first,
 Let your pen not be hasty now.
 Is sense creator, cause of all?
 It should be said: "in the beginning was the *force*".
 But as I write this new solution,
 Something says to me that I'll not rest on it.
 The spirit helps me! I'm suddenly advised
 And write with consolation:
 "In the beginning was the *action*".

'Word, sense, force, action', *śabda*, *artha*, *śakti*, *kriyā*: in Sanskrit tradition Goethe's attempts to grasp the absolute origin have good old words disposable. The moment has come, I believe, to look into both traditions and to compare philologically texts displaying such a deep background affinity.

A Bibliography on Bhartṛhari

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It is a great honour, as well as great pleasure, to be invited to participate to the centenary celebrations of Motilal Banarsidass with this bibliography.* It has a history, already linked with this publication house. The first version appeared in the *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari*, which took place in Poona, January 6-8, 1992; an Indian reprint was published by MLBD in 1994. The difference of size of the two versions shows at least that Bhartṛhari studies weren't forgotten during these past eleven years, and that Prof. V.N. Jha's initiative to organize December 2003's seminar has been welcomed may be taken as a hint that they may have some more years to flourish. No doubt MLBD will play a major role in that future history, as it did by diffusing the whole Indian culture throughout the whole world. By 'whole' I don't mean anything exhaustive, far from that. As this bibliography is also not. But variegated, as are the different angles adopted in the texts listed below. It is open, and has to remain so. Polemics are inside. MLBD's line is similar: to provide the material. Even *New Age* can be discussed. And this is very precious.

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The bibliography is still divided into three parts:

- a) The editions of the Vākyapadīya. The numbering is compatible with that of the bibliography of Wilhelm RAU (1977 and 1988).
- b) The editions of the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā.
- c) The rest, i.e., articles, studies, dissertations, translations and book reviews. Some books which edit the text and translate it into any language appear twice.

Internet addresses are given indicatively, as they are known to be anitya, somewhere between verba volant and *scripta manent*.

Editions and indices of the Vākyapadīya

For a complete word index, see no. 16b and 25, for a "Key Word In Context" index to the first kāṇḍa and the Vṛtti, see no. 27. For machine readable texts, see no. 29 and 30 below.

1. *Vākyapadīya*, a treatise on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar by Bhartṛhari with a commentary by Puṇyarāja on the 1st and 2nd kāṇḍas and Helārāja's commentary on the third kāṇḍa, edited by Ramakṛṣṇa Śāstrī Paṭavardhana, Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Mānavallī, Rāmacandra Śāstrī Koṭibhāskara and Goswāmi Dāmodara Śāstrī, Benares (Benares Sanskrit Series, Work no. 6: [fascicule] no. 11, 1884, pp. (1)-(2), 1-96 [I.1 - II.73]; no. 19, 1886, pp. 97-192 [II.74 - 266]; no. 24, 1887, pp. 193-292 [II.267 to end] = Volume I. —no. 95, 1905, pp. 1-96 [III.1.1 - III.2]; no. 102, 1905, pp. 97-192 [III.3 - III.7.24]; no. 130, 1907, pp. 193-288 [III.7.25 - 162]; no. 160, 1928, pp. 289-384 [III.7.162 - III.9.101]; no. 161, 1930, pp. 385-480 [III.9.102 - III.14.60]; no. 162, 1933, pp. 481-576 [III.14.61 - 260]; no. 163/4, 1937, pp. 577-744 [III.14.261 to end] = Volume II).
2. *Śrībhartṛhariviracitavākya-padīyabrahmakāṇḍaḥ*, so [']yam... śrī Dravyeśa Jhā - praṇītapratyēkārthaparakāśikāsamākhyayā vyākhyayopetaḥ, Śrī vṛndāvane paṁ° Rāmanivāsaśarmadvārā Śrī 'brajendra' mudraṇālaye sammudrya prākāśyam nītaḥ, Saṁvat 1983 [= 1927].
- 3a. *Bhagavadbhartṛhariviracitaṁ vākya-padīyaṁ*, tatra haryyupajñavṛttisanāthaṁ prathamam kāṇḍam, pariṣkartā Cārudevaḥ Śāstrī pāṇiniyaḥ, lavapura [= Lahore], vikramavatsarāḥ 1991 [= 1934].
- 3b. *Vākyapadīyam*, Bharṭṛyaryupajñavṛttisanāthaṁ puṇya-rājaṭikāsaṁyutaṁ dvitīyaṁ kāṇḍam (dvitīya-bhāge prathamakhaṇḍaḥ), sṛmatyā Rāma-Lāla-Kapūra-nyāsa-samityā prakāśitam, pariṣkartā Cārudevaḥ Śāstrī pāṇiniyaḥ [Lahore], vikramābdaḥ 1996 [= 1939].

- 4a. *The Vākyapadīya (3rd Kāṇḍa)* with the commentary Prakīrṇakaparakāśa of Helārāja son of Bhūtīrāja, Part I, edited by K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī, Trivandrum 1935 (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series no. CXVI, Śrī Citrodayamañjarī V) [III.7.156 - III.13]
- 4b. *The Vākyapadīya (3rd Kāṇḍa)* with the commentary Prakīrṇaka-prakāśa of Helārāja son of Bhūtīrāja. Part II, edited by L.A. Ravi Varmā, Trivandrum 1942 (University of Travancore Sanskrit Series no. CXLVIII) [III.14 complete].
5. *The Vākyapadīya — Brahmakāṇḍam of Bhartrīhari*, with the Prakash commentary of Pt. Narain Datt Tripathi, edited by Pt. Avadh Bihari Mishra, Benares 1937.
6. *The Vākyapadīya*, a treatise on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar by Bhartrī Hari [sic], (Brahma Kāṇḍa), edited with the Bhāvapradīpa commentary and notes by Sūryanārāyaṇa Śūkla [sic], Benares 1937 (Kashi Sanskrit Series 124).
7. *The Vākyapadīya*, a treatise on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar by Bhartṛhari (Brahma Kāṇḍa), with the Bhāvapradīpa Sanskrit commentary and notes by Sūryanārāyaṇa Śūkla, edited with Hindi commentary etc. by Rāmagovinda Śūkla, Varanasi 1961 (Kashi Sanskrit Series 124) [first edition is no. 6 above], fifth edition 1984, sixth edition 1990.
- 8a. *Vākyapadīya Part I (Brahmakāṇḍam)*, with the commentaries Svopajñavṛtti by Harivṛṣabha & Ambākartṛī by Padmaśrī Pt. Raghunātha Śarmā. Varanasi: Sampurnānandasamskṛtaviśvavidyālaya 1963 (Sarasvatī Bhavana Granthamālā Vol. 91), third edition 1998.
- 8b. *Vākyapadīyam Part II (Vākyakāṇḍam)* with the commentary Ambākartṛī by Raghunātha Śarmā, Varanasi: Sampurnānandasamskṛtaviśvavidyālaya 1968 (Sarasvatī Bhavan Granthamālā Vol. 91), second edition 1980.
- 8c. *Vākyapadīyam Part III (Pada Kāṇḍa)* (Jāti, Dravya and Sambandha Samuddeśa) with the commentary Prakāśa by Helārāja and Ambākartṛī by Pt. Raghunātha Śarmā, Varanasi: Sampurnānanda-samskṛta-viśvavidyālaya 1974 (Sarasvatībhavana-Granthamālā Vol. 91), second edition 1991.
- 8d. *Vākyapadīya Part III, Vol. II* (Bhūyodravya-Guṇa-Dik-Sādhana-Kriyā-Kāla-Puruṣa-Samkhyā-Upagraha- and Liṅga- Samuddeśa) with the commentary Prakāśa by Helārāja and Ambākartṛī by Pt. Raghunātha Śarmā, Varanasi: Sampurnānanda-samskṛta-viśvavidyālaya 1979 (Sarasvatī Bhavana Granthamālā [Vol. 91]).

- 8e. *Vākyapadīya Part III, (Padakāṇḍa)* (Vṛttisamuddeśa), with the commentary Prakāśa by Helārāja and Ambākartrī by Pt. Raghunātha Śarmā, Varanasi: Sampūrṇānanda-saṃskṛta-viśvavidyālaya 1977 (Sarasvatī Bhavan Granthamālā Vol. 91).
- 9a. *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari* with the commentary of Helārāja, Kāṇḍa III, Part I, edited by K.A. Subramania Iyer, Poona 1963 (Deccan College Monograph Series 21) [III.1.1 - III.7 end]. Reprint: 1994.
- 9b. *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari* with the commentaries Vṛtti and the Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva, kāṇḍa I, critically edited by K.A. Subramania Iyer, Poona 1966 (Deccan College Monograph Series 32).
- 9c. *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari* with the Prakīrṇaprakāśa of Helārāja, Kāṇḍa III, Part II, critically edited by K.A. Subramania Iyer, Poona 1973 [III.8.1 - III.14 end].
10. *Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadīya Brahmakāṇḍa*, Avec la Vṛtti de Harivṛṣabha, texte reproduit de l'édition de Lahore, traduction, introduction et notes par Madeleine Biarreau, Paris: de Boccard 1964 (publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Serie in-8, fascicule 24).
11. *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*, edited by K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye, Poona 1965 (University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, Vol. II).
12. *Śrīmadbhartṛhariviractiam svopajñāṭikāsamanvitam vākyapadīyam (brahmakāṇḍam)*, edited by Pandit Vāmana Bālakrishna Bhāgavata, tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeeth, Poona 1965 (Grantha-Saṃśodhana-Prakāśana-Maṇḍala, Publication no. 2) [Text and Marathi translation].
13. *Vākyapadīya (Brahmakāṇḍa) of Shrī Bhartṛhari, the great linguist & grammarian*, with trilingual commentary by Dr. Satyakam Varma, New Delhi: Munshi Ram Manohar Lal 1970 [Sanskrit - English - Hindi].
14. *The Vākyapadīya*, critical text of Cantos I and II [with English translation, summary of ideas and notes], by K. Raghavan Pillai, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1971 (Studies in the Vākyapadīya, Vol. I).
15. *Vaakyapadiyam*, Sanskrit original, Bhartṛhari- Telugu translation: Sri Peri Suryanarayana Sastri, Srīman Sribhashyam Appalacharyulu, Dr. Pullela Sriramachandrudu and Sri Appalla Somewara Sarma, Scrutiniser: Professor G. J. Somayaji, Hyderabad Telugu Akademi, 1974 [First and Second kāṇḍa].
- 16a. *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya*, die mūlakārikās nach den Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem Pāda-Index versehen von Wilhelm Rau, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 1977 (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XLII. 4) [see also no. 28 below].

- 16b. INDEX: *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya Vollständiger Wortindex zu den mūlakārikās*, von Wilhelm Rau, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1988 (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jahrgang 11 1988).
17. Yogirājamahāvaiyākaraṇaśrīmadbhaṭṭhariviracito Vākyapadīyabrahmakāṇḍaḥ parīkṣopayoginyā ṭikayā saṃvalitaḥ, Ṭikākāra - Yogi Śaṅkaranāthaḥ Phalegrahiḥ, Avedyanāthena Yatīndravartamanā-tmanā mudā Vākyapadīyapustakam, svakīyārikthēna vikāśitaṃ mude vicakṣaṇānām padavartmavartinām, Kalpasam° 1972949053, vi°sam° 2009 [= 1952], Sarvādhikārasaṃrakṣikā yogapracāriṇī Gorakṣaṭillā Kāśī, saṃrakṣaka yo° pra° upapradhāna, śrī Avedyanātha Vedāntavāgiśa Tarkacūḍāmaṇi Gorakṣapura.
18. *Vākyapadīyam of Bhartṛhari* (an ancient Treatise on the Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar), containing the Ṭikā of Puṇyarāja and the ancient Vṛtti, edited by K.A. Subramania Iyer, with a Foreword by Ashok Aklujkar, Kāṇḍa II, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1983.
19. *Vākyapadīya of Shri Bhartṛhari (Brahmakāṇḍam)*, with the commentary Prakasha by Pt. Nārāyaṇa Datta Tripathi, editor: Pt. Rameśa Chandra Pandeya, second edition, Vārāṇasī: Sudhi Prakashan 1984 (Sudhi Series-6), [to be completed in three volumes, first edition in no. 5 above].
20. *Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya* with Gujarati translation and notes by Jayadev Mohanlal Shukla, Ahmedabad 1984 (Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 98).
21. *Vākyapadīyam (Brahmakāṇḍam) of Bhartṛ Hari* with 'Pratibhā' Sanskrit - Hindi commentaries by Vamdev Acharya, edited by Satyanarayan Shastri Khanduri, Varanasi: Krishnadas Academy 1987 (Krishnadas Sanskrit Series 97).
22. *Vākyapadīya of Śrī Bhartṛhari*, along with his own Vṛtti (First: Brahmakāṇḍa), edited with Hindi Commentary by Dr. Shiv Shankar Avasthi Shastri, Varanasi: Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan 1990 (Vidyabhawan Sanskrit Granthamala 168).
23. *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya II: Text der Palmblatt-Handschrift Trivandrum S.N. 532 (=A)*, von Wilhelm Rau, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1991 (Akademie der Wissenschaft und der Literatur, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jahrgang 7, 1991).
24. *The Vākyapadīyam of Bhartṛhari, Brahmakāṇḍa*, text and English translation, by Korada Subrahmaniam, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications 1992 (Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series 146).

25. INDEX: *Word Index to the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari* (together with the complete text of the *Vākyapadīya*), by Saroja Bhate and Yashodhara Kar, Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers 1992 [follows roughly RAU 1977, but in *devanāgarī* script].
- 26a. *Vākyapadīya Brahmakāṇḍa*, Sampādakaḥ: Bīṣṇupada Bhaṭṭacharya, Calcutta: West Bengal State Book Board, Part 1: 1985 [Kā. 1-98, text with Bengali translation].
- 26b. *Vākyapadīya Brahmakāṇḍa*, Sampādakaḥ: Bīṣṇupada Bhaṭṭacharya, Calcutta: West Bengal State Book Board, Part 2, 1991 [Kā. 99-155, text with Bengali translation].
27. “KWIC index to the *Vākyapadīya*, kāṇḍa 1,” *Samhāṣā* 22, Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism, Nagoya: Nagoya University 2002 [this is a “Key Word In Context” index to Iyer’s edition (above 9b)] of the first kāṇḍa and the Vṛtti, by Toshiya Unebe].
28. *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya, Versuch einer vollständigen deutschen Übersetzung nach der kritischen Edition der Mūla-Kārikās*, von Wilhelm Rau, herausgegeben von Oskar von Hinüber, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 2002 (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur 8) [the text is also given, following 16a, but without the critical apparatus].
29. E-text of *Vākyapadīya* 1 – 3.7 (input by Somadeva Vasudeva 2002): <http://homepage.mac.com/somadevah/Etexts.html>
30. Complete *Vākyapadīya* e-text 2004 (input by Yves Ramseier, J. Sudhakar and Jan Houben): <http://hin.osaka-gaidai.ac.jp/~ramseier>. A “.pdf” and a “.rtf” versions are there, for other versions, please contact me, as well as for Helārāja’s *prakīrṇa-prakāśa* on 3.1 *jāti* and 3.2 *dravya*, you may ask Jan Houben for 3.3 *sambandha*.

Editions of the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā

1. Partly edited by Brahmadata Jijñāsu, *Suprabhātam* saṃvat 1991 [= 1933], covers only the first Āhnika up to p.11, 1.19 in the ‘critical edition’, edited by Johannes Bronkhorst.
2. Partly edited by V. Svaminathan under the title *Mahābhāṣya Tīkā* (Āhnikas 1-4), Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1965 (Hindu Vishvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series, Vol. 11).
3. Edited by K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1970 (Post-Graduate and Research Department Series 8).

4. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari*, [manuscript reproduced], Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1980.
5. 'Critical edition', with English translation, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

Āhnika I (fascicule IV), critically edited by Johannes Bronkhorst, Post-Graduate and Research Department Series 28, 1987.

Āhnika II (fascicule V), critically edited by G.B. Palsule, Post-Graduate and Research Department Series 31, 1988.

Āhnika III (fascicule I), critically edited by G.B. Palsule, Post-Graduate and Research Department Series 22, 1985.

Āhnika IV (fascicule VI), critically edited by G.V. Devasthali and G.B. Palsule, Post-Graduate and Research Department Series 32, 1989.

Āhnika V (fascicule II), critically edited by V.P. Limaye, G.B. Palsule and V. B. Bhagavat, Post-Graduate and Research Department Series 23, 1985.

Āhnika VI, Part I (fascicule III), critically edited by V.B. Bhagavat and Saroja Bhate, Post-Graduate and Research Department Series 25, 1986.

Āhnika VI, Part II (fascicule VII), critically edited by V.B. Bhagavat and Saroja Bhate, Post-Graduate and Research Department Series 34, 1990.

Āhnika VII (fascicule VIII), critically edited by G.B. Palsule and V.B. Bhagavat, Post-Graduate and Research Department Series 37, 1991.

Studies, translations and reviews

AKAMATSU, Akihiko

- 1986 "The evolution of linguistic theory in classical India," *Jinbun Gakuho* 60: 203-227 (Kyōto University) [in Japanese].
- 1993 "Pratibhā and the meaning of the sentence in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadiya," *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* 47.1: 37-43, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari, Pune, January 6-8, 1992. Indian reprint, *Bhartṛhari: Philosopher and Grammarian*, edited by Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1994.
- 1994 "Bhartṛhari on *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa*: what is the aim of the study of grammar?," *Tetsugaku Nempō* 53: 1-24 (Annual of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature, Kyūshū University, Fukuoka) [in Japanese].

- 1996a "Is the Word Permanent or Produced? – On MBhD I.16.26-18.5 (1)," in *Essays in Honor of Dr. Shinjo Suguro on his Seventieth Birthday* (Suguro Shinjō Hakushi Koki-Kinen-Ronbunshū), pp. 157-167 [in Japanese].
- 1996b "Is the Word Permanent or Produced? – On MBhD I.16.26-18.5 (2)," *Tetsugaku Nempō* 55: 1-31 (Annual of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature, Kyūshū University, Fukuoka) [in Japanese].
- 1998a *The Philosophy of Language in Classical India*, Vol. 1, translation and annotation of the first Kāṇḍa of the Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya with the Vṛtti (*Koten Indo no Gengo-Tetsugaku* 1), July 1998, Tōkyō: Heibon-sha (Tōyō-Bunko 637) [in Japanese].
- 1998b *The Philosophy of Language in Classical India*, Vol. 2, translation and annotation of the second Kāṇḍa and of the Kriyāsamuddēśa of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya (*Koten Indo no Gengo-Tetsugaku* 2), August 1998, Tōkyō: Heibon-sha (Toyo-Bunko 638) [in Japanese].
- 1999a "The two kinds of *anumāna* in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 27.1/2: 17-22 (Dordrecht)
- 1999b "On the definition of *anumāna* in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya," *Studies in the History of Indian Thought (Indo shisōshi kenkyū)* 11: 5-14 (Kyōto) [in Japanese].
- 2000 "Abhyudaya and *niḥśreyasa* in Bhartṛhari," in *Japanese Studies on South Asia 3 (The Way to Liberation, Indological Studies in Japan)*, edited by S. Mayeda, Y. Matsunami, M. Tokunaga and H. Marui).

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- 1969 "Two textual studies of Bhartṛhari," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 89: 547-563 (New Haven).
- 1970a *The philosophy of Bhartṛhari's Trikaṇḍī*, doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge Mass [unpublished].
- 1970b "Candrānanda's date," *Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda* 19: 340-41.
- 1971a "Nakamura on Bhartṛhari," *Indo-Iranian Journal* 13: 161-175 (The Hague).
- 1971b "Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā or Tripādī?," *Adyar Library Bulletin* 35: 159-171 (Madras).
- 1971c "The number of kārikās in Trikaṇḍī, book I," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 91: 510-513 (New Haven).

- 1972 "The authorship of the Vākyapadīya-vṛtti," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 16: 181-198 (Wien).
- 1974 "The authorship of the Vākya-kāṇḍa-ṭikā," in *Charudeva Shastri Felicitation Volume*, Delhi, pp.165-188.
- 1976 Review of RAU 1971, *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* (Berlin) 71, Jahrgang 3: 285-292.
- 1978a "The concluding verses of Bhartṛhari's Vākya-kāṇḍa," *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* LVIII/LIX : 9-26 [Diamond Jubilee Volume] (Poona).
- 1978b "The number of kārikā-s in Trikāṇḍī book II," *Adyar Library Bulletin* 42: 142-163 (Madras).
- 1979 "Emendation of some verses in Bhartṛhari's Trikāṇḍī," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 23: 63-74 (Wien).
- 1980/81 "Interpreting Vākyapadīya 2.486 historically (part 1)," *Adyar Library Bulletin* 44/45: 581-601 (Madras) [Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja Felicitation Volume].
- 1982 "Interpreting Vākyapadīya 2.486 historically (part 2)," in *Indological and Buddhist Studies* (Volume in Honour of Professor J.W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday), edited by L.A. Hercus et al. Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, pp. 1-10.
- 1983 Foreword to the edition of the Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa II, by K.A. Subramania Iyer (see edition no. 18 above).
- 1987 "Rāja-taraṅgiṇī 1.176," in *Ancient Indian History, Philosophy and Culture, Essays in Memory of Professor Radhagovinda Basak Vidyāvācaspati*, edited by Pratap Bandyopadhyaya and Manabendu Banerjee, Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, pp. 224-245 [relevant for VP 2.486].
- 1989a "Saṃbandha and abhisambandha," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 17: 299-309 (Dordrecht).
- 1989b "The number of pramāṇas according to Bhartṛhari," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 33: 151-158 (Wien).
- 1989c "Prāmāṇya in the philosophy of the grammarians," in *Studies in Indology* (Professor Rasik Vihari Joshi Felicitation Volume), edited by Avanindra Kumar et al., New Delhi: Shree Publishing House, pp. 15-28.
- 1990a Introduction and summary of the first two books of the Vākyapadīya, in COWARD and RAJA, 1990: 121-153.

- 1990b Summary of the third book of the Vākyapadīya, in COWARD and RAJA, 1990: 153-174 (In collaboration with Karl H. POTTER).
- 1991a "Bharṭṛhari's concept of the Veda," in *Pāṇini and the Veda*, edited by Madhav M. Deshpande (panels of the seventh World Sanskrit Conference, Vol. V), Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 1-18.
- 1991b "Interpreting Vākyapadīya 2.486 historically (part 3)," *S.D. Joshi Felicitation Volume*, edited by M. Deshpande and S. Bhate, Ann Arbor, pp. 1-47.
- 1991c "Syntactic gleanings from Bharṭṛhari's Trikāṇḍī," in *Studies in Sanskrit Syntax* – a volume in honor of the centennial of Speijer's Sanskrit Syntax (1886-1986), edited by Hans Henrich Hock, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 1-11.
- 1993a "An introduction to the study of Bharṭṛhari," *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* 47.1:7-36, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bharṭṛhari, Pune, January 6-8 1992. Indian reprint, *Bharṭṛhari: Philosopher and Grammarian*, edited by Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1994.
- 1993b "Once again on the authorship of the Trikāṇḍī-Vṛtti" *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* 47.1:45-47, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bharṭṛhari, Pune, January 6-8 1992. Indian reprint, *Bharṭṛhari: Philosopher and Grammarian*, edited by Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1994.
- 1994 "The Ṭikākāra Mentioned by Skanda-Maheśvara," in *Vācaspatyam* (Pt. Vamanshastri Bhagwat Felicitation Volume), Pune: Vaidika Samshodhana Mandala, pp. 9-25.
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